UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-3375 (JMC)
v.
APPROXIMATELY 2210.8222 OF SOL CRYPTOCURRENCY,
Defendant in rem.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The United States brought this forfeiture action in rem against over 2200 units of SOL, a
cryptocurrency that operates on the Solana blockchain (Defendant Property).1 The Government
argues that the Defendant Property is subject to seizure and forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) as property “constituting or derived from proceeds
traceable to computer fraud” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. ECF 10 ¶¶ 43–45. The Government
has satisfied the requisite notice requirements, yet potential claimants have failed to appear or
defend this action. The Clerk of Court entered default, and the Government now moves for an
entry of default judgment. The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated its entitlement
to such judgment and GRANTS the motion.2
1 The Government noted that, while the case caption references approximately 2210.8222 SOL, after transaction fees involved in transferring the funds to the U.S. Marshals Service, the Government received approximately 2204.7622 SOL, which now constitutes the Defendant Property. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.
1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an FBI investigation of a cryptocurrency heist perpetuated by North
Korean hackers known as the Lazarus Group. ECF 10 ¶¶ 26, 30. On April 29, 2024, Rain
Management W.L.L. (Rain), a licensed crypto-asset service provider headquartered in the
Kingdom of Bahrain, was targeted by members of the Lazarus Group using a malware scheme,
resulting in a financial loss of $16.13 million. Id. ¶ 30. Upon conducting an internal investigation,
Rain discovered that an employee’s device had been compromised. Id. ¶ 33. The North Korean
hackers had contacted the employee on LinkedIn, asking if they were interested in a new job. Once
the employee expressed interest, the hackers sent the employee “a malicious link disguised as a
coding challenge,” which compromised the device with malware. Id. ¶ 33; id. ¶ 27 (describing
how the Lazarus Group often operates through false job interviews offered on LinkedIn, inviting
unwitting employees to “execute a project from a GitHub repository that is malicious in nature”).
The hackers stole private keys and credentials that provided access to Rain’s online infrastructure.
Id. ¶ 34. The Lazarus Group hackers then “launder[ed] the virtual currency” to “obfuscate” the
origin of the stolen funds. Id. ¶ 41. The FBI was able to freeze a portion of the funds—
approximately 2210.8222 SOL—on a virtual currency exchange known as WhiteBIT, which is
headquartered in Lithuania. Id. ¶ 30. After the FBI served WhiteBIT with a seizure warrant for the
funds, WhiteBIT transferred the funds to the Government and the funds are “currently located in
the United States under the control of the U.S. Marshals Service.” Id. ¶ 31.
The relevant transactions involving the Defendant Property took place on the Solana
blockchain, which is run by the U.S.-based Solana Labs. Id. ¶ 42. SOL refers to the crypto asset
that is the “native token of the Solana blockchain.” SEC v. Coinbase, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 3d 260,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). The Solana blockchain is “a decentralized network that allows users to
2 create, transfer, and trade” such tokens “without any central authority.” Aguilar v. Baton Corp.,
No. 25-cv-880, 2025 WL 3523133, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025). The Government states that the
relevant computer nodes that enabled the transactions on the Solana blockchain “were located
around the world, including in the District of Columbia.” ECF 10 ¶ 42; see Aguilar, 2025 WL
3523133, at *1 (“Solana Labs relies on computers called validators, which process transactions
and maintain the integrity of the network.”).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 3, 2024, the Government filed a verified complaint asserting a civil forfeiture
action in rem against the Defendant Property. ECF 1. That day, the Court made a probable cause
finding and issued a warrant for arrest in rem with regards to the Defendant Property. ECF 3. On
January 20, 2025, the Government commenced notification of this forfeiture online at
forfeiture.gov for thirty consecutive days. ECF 4-1 at 3–4. Verified claims in response to this notice
were due no later than March 20, 2025. ECF 8 ¶ 12. No claims based on publication were filed.
Id. The Government also sent direct notice to counsel for Rain. Id. ¶ 13. While Rain did not file a
claim, it did submit a petition for remission. Id.
No party filed a claim or answer in this case, and on April 17, 2025, the Government moved
for entry of default. ECF 6. The Clerk of Court granted an entry of default the next day. ECF 7.
