[844]*844Clark, Judge.
This appeal involves a coverage question under the standard private automobile public liability insurance policy containing the language that "This policy does not apply: (g) To any automobile or trailer while maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise involved in the automobile business. . .”
Harnage to whom we will refer as "car owner” carried a public liability policy with United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company on his personal Chevrolet station wagon. Boyette, hereafter referred to as "service station operator,” carried a similar liability policy with the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Apparently, this was on his personal automobile because his State Farm policy contained the same exclusion as was in the car owner’s U. S. F. & G. policy even though Boyette was in the service station business. This exclusion stated "This policy does not apply: (g) To any automobile or trailer while maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business. . .” Both policies contained this special definition: " 'Automobile business’ means the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles.”
The automobile owner left his insured Chevrolet at the service station to be greased and serviced. The stipulation of facts agreed that "As accommodation to his customer, Jack Harnage [the car owner], L. L. Boyette, Sr. [the service station operator] promised Jack Harnage to return the motor vehicle to Jack Harnage at Harnage’s place of employment. After L. L. Boyette, Sr. had serviced said Chevrolet station wagon, he, L. L. Boyette, Sr. was returning the automobile to Jack Harnage and L. L. Boyette, Sr. was driving it for that purpose” (R. 54), when he had a collision with another car in which personal injuries were sustained by Carol Hall. She brought suit against both the service station operator and car owner for damages arising from that collision with the plaintiff therein recovering a final judgment jointly against the service station operator and the car owner in the total amount of $7,270.20. The stipulation between the parties does not contain the complaint and does not show who paid one-half of the judgment but does state that one-half was paid by the service station operator who also incurred attorney fees in the sum of $500 in the defense of that action.
The instant suit was brought by the service station operator against both the U. S. F. & G., that being the car owner’s insurer, [845]*845and State Farm which had issued the service station operator its public liability policy, for the one-half of the judgment paid by him plus the $500 attorney fee expense.
This matter was presented by stipulation of facts to the court for decision without the intervention of a jury. The trial judge accepted the stipulation as constituting the findings of fact. The court’s finding of law was that neither insurance company was relieved of liability under the exclusion reciting that "The court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff Boyette, in delivering the automobile to Harnage, its owner at the time of the alleged casualty was, as a matter of law, the agent of Harnage and Harnage was not employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business; accordingly the plaintiff Boyette was, while acting as such agent of Harnage, not employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.” (R. 70).
Since the insured automobile was an "owned automobile” under the U. S. F. & G. contract and a "non-owned automobile” under the State Farm policy the court further ruled State Farm would only be liable for excess coverage. As the primary coverage limits of U. S. F. & G. sufficed to pay the entire judgment the court exonerated State Farm which has not participated in this appeal. Held:
1. This is the fourth case in which this court has been called upon to consider the applicability of this "automobile business” exclusion clause. In the three previous cases we ruled there was no coverage. The first of these decisions was Public Indemnity Co. of Newark v. Yearwood, 50 Ga. App. 646 (179 SE 232) which is among those cases from a number of jurisdictions cited in 7 Blashfield Automobile Law & Practice (3d Ed.) § 315.16, page 638, as holding that there is no liability upon the insurer where the incident occurs while one in the specified class is driving, even though the driver might be acting at the specific request and for the benefit of the insured. The Yearwood case reasons at page 647 that "While it is true that policies of insurance should be construed so as to attain the object of the insurance and most favorably to the insured and against the insurer, yet 'the contract of insurance should be construed so as to carry out the true intention of the parties’ [Code citations]; and every other rule of construction of contract, including insurance contracts is subservient to this one [citations]. The ordinary and legal meaning of words employed in an insurance policy must be taken into consideration.[Cit.]”
In our next decision, Allstate Insurance Co. v. McBride, 117 Ga. [846]*846App. 592 (161 SE2d 415), it was recognized that the Yearwood case was not a precedent because it was a two-one decision. The court also pointed out that there the exclusion was based on a narrower provision in the policy than that in the McBride case where the language was exactly similar to that contained in the case sub judice. In the McBride case, as in the instant appeal, the policy defined what was meant by "automobile business.” This definition reads: "The business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles,” the court saying at page 594 that this was "plain and unambiguous.” Accordingly, we held that the exclusion applied to an automobile in the possession of a repair garage at the time it was being road tested after the work had been completed.
