DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Pupo and Govantes were indicted for (I) conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982); (II) interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1982); (III) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982); and (IV) distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Pupo alone was also indicted for (V) use of a communications facility in furtherance of a narcotics offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1982). At the close of the government’s case the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count II. Pupo’s objection, entered at that time, was that counts III and V of the indictment were invalid for failure to include an essential element of the crime charged. The omission was the failure to include a scien-ter allegation (“knowingly or intentionally”). In reaching its conclusion the district court relied on United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed. 2d 286 (1976). After submission to the jury, Govantes was later convicted on Count I and given a five-year sentence with immediate eligibility for parole. He was acquitted on Counts III and IV. Pupo was convicted on all four remaining charges. For Counts I, III, and IV he received twelve-year sentences to be served concurrently; for Count V he received a four-year sentence, also to be served concurrently.
The appellants appealed their convictions asserting numerous errors. We find no merit in any of the alleged claims of error with the exception of the contention of invalidity in Counts III and IV of the indictment. These cases were originally heard by a panel different from that in United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, decided along with these cases but in a separate opinion. Because these cases and Hooker involved primarily the same dispositive legal issues, we consolidated the cases for hearing en banc, but we decide the cases in separate opinions, which are being filed simultaneously.
[1238]*1238We accordingly reverse Pupo’s convictions on Counts III and IV because the indictments were fatally defective and affirm all other objections.
I.
Govantes individually contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The evidence shows that on May 10, 1986, Govantes accompanied Pupo from Florida to North Carolina where they were met by Winford Grainger and Raymond Allen. When the four men arrived at Allen’s auto shop, Govantes brought in a tote bag, and Pupo opened it. The bag contained a sizeable quantity of cocaine, which Allen tested in the presence of the others. Again in Govantes’ presence the other three men discussed the purity of the cocaine. Allen then removed the cocaine from the office and returned with a small quantity, which all four men snorted. Go-vantes and Pupo then booked a nearby motel room in North Carolina where they remained for nearly three days. On May 18, 1986, Pupo received a telephone call at the motel from Allen during which Pupo and Allen discussed both the ongoing drug transaction and a possible future sale. During that conversation Allen said “George [Govantes] is going crazy, man.”
Govantes argues that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of a crime is not enough to establish that an individual is part of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir.1984). Nor is mere presence at the scene of a distribution of drugs sufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. See United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.1983). This statement of the law is, of course, correct. We cannot say, however, that a reasonable jury could not have concluded, from the evidence presented, that Govantes was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. He carried the tote bag containing the cocaine, and he remained in a motel room with Pupo for three days until Allen called to report that the transaction was complete. The jury could properly conclude that these actions were more consistent with participation than they were with mere acquiescence. The jury could further believe from Pupo’s statement, “George is going crazy, man,” that Go-vantes was a participant in the conspiracy.
Although the evidence of Govantes’ participation in the conspiracy was not compelling, it was sufficient to support the verdict. We therefore affirm Govantes’ conviction on Count I.
II.
The attack on Counts III and IV by Pupo is more serious. Counts III and IV were single-paragraph counts charging possession with intent to distribute and actual distribution of cocaine.1 A comparison between the elements of the offense shown in the indictment and the elements set out in the statute shows that both of these counts failed to allege, either expressly or through words of import, that the defendants acted “knowingly or intentionally.”2 [1239]*1239It is well established that an indictment is defective if it fails to allege elements of scienter that are expressly contained in the statute that describes the offense. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932). “Knowingly or intentionally” is a definite element of the offense charged under 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Under similar circumstances, we held in Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir.1958), that “[w]here willfulness or knowledge is made an element of the crime, the statutory requirement is not to be ignored. The charge must either include these terms, or words of similar import.”3 The words “knowingly or intentionally” themselves “or words of similar import” did not appear in the count attacked, and, therefore, the count was found defective. That case is apposite here.
We refuse to follow the case on which the district court relied in dismissing the objection, United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed. 2d 286 (1976), in which the court held that scienter was adequately charged if the indictment also cited the statute itself. That position is contrary to our own precedents as well as the law in a majority of the circuits. See Finn, supra.
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DONALD RUSSELL, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Pupo and Govantes were indicted for (I) conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982); (II) interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1982); (III) possession of cocaine with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982); and (IV) distribution of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Pupo alone was also indicted for (V) use of a communications facility in furtherance of a narcotics offense in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1982). At the close of the government’s case the court granted the defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal as to Count II. Pupo’s objection, entered at that time, was that counts III and V of the indictment were invalid for failure to include an essential element of the crime charged. The omission was the failure to include a scien-ter allegation (“knowingly or intentionally”). In reaching its conclusion the district court relied on United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed. 2d 286 (1976). After submission to the jury, Govantes was later convicted on Count I and given a five-year sentence with immediate eligibility for parole. He was acquitted on Counts III and IV. Pupo was convicted on all four remaining charges. For Counts I, III, and IV he received twelve-year sentences to be served concurrently; for Count V he received a four-year sentence, also to be served concurrently.