Next, on June 6, 2025, the Government moved for default judgment. ECF 8. In October 2025, the
Court ordered the Government to file supplemental briefing with the Court detailing the factual
and legal bases for finding that the Defendant Property had the necessary nexus with the United
States to satisfy the elements of the underlying criminal statutes. Oct. 16, 2025 Min. Order. The
Government filed its amended complaint on January 23, 2026. ECF 10.
3 III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a district court to enter default judgment
against a defendant who fails to defend its case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “Obtaining a default
judgment is a two-step process.” United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b). First, a plaintiff must request the Clerk
of the Court to enter default against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the plaintiff must move for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Whether
default judgment is appropriate is “committed to the sound discretion of” the trial court. Boland v.
Yoccabel Constr. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). A defendant’s failure to respond “does
not automatically entitle plaintiff to a default judgment.” United States v. $6,999,925.00 of Funds
Associated with Velmur Mgmt. Pte. Ltd., 368 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2019). The complaint
must still plead sufficient allegations which, when taken as true, state a claim for relief for the
plaintiff to be entitled to default judgment.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff, Case No. 24-cv-3375 (JMC)
v.
APPROXIMATELY 2210.8222 OF SOL CRYPTOCURRENCY,
Defendant in rem.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The United States brought this forfeiture action in rem against over 2200 units of SOL, a
cryptocurrency that operates on the Solana blockchain (Defendant Property).1 The Government
argues that the Defendant Property is subject to seizure and forfeiture under 18 U.S.C.
§ 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) as property “constituting or derived from proceeds
traceable to computer fraud” in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030. ECF 10 ¶¶ 43–45. The Government
has satisfied the requisite notice requirements, yet potential claimants have failed to appear or
defend this action. The Clerk of Court entered default, and the Government now moves for an
entry of default judgment. The Court finds that the Government has demonstrated its entitlement
to such judgment and GRANTS the motion.2
1 The Government noted that, while the case caption references approximately 2210.8222 SOL, after transaction fees involved in transferring the funds to the U.S. Marshals Service, the Government received approximately 2204.7622 SOL, which now constitutes the Defendant Property. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, the formatting of citations has been modified throughout this opinion, for example, by omitting internal quotation marks, emphases, citations, and alterations and by altering capitalization. All pincites to documents filed on the docket in this case are to the automatically generated ECF Page ID number that appears at the top of each page.
1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
This case arises out of an FBI investigation of a cryptocurrency heist perpetuated by North
Korean hackers known as the Lazarus Group. ECF 10 ¶¶ 26, 30. On April 29, 2024, Rain
Management W.L.L. (Rain), a licensed crypto-asset service provider headquartered in the
Kingdom of Bahrain, was targeted by members of the Lazarus Group using a malware scheme,
resulting in a financial loss of $16.13 million. Id. ¶ 30. Upon conducting an internal investigation,
Rain discovered that an employee’s device had been compromised. Id. ¶ 33. The North Korean
hackers had contacted the employee on LinkedIn, asking if they were interested in a new job. Once
the employee expressed interest, the hackers sent the employee “a malicious link disguised as a
coding challenge,” which compromised the device with malware. Id. ¶ 33; id. ¶ 27 (describing
how the Lazarus Group often operates through false job interviews offered on LinkedIn, inviting
unwitting employees to “execute a project from a GitHub repository that is malicious in nature”).
The hackers stole private keys and credentials that provided access to Rain’s online infrastructure.
Id. ¶ 34. The Lazarus Group hackers then “launder[ed] the virtual currency” to “obfuscate” the
origin of the stolen funds. Id. ¶ 41. The FBI was able to freeze a portion of the funds—
approximately 2210.8222 SOL—on a virtual currency exchange known as WhiteBIT, which is
headquartered in Lithuania. Id. ¶ 30. After the FBI served WhiteBIT with a seizure warrant for the
funds, WhiteBIT transferred the funds to the Government and the funds are “currently located in
the United States under the control of the U.S. Marshals Service.” Id. ¶ 31.
