United States v. Beatrice Foods Co.

224 F. Supp. 353, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6436
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Missouri
DecidedDecember 17, 1963
DocketNo. 21317
StatusPublished

This text of 224 F. Supp. 353 (United States v. Beatrice Foods Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Missouri primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Beatrice Foods Co., 224 F. Supp. 353, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6436 (W.D. Mo. 1963).

Opinion

JOHN W. OLIVER, District Judge.

This prosecution, by way of a twenty-four count information, for alleged violations of Section 608c (14) of Title 7 United States Code, has been submitted on stipulation of the parties to the Court as the trier of the facts. Inasmuch as all facts are stipulated, there obviously can be no dispute about them. Our formal findings will be stated separately hereinafter.

Defendant divides its memorandum brief into four sections. Defendant inquires (I) whether “Milk Marketing Order No. 13 [is] invalid as a matter of law”; (II) whether “Market Order No. 13 [was] violated by the timely filing of reports required by the order, which reports contained false or inaccurate information”; (III) whether “assuming that the making of false reports constitutes a violation of 7 U.S.C.A., Section 608e(14), were the Notice of Producer Addition reports cited in Counts I through XII of the information false ?”; and (IV) whether “assuming that the making of a report containing false or incorrect information is a violation of the marketing order, are any of the 24 counts of the information bad for duplicity?”

[354]*354Lehigh Valley Coop Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 76, 82 S.Ct. 1168, 8 L.Ed. 345 (1962) is the single case cited by the defendant. That case, together with United States v. Rock Royal Coop, 307 U.S. 533, 59 S.Ct. 993, 83 L.Ed. 1446 (1939); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 62 S.Ct. 523, 86 L.Ed. 726 (1942); Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 64 S.Ct. 559, 88 L.Ed. 733 (1944); United States v. Ruzicka, 329 U.S. 287, 67 S.Ct. 207, 91 L.Ed. 290 (1945); Panno v. United States, (9 Cir., 1953) 203 F.2d 504; and Chapman v. United States, (8 Cir., 1943) 139 F.2d 327, long ago laid to rest any real question that might concern the validity of orders such as Order No. 13 involved in this case, or any real question of whether reports containing false or inaccurate information are violations of Order No. 13, within the meaning of Section 608c (14). Our findings of fact have been made in accordance with the principles announced in the cases cited and, as stated above, in accordance with the stipulation of the parties.

Defendant’s basic legal argument is that “the provisions of the order relating to the making of reports * * * removes any implication that the timely submission of reports containing erroneous information is a violation of the order, and the statute under which defendant is charged”; that “the order [as distinguished from the statute] provides only for a civil liability in such cases and that liability has been satisfied”; that “the term ‘fraudulently’ used in this information is mere surplusage”;1 and that if this defendant did in fact fraudulently submit false reports, it should have been charged under Title 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001.

We quite agree that the use of the word “fraudulently” in the information was surplusage; but we do not agree that recognition of that proposition requires a determination either that this defendant be acquitted; or, that it is subject only to prosecution under Section 1001; or, that its only liability is civil. The question of whether the Government wanted to prosecute also under other statutes is not the choice of this Court. We deal only with the prosecution before us.

Section 608c (14) of Title 7 U.S.Code, in its applicable portion provides that:

“(14) Any handler subject to an order issued under this section, or any officer, director, agent, or employee of such handler, who violates any provision of such order (other than a provision calling for payment of a pro rata share of expenses) shall, on conviction, be fined not less than $50 or more than $500 for each such violation, and each day during which such violation continues shall be deemed a separate violation: * *

Our jurisdiction over prosecutions instituted to enforce that section is vested by Section 1355 of Title 28 U.S.Code. The latter section provides that:

“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress.”

The general thrust of defendant’s argument seems to be that Section 608c (14) can not be enforced and that a fine under that section may not be imposed unless the Congress had included a specific criminal intent as an element of the offense.

We pointed out recently in footnote 2 of our memorandum in United States v. Jaben, 224 F.Supp. 603, 1963, that “the inclusion or the exclusion of * * * words of purchase * * * such words as ‘intentional,’ ‘wilful,’ ‘knowing[355]*355ly/ ‘fraudulent/ or ‘malicious’ * * * is not the single criteria of judgment as to whether specific intention is or is not an essential element of a federal crime.”

It is clear that the Congress in its enactment of Section 608c (14) did not specifically require any finding of guilty intent as an element of the offense. Nothing in the Constitution or elsewhere requires that the Congress must include intent in its definition of certain particular offenses, including offenses that fall in the category here involved, against the United States. In regard to Section 608c(14) we do not think that it can be said that Congress intended that any proof be required in a prosecution instituted under that section beyond proof of the elements set forth in the specific language of that statute.

Section 608c (14) neither states any requirement of specific intent, nor does it incorporate any concept of a long established common law crime that could be said to require proof of any specific intent. The type of offense defined in Section 608e(14) is to be distinguished from the type of offense involved in Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). The type of offense here involved is in the category that depends on no mental element but rests entirely upon the “forbidden acts or omissions”, to borrow the words of Morissette (page 253 of 342 U.S., page 244 of 72 S.Ct., 96 L.Ed. 288).

In regard to the Section 608c (14) offenses, which have no common law origin, Morissette noted that “a century-old but accelerating tendency, discernible both here and in England [has called], into existence new duties and crimes which disregard any ingredient of intent”. It further noted that the complexities of modern life “have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regulations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries, trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare”. Section 608c (14) falls into such a category.

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Related

United States v. Rock Royal Co-Operative, Inc.
307 U.S. 533 (Supreme Court, 1939)
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co.
315 U.S. 110 (Supreme Court, 1942)
Stark v. Wickard
321 U.S. 288 (Supreme Court, 1944)
United States v. Ruzicka
329 U.S. 287 (Supreme Court, 1946)
Morissette v. United States
342 U.S. 246 (Supreme Court, 1952)
Chapman v. United States
139 F.2d 327 (Eighth Circuit, 1943)
United States v. Jaben
224 F. Supp. 603 (W.D. Missouri, 1963)

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Bluebook (online)
224 F. Supp. 353, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6436, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-beatrice-foods-co-mowd-1963.