United States of America v. Charod Becton; Charod Becton v. United States of America

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided April 9, 2026·No. 1:24-cv-03439·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------------------------x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

02-cr-451 (PKC)

-against- ORDER

CHAROD BECTON,

Defendant. -----------------------------------------------------------x

CHAROD BECTON,

Movant, -against- 24-cv-3439 (PKC)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. __________________________________________x CASTEL, U.S.D.J. Petitioner Charod Becton, who is proceeding pro se, moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 based on ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons below, the motion is dismissed as untimely.

BACKGROUND On November 28, 2018, the Court sentenced Becton principally to life imprisonment plus a consecutive term of five years’ imprisonment. Becton had initially pled guilty to fifteen counts on November 1, 2006, but entered a plea modification agreement in March 2018 in which one count was dismissed. The Second Circuit denied Becton’s appeal in a summary order dated September 21, 2020. United States v. Henderson, 827 F. App’x 105 (2d Cir. 2020). On February 22, 2021, the Supreme Court denied Becton’s petition for writ of certiorari. Becton v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1431 (Feb. 22, 2021).

On November 23, 2021, Becton, proceeding pro se, moved this Court to compel his former counsel to provide him with his case file. (ECF 278.) Becton’s former counsel submitted that it would be “incredibly burdensome, if not impossible” to provide Becton with a physical copy of the case file (an estimated 18 banker’s boxes worth of paper) while he was incarcerated. (ECF 279.) The Court declined to authorize the use of CJA funds to digitize the case file based on Becton’s assertion that there may be materials in the file relevant to a future motion without a particularized showing of need. (ECF 280.) Becton reports that his former counsel did nonetheless provide him with most of the case file in June 2023. On February 8, 2024, Becton, through a new attorney, submitted an unfiled motion requesting, among other things, appointment of counsel for the purpose of preparing a section 2255 motion.1 (See ECF 297 at 2.) The Court denied that motion as moot, (id. at 3), 0F because Becton, proceeding pro se, submitted a 2255 motion that was docketed on April 30, 2024, (ECF 292).

1 Becton seeks to include “by reference arguments raised in his February 8, 2024 motion for discovery as well as the reply dated April 15, 2024, but otherwise is proceeding [ ] pro se[.]” (ECF 14 at 2, 24-cv-3439.) An attorney delivered to the undersigned’s Chambers unfiled motions for discovery in aid of a section 2255 motion and appointment of counsel, but the same attorney emphatically stated, “I do not represent Mr. Becton for the § 2255 petition itself[.]” (ECF 294.) For reasons explained and in the exercise of discretion, the Court declined to permit this sort of “hybrid or attempted hybrid” representation. (ECF 297.) Accordingly, the Court does not consider on the section 2255 motion the February 8, 2024, and April 15, 2024, submissions of the attorney. BECTON’S MOTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS Section 2255(f) creates a one-year statute of limitations. The limitation period begins to run on the latest of the following dates: (1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final; (2) the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action; (3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). The timeliness of a section 2255 motion is assessed on a “claim-by-claim basis.” United States v. Herbert, 03-cr-211, 2014 WL 3579806, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 21, 2014) (Stein, J.). Courts deciding the applicability of section 2255(f)(4) ask “when a duly diligent person in petitioner’s circumstances would have discovered” the facts underlying petitioner’s claims. Wims v. United States, 225 F.3d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 2000). “[T]he burden of showing due diligence under § 2255(f)(4) rests on” the petitioner. Gacko v. United States, 09-cv-4938, 2010 WL 2076020, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2010). Becton’s conviction became final for the purposes of subsection (f)(1) on February 22, 2021, when the Supreme Court denied Becton’s certiorari petition. See Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003) (“Finality attaches when this Court affirms a conviction on the merits on direct review or denies a petition for a writ of certiorari, or when the time for filing a certiorari petition expires.”). This motion is thus untimely under subsection (f)(1) whether it is deemed filed on April 12, 2024, as the signature page of Becton’s motion suggests, or April 25, 2024, as the government suggests.2 1F Becton urges that the limitations period is instead governed by subsection (f)(4), as he only uncovered the factual predicates for the instant claims on June 9, 2023, when counsel provided him with his case file. (See ECF 1 at 18, 24-cv-3439; ECF 14 at 2–3, 24-cv-3439.) But section 2255(f)(4) is inapplicable, not because of the degree of diligence Becton exercised in obtaining the case file, but because Becton does not appear to rely on any facts he uncovered in the file. Indeed, Becton argues that the file is missing “crucial documents that could prove ineffectiveness.” (ECF 14 at 3.) The motion instead depends on facts of which he has been aware all along, or facts he could have discovered with due diligence outside of the case file. Becton claims counsel erroneously assured him that he would receive substantial assistance credit and a sentence of only 10 to 15 years (Ground 1), that counsel misled him into pleading guilty because his co-defendant was sentenced to life while he was sentenced to life

plus five years (Ground 3), that his plea was not knowing or voluntary because counsel did not inform him that he could receive a life sentence (Ground 5), that his “speedy sentencing” rights were violated (Ground 6), and that counsel did not review with him the various plea deals and presentence reports prepared in this case (Ground 7). The necessary facts to assert these claims were known or should have been known to Becton as the recipient of his attorney’s advice and an attendee at his own sentencing and plea

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United States of America v. Charod Becton; Charod Becton v. United States of America, (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

United States of America v. Charod Becton; Charod Becton v. United States of America (United States of America v. Charod Becton; Charod Becton v. United States of America) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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