DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
Jose Manuel Segura-Del Real pleaded. guilty to a one-count indictment for illegal reentry by an alien after deportation subsequent to conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). The district court departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced Segura-Del Real to 41 months in prison. Segura-Del Real appeals this sentence arguing that his prior criminal record, which placed him in criminal history category VI, was not sufficiently egregious to permit the court to depart upward from that category, and in any event the extent of the district court’s upward departure was unreasonable.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. We hold that a sentencing court may depart upward from criminal history category VI based upon a defendant’s repetition of a series of offenses which are the same or similar to the defendant’s crime of conviction; and that the record supports the reasonableness of the extent of the district court’s departure.:
FACTS
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Segura-Del Real had an offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of VI. The district court found that he had 17 prior convictions which added up to 26 criminal history points. He had several convictions for immigration violations, including one previous conviction for illegal reentry.
At the first hearing to determine Segura-Del Real’s sentence, the district court stated it was inclined to depart upward and sentence Segura-Del Real to the statutory maximum of 5 years. The court commented:
[Segura-Del Real’s] handling or his treatment of his status in reentry into the United States is what I would call a seofflaw. He just goes out and in again without any appreciation for what he is doing by way of violating United States laws. And I don’t see why the citizens of this district or law enforcement in this district should be made to put up with a person with 17 prior convictions.
The court postponed sentencing so that Seg-ura-Del Real would have time to prepare arguments against imposition of the maximum five-year sentence.
At the second sentencing hearing, Segura-Del Real argued against departure. He suggested, however, that if the district court were to depart, the appropriate sentence range should be between 45 and 48 months, rather than the maximum of five years. His counsel justified this suggested sentence range by arguing that if Segura-Del Real’s criminal history category were extended incrementally beyond category VI, his 26 criminal history points would place him in theoretical criminal history category X. This category would have a sentence range of 45-48 months. He argued that using this meth[277]*277odology, Segura-Del Real should be sentenced within this range.
The district court commented that the “sheer magnitude” of the number of Segura-Del Real’s convictions “indicates that his criminal history category is understated.” The court acknowledged the minor nature of most of Segura-Del Real’s prior crimes, but emphasized that among those convictions were repeated immigration violations. The court then departed upward pursuant to Guidelines § 4A1.3, and sentenced Segura-Del Real to 41 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the question whether a district court has authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir.1995). We review the extent of the district court’s upward departure “to determine whether it is ‘unreasonable.’ ” United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3).
B. Authority to Depart
Departure from the Sentencing Guidelines is warranted when a defendant’s criminal history category significantly under-represents the seriousness of his criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. Guidelines § 4A1.3 (1994). A district court may not depart upward from category VI, however, except in the unusual case where the defendant’s criminal record is significantly more serious than that of other defendants whose criminal records place them in that category. United States v. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir.1993).
An upward departure from category VI is permissible when a district court finds that a defendant has a long record of criminal conduct of escalating seriousness and prior incarcerations have not affected his propensity to commit crimes. United States v. Singleton, 917 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir.1991). The mere fact that a defendant has a long criminal record, however, will not, of itself, support an upward departure. United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir.1995); Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d at 322-23. In Carrillo-Alvarez, we emphasized that it is the quality of the defendant’s criminal history not the quantity which is decisive. Id.
In examining the quality of a defendant’s criminal history, a district court may consider the defendant’s repetition of the same or similar offenses, and may base its upward departure on this circumstance. In United States v. Chavez-Botello, 905 F.2d 279 (9th Cir.1990) we stated:
“The recidivist’s relapse into the same criminal behavior demonstrates his lack of recognition of the gravity of his original wrong, entails greater culpability for the offense with which he is currently charged, and suggests an increased likelihood that the offense will be repeated.” Since the similarity between the prior and current offenses is not considered when computing the criminal history category, departure for this reason is permissible.
Id. at 281 (quoting United States v. De Luna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir.1989) (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F,2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Merino, 44 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir.1994).
We' have not considered, however, whether a criminal history which reflects the repetition of the same or similar offenses may warrant an upward departure from category VI.
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DAVID R. THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.
Jose Manuel Segura-Del Real pleaded. guilty to a one-count indictment for illegal reentry by an alien after deportation subsequent to conviction in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1). The district court departed upward from the Sentencing Guidelines and sentenced Segura-Del Real to 41 months in prison. Segura-Del Real appeals this sentence arguing that his prior criminal record, which placed him in criminal history category VI, was not sufficiently egregious to permit the court to depart upward from that category, and in any event the extent of the district court’s upward departure was unreasonable.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm. We hold that a sentencing court may depart upward from criminal history category VI based upon a defendant’s repetition of a series of offenses which are the same or similar to the defendant’s crime of conviction; and that the record supports the reasonableness of the extent of the district court’s departure.:
FACTS
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, Segura-Del Real had an offense level of 10 and a criminal history category of VI. The district court found that he had 17 prior convictions which added up to 26 criminal history points. He had several convictions for immigration violations, including one previous conviction for illegal reentry.
At the first hearing to determine Segura-Del Real’s sentence, the district court stated it was inclined to depart upward and sentence Segura-Del Real to the statutory maximum of 5 years. The court commented:
[Segura-Del Real’s] handling or his treatment of his status in reentry into the United States is what I would call a seofflaw. He just goes out and in again without any appreciation for what he is doing by way of violating United States laws. And I don’t see why the citizens of this district or law enforcement in this district should be made to put up with a person with 17 prior convictions.
