OPINION OF THE COURT
GARTH, Circuit Judge.
This appeal is from a conviction that arose out of events transpiring in the context of contract negotiations between officials of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and CTA, Limited (“CTA”), a California corporation that specialized in recovering overpaid Social Security taxes (“FICA”) for [1485]*1485businesses and their employees.1 Appellant Robert B. Asher (“Asher”), former Chairman of the State Republican Committee, R. Budd Dwyer (“Dwyer”), former Treasurer of the Commonwealth, and William T. Smith, Jr. (“Smith”), an attorney in private practice and the former Republican Party Chairman of Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, were involved in a scheme to accept bribes from John R. Torquato, Jr. (“Torquato”), a CTA official, in exchange for awarding a FICA recovery contract to CTA.
As a result of the scheme, Asher was convicted by a jury of one count of conspiracy to violate the federal mail fraud and interstate transportation in aid of racketeering (“ITAR”) statutes, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982); on five counts of mail fraud, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982); on three ITAR counts, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1982); and on one perjury count, in contravention of 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1982). He was sentenced to concurrent one year and one day prison terms on each count and was ordered to pay fines and special assessments amounting to $205,050.
On appeal, Asher argues that his mail fraud, conspiracy and perjury convictions must be overturned in light of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McNally v. United States, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987).2 He also claims that the district court’s instructions to the jury constituted an impermissible amendment of the government’s indictment. Asher’s final claim is that the district court abused its discretion in allowing a prosecution witness, Smith, whose credibility had not been attacked by Asher, to read into evidence a written statement that Smith made in 1984 for purposes of negotiating immunity.
We are not persuaded by either of the first two of Asher’s arguments and thus will not vacate his conviction on these grounds. Moreover, while we find merit in Asher’s final argument, we are satisfied that the district court’s ruling to admit Smith’s prior consistent statement amounts to harmless error when viewed in conjunction with the remaining evidence adduced by the government. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court’s order of March 20, 1987, which denied Asher’s motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative, for a new trial.
I.
Robert B. Asher was elected Chairman of the Republican Party of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in 1983. Soon thereafter, he received a telephone call from William T. Smith, who was calling on behalf of his client John Torquato. Smith was seeking Asher’s assistance in arranging a meeting between Torquato and Robin Ross, a representative of Richard Thorn-burgh, who at the time was Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. When Asher learned that Ross was not available, he set up a meeting between Torquato and John Pierce, who also worked for the Governor.
On the day of the meeting with Pierce, Smith and Torquato first stopped at Ash-er’s office in Harrisburg. They explained to Asher that FICA recovery provided an easy — and, to the Governor, a beneficial— way for Pennsylvania to recover a significant amount of money for itself and its state employees.3 Smith and Torquato ex[1486]*1486pressed to Asher their hope that the Governor’s office would award CTA the contract to perform such recovery. At Asher’s trial, Torquato testified that, during this meeting with Asher, Smith had specifically mentioned that CTA would make a $300,-000 campaign contribution, to be divided equally among the Treasurer, the Treasurer’s re-election campaign, and the Republican State Committee, if CTA was awarded the contract.
The Governor’s office failed to award the FICA recovery contract for state employees to CTA. Thereafter, in a sequence of events that is not directly related to this appeal, the Pennsylvania state legislature enacted legislation that removed authority to award FICA recovery contracts from the Governor and granted that authority to the state Treasurer, who, at the relevant time, was Dwyer. That legislation was subsequently signed into law by Governor Thorn-burgh.4
Smith and Torquato next met with Asher to discuss FICA recovery in March 1984. At that time, CTA was pursuing a FICA recovery contract for teachers and other school district employees. Smith and Tor-quato explained to Asher that, due to the new legislation, any state checks representing FICA refunds would be signed by Dwyer. They also explained the obvious political benefits to the Republican party.
Torquato testified that, at this March 1984 meeting, he and Smith informed Ash-er that Smith and Dwyer had previously agreed that CTA, in order to secure the FICA recovery contract, would make “campaign contributions” of $300,000. Smith, on the other hand, testified that Asher had learned before this meeting of Smith’s offer to Dwyer, and that Asher was the one who brought it up at the meeting.
After this meeting, Smith called Asher on numerous occasions, seeking his aid in getting Dwyer to meet with CTA to negotiate a contract. Ultimately, CTA was officially awarded the FICA recovery contract for approximately $5,000,000 on May 10, 1984, despite a significantly lower bid from Arthur Young, Inc. (a nationally recognized accounting firm) to perform the same services. Throughout this period, Torquato was sending Asher carbon copies or blind copies of Torquato’s CTA-related correspondence.