The appellants appealed their convictions asserting numerous errors. We find no merit in any of the alleged claims of error with the exception of the contention of invalidity in Counts III and IV of the indictment. These cases were originally heard by a panel different from that in United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225, decided along with these cases but in a separate opinion. Because these cases and Hooker involved primarily the same dispositive legal issues, we consolidated the cases for hearing en banc, but we decide the cases in separate opinions, which are being filed simultaneously.
[1238]*1238We accordingly reverse Pupo’s convictions on Counts III and IV because the indictments were fatally defective and affirm all other objections.
I.
Govantes individually contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The evidence shows that on May 10, 1986, Govantes accompanied Pupo from Florida to North Carolina where they were met by Winford Grainger and Raymond Allen. When the four men arrived at Allen’s auto shop, Govantes brought in a tote bag, and Pupo opened it. The bag contained a sizeable quantity of cocaine, which Allen tested in the presence of the others. Again in Govantes’ presence the other three men discussed the purity of the cocaine. Allen then removed the cocaine from the office and returned with a small quantity, which all four men snorted. Go-vantes and Pupo then booked a nearby motel room in North Carolina where they remained for nearly three days. On May 18, 1986, Pupo received a telephone call at the motel from Allen during which Pupo and Allen discussed both the ongoing drug transaction and a possible future sale. During that conversation Allen said “George [Govantes] is going crazy, man.”
Govantes argues that mere knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of a crime is not enough to establish that an individual is part of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. See United States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360 (4th Cir.1984). Nor is mere presence at the scene of a distribution of drugs sufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. See United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.1983). This statement of the law is, of course, correct. We cannot say, however, that a reasonable jury could not have concluded, from the evidence presented, that Govantes was a knowing participant in the conspiracy. He carried the tote bag containing the cocaine, and he remained in a motel room with Pupo for three days until Allen called to report that the transaction was complete. The jury could properly conclude that these actions were more consistent with participation than they were with mere acquiescence. The jury could further believe from Pupo’s statement, “George is going crazy, man,” that Go-vantes was a participant in the conspiracy.
Although the evidence of Govantes’ participation in the conspiracy was not compelling, it was sufficient to support the verdict. We therefore affirm Govantes’ conviction on Count I.
II.
The attack on Counts III and IV by Pupo is more serious. Counts III and IV were single-paragraph counts charging possession with intent to distribute and actual distribution of cocaine.1 A comparison between the elements of the offense shown in the indictment and the elements set out in the statute shows that both of these counts failed to allege, either expressly or through words of import, that the defendants acted “knowingly or intentionally.”2 [1239]*1239It is well established that an indictment is defective if it fails to allege elements of scienter that are expressly contained in the statute that describes the offense. Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932). “Knowingly or intentionally” is a definite element of the offense charged under 18 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). Under similar circumstances, we held in Finn v. United States, 256 F.2d 304, 306 (4th Cir.1958), that “[w]here willfulness or knowledge is made an element of the crime, the statutory requirement is not to be ignored. The charge must either include these terms, or words of similar import.”3 The words “knowingly or intentionally” themselves “or words of similar import” did not appear in the count attacked, and, therefore, the count was found defective. That case is apposite here.
We refuse to follow the case on which the district court relied in dismissing the objection, United States v. Arteaga-Limones, 529 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 315, 50 L.Ed. 2d 286 (1976), in which the court held that scienter was adequately charged if the indictment also cited the statute itself. That position is contrary to our own precedents as well as the law in a majority of the circuits. See Finn, supra. We have uniformly dismissed on objection before verdict indictments for failure to include an essential statutory element despite the inclusion of a citation to the statute itself in the indictment. See United States v. Hooker, 841 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir.1988); United States v. Hayes, 775 F.2d 1279, 1282 (4th Cir.1985); United States v. Pomponio, 517 F.2d 460, 461 (4th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015, 96 S.Ct. 448, 46 L.Ed.2d 386 (1975). We hold that a mere citation to the applicable statute does not give the defendant notice of the nature of the offense. An indictment that must rely on a statutory citation does not “fully, directly, and expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the elements necessary to constitute the offense intended to be punished.” See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2907-08, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). Furthermore, a statutory citation does not ensure that the grand jury has considered and found all essential elements of the offense charged. It therefore fails to satisfy the Fifth Amendment guarantee that no person be held to answer for an infamous crime unless on indictment of a grand jury. See Hooker, supra.
