United States v. Approximately 2210.8222 of Sol Cryptocurrency

CourtDistrict Court, District of Columbia
DecidedMarch 11, 2026
DocketCivil Action No. 2024-3375
StatusPublished

This text of United States v. Approximately 2210.8222 of Sol Cryptocurrency (United States v. Approximately 2210.8222 of Sol Cryptocurrency) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Approximately 2210.8222 of Sol Cryptocurrency, (D.D.C. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-3375 (JMC)

v.

APPROXIMATELY 2210.8222 OF SOL CRYPTOCURRENCY,

Defendant in rem.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The United States brought this forfeiture action in rem against over 2200 units of SOL, a

cryptocurrency that operates on the Solana blockchain (Defendant Property).1 The Government

argues that the Defendant Property is subject to seizure and forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.

§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) as property “constituting or derived from proceeds

traceable to computer fraud” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. ECF 10 ¶¶ 43–45. The Government

has satisfied the requisite notice requirements, yet potential claimants have failed to appear or

defend this action. The Clerk of Court entered default, and the Government now moves for an

entry of default judgment. The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated its entitlement

to such judgment and GRANTS the motion.2

1 The Government noted that, while the case caption references approximately 2210.8222 SOL, after transaction fees involved in transferring the funds to the U.S. Marshals Service, the Government received approximately 2204.7622 SOL, which now constitutes the Defendant Property. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.

1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of an FBI investigation of a cryptocurrency heist perpetuated by North

Korean hackers known as the Lazarus Group. ECF 10 ¶¶ 26, 30. On April 29, 2024, Rain

Management W.L.L. (Rain), a licensed crypto-asset service provider headquartered in the

Kingdom of Bahrain, was targeted by members of the Lazarus Group using a malware scheme,

resulting in a financial loss of $16.13 million. Id. ¶ 30. Upon conducting an internal investigation,

Rain discovered that an employee’s device had been compromised. Id. ¶ 33. The North Korean

hackers had contacted the employee on LinkedIn, asking if they were interested in a new job. Once

the employee expressed interest, the hackers sent the employee “a malicious link disguised as a

coding challenge,” which compromised the device with malware. Id. ¶ 33; id. ¶ 27 (describing

how the Lazarus Group often operates through false job interviews offered on LinkedIn, inviting

unwitting employees to “execute a project from a GitHub repository that is malicious in nature”).

The hackers stole private keys and credentials that provided access to Rain’s online infrastructure.

Id. ¶ 34. The Lazarus Group hackers then “launder[ed] the virtual currency” to “obfuscate” the

origin of the stolen funds. Id. ¶ 41. The FBI was able to freeze a portion of the funds—

approximately 2210.8222 SOL—on a virtual currency exchange known as WhiteBIT, which is

headquartered in Lithuania. Id. ¶ 30. After the FBI served WhiteBIT with a seizure warrant for the

funds, WhiteBIT transferred the funds to the Government and the funds are “currently located in

the United States under the control of the U.S. Marshals Service.” Id. ¶ 31.

The relevant transactions involving the Defendant Property took place on the Solana

blockchain, which is run by the U.S.-based Solana Labs. Id. ¶ 42. SOL refers to the crypto asset

that is the “native token of the Solana blockchain.” SEC v. Coinbase, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 3d 260,

275 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). The Solana blockchain is “a decentralized network that allows users to

2 create, transfer, and trade” such tokens “without any central authority.” Aguilar v. Baton Corp.,

No. 25-cv-880, 2025 WL 3523133, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025). The Government states that the

relevant computer nodes that enabled the transactions on the Solana blockchain “were located

around the world, including in the District of Columbia.” ECF 10 ¶ 42; see Aguilar, 2025 WL

3523133, at *1 (“Solana Labs relies on computers called validators, which process transactions

and maintain the integrity of the network.”).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 3, 2024, the Government filed a verified complaint asserting a civil forfeiture

action in rem against the Defendant Property. ECF 1. That day, the Court made a probable cause

finding and issued a warrant for arrest in rem with regards to the Defendant Property. ECF 3. On

January 20, 2025, the Government commenced notification of this forfeiture online at

forfeiture.gov for thirty consecutive days. ECF 4-1 at 3–4. Verified claims in response to this notice

were due no later than March 20, 2025. ECF 8 ¶ 12. No claims based on publication were filed.

Id. The Government also sent direct notice to counsel for Rain. Id. ¶ 13. While Rain did not file a

claim, it did submit a petition for remission. Id.

No party filed a claim or answer in this case, and on April 17, 2025, the Government moved

for entry of default. ECF 6. The Clerk of Court granted an entry of default the next day. ECF 7.

Next, on June 6, 2025, the Government moved for default judgment. ECF 8. In October 2025, the

Court ordered the Government to file supplemental briefing with the Court detailing the factual

and legal bases for finding that the Defendant Property had the necessary nexus with the United

States to satisfy the elements of the underlying criminal statutes. Oct. 16, 2025 Min. Order. The

Government filed its amended complaint on January 23, 2026. ECF 10.

3 III. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a district court to enter default judgment

against a defendant who fails to defend its case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “Obtaining a default

judgment is a two-step process.” United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F.

Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b). First, a plaintiff must request the Clerk

of the Court to enter default against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the plaintiff must move for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Whether

default judgment is appropriate is “committed to the sound discretion of” the trial court. Boland v.

Yoccabel Constr. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). A defendant’s failure to respond “does

not automatically entitle plaintiff to a default judgment.” United States v. $6,999,925.00 of Funds

Associated with Velmur Mgmt. Pte. Ltd., 368 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2019). The complaint

must still plead sufficient allegations which, when taken as true, state a claim for relief for the

plaintiff to be entitled to default judgment.

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