The court postponed sentencing so that Seg-ura-Del Real would have time to prepare arguments against imposition of the maximum five-year sentence.
At the second sentencing hearing, Segura-Del Real argued against departure. He suggested, however, that if the district court were to depart, the appropriate sentence range should be between 45 and 48 months, rather than the maximum of five years. His counsel justified this suggested sentence range by arguing that if Segura-Del Real’s criminal history category were extended incrementally beyond category VI, his 26 criminal history points would place him in theoretical criminal history category X. This category would have a sentence range of 45-48 months. He argued that using this meth[277]*277odology, Segura-Del Real should be sentenced within this range.
The district court commented that the “sheer magnitude” of the number of Segura-Del Real’s convictions “indicates that his criminal history category is understated.” The court acknowledged the minor nature of most of Segura-Del Real’s prior crimes, but emphasized that among those convictions were repeated immigration violations. The court then departed upward pursuant to Guidelines § 4A1.3, and sentenced Segura-Del Real to 41 months in prison. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review de novo the question whether a district court has authority to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir.1995). We review the extent of the district court’s upward departure “to determine whether it is ‘unreasonable.’ ” United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 747 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc), citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(3).
B. Authority to Depart
Departure from the Sentencing Guidelines is warranted when a defendant’s criminal history category significantly under-represents the seriousness of his criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes. Guidelines § 4A1.3 (1994). A district court may not depart upward from category VI, however, except in the unusual case where the defendant’s criminal record is significantly more serious than that of other defendants whose criminal records place them in that category. United States v. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d 316, 320 (9th Cir.1993).
An upward departure from category VI is permissible when a district court finds that a defendant has a long record of criminal conduct of escalating seriousness and prior incarcerations have not affected his propensity to commit crimes. United States v. Singleton, 917 F.2d 411, 413 (9th Cir.1990); see also United States v. Durham, 941 F.2d 858, 863 (9th Cir.1991). The mere fact that a defendant has a long criminal record, however, will not, of itself, support an upward departure. United States v. George, 56 F.3d 1078, 1085 (9th Cir.1995); Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d at 322-23. In Carrillo-Alvarez, we emphasized that it is the quality of the defendant’s criminal history not the quantity which is decisive. Id.
In examining the quality of a defendant’s criminal history, a district court may consider the defendant’s repetition of the same or similar offenses, and may base its upward departure on this circumstance. In United States v. Chavez-Botello, 905 F.2d 279 (9th Cir.1990) we stated:
“The recidivist’s relapse into the same criminal behavior demonstrates his lack of recognition of the gravity of his original wrong, entails greater culpability for the offense with which he is currently charged, and suggests an increased likelihood that the offense will be repeated.” Since the similarity between the prior and current offenses is not considered when computing the criminal history category, departure for this reason is permissible.
Id. at 281 (quoting United States v. De Luna-Trujillo, 868 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir.1989) (citation omitted)); see also United States v. Montenegro-Rojo, 908 F,2d 425, 429 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Merino, 44 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir.1994).
We' have not considered, however, whether a criminal history which reflects the repetition of the same or similar offenses may warrant an upward departure from category VI. Logically, if an upward departure is permissible at all, it should make no difference which category the district court departs from. But category VI is different from the other categories. Defendants are placed in category VI because they are the most intractable of all defendants. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d at 318 n. 5. It is the very circumstance of their recidivism which puts them in this category. Id. Therefore, to depart upward from category VI requires that the defendant’s conduct be significantly more serious than that of other defendants in the same category. Id.
[278]*278Segura-Del Real’s seventeen prior convictions included convictions for auto theft, attempted auto theft, three petty thefts, and first and second-degree burglary. His convictions also included three illegal entries into the United States during which he was assisting other illegal aliens to enter this country, reentry as a deported alien, and four convictions of aiding and abetting the illegal entry of other aliens. The district court appropriately focused on Segura-Del Real’s repetitive immigration violations. As to these violations, his criminal history demonstrated a total lack of recognition of the gravity of such offenses and his propensity to continue to commit them.
We conclude Segura-Del Real’s numerous and repetitive immigration violations warranted an upward departure from category VI of the Sentencing Guidelines.1
C. Extent of Departure
Segura-Del Real next argues that the extent of the district court’s upward departure is unreasonable, because the court failed to provide a statement of reasons justifying the departiere. See United States v. Hines, 26 F.3d 1469, 1478 (9th Cir.1994). We disagree.
At the sentencing hearing, Segura-Del Real suggested that if the court did depart upward, an appropriate sentence would be 45-58 months. The rationale provided by Segura-Del Real was that if his category VI criminal history category were extended out, a defendant with 252 criminal history points would be in theoretical criminal history category X, with a corresponding sentence range of 45-48 months. The district court used this suggested methodology, but sentenced Segura-Del Real to 41 months ■ in prison. Having suggested the methodology for the distriet court to follow in determining the extent of its departure, Segura-Del Real cannot now complain the district court erred by employing such a methodology. To hold otherwise would be to permit a defendant to invite the court to err and then complain of the error the defendant suggested. See United States v. Frank, 36 F.3d 898, 903 (9th Cir.1994).
AFFIRMED.