In July 1984, the FBI began to investigate CTA and the circumstances under which the FICA recovery contract was awarded.5 Thereafter, Torquato decided to cooperate with the government and pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy. Smith, who had been indicted in the meantime, attempted to negotiate immunity from prosecution in exchange for his cooperation. The government refused to grant Smith immunity. Smith proceeded to trial. In his testimony, he denied offering campaign contributions to Dwyer or to Asher. Asher and Dwyer testified for the defense [1487]*1487at Smith’s trial.6 Smith ultimately was convicted and sentenced to twelve years in prison. Thereafter, the government threatened to indict Smith’s wife and law partner, Judy Smith. At that point, Smith agreed to cooperate with the government in exchange for its promise not to prosecute his wife and in the hope of reducing his own sentence.7
Asher and Dwyer were indicted on May 13, 1986. They were tried together in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. On December 18, 1986, the jury returned guilty verdicts against each defendant on the conspiracy, mail fraud, ITAR, and perjury counts. On January 27, 1987, as previously noted, the district court sentenced Asher8 to concurrent prison sentences of one year and one day on each count, and imposed fines total-ling $205,000 plus a mandatory special assessment of $50. App. at 1562-63. The district court subsequently granted Asher’s motion for release on bail pending appeal, United States v. Asher, Crim. No. 86-00088-02 (M.D. Pa. February 6, 1987), but denied Asher’s motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c) or, in the alternative, for a new trial pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 33.
II.
Asher’s first, and most troubling, claim on appeal is that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McNally v. United States, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987), which was filed after Asher had been convicted, requires that we vacate his convictions on all counts. Although McNally dealt solely with the proper scope of the mail fraud statute,9 and thus would directly affect only the mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud counts of Asher’s conviction, Asher claims that his ITAR and perjury convictions were preju-dicially tainted by his wrongful mail fraud and conspiracy convictions.
In reviewing the district court’s order, we are bound by McNally, despite the fact that it was decided after Asher’s trial had been completed and was therefore unavailable to the district court. See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156, 64 S.Ct. 921, 927, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944); Hayman Cash Register Co. v. Sarokin, 669 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir.1982); Zichy v. City of Philadelphia, 590 F.2d 503, 508 (3d Cir.1979). See also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed. 2d 649 (1987) (“[A] new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the past.”).
As this court has recently stated, “if ... jury instructions [in a pre-McNally case] allowed conviction for conduct outside the proscription of the mail fraud statute, such instructions would constitute both plain error and a defect affecting [the defendant’s] due process rights.” United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2014, 100 L.Ed.2d 602 (1988). However, “when determining the effect of a single challenged instruction on the validity of a conviction, the reviewing court must view the challenged instruction in the context of the [1488]*1488overall charge rather than in ‘artificial isolation.’ ” Id. (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973) (citing Boyd v. United States, 271 U.S. 104, 107, 46 S.Ct. 442, 443, 70 L.Ed. 857 (1926))); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674, 95 S.Ct. 1903, 1912, 44 L.Ed.2d 489 (1975). The Supreme Court has pointed out:
a judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence, and instruction of the jury by the judge. Thus not only is the challenged instruction but one of many such instructions, but the process of instruction itself is but one of several components of the trial which may result in the judgment of conviction.
Cupp, 414 U.S. at 147, 94 S.Ct. at 400 (quoted in Piccolo, 835 F.2d at 519). With these principles in mind, we turn to an analysis of Asher’s appeal in light of McNally and its progeny.
A. The Pre-McNally Decisions and McNally
In McNally, the Supreme Court assessed for the first time whether the statutory language and legislative history of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, see note 9 supra, would support a long line of court of appeals decisions that had interpreted the statute as proscribing schemes by government officials to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government.10 These decisions, including this court’s contribution in United States v. Clapps, 732 F.2d 1148, 1152 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1085, 105 S.Ct. 589, 83 L.Ed.2d 699 (1984), had held that because a public official owes a duty of honesty and integrity to his constituency, any misuse of his office for personal gain is a fraud. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2879-80. See generally Comment, The Intangible-Rights Doctrine and Political-Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U.Chic.L.Rev. 562, 563 (1980). These cases found a violation of the mail fraud statute where public officials had failed to perform their duties honestly, despite the fact that the acts by public officials were not “aimed at causing deprivations of money or property.” McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2880.11 Moreover, even a private individual who had no formal official duty to the public could be held to the honest and faithful standard required of an official, if others depended on him “ ‘because of a special relationship in the government’ and he in fact makes governmental decisions.” McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2879 (quoting United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1296 (6th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 122 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. [1489]*1489913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983) (political party leader)).
McNally involved a scheme by James Gray, a former member of the Governor of Kentucky’s cabinet, Charles McNally, a private citizen, and Howard Hunt, former Chairman of Kentucky’s Democratic Committee, whereby Gray, McNally and Hunt agreed to purchase a workmen’s compensation policy for the Commonwealth of Kentucky from Wombwell Insurance Company in return for a promise from Wombwell that it would pay a portion of its commissions to other insurance agencies owned and controlled by McNally, Hunt and Gray. Upon discovery of this self-dealing scheme —which funnelled some $850,000 to agencies designated by Hunt — Gray and McNally were prosecuted on the theory that the scheme defrauded the citizens of Kentucky of their intangible right to honest government.12 The jury instructions at issue in McNally referred to intangible, non-property losses by Kentucky as the basis for a mail fraud conviction. Gray and McNally were convicted of mail fraud and their convictions affirmed on appeal. United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir.1986).
