United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.

97 F. Supp. 2d 248, 50 ERC (BNA) 1772, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5689, 2000 WL 554441
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. New York
DecidedMay 1, 2000
Docket87-CV-920, 91-CV-1132
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 97 F. Supp. 2d 248 (United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 248, 50 ERC (BNA) 1772, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5689, 2000 WL 554441 (N.D.N.Y. 2000).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM — DECISION & ORDER

McAVOY, District Judge.

I. Procedural History

On June 10, 1987, the United States of America and the State of New York (collectively “the government”) initiated an action against 83 business entities to recover response costs pursuant to Section 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 9601, et seq., in connection with the clean-up costs of a hazardous waste site formerly owned by Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc. (“PAS”). Shortly after commencement of that action, the government entered into a consent decree with 82 of the defendants, recovering approximately $9.1 million of the approximately $12.3 million in response costs incurred through April 1,1987. The present litigation proceeded against Acan Aumi-num Corporation (“Acan”), the only non-settling defendant.

In February 1988, Acan commenced a third-party action against Cornell University (“Cornell”). That action sought a declaration that Cornell was jointly and severally liable for the response costs incurred by the government relative to PAS and an order directing Cornell to contribute its fair share of the costs.

*253 In January of 1991, this Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government, holding Alcan jointly and severally liable for approximately $4 million in response costs at PAS. See United States v. Alcan, 755 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y.1991) (“Alcan-PAS”). The Court also granted Alcan’s motion against third-party defendant, Cornell, and found that a hearing was necessary to determine Cornell’s fair share of response costs. See id.

On November 19 and 20, 1991, the Court held a hearing to determine Cornell’s fair share of the response costs incurred by the government at PAS. The Court adopted the six-factor fair share allocation test set forth in United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir.1991), and found Cornell liable for six percent of the response costs recovered from Alcan and, thus, the Court awarded Alcan $310,540.92.

On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment with respect to the imposition of liability against Alcan for response costs at PAS and the finding that Alcan was entitled to contribution from Cornell. See United States v. Alcan, 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir.1993). However, the Second Circuit reversed the Court’s finding that the government was entitled to summary judgment on the issue of damages. See id. In “essentially” adopting the reasoning of the Third Circuit in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 267-271 (3d Cir.1992) (“Alcan-Butlei•”), the court found that the common law scheme of joint and several liability applies to CERCLA. Under this rubric,

where two or more tortfeasors act independently and cause a distinct or single harm, for which there is a reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of each, then each is liable for damages only for its own portion of harm. In other words, the damages are apportioned. But where each tortfeasor causes a single indivisible harm, then damages are not apportioned and each is liable in damages for the entire harm.

990 F.2d at 722 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433(A)(1965)). ■ The Second Circuit “candidly admitted” that its holding brought causation into CERCLA, a strict liability statute, through the back door, but limited the “special exception to the usual absence of causation” to situations where a defendant’s “pollutants did not contribute more than background contamination and also cannot concentrate.” Id. Thus, the court held:

Alcan may escape liability if it either succeeds in proving that its oil emulsion, when mixed with other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the release and the clean-up costs that followed, or contributed at most to only a divisible portion of harm.

Id. (citing Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 270). The court further instructed that Alcan “may present evidence relevant to establishing divisibility of harm, such as, proof disclosing the relative toxicity, migratory potential, degree of migration, and synergistic capacities of the hazardous substances at the site” to show that the harm at PAS was divisible. Id. (citing Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 270 n. 29, 271; United States v. Monsanto, Co., 858 F.2d 160, 172 n. 26 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156, 104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989)). Finally, the court held that if Alcan can show divisibility of harm they must also provide a “reasonable basis for apportionment of liability.” Id.

At that time, the case United States v. Alcan Aluminum, 91-CV-1132 (“Alcan-Fulton”), involving clean-up costs at a su-perfund site in Fulton, New York was also pending before the Court. On December 1, 1993, the Court consolidated Alcan-Fulton with the PAS case.

In May of 1996, the government moved for summary judgment against Alcan on two issues: (1) 'liability in the Alcan-Ful-ton case and (2) divisibility of harm and apportionment of costs in Alcan-PAS. Al-can opposed this motion, cross-moved for summary judgment on the same issues, *254 and moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming that CERC-LA (1) cannot be applied retroactively and (2) is violative of the Commerce Clause. On October 28, 1996, the Court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment with respect to liability at the Alcan-Fulton site 1 , denied Alcan’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and reserved decision pending re-briefing on the issues of divisibility and apportionment of harm. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 1996 WL 637659 (N.D.N.Y. Oct.28, 1996).

After considering the supplemental briefing submitted by both parties, the Court denied the government’s motion for summary judgment; finding that genuine issues of fact existed with respect to the constituents of Alcan’s emulsion; 2 whether the emulsion contributed to the response costs and clean-up; and whether the metals in Alcan’s emulsion could have concentrated and, thus, posed an environmental threat. See United States v. Alcan, 1997 WL 727506, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Aug.20, 1997).

On October 29, 1998, Alcan moved to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6), asserting that the retroactive application of CERCLA is unconstitutional in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Eastern Enter. v.

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97 F. Supp. 2d 248, 50 ERC (BNA) 1772, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5689, 2000 WL 554441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-alcan-aluminum-corp-nynd-2000.