The relevant transactions involving the Defendant Property took place on the Solana
blockchain, which is run by the U.S.-based Solana Labs. Id. ¶ 42. SOL refers to the crypto asset
that is the “native token of the Solana blockchain.” SEC v. Coinbase, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 3d 260,
275 (S.D.N.Y. 2024). The Solana blockchain is “a decentralized network that allows users to
2 create, transfer, and trade” such tokens “without any central authority.” Aguilar v. Baton Corp.,
No. 25-cv-880, 2025 WL 3523133, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025). The Government states that the
relevant computer nodes that enabled the transactions on the Solana blockchain “were located
around the world, including in the District of Columbia.” ECF 10 ¶ 42; see Aguilar, 2025 WL
3523133, at *1 (“Solana Labs relies on computers called validators, which process transactions
and maintain the integrity of the network.”).
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 3, 2024, the Government filed a verified complaint asserting a civil forfeiture
action in rem against the Defendant Property. ECF 1. That day, the Court made a probable cause
finding and issued a warrant for arrest in rem with regards to the Defendant Property. ECF 3. On
January 20, 2025, the Government commenced notification of this forfeiture online at
forfeiture.gov for thirty consecutive days. ECF 4-1 at 3–4. Verified claims in response to this notice
were due no later than March 20, 2025. ECF 8 ¶ 12. No claims based on publication were filed.
Id. The Government also sent direct notice to counsel for Rain. Id. ¶ 13. While Rain did not file a
claim, it did submit a petition for remission. Id.
No party filed a claim or answer in this case, and on April 17, 2025, the Government moved
for entry of default. ECF 6. The Clerk of Court granted an entry of default the next day. ECF 7.
Next, on June 6, 2025, the Government moved for default judgment. ECF 8. In October 2025, the
Court ordered the Government to file supplemental briefing with the Court detailing the factual
and legal bases for finding that the Defendant Property had the necessary nexus with the United
States to satisfy the elements of the underlying criminal statutes. Oct. 16, 2025 Min. Order. The
Government filed its amended complaint on January 23, 2026. ECF 10.
3 III. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize a district court to enter default judgment
against a defendant who fails to defend its case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “Obtaining a default
judgment is a two-step process.” United States v. Twenty-Four Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2020); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a)–(b). First, a plaintiff must request the Clerk
of the Court to enter default against a party who “has failed to plead or otherwise defend.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 55(a). Second, the plaintiff must move for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Whether
default judgment is appropriate is “committed to the sound discretion of” the trial court. Boland v.
Yoccabel Constr. Co., 293 F.R.D. 13, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). A defendant’s failure to respond “does
not automatically entitle plaintiff to a default judgment.” United States v. $6,999,925.00 of Funds
Associated with Velmur Mgmt. Pte. Ltd., 368 F. Supp. 3d 10, 17 (D.D.C. 2019). The complaint
must still plead sufficient allegations which, when taken as true, state a claim for relief for the
plaintiff to be entitled to default judgment. Id.
Here, the Government seeks default judgment in a civil forfeiture action in rem. Rule G of
the Supplemental Rules for Admiralty or Maritime Claims and Asset Forfeiture Actions
(Supplemental Rules) set forth the pleading requirements for such an action. First, Supplemental
Rule G(1) requires that a forfeiture action in rem properly “aris[e] from a federal statute.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. Supp. R. G(1). Next, Supplemental Rule G(2) requires that a complaint must (a) be verified;
(b) state the grounds for the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction over the
property, and venue; (c) describe the property with “reasonable particularity”; (d) if the property
is tangible, identify where the property was seized or else “its location when the action is filed”;
(e) identify the statutory cause of action; and (f) “state sufficiently detailed facts to support a
reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden of proof at trial.” Id. G(2).
4 Finally, before default judgment is issued for forfeiture in rem, “the government must show that it
complied with the notice requirements contained in the Supplemental Rules.” United States v.
$1,071,251.44 of Funds Associated with Mingzheng Int’l Trading Ltd., 324 F. Supp. 3d 38, 46
(D.D.C. 2018); see Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(4).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court finds that default judgment is warranted. The Government complied with notice
requirements and the verified complaint contains sufficient information to support a finding by the
preponderance of the evidence that forfeiture of the Defendant Property is appropriate under 18
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C. § 2461. ECF 10 ¶¶ 43–45.
A. Notice
Before the Court enters default judgment, the Government must show that it complied with
the notice requirements in the Supplemental Rules. Supplemental Rule G requires two forms of
notice in a forfeiture action in rem: notice via publication as well as direct notice to potential
claimants. See Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(4)(a), (b). Here, the Government has satisfied its
obligation as to both publication and direct notice.