After reviewing the statutory history of the mail fraud statute and after analyzing congressional intent, the Supreme Court in McNally overturned the line of cases based on the intangible rights theory, holding that the “mail fraud statute clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to the intangible right of the citizen to good government.” McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2879. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the mail fraud statute’s elements “to defraud” and “for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representation or promises” are presented in the disjunctive and thus could be construed independently, it relied on its holding in Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 512, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924) to conclude that the term “to defraud” “commonly refer[s] to wronging one in his property— ” McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2880-81.
The Supreme Court also relied on the oft-invoked rule of construction which requires that when “two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other,” are possible, the least harsh of the two must be chosen unless Congress has clearly spoken to the contrary. Id. 2881 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347, 92 S.Ct. 515, 522, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971)). The Supreme Court thus concluded that “Congress’ intent in passing the mail fraud statute was to prevent the use of the mails in furtherance of such [money- or property-depriving] schemes.” Id.
B. The Post-McNally Decisions
Some five months after deciding McNally, the Supreme Court filed its first opinion which clarified McNally. In Carpenter v. United States, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 316, 98 L.Ed.2d 275 (1987), R. Foster Winans, one of the authors of the Wall Street Journal’s (“Journal”) daily “Heard on the Street” column,13 made the information, to [1490]*1490be contained in the column, available to a securities broker prior to the column’s publication. Because the column’s discussion of various stocks often had either a positive or adverse impact on the prices of those stocks, the selective release of confidential information prior to its publication allowed Winans and his co-conspirators to trade on the basis of the “probable impact of the column on the market.” Id.
Winans was ultimately convicted for both mail and wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343. The Second Circuit subsequently upheld the conviction on the theory that Winans had fraudulently misappropriated “intangible property” from the Journal within the purview of the mail and wire fraud statutes. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Winans argued, among other things, that his convictions for mail and wire fraud were invalid under McNally, because the Journal had not been deprived of “money or property.” Id. 108 S.Ct. at 320.
The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision. It held that “McNally did not limit the scope of § 1341 to tangible as distinguished from intangible property rights.” Id. The Supreme Court sustained Winans’ conviction on the ground that the confidential information secretly parlayed into profits by Winans, constituted that form of “intangible property” in which the Journal had a proprietary interest and which constituted “property” within the meaning of the mail fraud statute. Id. While the Carpenter Court broadly interpreted the meaning of “property interests” by making it clear that a mail fraud conviction could be sustained even in the absence of a purely monetary or tangible property loss, the Supreme Court noted that the Journal had been “defrauded of much more than its contractual right to [Winans’] honest and faithful service, an interest too ethereal in itself to fall within the protection of the mail fraud statute, which ‘had its origin in the desire to protect individual property rights.’ ” Id. (quoting McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2881 n. 8).
In the wake of the Court’s decisions in McNally and Carpenter, a significant number of pre-McNally criminal convictions have been challenged on the ground that they were based on the now outlawed intangible rights doctrine. In response to these challenges, the courts of appeals have sought to analyze and apply McNally and Carpenter within an appropriate framework. Those cases in which a conviction was based entirely on the intangible rights theory of mail fraud, and in which the instructions to the jury could not assure that money or property interests were implicated, have been overturned on McNally’s authority. See, e.g., United States v. Conover, 845 F.2d 266 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515 (1st Cir.1988); United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir.1988); United States v. Matt, 838 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir.1988); United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Gordon, 836 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir.1988); United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.1988); United States v. Cooke, 833 F.2d 109 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Gimbel, 830 F.2d 621 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Herron, 825 F.2d 50 (5th Cir.1987).
However, in those cases in which courts have concluded that monetary or property losses have resulted from fraudulent schemes, convictions have been upheld on the basis of those losses, despite the fact that the government may have relied, at least in part, on the intangible rights theory as a basis for the convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Perholtz, 836 F.2d 554 (D.C.Cir.1988); United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517; United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.1987); United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 697, 98 L.Ed.2d 649 (1988). This court’s recent decision in United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517 provides an excellent example of a post-McNally analysis.
[1491]*1491In Piccolo, the defendant, Anthony Piccolo, participated in a commercial kickback scheme in which he caused his company to issue false invoices as part of a money laundering operation. For his efforts in facilitating the laundering of monies, Piccolo kept part of the money paid to his company.
