NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITE HERE INTERNATIONAL No. 24-5964 UNION, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-01938-PA-PVC Plaintiff - Appellant, MEMORANDUM* v.
SKY CHEFS, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Percy Anderson, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted December 4, 2025** Pasadena, California
Before: BEA, BADE, and LEE, Circuit Judges. Dissent by Judge LEE.
UNITE HERE International Union (the Union) appeals the district court’s
refusal to order backpay to remedy a violation of Section 6 of the Railway Labor
Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 156. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and
* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). we vacate and remand for further proceedings.
1. The district court erred in concluding that it had discretion whether to
award backpay as part of the status quo injunction. Although the general
presumption is that “a federal judge sitting as chancellor is not mechanically
obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law,” Congress is free to
depart from that default rule. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313
(1982); Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193–95 (1978). Congress has
traditionally been understood to have done so in two circumstances: “(a) when the
statutory command is absolute and does not brook equitable discretion, and
(b) when the statutory scheme permits only equitable relief and denial of that relief
would be a denial of the right granted by the statute.” Dan B. Dobbs & Caprice L.
Roberts, Law of Remedies: Damages, Equity, Restitution § 2.4(7), at 88 (3d ed.
2018). Both circumstances are present under Section 6 of the RLA.
First, Section 6 provides that “rates of pay, rules, or working conditions shall
not be altered by the [employer]” during a major dispute. 45 U.S.C. § 156. “The
word ‘shall’ generally indicates a command that admits of no discretion on the part
of the person instructed to carry out the directive,” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 661 (2007) (quoting Ass’n of Civilian Technicians
v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994)), and that is particularly true when
the command is framed in the negative, thereby taking the form of a prohibition.
2 24-5964 See Tex. & Pac. Ry. v. Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry., 270 U.S. 266, 270, 273 (1926)
(describing a similarly worded prohibition as “absolute” and explaining that the
party seeking judicial enforcement of that prohibition was therefore “entitled as of
right to an injunction”); see also Tex. & New Orleans R.R. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 568 (1930) (“[A] definite statutory prohibition of conduct
which would thwart the declared purpose of the legislation cannot be
disregarded.”). Consistent with the absolute character of Section 6’s prohibition,
when an injunction is sought to enforce the status quo ante during a major dispute,
it becomes “the duty of the court to issue an injunction maintaining the status quo
pending a final resolution of [the dispute],” O’Donnell v. Wien Air Alaska, Inc.,
551 F.2d 1141, 1148 (9th Cir. 1977), and “such an injunction will issue without
regard for the traditional requisites in equity for obtaining injunctive relief,” Bhd.
of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Consol. Rail Corp., 844 F.2d 1218, 1220 (6th Cir. 1988),
cited with approval in Consol. Rail Corp. v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 491 U.S.
299, 303 (1989).
Second, only equitable relief can vindicate the right conferred upon the
Union by Section 6, and the failure to grant restorative equitable relief would deny
the Union a remedy for past violations of that right. The legal right created by
Section 6 is a right to the status quo itself. See Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs v. Balt.
& Ohio R.R., 372 U.S. 284, 289–90 (1963); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
3 24-5964 Workers v. Aloha Airlines, Inc., 776 F.2d 812, 816 (9th Cir. 1985). This right can
be protected prospectively by a prohibitory injunction commanding the employer
to refrain from departing from the status quo in the future—“[m]aintenance of the
status quo is, of course, a traditional basis for equitable relief.” See Trans Int’l
Airlines, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 650 F.2d 949, 967 (9th Cir. 1980). But a
court of equity is not limited to granting only prospective relief for violations of
Section 6, as “[t]hat right would be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the
remedy which courts can give for breach of such a duty or obligation.” Steele v.
Louisville & Nash. R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944). Thus, a court may issue a
mandatory injunction providing for the restoration of the status quo prior to the
defendant’s unlawful act—another traditional basis for equitable relief. See, e.g.,
Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. at 557, 571; Tex. & New Orleans R.R. v.
