United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc.

197 F. Supp. 2d 788, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4160, 2002 WL 537630
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Michigan
DecidedMarch 13, 2002
Docket98-CV-73252
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 197 F. Supp. 2d 788 (United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Michigan primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Bay-Houston Towing Co., Inc., 197 F. Supp. 2d 788, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4160, 2002 WL 537630 (E.D. Mich. 2002).

Opinion

DECISION ON CIVIL PENALTIES

COHN, District Judge.

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I. Introduction

A. Nature of the Case

This is the civil penalty phase of an environmental action brought by the United States at the request of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to § 309 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1251, et seq. EPA seeks in-junctive relief and civil penalties relating to defendant Bay-Houston Towing Company, Inc.’s Michigan Peat Division’s (Michigan Peat) 1 peat mining 2 activities on 950 acres of land in Minden Township, Sanilac County, Michigan on a parcel known as Minden North, which is part of a 20,000 acre wetland known as the Minden Bog. EPA claims that Michigan Peat has discharged peat bog drainage water containing pollutants 3 through ditch outfalls into *791 the Black River Drain without a permit under § 402 of the CWA (Count I); discharged dredged or fill material into wetlands without a permit under § 404 of the CWA (Count II); and violated an administrative compliance order issued by EPA under § 309 of the CWA, requiring, among other things, that Michigan Peat cease un-permitted discharges and submit a wetlands restoration plan (Count III). EPA seeks to impose a three million dollar civil penalty against Michigan Peat.

For the reasons which follow, which constitute the findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 52, no civil penalty -will be assessed.

B. The Claims of the Parties

1.

a.

The Joint Final Pretrial Order filed March 5, 2001, generally describes the claims of the parties as follows:

EPA:

1. From 1977 to the present, in its peat mining [Michigan Peat] has discharged pollutants into waters of the United States in violation of § 301 and § 404 by
a. placing field windrows (or piles) of peat at Minden Bog without a permit;
b. placing peat and other materials, dredged and removed from drainage ditches on Minden Bog without a permit; and
c. placing fill materials on Minden Bog, for the purpose of constructing and/or maintaining roads for moving mining equipment without a permit.
2. Michigan Peat has discharged pollutants into the waters of the United States in violation of § 301 and § 402 by
a. discharging effluent waste water without an individual National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit prior to July 1998.
3.Michigan Peat has violated § 309 by failing to observe the requirements of a February 1998 administrative compliance order that it “immediately cease further discharges” of dredged and fill material, except in compliance with a permit issued under § 404.
As to remedy:
EPA is entitled to injunctive relief and a civil penalty for Michigan Peat’s violations of the CWA. By way of injunctive relief, EPA is entitled to an order requiring Michigan Peat to implement and observe a restoration plan intended (except as otherwise agreed upon by EPA to reestablish peatland conditions at Minden North), in such a way that natural succession will eventually reproduce the objective ombrotrophic bog that previously existed in the mined area of Min-den Bog. As for a penalty the CWA authorizes a maximum penalty of $25,000 per day per violation. For violations which take place after January 30, 1997, the maximum civil penalty under § 309(d) is $27,500 per day. The factors the Court should take into account in assessing a penalty are set forth in § 1319(b). The factors the Court should take into account in approving an appropriate restoration plan are whether: (1) the plan will confer maximum environmental benefits; (2) the proposed plan is achievable as a practical matter; and (3) he proposed plan bears an equitable re *792 lationship to the degree and kind of wrong it is intended to remedy.
b.
Michigan Peat:
1. Its peat extraction operations were initially covered by nationwide permit 26 as adjacent to headwaters. As to its drainage ditch and temporary haul roads, they were installed prior to any permit required under § 404 or were covered by nationwide permit 26. In any event, the construction and maintenance of the existing temporary haul roads was and is exempt from a § 404 permit requirement. The maintenance of existing ditches is also exempt.
2. Its storm water management drains do not require an individual § 402 permit and its peat operations do not result in the generation of any process wastewater or the addition of a pollutant to any navigable water of the United States. It received timely coverage of its storm water discharge under § 402 in 1994. At the request of the State of Michigan, the issuing agency for § 402 permits, it also applied for an individual point source § 402 permit early in 1995. Although the permit process was intentionally frozen by the issuing agency in 1997 for no environmental reason, it ultimately received a permit in July of 1998 — shortly after the filing of the complaint.
3. It complied in 1998 with the part of the compliance order requiring it to cease operations and only resumed operations in 1999 after the receipt of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Michigan Peat v. U.S. E.P.A., 175 F.3d 422 (6th Cir.1999).
4. Since 1990, it has made a good faith effort to obtain permits identified by the government agencies as necessary for its peat mining operation. Even if its maintenance of ditches and roads or the processing of peat in windrows constitute technical violations of § 404, no penalty is warranted or appropriate. Any material in windrows or removed from ditches has been removed from the property.
5. In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 531 U.S. 159, 121 S.Ct. 675, 148 L.Ed.2d 576 (2001) (SWANCC), the Minden North site is not subject to the jurisdiction of § 404.
2.
a.
More particularly, EPA asserts:

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Related

Michigan Farm Bureau v. Department of Environmental Quality
807 N.W.2d 866 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 2011)
Bay-Houston Towing Co. v. United States
58 Fed. Cl. 462 (Federal Claims, 2003)

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Bluebook (online)
197 F. Supp. 2d 788, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4160, 2002 WL 537630, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-bay-houston-towing-co-inc-mied-2002.