The district court’s jury instructions implicated both property losses allegedly suffered by Piccolo’s employer and intangible losses arising from Piccolo’s dishonesty. The property rights component of the instruction included references to Piccolo’s receipt of a bribe and to money lost by a second company (not his employer) as a result of the fraudulent scheme. The district court’s instructions stated that in order to return a conviction, the jury must find “that the defendant devised a scheme or artifice to defraud [his employer] United Engineers of its right to the honest, faithful and loyal services of its employee ... and further, to defraud both United Engineers and Delmarva Power and Light Company of money.” 835 F.2d at 520.14
On appeal, Piccolo argued, as does Asher in the instant case, that his mail fraud conviction should be overturned because the district court’s instructions permitted the jury to convict him for conduct outside the post-McNally parameters of the mail fraud statute. Piccolo claimed that the jury was permitted to convict him of mail fraud if it found that he had participated in a scheme to defraud his employer of its right to his honest and faithful services, even if the object of wrongfully obtaining money or property was not part of the scheme.
In analyzing the district court's instructions, we stated that “a plain reading of [the instructions] fairly compels the conclusion that Piccolo could be convicted of mail fraud only if the jury found that he participated in a scheme to defraud United Engineers ... of money.” Id. at 520. We continued by stating that “[e]ven if we assume that the [intangible rights instruction] was a misstatement of the law in the present context, we find that the jury could not, given the totality of the instructions, have convicted Piccolo unless it found that an object of the scheme in which he participated was to obtain money from Delmarva Power.” Id. Accordingly, we found no reversible error in the jury instructions. But see id. at 521 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
A similar outcome was reached by the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.1987), though on a somewhat different and more creative theory, and one to which we do not necessarily subscribe. In Runnels, Frank Runnels, the President of Local 22 of the United Automobile Workers (“UAW”), took bribes in return for referring workers’ compensation cases to a particular law firm. Runnels was subsequently charged with committing mail fraud by obtaining money through false and fraudulent pretenses and by depriving Local 22 of his fair and honest services. After he had been convicted, Runnels appealed his conviction, arguing that it could not stand in light of McNally.
In affirming Runnels’ conviction, the Sixth Circuit relied on principles of agency law, reasoning that, because Runnels received a bribe in his role as Local 22’s president, that money rightfully belonged to the Local, of which he was an agent. The court stated that:
[t]he existence of ... a bribe or kickback makes it unnecessary to invoke intangible rights doctrine. The fiduciary’s acquisition of an economic benefit which properly belongs to the principal, through an intentional breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the principal, is in itself sufficient to support a finding of guilt under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
[1492]*1492Runnels, 833 F.2d at 1187. The court, relying primarily on the constructive trust argument made in Justice Stevens’ dissent in McNally,15 supported its conclusion on the ground that the financial benefit obtained by fiduciary in the form of a bribe belongs to the entity to whom he has a duty, and by accepting the bribe, the fiduciary has deprived that entity of property or money in which it has an ownership interest. Id. Thus, the court affirmed Runnels’ conviction, concluding that “the economic deprivation to the principal which occurs when the fiduciary knowingly breaches his duty by accepting a bribe, the value of which properly belongs to the principal, is itself sufficient to support a finding of taking of value.” Id.16
In two subsequent cases, the Fifth Circuit used an analysis somewhat similar to the analysis used by the Sixth Circuit in Runnels, in affirming post-McNally mail fraud convictions dependent in part on the presence of an intangible right. See U.S. v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.1987); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 697, 98 L.Ed.2d 649 (1988). Unlike the Local union in Runnels however, the employers in both Fagan and Richerson suffered direct monetary losses in addition to being deprived of intangible rights.
Fagan involved a kickback scheme in which Ralph Fagan, the owner of two companies engaged in the leasing of work boats to offshore oil companies, would pay kickbacks to Donald Riley, the drilling manager for an offshore company, in exchange for a promise that Riley’s employer would lease boats from Fagan’s companies. In finding that Riley’s employer had been economically disadvantaged by Fagan’s scheme because it might have received some of the economic benefits being kept by Riley, the Fifth Circuit was able to comply with the requirements of McNally and to affirm Fagan’s conviction, despite the arguably intangible (breach of duty of loyalty) nature of the losses to Riley’s employer. See Fagan, 821 F.2d at 1011 n. 6.
Similarly, in Richerson, an employee (Richerson) of an offshore oil drilling contractor accepted kickbacks from oil rig parts vendors in exchange for steering business to those vendors. The kickbacks were financed by money received from false invoices submitted to Richerson’s employer by the vendors. Thus, Richerson’s employer was deprived of Richerson’s honest services and unknowingly financed the kickbacks. At Richerson’s trial, the jury was instructed, inter alia, that “... the object of a fraudulent scheme need not be the deprivation of a tangible interest. Artifices designed to cause losses of an intangible nature also violate the statute.” Richerson, 833 F.2d at 1156. Despite this jury instruction, which allowed for a conviction without a finding of monetary or property loss by the employer, see id. at 1156-57, [1493]*1493the Fifth Circuit upheld Richerson’s conviction citing to Justice Stevens’ footnote. In doing so, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[t]he McNally majority did not disagree with Justice Stevens’ comments regarding employee’s breaches of loyalty.” Id. at 1157.
The Richerson court’s primary reliance was on the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter. The Fifth Circuit stated that “Richerson’s concealment of material information from his employer is analogous to the Carpenter defendant’s disclosure of his employer’s material information.” Id. Noting that “the overriding and predominant theory of the Government’s case involved [the employer’s] loss of money and property,” the Richerson court minimized the intangible rights language in the challenged jury instruction and affirmed. Id.