Northside Belt Ry., 276 U.S. 475, 479 (1928).
No other form of retrospective relief is available for vindication of this right.
The Union lacks Article III standing to seek damages on its own behalf, as the
status quo does not have any intrinsic economic value to the Union as an entity.
See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 427–29 (2021). Congress has not
affixed a penalty for violations of Section 6, so no fine can be imposed. See 45
U.S.C. § 152, subdiv. Tenth; Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. v. United Transp.
Union, 396 U.S. 142, 156 (1969); United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445, 464–65
4 24-5964 (2019). And Congress has not granted the Union standing to seek damages on
behalf of its members, so that remedy is not available either. See United Food &
Com. Workers Union v. Brown Group, Inc., 517 U.S. 544, 556–58 (1996)
(explaining that associations generally lack standing to recover damages for injury
to their members, but that “Congress may abrogate the impediment” by statute).
Thus, a mandatory injunction restoring the status quo is the only judicial remedy
that can provide relief for past violations of Section 6, and a district court therefore
lacks discretion to refuse to issue this remedy when necessary to redress such a
violation.1 See United Indus. Workers of Seafarers Int’l Union v. Bd. of Trustees of
Galveston Wharves (Galveston Wharves II), 368 F.2d 412, 413 (5th Cir. 1966)
(“[T]he discretion granted [to] the District Court [is] not whether to restore the
status quo but only how to restore it.”); accord O’Donnell, 551 F.2d at 1148;
Steele, 323 U.S. at 207.
2. The district court gave the following reasons in support of its decision to
deny backpay: (1) even though Sky Chefs altered the rates of pay in violation of
Section 6, its action was consistent with one of the purposes of the City of Los
1 For similar reasons, we conclude that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not prohibit an injunction to enforce the obligation imposed upon carriers by Section 6 of the RLA. See Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 772–73 (1961); see also Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963) (“Repeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the [second statute] work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary.”).
5 24-5964 Angeles’s Living Wage Ordinance—providing health insurance coverage for
covered employees; (2) Sky Chefs made similar modifications at other facilities
covered by similar ordinances without objection from the Union, which suggests
that the violation of Section 6 was neither willful nor committed in bad faith;
(3) the Union made proposals indicating that it was willing to end the market rate
adjustment in exchange for a healthcare plan, and had Sky Chefs agreed to such a
proposal, the Union’s members would have experienced the same rate-of-pay
change that occurred through Sky Chefs’ unilateral action; (4) the Union’s
members received valuable health insurance coverage in lieu of the market rate
adjustment; (5) determining the amount of backpay would require additional
discovery and complex factfinding; and (6) awarding backpay might supplant
administrative proceedings instituted by the City of Los Angeles against Sky
Chefs. To avoid reversing for a potentially harmless error, we consider whether
these reasons provide a legally sufficient justification for the district court’s
decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
The first, second, third, and fifth reasons are not relevant considerations.
“The function of the court upon the application for an injunction is to construe a
statutory provision and apply the provision as construed to the facts.” Tex. & Pac.,
270 U.S. at 273. As discussed above, when a court finds that an employer
unlawfully altered the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions in violation of
6 24-5964 Section 6, it becomes the court’s non-discretionary “duty” to enforce that
prohibition by way of an injunction restoring the status quo as completely as
possible and prohibiting future violations of a similar nature. O’Donnell, 551 F.2d
at 1148; Galveston Wharves II, 368 F.2d at 413. The balance of the equities
between the parties therefore does not affect the entitlement to relief. See Bhd. of
Locomotive Eng’rs, 844 F.2d at 1220; Tex. & Pac., 270 U.S. at 273.
The fourth and sixth reasons could affect the propriety of awarding backpay,
but not on this record. In resolving the backpay issues in this case, the district
court should have looked to the traditional analytical framework for backpay
awards under other labor statutes, a framework that presumptively applies here.
