United States v. Ameelyenah

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: 23-3954
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 7 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 23-3954 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellee, 2:22-cr-01296-SPL-1 v. MEMORANDUM* RYAN NILES AMEELYENAH,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Steven Paul Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted April 2, 2025 Phoenix, Arizona

Before: HAWKINS, W. FLETCHER, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges. Partial Concurrence and Partial Dissent by Judge R. NELSON.

Ryan Niles Ameelyenah appeals his sentence of 120 months for one count of

assault resulting in serious bodily injury and one count of assault resulting in

substantial bodily injury of an intimate partner in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§

113(a)(6)–(7) and 1153. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. affirm his sentence in part and vacate and remand in part for clarification.

1. Ameelyenah challenges the district court’s imposition of the statutory

maximum sentence of 120 months (nearly double the Sentencing Guidelines range

as calculated in his Pre-Sentence Investigation Report (PSR) and 33 months greater

than the 87-month sentence the government requested). We affirm the length of the

sentence, which survives either the plain-error or abuse-of-discretion standards of

review.

Ameelyenah’s sentence was procedurally proper. The district court “set forth

enough to satisfy” us that it “considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned

basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” United States v. Carty,

520 F.3d 984, 996 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quotation omitted). The district court

correctly relied on the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and provided significant

explanation for its decision to vary from the Guidelines, including that this was one

of a series of brutal crimes against intimate partners, that it earlier sentenced

Ameelyenah for a similar crime against the same victim with little deterrent effect,

and that Ameelyenah’s violent behavior towards intimate partners was escalating.

Ameelyenah also argues procedural impropriety because the district court

relied, “at least in part, on unproven facts.” In response to an email Ameelyenah’s

victim sent to the court indicating that she wanted him home, the district court said

that “there’s no doubt in my mind that you talked to her on the phone and you said,

2 23-3954 you really need to help me out. You need to tell the judge that you want me back

home.” A district court is “entitled to make reasonable inferences” at sentencing.

United States v. Orozco-Acosta, 607 F.3d 1156, 1166 (9th Cir. 2010). The district

court found little value in this mitigating evidence because it thought Ameelyenah

either persuaded the victim to write the email or she was motivated by the need for

Ameelyenah’s income. In making this inference, the district court relied on its

considerable experience dealing with similar cases of partner abuse. The district

court also relied on a recording presented at trial in which Ameelyenah successfully

persuaded the victim not to testify at trial.

Ameelyenah’s sentence was substantively reasonable. The district court

appropriately relied on the § 3553(a) factors when crafting the sentence.

Ameelyenah broadly claims that the district court overlooked the applicable

Guidelines range, the kinds of sentences available, and the need to avoid sentence

disparities for defendants with similar records. We “assume that district judges

know the law and understand their obligation to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors,

not just the Guidelines.” Carty, 520 F.3d at 992. The district court also heard from

both Ameelyenah and the government and considered the possible sentences and the

Guidelines range. And Ameelyenah does not provide examples of sentences

comparable to his circumstances—instead, he cites examples of defendants in

assault cases broadly.

3 23-3954 2. Ameelyenah challenges a special condition of release (Special

Condition 6) which potentially prohibits him from contacting his children. We

vacate and remand for clarification on Special Condition 6.

In the written judgment, Special Condition 6 states that Ameelyenah “must

not contact” his victim and that “the probation officer will verify compliance.” This

appears to implicate Ameelyenah’s right to contact only the victim, with whom he

has minor children. But when asked to clarify this condition of release, the district

court concluded his explanation by stating that “you can’t contact any minor child

that you have” with the victim. Under our precedent, a condition of release that

restricts access to one’s children implicates a significant liberty interest and carries

“an enhanced procedural requirement to make special findings on the record” to

support it. United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2012).

The district court did not make any Wolf Child findings.

The district court was less than clear at sentencing, and “[t]he only sentence

that is legally cognizable is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the

defendant.” United States v. Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974)

(per curiam). While “written judgments . . . may properly serve the function of

resolving ambiguities in orally pronounced sentences,” Payne v. Madigan, 274 F.2d

702, 705 (9th Cir. 1960), the district court’s statement that Ameelyenah “can’t

contact any minor child” he has with the victim conflicts with the written judgment.

4 23-3954 Because such a condition would require Wolf Child findings, and none were made

here, we vacate Special Condition 6 and remand for the district court to clarify this

condition of release.

3. At sentencing, the district court fined Ameelyenah “a total of $2,000,” one

thousand dollars for each count, “due immediately.” Ameelyenah challenges this

fine because the written judgment stated that “[t]he Court finds the defendant does

not have the ability to pay a fine and orders the fine waived.” The government does

not oppose remanding this to the district court. Because we remand for clarification

on Special Condition 6, we also remand for the district court to clarify the fine.

AFFIRMED in part, VACATED and REMANDED in part.

5 23-3954 FILED United States v. Ameelyenah, No. 23-3954 MAY 7 2025 R. Nelson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I agree that the sentence is procedurally sound and substantively reasonable

and that we should vacate and remand Special Condition 6 for clarification.

Following precedent, however, we should not vacate and remand the $2,000 fine for

clarification.

As the majority correctly notes, “[t]he only sentence that is legally cognizable

is the actual oral pronouncement in the presence of the defendant.” United States v.

Munoz-Dela Rosa, 495 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1974) (per curiam). “Where a

discrepancy arises between the terms of an oral pronouncement of a sentence and

the subsequent written judgment, the terms of the oral pronouncement control.”

United States v. Orlando, 553 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir. 2009). The district court

orally fined Ameelyenah “a total of $2,000,” “due immediately.” The district court’s

oral fine was not ambiguous. At most, we should remand for the district court to

conform the written judgment to the oral sentence. See United States v. Holden, 908

F.3d 395, 404 (9th Cir. 2018).