Unlike the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of McNally in Richerson and Fagan, each of which relied at least in part on Justice Stevens’ McNally dissent, the Seventh Circuit has upheld a pre-McNally conviction on a somewhat broader theory. It held that a conviction may be affirmed where an evaluation of the indictment, jury instructions, and proof in the case leads to the conclusion that monetary or property losses underlay the fraudulent scheme at issue. United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir.1987).
In Wellman, Glenn Wellman, the chief executive officer of a shipping tank manufacturer, sold a number of refurbished shipping tanks to M-Chem Chemical Company after having assured M-Chem that the tanks met government specifications. After the government discovered that Well-man had made a series of fraudulent misrepresentations about the tanks’ specifications, Wellman was indicted on charges that he had engaged in a scheme to defraud M-Chem of its right to have tanks which complied with government regulations. The indictment specifically charged that Wellman’s scheme had defrauded M-Chem of “its right to have safe and authorized equipment for the storage and shipment of hazardous chemicals and of its right to know that equipment it purchased was in full compliance with D.O.T. regula-tions_” Id. at 1462.
Notwithstanding the intangible character of this part of the indictment, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Wellman’s conviction. The Court emphasized that the district court’s instructions had required the jury to find that Wellman had intended to “deprive another of something of value,” id. at 1463, and that the harm to M-Chem, i.e., the money it paid Wellman for the substandard tanks, “was anything but ‘intangible.’ ” Id. The court further noted that “Wellman’s scheme clearly involved ‘wronging [M-Chem] in [its] property rights by dishonest methods or schemes.’ ” Id. (brackets in original) (quoting McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2881). Thus, the Seventh Circuit looked beyond portions of the language in the indictment and jury instructions that referred to intangible rights, and instead focused on the ultimate monetary losses that were clearly part of Wellman’s fraudulent scheme. Id.
The District of Columbia Circuit was presented with an opportunity to analyze and apply McNally in United States v. Perholtz, 836 F.2d 554 (D.C.Cir.1987) (per curiam) but in a bail pending appeal context rather than on a direct appeal of a mail fraud conviction. In Perholtz, the appellants developed a computerized payroll system and data communications system for use by various federal agencies. They were convicted by a jury of mail fraud committed in furtherance of a kickback scheme whereby they received unearned commissions from subcontractors of one of the systems. On appeal of the district court’s denial of appellants’ motion for release on bail pending appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court on the ground that the McNally issue did not raise a substantial question on appeal. The Court’s analysis — which focused on bottom-line monetary losses in much the same way as did the Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Wellman — was predicated on the theory that the scheme,
ensured that the ‘negotiated’ cost of the subcontracts was higher than the price at which the subcontractors would have [1494]*1494been willing to contract, and ensured that this higher cost was passed through to the [government] in its cost-plus contract with the prime contractor. The defendants’ scheme caused the [government] to pay more than it need have, so it cannot be said that the cost would necessarily have been paid to some company in the sense that this was true in McNally. In fact, a lesser cost could have been paid to the prime contractor if the defendants had negotiated subcontracts that did not include the cost of bogus marketing agreements and other kickbacks.
Id. at 558.
Thus, despite the fact that the indictment and the jury charge included classic intangible rights language, see Perholtz, 836 F.2d at 559, the D.C.Circuit concluded that, when taken together and in their respective totalities, the jury charge and the indictment required that the jury find a tangible property loss by the government in order to convict. Id.
III.
A.
Although the outcomes in the post-McNally cases we have discussed vary depending on the facts, indictments, and jury instructions of the particular case, a common thread running through each of these cases can be discerned. While we recognize that cases may fall on either side of the McNally/Carpenter line, those cases that have sustained mail fraud convictions have done so where the “bottom line” of the scheme or artifice had the inevitable result of effecting monetary or property losses to the employer or to the state. This common thread appears despite references in the indictments, proofs, or instructions to violations of intangible rights.
Essentially, therefore, where rights are involved whose violation would lead to no concrete economic harm, and where those rights are the only rights involved in the case, McNally’s proscriptions would prevent upholding conviction on appeal. Where, on the other hand, a violation of the rights involved would result in depriving another of something of value, and the indictment, the proofs and the instructions are based on that fact, then the presence of intangible rights language will not prove fatal on appeal.
With these precepts in mind, and with the cases which we have discussed as a backdrop, we turn to a consideration of the facts of this case.
B.
Not surprisingly, the government urges us to affirm Asher’s conviction primarily on the authority of Piccolo, Runnels, Richerson, Wellman and Perholtz, each of which recognized a real or potential property loss and affirmed a pre-McNally mail fraud conviction on that basis.17 The government’s supplemental brief emphasizes passages from the indictment18 and the jury instructions, both of which contain references to tangible losses by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.19 For exam-[1495]*1495pie, the indictment charges that the scheme devised by Asher and his co-conspirators was designed to “grant, or cause to be granted, lucrative FICA recovery contracts without competitive bidding, notwithstanding the fact that others were willing to perform substantially identical FICA recovery work at a much lower cost ...” App. at 22.20 The indictment also alleges that one of the objects of the fraudulent scheme was “to defraud the citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the employees entitled to share in a FICA recovery of tangible monetary savings and financial benefits ...” App. at 24.