See Advanced Integrative Med. Sci. Inst., PLLC v. Garland, 24 F.4th 1249, 1256
(9th Cir. 2022); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
383 (1969). Drawing from that traditional framework, the Union has the burden of
establishing (1) the existence of a violation of Section 6; (2) that the violation of
Section 6 resulted in its members being paid wages at a lower rate of pay than they
were entitled to under the status quo; and (3) the gross amount of backpay due.
NLRB v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 531 F.2d 424, 426 (9th Cir. 1976).
Once this prima facie case has been made, the burden shifts to Sky Chefs “to
7 24-5964 produce evidence to mitigate its liability.”2 NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance
Serv., Inc., 589 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1979).
It is undisputed that a violation of Section 6 occurred and that this violation
resulted in members of the Union being paid wages at a lower rate of pay than was
provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. And in its motion for an
injunction, the Union explained in general terms how the gross amount of backpay
should be calculated, argued that certain facts necessary to the exact calculation
were “known to Sky Chefs,” and requested that the district court “order the parties
to pursue the mediation and discovery procedures they agreed upon for resolving
2 The dissent suggests that we should allow the district court to address the question of the appropriate analytical framework in the first instance. Dissent at 5 n.2. But to avoid reversing for a harmless error, it is necessary to determine whether the provision of health insurance coverage in lieu of the market rate adjustment justifies a refusal to order backpay. Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 367 (9th Cir. 1992). And in doing so, we must identify the governing principles of law for resolution of this issue—“[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” Loper Bright Enterps. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 385 (2024) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)) (emphasis added); accord All. for the Wild Rockies v. Higgins, — F.4th —, 2026 WL 2054202, at *5 n.5 (9th Cir. 2026). Moreover, the NLRA burden-shifting framework, even if has not been explicitly applied to the RLA, is not novel. Instead, it is an application of the general principle that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving a prima facie case for relief, including the amount of relief, and the defendant bears the burden with respect to any affirmative defenses or counterclaims, including a right to a setoff or recoupment. Faria v. M/V Louise, 945 F.2d 1142, 1143 (9th Cir. 1991); Payan v. Aramark Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. P’ship, 495 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2007); Nayab v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 942 F.3d 480, 494 (9th Cir. 2019); Newbery Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 95 F.3d 1392, 1399 (9th Cir. 1996).
8 24-5964 disputes over backpay.” The district court’s refusal to allow discovery on this
important issue was an abuse of discretion. See Colchester v. Lazaro, 16 F.4th
712, 725–27 (9th Cir. 2021).
As for mitigation of liability, the district court was correct to be concerned
about the inequity of ordering the full gross amount of backpay due, given the
circumstances of this case. Because any order of backpay would be equitable in
nature, the district court has authority only to order Sky Chefs to “perform the
[employment] contract[s] on the precise terms agreed upon by the parties” and “do
precisely what [it] ought to have done without being coerced by [the] court.” 71
Am. Jur. 2d Specific Performance § 1; see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 418–19 (1975) (“The injured party is to be placed, as near as may
be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.”
(quoting Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 94, 99 (1867))); Columbia Pictures
Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 1020, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (“[I]njunctive relief
should be no more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide
complete relief to the plaintiffs before the court.” (quoting L.A. Haven Hospice,
Inc. v. Sebelius, 638 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 2011)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Thus, to the extent that Sky Chefs has already paid some or all of the
gross amount of backpay due, the district court should offset that amount in the
final calculation of liability—under no circumstances should the Union’s members
9 24-5964 receive a double recovery. See Teutscher v. Woodson, 835 F.3d 936, 954 (9th Cir.
2016). But the record does not suggest that Sky Chefs has remunerated any
employee affected by its violation of Section 6 (or that a backpay award would
otherwise result in a double recovery).