As we stated in Hooker, when an indictment fails to include an essential element of the offense charged, it thereby fails to charge any federal offense and a conviction under the indictment may not stand, provided the omission is timely raised. Such an objection is timely filed at any time prior to verdict. Fed.R.Crim.P. 12(b). In this case, the objection was raised at the conclusion of the government’s case and before verdict. The objection in this case was thus timely and should have been sustained. The argument of the government for a liberalization of the rule that the failure of the indictment to include an essential element of the crime would render the indictment in this case valid in this case overlooks that such liberalization is allowable only where the objection is raised after verdict. This is implicit in the language in Finn v. United States, supra, 256 F.2d at 307, in which Judge Sobeloff said:
Indictments and informations are construed more liberally after verdict than before, and every intendment is then indulged in support of the sufficiency.
The contention here was raised before verdict and the liberalization rule is inapplicable. Nor will the fact that the district judge in his jury instructions correctly identified all the elements of the crime charged render the omission in the indictment of such allegation harmless, provided, of course, the objection is raised before verdict.
[1240]*1240We therefore must vacate the convictions on Counts III and IV.
III.
A crucial witness against the defendants was Winford Grainger, an unindicted coconspirator who testified under a court-ordered grant of immunity. Because an immunized witness may have an incentive to falsify his testimony, the court carefully instructed the jury to examine and weigh Grainger’s testimony “with greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses.” The court further warned the jury not to convict any defendant “upon the unsupported testimony of such a witness unless you believe that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.”
The defendants contend that the court erred in giving this instruction rather than the instruction proposed by the defendants. Although the defendants’ proposed instruction put greater emphasis on the witness’ incentive to falsify his testimony, we cannot say that the instruction given by the court was inaccurate or inadequate. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the court’s refusal to give the particular instruction proposed by the defendants.
IV.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor made statements that allegedly were improper and prejudicial. His statement that he believed the evidence proved that the defendants were guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, however, was not an improper suggestion that he had personal knowledge of their guilt. The statement was merely an alternative — albeit less than desirable — form of arguing to the jury that the evidence adduced proved the defendants’ guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The prosecutor closed his argument by urging the jury to “make that statement so that we can address these types of conspiracies that are taking place in our community.” This statement is improper because it could suggest to the jury that they should convict the defendants not for their participation in these crimes, but merely to make a statement against narcotics crimes in general or to prevent future crimes. The defendants successfully objected to this argument, but they did not request a curative instruction. Although we believe a curative instruction may have been proper, we cannot say that the court’s failure to give such an instruction rises to the level of plain error. Applying the analytical framework set out in United States v. Harrison, 716 F.2d 1050, 1052 (4th Cir.1983), cert1. denied, 466 U.S. 972, 104 S.Ct. 2345, 80 L.Ed.2d 819 (1984), we can see that the improper remarks were isolated and were not deliberately made to divert the jury’s attention to extraneous matters. Although the evidence of guilt was not overwhelming, especially as to appellant Govantes, it was adequate. Finally, the degree to which the remarks could have misled and prejudiced the jury was relatively small. Therefore, we find no reversible error in the prosecutor’s uncured statements.
V.
A significant piece of evidence against appellant Pupo was a recording of the telephone conversation between Allen and Pupo on May 13, 1986. The recording was made without a wire intercept order but allegedly with the consent of Allen. At a suppression hearing, Allen testified that he had not made the call voluntarily, but had agreed to the placement and recording of the call only after being beaten by the police and threatened with further physical harm if he did not cooperate. Allen’s brother and Allen’s girlfriend corroborated the existence of his injuries. Both testified that Allen had told them that he made the call out of fear of reprisal by the law enforcement officers. A medical record also was put into evidence showing Allen’s injuries.
Various law enforcement officers testified that the only force they had used against Allen was that necessary to subdue him when he tried to avoid arrest. A physician’s assistant who had examined Allen in the hospital testified that Allen did not appear to have been beaten.
[1241]*1241The court concluded that Allen had not been beaten nor had he been coerced. Therefore, it found that Allen voluntarily consented to record his conversation with Pupo, and it denied the motion to suppress the recording. Following the jury verdict, but before entry of judgment, the defendants moved for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence regarding Allen’s consent. This evidence consisted of an agreement by Allen’s attorney to testify that Allen told him, shortly after Allen’s arrest, that he had been beaten by law enforcement officers. Furthermore, the lawyer agreed to testify that he had immediately told the Assistant United States Attorney handling the case about the alleged beating.
The court denied the motion for a new trial on the ground that the new evidence was merely cumulative and would not have resulted in a different ruling on the motion to suppress. We agree and find no error in the denial of the motion for a new trial.
For the reasons stated above, the conviction of Govantes on Count I is affirmed. The convictions of Pupo on Count I and V are affirmed, and the convictions on Counts III and IV are vacated. On remand the court is directed to dismiss Counts III and IV without prejudice to the government to reindict and reprosecute Pupo on those counts. Hayes, 775 F.2d at 1238.
AFFIRMED IN PART VACATED IN PART and REMANDED.