Like the indictment, the jury instructions in the instant ease disclose a number of references to concrete economic or property losses by the Commonwealth. For example, in defining intent to defraud, the instructions charge that the jury may find such intent if it finds that the defendants sought “to deceive for the purpose of either causing some financial loss to another, or losses of an intangible nature, or bringing about financial gain to one’s self, or for any of these purposes.” App. at 1523. In describing the objects of the conspiracy to defraud in the jury instructions, as set forth in the indictment, the court stated that “[o]ne object involves a statutory right, and one object involves a property right.” App. at 1538. In summarizing its conspiracy instructions, the district court once again referred to tangible property interests, stating that:
... Where the statutory duty of refraining from bribery is concerned, or if you find that one of the objects of the conspiracy was to defraud of the tangible savings coming from an impartially awarded contract, you do not have to consider the public official defendant first, but may consider both defendants and find either one or the other, or both, either guilty or innocent, as the facts indicate.
App. at 1540-41 (emphasis added).
It is true that the jury instructions in the present case, like those in Piccolo, Per-holtz and Wellman, made references to intangible losses incurred by the citizens of the Commonwealth. However, we are unable to hypothesize a set of circumstances under which this jury could have found Asher guilty of depriving the citizens of the Commonwealth of their right to honest government (an impermissible intangible right under McNally) without also having found that Asher was involved in a scheme, the sole purpose of which was to ensure that CTA obtained a no-bid FICA recovery [1496]*1496contract at a substantially greater cost to the Commonwealth than a contract obtained through traditional competitive bidding. Indeed, as we have noted in note 20 supra, the government submitted evidence that Arthur Young, Inc. was willing and able to perform the same services as CTA but at a substantially lower cost to the Commonwealth than CTA’s contract.
Thus, every aspect of the charged crime considered by the jury in this case involved some potential tangible loss to the Commonwealth. Indeed, even without regard to the $300,000 bribe promised by Torquato for the CTA contract, the contract itself deprived the Commonwealth of tangible savings that it would have derived from a less expensive agreement.
This is a substantially different set of circumstances from those presented in McNally. McNally did not involve an allegation of lost savings by Kentucky. Moreover, the focal point of the jury instructions in McNally was honest government rather than tangible losses by the State. See McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2882. Indeed, in McNally, the Supreme Court went to great lengths to point out that no loss whatsoever was suffered by Kentucky. In contrast, Asher’s scheme in this case obviously involved “ ‘wronging [Pennsylvania] in [its] property rights by dishonest methods and schemes.’ ” McNally, — U.S. at -, 107 S.Ct. at 2881 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188, 44 S.Ct. 511, 512, 68 L.Ed. 968 (1924)).
As was true of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Wellman, 830 F.2d at 1463, we are satisfied that the government in the instant case could not have proved a violation of intangible rights without simultaneously proving that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was deprived of money as the result of the no-bid contract awarded to CTA. Nor does this case present a Runnels situation where tangible losses could only be found by use of a legal (constructive trust) fiction (i.e., the monies paid to Runnels were never intended to be paid to his union). Here, the scheme was clearly aimed at awarding a contract, which would have had the effect of requiring Pennsylvania to bear the burden of an enhanced cost for a service that was available at a substantially lower price.
Thus, the jury in this case could not have found a fraudulent scheme that consisted solely of depriving the citizens of their right to honest government that did not also involve tangible losses by Pennsylvania—losses which were inherent in the scheme for which Asher was convicted. See, e.g., Perholtz, 836 F.2d at 559, discussed supra at 1494.
Because we reject Asher’s attack on his mail fraud conviction on McNally grounds, there is of course no need to address his ancillary attacks on the conspiracy, perjury and ITAR convictions.
IV.
Asher also argues that the district court’s instruction to the jury that Asher could be found guilty in his capacity as a “party official,” improperly amended the indictment which charged him in his capacity as a “public official.” App. at 20-22. Asher claims that this instruction constituted reversible error per se because it imper-missibly broadened the indictment.
Asher begins his argument by alluding to the language in the indictment that referred to Asher as a “public official,” who was being “influenced in carrying out official acts.” Appellant’s Brief at 27. Asher points to various general references in the indictment to the defendants as “public officials.” He refers particularly to the perjury count (Count 13), which characterizes Asher as a public official. Count 13 recites:
The above false declaration was material because the indictment then being tried by the District Court and Jury charged that the named defendants conspired to violate the mail fraud statute ... by, among other ways, offering large cash payments and political contributions to elected public officials and the defendant, ROBERT B. ASHER, was at that time a [1497]*1497public official as defined by the applicable law.