In our next case with exactly the same policy language, Northwestern Cas. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 209 (173 SE2d 407), the facts involved a car owner who took his automobile to a Chrysler-Plymouth agency for repairs and was then driven to his place of work by an employee of the auto agency. The collision occurred while the automobile was being returned to the auto dealer to commence the repairs. This court pointed out that the gist of the exclusion was "Use by another while employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.” Page 211. Thus it was applicable even though the auto dealer’s employee was not actually working on the car at the time it was in his possession for the sole purpose of transportation to the automobile agency and came within the exclusion.
In that case this court undertook at page 210 to restate the plain meaning of the policy’s provisions to be: "This policy does not apply' under the liability section to an owned automobile while used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking automobiles.”
This restatement by our court in explanation of the same language in the policy now under consideration clearly applies to a service station operator returning an automobile to its owner after completing repairs. In fact, in a similar situation which was presented in Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 306 FSupp. 437 (111.
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[844]*844Clark, Judge.
This appeal involves a coverage question under the standard private automobile public liability insurance policy containing the language that "This policy does not apply: (g) To any automobile or trailer while maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise involved in the automobile business. . .”
Harnage to whom we will refer as "car owner” carried a public liability policy with United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company on his personal Chevrolet station wagon. Boyette, hereafter referred to as "service station operator,” carried a similar liability policy with the State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. Apparently, this was on his personal automobile because his State Farm policy contained the same exclusion as was in the car owner’s U. S. F. & G. policy even though Boyette was in the service station business. This exclusion stated "This policy does not apply: (g) To any automobile or trailer while maintained or used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business. . .” Both policies contained this special definition: " 'Automobile business’ means the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles.”
The automobile owner left his insured Chevrolet at the service station to be greased and serviced. The stipulation of facts agreed that "As accommodation to his customer, Jack Harnage [the car owner], L. L. Boyette, Sr. [the service station operator] promised Jack Harnage to return the motor vehicle to Jack Harnage at Harnage’s place of employment. After L. L. Boyette, Sr. had serviced said Chevrolet station wagon, he, L. L. Boyette, Sr. was returning the automobile to Jack Harnage and L. L. Boyette, Sr. was driving it for that purpose” (R. 54), when he had a collision with another car in which personal injuries were sustained by Carol Hall. She brought suit against both the service station operator and car owner for damages arising from that collision with the plaintiff therein recovering a final judgment jointly against the service station operator and the car owner in the total amount of $7,270.20. The stipulation between the parties does not contain the complaint and does not show who paid one-half of the judgment but does state that one-half was paid by the service station operator who also incurred attorney fees in the sum of $500 in the defense of that action.
The instant suit was brought by the service station operator against both the U. S. F. & G., that being the car owner’s insurer, [845]*845and State Farm which had issued the service station operator its public liability policy, for the one-half of the judgment paid by him plus the $500 attorney fee expense.
This matter was presented by stipulation of facts to the court for decision without the intervention of a jury. The trial judge accepted the stipulation as constituting the findings of fact. The court’s finding of law was that neither insurance company was relieved of liability under the exclusion reciting that "The court concludes as a matter of law that the plaintiff Boyette, in delivering the automobile to Harnage, its owner at the time of the alleged casualty was, as a matter of law, the agent of Harnage and Harnage was not employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business; accordingly the plaintiff Boyette was, while acting as such agent of Harnage, not employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.” (R. 70).
Since the insured automobile was an "owned automobile” under the U. S. F. & G. contract and a "non-owned automobile” under the State Farm policy the court further ruled State Farm would only be liable for excess coverage. As the primary coverage limits of U. S. F. & G. sufficed to pay the entire judgment the court exonerated State Farm which has not participated in this appeal. Held:
1. This is the fourth case in which this court has been called upon to consider the applicability of this "automobile business” exclusion clause. In the three previous cases we ruled there was no coverage. The first of these decisions was Public Indemnity Co. of Newark v. Yearwood, 50 Ga. App. 646 (179 SE 232) which is among those cases from a number of jurisdictions cited in 7 Blashfield Automobile Law & Practice (3d Ed.) § 315.16, page 638, as holding that there is no liability upon the insurer where the incident occurs while one in the specified class is driving, even though the driver might be acting at the specific request and for the benefit of the insured. The Yearwood case reasons at page 647 that "While it is true that policies of insurance should be construed so as to attain the object of the insurance and most favorably to the insured and against the insurer, yet 'the contract of insurance should be construed so as to carry out the true intention of the parties’ [Code citations]; and every other rule of construction of contract, including insurance contracts is subservient to this one [citations]. The ordinary and legal meaning of words employed in an insurance policy must be taken into consideration.[Cit.]”
