United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton

188 F.2d 674, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 3744
CourtCourt of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
DecidedApril 5, 1951
Docket10624
StatusPublished
Cited by15 cases

This text of 188 F.2d 674 (United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Britton, 188 F.2d 674, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 3744 (D.C. Cir. 1951).

Opinion

STONE, Circuit Judge.

Appellant is the insurance carrier for William J. Nicholas, t/a Williams’ Waste Oil Service, Inc., under the “Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act” of March 4, 1927, 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 et seq., as made applicable to the District of Columbia, Act of May 17, 1928, 45 Stat. 600, D.C.Code, 36-501 (1940), 33 U.S.C.A. § 901 note. While the insurance was in effect, Ivor Jones, an employee of insured, was killed in the course of such employment. A Deputy Commissioner awarded compensation to his mother, a minor sister, and a minor brother. The District Court upheld the award in an action by appellant to enjoin enforcement thereof.

While argued from various angles, the only issue is whether the evidence justifies a determination that this mother, sister and brother are dependents within the intent of the Act. The requirement of the *675 Act goes beyond mere receipt of benefits. Bare benefits may result from gifts or from payments for isolated, particular purposes. For dependency, within the Act, there must be a legal or a voluntarily created status where the contributions are made for the purpose and havé the result of maintaining or helping to maintain the dependent in his customary standard of living. It is by this measure, we must determine dependency here.

Neither this nor the trial court is a trier of facts. O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 1951, 340 U.S. 504, 71 S.Ct. 470; Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 477, 67 S.Ct. 801, 91 L.Ed. 1028; Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 568, 64 S.Ct. 747, 88 L.Ed. 430; South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251, 257, 60 S.Ct. 544, 84 L.Ed. 732. Dependency, within the Act, is a matter of fact. Ottenstein v. Britton, 82 U.S.App.D.C. 10, 160 F.2d 253. Our duty is confined to determining a question of law: Was there no substantial evidence to sustain the partial dependency of these three beneficiaries of the award? Since we do not weigh conflicting evidence, nor opposed inferences, both of which the trier of fact must resolve, we confine our statement of the evidence to that most favorable to the award.

Ivor had never married and was twenty-one years old. At the time of his death, September 4, 1948, and theretofore, except when he was in the Navy, he had lived at home. The family consisted of his parents, a sister (Janet Hood) and two brothers (William and George). Ivor was the oldest child, the others being minors at the time of his death, although George has since reached his majority.

For several years, the family lived in a large, rented house at 2150 Florida Avenue, N. W. in Washington. About Easter, 1948, the owner gave notice to vacate. Up to that time, four rooms had been let to roomers who took meals elsewhere. By June, 1948, all of the roomers had moved except one, who remained until the Jonés family moved out. After the notice to vacate, various attempts were made to secure a house. The result was the purchase of a house at 1411 Buchanan Street in August, for $16,950.00 —$3,000.00 down and $60.00 a week (covering principal, interest, taxes, etc.). This was the status at the time Ivor died. The move was made to this house a few days afterwards. This shift in residence caused changes in the family financial plan which need notice here.

Up to the notice to vacate, the family income came from the sources following. Payments from the roomers were about one hundred and thirty dollars a month. Otherwise, the family income came from earnings of the father, of Ivor and of George. The father (Lloyd) was employed at a daily wage which averaged ninety dollars a week. 1 Ivor first contributed to the family while he was in the Navy for twenty-one months ending in 1946. He listed no one as a dependent — leaving that space blank — but he sent twenty-five dollars a month from his pay, to be spent for furniture for the home. 2 After his discharge, his first employment (July, 1947) was at twenty-five dollars a week of which he contributed about fifteen dollars to the family expenses. This continued until February 13, 1948 when he was employed by Nicholas as a truck driver at a daily wage of twelve dollars. His weekly earnings increased from twenty-five dollars (his first week) up to sixty dollars and fifty cents (the seventh week). George was earning twenty-nine or thirty dollars a week from which he contributed about twenty dollars. The father and sons turned their earnings over to the mother, retaining or being given by her what they wished for clothing and spending money.

After the notice to vacate, the roomers left, except one, who paid $40.00 a month. The earnings of the father and George remained the same. Those of Ivor maintained an average higher level, ranging between $60.00 and $72.00 weekly during *676 July and August. For six weeks before the death of Ivor, the mother worked at a cafeteria, earning $37.50 a week, with two free meals daily. She never before worked for wages.

Up to the consideration of the purchase of the Buchanan Street residence, the contributions to the family support by the father, mother, Ivor and George went into a common fund from which all household expenses and rent were paid. There was no separate allotment of particular expenses to individual contributors. The father was apprehensive that he could not undertake this purchase. Ivor agreed to help all he could. The family was considering returning to Pennsylvania — the earlier home — because of difficulty in finding a place to live. Upon the assurance of Nicholas that the employment of the father and Ivor was secure, and his consent to sign the purchase loan note, the purchase' was made. The down payment was borrowed. In connection with the purchase the family plan was for the father to take care of the weekly payments of $60.00, and for Ivor to provide for the table. While this plan never became operative as to Ivor, because he was killed a few days before the family occupied the Buchanan place, yet the purchase was completed and the obligations in connection therewith were assumed before his death. This bears directly upon the situation of dependency at the time of his death.

There is no suggestion of extravagance by any member of this family. The need for all of these contributions for the support of the family is pathetically established by the fact that Nicholas loaned’the father $400.00 for funeral expenses of Ivor, although the Government paid social security benefits of $181.00, burial benefits of $105.50 and furnished a headstone. Also, the family has been kept going, since the death of Ivor, only by increased earnings of George, 3 by the labor of the mother, when she was able to work, and by help from a brother of the father.

There is one matter which could be passed by since the fact involved therein is the subject of conflicting evidence.

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Bluebook (online)
188 F.2d 674, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 293, 1951 U.S. App. LEXIS 3744, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-fidelity-guaranty-co-v-britton-cadc-1951.