App. at 55.
For at least three reasons we reject Asher’s argument. First, notwithstanding the indictment’s references to the defendants as “public officials,” see, e.g., Count 1 ¶ 3(c)-(g), App. at 20-22, the indictment at its outset clearly identifies Asher as the Chairman of the State Republican Committee of Pennsylvania. The indictment states that “[a]t all times relevant to the indictment, ROBERT B. ASHER was Chairman of the Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania.” App. at 17.
Second, Pennsylvania’s bribery statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4701 (Purdon 1983), which is the statute underlying the mail fraud counts, makes no distinction between public servants and party officials— both are equally culpable for offering or accepting a bribe.21
Third, the district court went to great lengths to explain Asher’s position as a party official and to distinguish it from Dwyer’s position as a public servant. See, e.g., App. at 1539. This instruction was also repeated at a later stage in the charge. See id. at 1544. Moreover, in defining the manner in which the jury should proceed, the court was painstakingly careful to identify and distinguish those rights owed only by a public official from those owed by a party official. See id. at 1540. Finally, the district court, in instructing the jury, explained the bribery statute and its application to both public officials and party officials. See id. at 1531, 1535 and 1537.
In addition, we cannot overlook the fact that the indictment, which was in the jury’s possession and which was explained in its particulars by the district court, could have left no impression other than that Asher was a party official. Moreover, while Ash-er’s perjury count (Count 13) does identify Asher as a public official, it does so in recognition of the fact that Asher was not an elected public official, as were his code-fendants, but was, rather, a party official whose activities were the equivalent of a public official’s under the Pennsylvania bribery statute. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4701 (Purdon 1983).
We are not persuaded by Asher’s contention that the district court improperly amended the indictment. In order to rise to the level of an impermissible amendment, a variance must act to modify the indictment so that the defendant is convicted of a crime that involves elements distinct from those of the crimes with which he was originally charged. See United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 1818, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985); United States v. DeCavaleante, 440 F.2d 1264, 1271 (3d Cir.1971). Thus, where “trial evidence [has] ‘amended’ the indictment by broadening the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment,” Miller, 471 U.S. at 138, 105 S.Ct. at 1816 (emphasis in original) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960)), the variance violates the defendant’s “ ‘substantial right to be tried only on charges returned by a grand jury.’ ” Id. “If, on the other hand, the variance does not alter the elements of the offense charged, [courts] focus upon whether or not there has been prejudice to the defendant....” United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 1122 (3d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1029, 106 S.Ct. 1233, 89 L.Ed.2d [1498]*1498342 (1986). Thus, “[cjonvictions generally have been sustained as long as the proof upon which they are based corresponds to an offense that was clearly set out in the indictment.” Miller, 471 U.S. at 136, 105 S.Ct. at 1815.
As the district court pointed out, the proof on which Asher’s conviction as a party official was based does in fact correspond to an offense that was clearly identified in the indictment. Asher is alleged to have violated the Pennsylvania bribery statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 4701, and to have been involved in a criminal conspiracy. As noted, the bribery statute refers to both public and party officials for which the elements of the crime are identical. See id. & note 21 supra. Thus, Asher could be convicted of the charged conspiracy if any member of the conspiracy in which he was involved was a public official. As the district court commented in denying Asher’s motion to dismiss the indictment because of references in the indictment to Asher as a public official, “R. Budd Dwyer, the alleged co-conspirator, ... clearly owes a fiduciary duty to the citizens. Asher, not a public servant, can be charged with conspiracy to bribe a public servant (Dwyer). Thus, the indictment, insofar as it alleges a conspiracy, is not critically defective because it labels Asher as a public official.” App. at 124-25.
In summary, although the indictment contained a number of technical errors and could have been more accurately drafted, we are satisfied that it clearly distinguished Asher from his codefendants by identifying him as a party official and did not prejudice Asher. See App. at 17. Moreover, the elements of the crimes charged in the indictment are also the elements of the crimes for which Asher was ultimately convicted. The indictment properly gave notice of the crime for which Asher was convicted and was sufficient to allow Asher to plead his conviction as a bar to subsequent prosecutions.
V.
In his final argument, Asher claims that the district court erred by admitting a written statement made by William Smith in early 1984 for purposes of negotiating immunity prior to his own trial in the same year. In that statement, Smith claimed, among other things, that “Robert Asher was our principal aide in getting Dwyer to act.” App. at 1246-47. Smith’s full statement is set out in the margin.22
[1499]*1499Asher argues that because he did not attack Smith’s credibility at trial, Smith’s prior consistent statement should not have been admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 801. The Rule provides, in pertinent part, that:
A statement is not hearsay if—
(1) Prior statement by witness. The de-clarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ...
(B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) (emphasis added).
The government counters by arguing that counsel for both Asher and Dwyer sought to attack Smith’s credibility at trial, thus allowing for the admission of Smith’s prior statement under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B). The government also claims that Asher’s counsel, independent of Dwyer’s counsel, sought to discredit Smith by suggesting that: 1) Smith had originally maintained that he and Asher had done no wrong and that Smith had recently changed his story, see Appellee’s Brief at 40; and, 2) that Smith had changed his original statement because his wife had been threatened with an indictment. See id. at 41.