In a similar vein, the value of the health insurance coverage provided to the
Union’s members in lieu of the market rate adjustment could possibly mitigate Sky
Chefs’ total liability. Cf. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946)
(explaining that a court of equity may “adjust and reconcile competing claims”
between the parties). But the unilateral provision of this benefit does not
necessarily mitigate Sky Chefs’ liability for failing to pay its employees the rates
of pay in effect at the time the dispute began. See 70 C.J.S. Payment §§ 9, 25 (“In
the absence of agreement or consent, the services [rendered by the debtor] cannot
be considered as payment, and services voluntarily rendered do not extinguish or
reduce the debt.”); 8 Corbin on Contracts § 36.9 (2025) (explaining that “actual
receipt and enjoyment of [non-conforming] benefits” is “absolutely necessary” for
proving “quantum meruit,” and even then, “actual use does not necessarily prove
net benefit” because “[t]he value of the use may be more than offset by the injury
from breach”). It is Sky Chefs’ burden to show that it is entitled to an offset on
this basis, and on this record, it cannot be said that Sky Chefs has carried its
burden.
10 24-5964 In sum, we conclude that the district court erred in refusing to restore the
status quo with respect to the rates of pay in effect prior to the major dispute. We
therefore vacate that portion of its order and remand for further proceedings to
determine the gross amount of backpay due and whether Sky Chefs’ liability
should be mitigated by any amount.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
11 24-5964 FILED AUG 4 2026 UNITE HERE Int’l Union v. Sky Chefs, Inc., No. 24-5964 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS LEE, Circuit Judge, dissenting: Sky Chefs—an airplane catering and customer service employer—offered a
choice of two healthcare insurance plans for its employees at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX). Under either plan, the company would cover 65% of
the premium costs—and the employees would pay the remaining 35%. Under the
City of Los Angeles’ Living Wage Ordinance, if the chosen healthcare plan’s benefits
fell below an “hourly value of [] healthcare” established by the City, then the
company would pay the differential in cash to the employee. See Los Angeles
Admin. Code Ch. 1, Art 11, Div. 10, § 10.37.2(a)(3).
But that created an incentive for some employees to choose the skimpier
insurance plan (or opt out of employer coverage altogether) and instead collect
additional cash payments. UNITE HERE, a national bargaining unit representing
approximately 10,000 of Sky Chefs’ employees, was concerned that “if the cash was
paid into people’s pockets and people started living off of the cash as part of their
wage, it would be next to impossible to redirect that money back into healthcare.”
The Union wanted a no-cost or low-cost employee insurance plan and asked Sky
Chefs to negotiate a new agreement.
Sky Chefs ultimately responded by unilaterally modifying its employee health
plans at LAX and offered a “no-cost” insurance plan that covered 100% of the
premiums and reduced deductible, co-pay, and out-of-pocket expenses for its employees. Because of these more generous benefits, some employees no longer
received differential cash payments required under Los Angeles’ Living Wage
Ordinance. The Union sued, arguing that Sky Chefs could not unilaterally change
its healthcare plan offerings under the parties’ agreement.
The district court issued a comprehensive and permanent injunction in favor
of the Union. In doing so, the district court applied Section 6 of the Railway Labor
Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C. § 156, which requires that carriers maintain the “status quo”
while engaged in a major dispute with its employees over compensation and working
conditions. While the district court ordered that Sky Chefs restore its original
offerings and pay the cash adjustment going forward, the district court relied on its
equitable discretion to conclude that the status quo did not include the Union’s
request for an additional cash award to employees who claimed they preferred a
market rate cash adjustment during earlier phases of the dispute.
