United States v. A. L. Ramsey, Circuit Court Clerk and Registrar, Clarke County, Mississippi, and State of Mississippi

331 F.2d 824
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedApril 23, 1964
Docket20596_1
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 331 F.2d 824 (United States v. A. L. Ramsey, Circuit Court Clerk and Registrar, Clarke County, Mississippi, and State of Mississippi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. A. L. Ramsey, Circuit Court Clerk and Registrar, Clarke County, Mississippi, and State of Mississippi, 331 F.2d 824 (5th Cir. 1964).

Opinions

HUNTER, District Judge:

In July of 1961 the Attorney General of the United States filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi against A. L. Ramsey, Circuit Court Clerk and Registrar, Clarke County, Mississippi, and the State of Mississippi, under the Civil Rights Act of 1957 and 1960 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 et seq.). The complaint alleges that defendants, in conducting registration for voting, have engaged in certain racially discriminatory acts and practices which deprived Negro citizens of Clarke County of the right to register to vote; that these deprivations were pursuant to a pattern and practice, and that unless restrained, defendants will continue to engage in such acts and practices. The prayer is for:

A. A finding of a pattern and practice and the issuance of an injunction ordering defendants to refrain from:

(1) Engaging in any act which would deprive any citizen in Clarke County of the right to vote on account of hi’s race or color;

(2) Engaging in any act which would delay, prevent, hinder or discourage qualified Negro citizens, on account of their race or color, from applying for, and becoming, registered voters;

(3) Failing to register any Negro applicant who possesses the same or similar qualifications of the least qualified white person who has been registered.

After a long, hard, and well fought trial, the District Court made specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered its decree, which:

1. Dismissed the complaint against Mississippi;

2. Found that Negro citizens had been discriminated against by the Registrar, but that this discrimination did not form a pattern or practice of discrimination within the meaning and contemplation of 42 U.S.C.A. 1971(e);

[826]*8263. Granted to the United States injunctive relief against the County Registrar, A. L. Ramsey, enjoining and restraining him from engaging in any act or practices which would deprive any citizen in Clarke County of the right to vote on account of his race or color. The injunction was detailed.1

It is fair and accurate to say that in substance what the District Court ordered was full and non-diseriminatory compliance with the law of Mississippi. No finding of any unconstitutionality of any Mississippi constitutional or statutory provision is sought by the United States.2 However, the United States appealed, assigning three specific errors:

(1) The District Court erred in dismissing the amended complaint as to the State of Mississippi.

(2) The District Court erred in refusing to find that the discrimination found to have been committed constituted a pattern or practice of discrimination.

(3) The District Court erred in not granting the complete relief sought by appellant as outlined in appellant’s proposed decree.

The initial error assigned is the District Court’s dismissal of the State of Mississippi as a party. Under our holding in United States v. Atkins, 5 Cir., 323 F.2d 733, 739, we do not think that it was improper to eliminate the State as a party. There, we referred to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971(c), as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1960, § 601(b), and to the case of United States v. Alabama, 1960, 362 U.S. 602, 80 S.Ct. 924, 4 L.E.2d 982, and stated:

“In that case, the Supreme Court intimated no views upon 'any defenses, constitutional or otherwise, that may be asserted by the State.’ We follow the same course in the present case.”

Inasmuch as full and complete relief can be afforded here without enjoining the State, we hold that the court below was correct in its dismissal of the State as a party.

Some discussion was had between the parties in the argument of this case concerning the application of the freezing principle. As shown in the Atkins decision, this Court has had the principle under discussion, but has not been faced with a case which required a decision on the subject. Under the facts here, we think that adequate and proper relief is provided by the judgment of the court below, as hereinafter modified, and we pretermit further discussion of the principle.

And the same is true of the appellant’s contention with respect to pattern and practice.

Defendant vigorously challenges the finding of discrimination. In the face of testimony which witness by witness convicts Ramsey of palpable discrimination, the District Court was certainly correct in its finding of discrimination. The Government argues strenuously that the lower court erred in not finding a pattern of discrimination. Assuming that the District Judge would have been justified in finding the existence of a “pattern or practice of discrimination,” we pretermit any definitive action on this facet of the case because we feel it was within the District Judge’s discretion to omit action on that phase of the complaint (United States v. Raines, D.C., 203 F.Supp. 147 (1961)). It is apparent to us that the District Judge has obviously made an intelligent and sincere effort to guarantee to all persons in Clarke County, regardless of race, a full opportunity to register and vote without discrimination. He has granted a sweeping injunction against discrimination. The relief granted appears to be carefully designed to provide to Negro citizens of Clarke County the greatest pro[827]*827‘tection and safeguard of their right to register and vote, while maintaining, as far as is consistent with the requirements of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the delicate balance between State and Federal relations. Registration is a State function; it can best be carried out by the appropriate State officials. But, if one man’s rights are denied, the rights of all are endangered. In our country the courts have a most important obligation to protect the rights of all and to do it as harmoniously as possible. In his endeavor to do just this, the District Judge obviously thought it best not to make a specific finding that there was a “pattern.” We do not believe that by the language of subsection (e) of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1971 the Congress of the United States intended to impose upon the district courts the mandatory duty of making a finding as to whether a previously found deprivation of rights or privileges was or is pursuant to a pattern or practice, regardless of the District Court’s opinion as to the necessity or non-necessity of making such a finding. A federal district court is a court of equity, and as such has broad powers of discretion. Judge Cox heard the evidence; he knows the circumstances ; he is the appropriate person to decide what orders are proper and necessary. Discretion is a fundamental attribute of equity. “Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling public and private needs.” This language is quoted from the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083. What the Supreme Court said there dealing with the question of segregation in the public schools is equally applicable here. And cf. United States v. Raines, D.C., 203 F.Supp. 147, citing Hecht Company v.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Green Party v. Kemp
171 F. Supp. 3d 1340 (N.D. Georgia, 2016)
State v. Guibilio
353 A.2d 165 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1976)
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc.
517 F.2d 299 (Fifth Circuit, 1975)
United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc.
474 F.2d 115 (Fifth Circuit, 1973)
United States v. Real Estate Development Corporation
347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Mississippi, 1972)
United States v. Ironworkers Local 86
443 F.2d 544 (Ninth Circuit, 1971)
United States v. Ramsey
353 F.2d 650 (Fifth Circuit, 1965)
United States v. McClellan
248 F. Supp. 62 (S.D. Mississippi, 1965)
United States v. William B. Mandell Co.
242 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pennsylvania, 1965)
United States v. Cox
342 F.2d 167 (Fifth Circuit, 1965)
United States v. Mayton
335 F.2d 153 (Fifth Circuit, 1964)
United States v. State of Mississippi
229 F. Supp. 925 (S.D. Mississippi, 1964)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
331 F.2d 824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-a-l-ramsey-circuit-court-clerk-and-registrar-clarke-ca5-1964.