While the record clearly indicates that Dwyer’s counsel repeatedly attacked Smith’s credibility, thus opening the door to the introduction of Smith’s prior consistent statement with regard to Dwyer, we are not persuaded that Asher’s counsel joined the attacks made by Dwyer’s counsel. The record makes clear the fact that Asher’s lawyer expressly stated at trial that he disagreed with Dwyer’s lawyer’s assertions with respect to Smith’s credibility. See App. at 1419-20, 1411-18, 1424. Thus, it would be inaccurate to attribute Dwyer’s lawyer’s statements to Asher’s lawyer simply by virtue of the fact that Dwyer and Asher were codefendants.
The record in this case thus weighs heavily against the government on this point. Smith’s testimony with respect to his wife’s possible indictment was elicited by the government on direct examination, not by Asher’s counsel. See App. at 1177-1189. Furthermore, Asher’s lawyer was careful throughout the trial not to attack Smith’s testimony or to claim that Smith’s testimony had been recently fabricated. Indeed, Asher’s lawyer explicitly stated that he believed that Smith had answered questions about Asher truthfully. See App. at 1419-20; 141-13, 1424; Appellant’s Brief at 45.
As noted above, Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) “excludes from the definition of hearsay prior statements where the ‘declarant testifies at the trial ... and the statement is ... consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication.’ ” United States v. De Peri, 778 F.2d 963, 977 (3d Cir.1985) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1)(B)); United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1002 n. 21 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899, 101 S.Ct. 267, 66 L.Ed.2d 129 (1980). However, absent any charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, a prior consistent statement is inadmissible. The record here does not disclose that Asher’s attorney was seeking to attack Smith’s testimony by charging Smith with recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.
While it is clear that Dwyer’s attorney sought to discredit Smith at every turn during the trial, it is equally clear that Asher’s attorney took pains not to do so. Even the district court had misgivings about admitting Smith’s prior statement, observing that the government might have to “retry this case,” if it insisted upon placing Smith’s statement in evidence. See App. at 1195. On the basis of the record, [1500]*1500Smith’s prior statement should not have been admitted.
However, in our view the district court’s admission of Smith’s statement constitutes harmless error under Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). In making non-constitutional “harmless error” determinations as to the admission of evidence, we must determine whether it is “highly probable that the evidence did not contribute to the jury’s judgment of conviction.” Government of the Virgin Islands v. Toto, 529 F.2d 278, 284 (3d Cir.1976); accord United States v. Grayson, 795 F.2d 278, 290 (3d Cir.1986). To constitute a “high probability,” we must have a “sure conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.” United States v. Jannotti, 729 F.2d 213, 219-20 (3d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 880, 105 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984). “On the other hand, we may be firmly convinced that the error was harmless without disproving every ‘reasonable possibility of prejudice.’ ” Id. at 219-20 & n. 2 (quoting R. Traynor, The Riddle of Harmless Error, 33-37, 44-45 (1970)); accord Grayson, 795 F.2d at 290.23
Under this standard, we are satisfied that the district court’s admission of Smith’s prior statement is harmless. In addition to Smith's testimony during Ash-er’s trial, see App. at 1148-1200, Smith’s former attorney, John Rogers Carroll, who had been released from the confidences of the attorney-client relationship, testified as to his discussions with Smith prior to Smith’s trial. Carroll, who was examined about Smith’s prior statement, corroborated Smith’s testimony in much the same way as Smith’s prior consistent statement did. See App. at 1258-63. For example, Carroll testified as follows:
What Bill Smith said to me was, the Treasurer and he discussing this, at the conclusion of their talk, both of them thought that Mr. Dwyer should discuss how the money should be paid with Mr. Asher. And he said that Dwyer told him he expected to see Mr. Asher at a political picnic that particular weekend which was coming up at the time of their discussion, and that picnic or meeting did not occur but there was a later discussion, at least it came back to Bill from Mr. Asher that his feeling about it was the money should not be split the way Mr. Dwyer suggested but all paid into the State Committee rather than split it.
He told me that they commenced their real negotiations with the Treasurer after that point and had a lot of problems with it. Sometime during those negotiations he was begging Asher to communicate with Dwyer to help them out; that Asher assured him from time to time that he was doing so; that on one occasion he mentioned the contribution to Mr. Phenicie and that eventually they got the contract.
App. at 1261-62.
Thus, contrary to the views expressed in the dissent, we view it as highly probable that the admission of Smith's prior consistent statement did not tip the balance by contributing to the jury’s judgment of conviction. We therefore hold that even though Smith’s prior statement may have been erroneously admitted into evidence, its admission did not constitute reversible error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a).
VI.
The district court’s order of March 20, 1987, which denied Asher’s motion for judgment of acquittal or, in the alternative for a new trial, will be affirmed.