UNITED ALLOYS, INC. v. Baker

797 F. Supp. 2d 974, 2011 WL 2490660
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedJune 22, 2011
DocketCV 93-4722 CBM (Ex)
StatusPublished
Cited by17 cases

This text of 797 F. Supp. 2d 974 (UNITED ALLOYS, INC. v. Baker) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
UNITED ALLOYS, INC. v. Baker, 797 F. Supp. 2d 974, 2011 WL 2490660 (C.D. Cal. 2011).

Opinion

AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

CONSUELO B. MARSHALL, District Judge.

The matter before the Court, the Honorable Consuelo B. Marshall, United States District Judge presiding, is the bench trial held on Plaintiff and Counter-defendant United Alloys, Ine.’s (“United Alloys”) claims for cost recovery and declaratory relief against Defendant and Counter-claimant Flask Chemical Corporation (“Flask”), and Flask’s counterclaims for contribution against United Alloys, due to the contamination at United Alloys’ property located at 900 East Slauson Avenue in Los Angeles, California. Upon consideration of the testimony and evidence received, and the Court’s evaluation of the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). 1

*979 JURISDICTION

The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607 and 9613(b).

FINDINGS OF FACT

A. PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THIS ACTION

1. On August 6, 1993, United Alloys filed the Complaint in this action pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., and other state laws. (Final Pretrial Conference Order at ¶ 40.)
2. On October 20, 1993, Flask answered the Complaint and filed counterclaims for contribution and declaratory relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613 and equitable indemnity and negligence against United Alloys. (Id. at 141.)
3. In 1994, Flask filed bankruptcy. (Id. at ¶ 43.) In 1995, in order to lift the mandatory litigation stay imposed by Flask’s bankruptcy, United Alloys and the bankruptcy trustee stipulated that United Alloys would release Flask from liability if United Alloys stipulated that it would limit any recovery to what might be obtained from claims against Flask’s insurance carriers, Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company (“Fireman’s Fund”) and Chubb Insurance Company (“Chubb”). (Id. at ¶ 44.)
4. On January 13, 1997, the Court approved the settlements of Siskin Investment Company (“Siskin”), Harold A. Baker (“Baker”), and Harold A. Baker Metal Supply Company, Inc. (Id. at ¶ 46.) These settlements totaled $290,000. (Flask Chemical Corp.’s Posh-Trial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 50 [Doc. No. 301].) As part of the Order Confirming Good Faith Settlement, United Alloys was ordered to place all settlement proceeds in a separate, segregated account for the purpose of funding environmental remediation at the Property. (Final Pretrial Conference Order at ¶ 47.)
5. United Alloys filed a Second Amended Complaint on June 2, 1998, in which it named Southern Pacific Transportation Company as a defendant in the action. [Doc. No. 105.] •
6. On April 11, 2001, United Alloys filed its Third Amended Complaint, in which it named BNSF Railway Company (“BNSF”) as a defendant. [Doc. No. 125.] The Third Amended Complaint also named Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) as a defendant, and alleged that Union Pacific is the successor-in-interest to SPTC. [Doc. No. 125.]
7. On March 26, 2010, the Court dismissed United Alloys’ claim for relief under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq., for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. [Doc. No. 255.]
8. The parties stipulated that United Alloys entered a settlement with BNSF and Union Pacific (collectively, “the Railroads”) in the amount of $50,000 and a settlement with Chubb in the amount of $300,000. (4/21/102 Trial Tr. at 35.)
9. United Alloys thereafter voluntarily dismissed its state common law causes of action, with the exception of its Carpenter-Presley-Tanner Hazardous Substance Account Act claim. [Doc. No. *980 262.] Flask also voluntarily dismissed its claims for equitable indemnity and negligence. [Doc. No. 261.]
10. At trial, the parties sought a judicial determination as to the extent and scope of the parties’ liability for and contribution to contamination at United Alloys’ property located at 900 East Slauson Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Thus, the Court must determine the liability of each party with respect to the contamination, the appropriate allocation of past costs incurred by United Alloys for site investigation and characterization, and whether declaratory relief is appropriate.
11. In the Final Pretrial Conference Order, the parties stipulated to sixty-three (63) facts, all of which are incorporated into the Court’s Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. [Doc. No. 291.]
12. The Court heard live testimony from three lay witnesses and three expert witnesses. Mr. Timothy Wood (“Wood”), who testified as an expert witness on behalf of United Alloys, rendered opinions regarding the source and nature of the contamination at the Property, the impact of the contamination on soil and groundwater beneath the Property, the need for remediation, and the proper apportionment of liability. Mr. Ulf Lindmark (“Lindmark”), an expert witness on behalf of Flask, testified as to the source and extent of subsurface contamination of volatile organic compounds (“VOCs”). Mr. James T. Wells (“Wells”), who also testified as an expert witness on behalf of Flask, served as a rebuttal expert witness to Wood. The Court also received into evidence the deposition testimony of three lay witnesses and hundreds of exhibits.

B. BACKGROUND OF THE OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY

13. The dispute concerns real property located at 900 East Slauson Avenue, Los Angeles, California (“the Property”). (Final Pretrial Conference Order at ¶ 1. 2 ) The Property is three hundred sixty-seven (367) feet long and two hundred (200) feet wide. (Id.

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Bluebook (online)
797 F. Supp. 2d 974, 2011 WL 2490660, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-alloys-inc-v-baker-cacd-2011.