First, the Government provided publication notice. Publication notice requires the
Government to “describe the property, state the time to file a claim and answer, and name the
government attorney to be served with the claim and answer.” Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F. Supp.
3d at 5 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(4)(a)(ii)). Such notice can be published “on an official
internet government forfeiture site for at least 30 consecutive days.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.
G(4)(a)(iv)(C). In this case, the Government published a notice of forfeiture online at
http://www.forfeiture.gov on January 20, 2025. ECF 8 ¶ 12. The publication contained all the
5 required information and was publicly available for thirty consecutive days. ECF 4-1 at 2–3. No
claims based on publication were filed. ECF 8 ¶ 12.
Second, the Government satisfied the direct notice requirement. Direct notice must be sent
“to any person who reasonably appears to be a potential claimant.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R.
G(4)(b)(i). Actual notice is not required, but the government must send direct notice “by means
reasonably calculated to reach the potential claimant.” Id. G(4)(b)(iii)(A). On December 5, 2024,
the Government sent notice of this forfeiture action to counsel for Rain, the only potential claimant
known to the Government in this case. ECF 8 ¶ 13. By notifying Rain, the Government has
satisfied its burden to provide direct notice of this action. Accordingly, the Government has met
both the publication notice and direct notice requirements established by the Supplemental Rules.
B. Adequacy of Complaint
As described above, default judgment in a civil forfeiture action in rem requires the
Government to fulfill two requirements. First, the Government must demonstrate that its forfeiture
action adequately “aris[es] from a federal statute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(1). Second, its
complaint must satisfy the six elements set forth in Supplemental Rule G(2): “(a) be verified; (b)
state the grounds for subject-matter jurisdiction, in rem jurisdiction over the defendant property,
and venue; (c) describe the property with reasonable particularity; (d) if the property is tangible,
state its location when any seizure occurred and—if different—its location when the action is filed;
(e) identify the statute under which the forfeiture action is brought; and (f) state sufficiently
detailed facts to support a reasonable belief that the government will be able to meet its burden at
trial.” Id. G(2). Rule G(1) effectively collapses into (G)(2)’s requirements, so the Court addresses
the Rules collectively below.
6 The Government has filed a verified compliant “identifying the statute under which the
forfeiture action was brought and describing the Defendant Propert[y] in extensive detail.”
Cryptocurrency Accts., 473 F. Supp. 3d at 6–7; ECF 10 ¶¶ 38–48 (describing the Defendant
Property and the statutory provisions under which forfeiture is sought). The Court also finds that
the complaint properly establishes the bases for subject-matter jurisdiction and venue. Under
28 U.S.C. § 1355(a), district courts “have original jurisdiction . . . of any action or proceeding for
. . . forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, incurred under any Act of Congress”—in this case,
18 U.S.C. § 981. Further, under 28 U.S.C. § 1345, “the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the United States.” This being
a civil forfeiture action initiated by the United States, the Court is satisfied that it has subject-
matter jurisdiction. Additionally, venue can be established under 28 U.S.C. § 1395. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1395(b), a civil proceeding for forfeiture “may be prosecuted in any district where such
property is found” and, under subsection (c), “[a] civil proceeding for the forfeiture of property
seized outside any judicial district may be prosecuted in any district into which the property is
brought.” Because the Defendant Property was seized outside of any judicial district and is now
under the control of the U.S. Marshals Service, which operates in this district, the Court finds that
venue is proper here. ECF 10 ¶ 31. Finally, the Court finds that it has in rem jurisdiction over the
Defendant Property held by the U.S. Marshals Service. See United States v. All Assets Held in
Acct. No. XXXXXXXX, 330 F. Supp. 3d 150, 156 (D.D.C. 2018) (“Traditionally, when exercising
in rem jurisdiction, the defendant property is physically present within the court’s territorial
jurisdiction.”); United States v. $299,218.48 in U.S. Currency, 742 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2024)
(“The defendant funds are located within this court’s territorial jurisdiction because DHS
transferred them to an account in Washington, D.C. after their seizure.”).