In its rationale, the district court noted that those employees who claimed they
would have otherwise elected plans qualifying for a cash adjustment had, during the
dispute, received some value in the form of Sky Chefs’ new—and more robust—
health plan. Stated differently, those employees would otherwise be receiving a
windfall because (a) they already benefitted from the more expensive health plan
that provided better coverage with no premiums paid by the employees, and (b) they
would still receive the differential cash payment that normally would be reserved for employees who paid premiums for the less generous insurance plan. The district
court also noted that the City of Los Angeles, in parallel proceedings, had already
ordered Sky Chefs to pay these employees some restitution based on the City’s
assessment of the value of the healthcare benefits provided.
It is true, as the majority notes, that the Railway Labor Act is firm in creating
employees’ entitlement to the preservation of the status quo by dictating that “rates
of pay, rules, or working conditions shall not be altered” during a major dispute. See
45 U.S.C. § 156. Although the word “shall” represents Congress’ command that an
employer has no discretion, the Act provides no further direction to the courts on
how to ensure that the status quo remains intact. Even if the Act effectively forces
the court to use its equitable discretion to ensure that employers comply with the
Act, the statute provides no guidance to the district court on how to fashion directives
that restore the status quo.
Not only that, it is difficult to see how providing cash payments to employees
who already benefitted from the more generous and less expensive insurance
coverage reinstates the status quo. It would be immensely difficult to figure out for
each employee what costs they would have incurred in premiums, higher
deductibles, larger co-pays, and other out-of-pocket expenses had they remained
under the bare-bones insurance plan. Further, some employees likely would not have
visited a healthcare professional for more minor ailments under their no-frills insurance plan because of high out-of-pocket costs (or lack of coverage) but availed
themselves to medical assistance under their more generous and less expensive
insurance plan. It is not clear how a court should address such a situation. And
another advantage of having better insurance coverage is peace of mind: The
employees with better coverage already benefited from it but it is hard to place a
monetary value for it. Finally, it is virtually impossible to figure out if employees
ex ante would have preferred to be paid the extra cash (and still pay 35% of the
premium and higher out-of-pocket expenses for worse coverage) over receiving
better insurance coverage with no premiums and lower out-of-pocket expenses.1 Of
course, ex post—after having already received the benefits of the better and less
expensive insurance—the employees would not surprisingly say that they would
have preferred the bare bones coverage during that earlier period and now demand
cash payments.
Given this statutory silence (or at least ambiguity) and the practical difficulty
of reverting to the status quo, I would rely on our longstanding principle that district
courts enjoy discretion in fashioning equitable relief. See Powers v. McDonough,
1 The fact that some employees had earlier opted for the no-frills healthcare plan (with cash payments) does not mean that they would have still chosen the no-frills plan over the new no-cost plan that offers better benefits. As noted earlier, the employees before had a choice between two plans in which they had to pay 35% of the premium, regardless of which coverage they chose. Some may have opted for the cheaper insurance plan to avoid paying the heftier premiums of the more expensive plan. 163 F.4th 1162, 1196 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv., 524 F.3d 917, 936 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(“District courts have broad latitude in fashioning equitable relief.”).
And here, the district court’s rationale for the scope of the injunction was not
arbitrary. As the majority notes, the district court made substantial factual findings
to develop its course of action, and in its order listed six reasons why the court did
not view what the Union claims is “back pay” to be part of the status quo. Absent
frivolous action by the court or a clear directive of law divesting the court of its
powers, we should decline to allow parties to set the terms that force the court’s hand
to balance the equities to the parties’ preferences. 2
I respectfully dissent.
2 The majority also concludes that the district court should have read into the Railway Labor Act a wholly separate analytic framework, which the National Labor Relations Board uses to calculate back pay awards in unfair labor practices disputes. See NLRB v. Mercy Peninsula Ambulance Serv., Inc., 589 F.2d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 1979); 29 U.S.C. § 160. But these statutes have little relation beyond sharing the general subject of employment disputes. And no authority in the Ninth Circuit or our sister circuits appears to have imported the NLRB framework into the RLA. And given that the Union seemingly did not present this argument to the district court, I would decline to find that the district court abused its discretion by failing to tread new ground on the Union’s behalf.