In our next decision, Allstate Insurance Co. v. McBride, 117 Ga. [846]*846App. 592 (161 SE2d 415), it was recognized that the Yearwood case was not a precedent because it was a two-one decision. The court also pointed out that there the exclusion was based on a narrower provision in the policy than that in the McBride case where the language was exactly similar to that contained in the case sub judice. In the McBride case, as in the instant appeal, the policy defined what was meant by "automobile business.” This definition reads: "The business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing or parking automobiles,” the court saying at page 594 that this was "plain and unambiguous.” Accordingly, we held that the exclusion applied to an automobile in the possession of a repair garage at the time it was being road tested after the work had been completed.
In our next case with exactly the same policy language, Northwestern Cas. Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 121 Ga. App. 209 (173 SE2d 407), the facts involved a car owner who took his automobile to a Chrysler-Plymouth agency for repairs and was then driven to his place of work by an employee of the auto agency. The collision occurred while the automobile was being returned to the auto dealer to commence the repairs. This court pointed out that the gist of the exclusion was "Use by another while employed or otherwise engaged in the automobile business.” Page 211. Thus it was applicable even though the auto dealer’s employee was not actually working on the car at the time it was in his possession for the sole purpose of transportation to the automobile agency and came within the exclusion.
In that case this court undertook at page 210 to restate the plain meaning of the policy’s provisions to be: "This policy does not apply' under the liability section to an owned automobile while used by any person while such person is employed or otherwise engaged in the business or occupation of selling, repairing, servicing, storing, or parking automobiles.”
This restatement by our court in explanation of the same language in the policy now under consideration clearly applies to a service station operator returning an automobile to its owner after completing repairs. In fact, in a similar situation which was presented in Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Ins. Co., 306 FSupp. 437 (111. 1969) the court pointed out that the return of the automobile to the owner’s residence as requested by the owner was an integral part of the business "by providing a service of convenience to engender good will.”
The party seeking recovery of the insurer in the case at bar is [847]*847the service station operator and not the insured. The service station operator’s possession of the car was for servicing and he continued in the service station business while returning the car as an accommodation.
Our ruling here is in accord with the general principle stated in 7 Appleman Insurance Law & Practice, § 4372, where the author says: "Under the standard automobile policy, a limitation is applied to the coverage of the omnibus policy so as not to extend coverage over to a service station, public garage, sales agency, repair shop, or public parking place, even though such establishment has rightful custody of the vehicle during its operation, maintenance, or use by an employee thereof. This does not mean that the named insured is not protected if liability should be imposed upon him while the vehicle is being so used; but it prevents the insurer from becoming liable by reason of judgments recovered against such an establishment.” In conformance with this quotation from Appleman, we wish to make clear that nothing in this opinion shall be construed to deprive the insured automobile owner from coverage if he be held liable for the acts of the driver. See also 7 AmJur2d 285, Automobile Insurance, § 125 and 13 Couch on Insurance §§ 45:982 and § 45:986.
2. Under our ruling it is not necessary to consider the question of agency but it would appear from Pressley v. Wilson, 116 Ga. App. 206 (1) (156 SE2d 399) that delivery to a mechanic for the purpose of repairs creates a bailment relationship with the mechanic being an independent contractor. In addition to cases cited therein on this point see Graham v. Cleveland, 58 Ga. App. 810 (200 SE 184); Speed Oil Co. of Calhoun v. Jones, 59 Ga. App. 625, 626 (1 SE2d 760); Fisher v. Clark, 60 Ga. App. 744 (5 SE2d 249); and Simmons v. Beatty, 61 Ga. App. 759 (7 SE2d 613).
Judgment reversed.
Bell, C. J., Hall P. J., Eberhardt, P. J., Pannell, Deen, Quillian and Stolz, JJ., concur. Evans, J., dissents.