7 The final element is whether the Government has alleged sufficient facts in its complaint
to “support a reasonable belief that the [G]overnment will be able to meet its burden of proof at
trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. Supp. R. G(2)(f); see Mingzheng Int’l Trading, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 41
(requiring that the complaint “establish a reasonable belief that the government could prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that [Defendant Property is] subject to civil in rem forfeiture”).
Supplemental Rule G(2) “does not articulate an onerous standard,” but instead establishes a “low
bar” that is appropriate at the default judgment stage “where a court should exercise greater
flexibility in judging factual allegations.” Mingzheng Int’l Trading, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 51–52.
The complaint satisfies this low bar. The Government alleges, among other bases, that the
Defendant Property is subject to forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C) and 28 U.S.C.
§ 2461(c) because it is property “constituting or derived from proceeds traceable to” computer
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1030. ECF 10 ¶¶ 43–45. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A) criminalizes activity
that “knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or command, and . . .
intentionally causes damage without authorization, to a protected computer.” The statute defines
“protected computer” as any computer “which is used in or affecting interstate or foreign
commerce or communication, including a computer located outside the United States that is used
in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.”
Id. § 1030(e)(2)(B).
The complaint lays out a scheme in which North Korean hackers illicitly accessed the
Defendant Property through a series of transactions on the Solana blockchain. ECF 10 ¶ 38–42.
As described above, the Solana blockchain is “a decentralized network that allows users to create,
transfer, and trade digital tokens” known as SOL “without any central authority.” Aguilar,
2025 WL 3523133, at *1. The system relies on computers called validators to “process transactions
8 and maintain the integrity of the network.” Id. The Government alleges that the hackers caused
“damage without authorization” to “protected computers” running the Solana blockchain. ECF 10
¶ 5 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A)). The complaint states that the hackers inflicted
“damage[]” when they “initiated transactions that caused Solana’s data to reflect these
unauthorized transfers.” Id. It further states that “Solana operates via a web of interconnected
computers all around the world, including in Washington, D.C.,” and that the computers in
Washington, D.C. “are the protected computers in this case.” Id.
The Court finds that the Government has established that it would likely be able to satisfy
its burden at trial that the Defendant Property constitutes the proceeds of computer fraud and is
therefore subject to forfeiture. At least some of the Solana blockchain operates on U.S.-based
computers and, in making a series of illicit transactions, the hackers altered the data on those
computers, thereby causing damage to them without authorization. See 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
The Court further notes that, even if only Solana nodes outside of the United States were involved
in the transactions, such conduct would still be covered by the statute, which extends to any
computer “used in a manner that affects interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the
United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2)(B). To register a transaction on the Solana blockchain, it
is likely that the relevant computers had to communicate with U.S.-based computers. See Ryanair
DAC v. Expedia Inc., No. 17-cv-1789, 2018 WL 3727599, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 6, 2018)
(noting that the conduct regulated by the computer fraud statute “basically happens simultaneously
at the locations of the accessor and the accessed computer, with limitless possible locations that
the transmitted data may pass through in between”); Ryanair DAC v. Booking.com B.V., No 20-
cv-1191, 2025 WL 266631, at *6–*7 (D. Del. Jan. 22, 2025) (finding that a European airline
company’s website was a computer that affected “interstate or foreign commerce or
9 communication”). As such, the Court finds that the Government has thus met its burden under
Supplemental Rule G(2) and alleged facts sufficient to establish a reasonable belief that it would
be able to prove its forfeiture claim by a preponderance of the evidence. As a result, both
Supplemental Rules G(1) and G(2) are satisfied.
* * *
Because the verified complaint states a claim for forfeiture in rem pursuant to Supplemental
Rules G(1) and G(2), the Government has complied with the notice requirements of Supplemental
Rule G(4), and no claimant has appeared in this action, the Government’s motion for default
judgment, as supplemented by the details in the amended complaint, is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED:
1. That default judgment is hereby entered against all persons or entities claiming an
interest in the Defendant Property;
2. That the Defendant Property shall be forfeited to the United States of America and no
right, title, or interest in the following property shall exist in any other entity or person;
3. Title to the Defendant Property is vested solely in the United States;
4. That the Defendant Property shall be disposed of according to law; and
5. That no additional action is required, and this matter is dismissed. The Clerk of Court is
directed to close this case.
A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
SO ORDERED.
__________________________ JIA M. COBB United States District Judge
Date: March 11, 2026