Uniform Oil Company v. Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware Corp.
This text of 400 F.2d 267 (Uniform Oil Company v. Phillips Petroleum Company, a Delaware Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Appellant Uniform Oil Company, plaintiff below, brought suit in the District Court against the appellees, alleging violations of sections one and two of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and seeking injunctive relief, 15 U.S. C. § 26, and treble damages, 15 U.S.C. § 15. The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for a directed verdict, and Uniform Oil appeals. We affirm.
Uniform Oil is a Montana corporation which operated a single retail gasoline and service station in Helena, Montana. Appellee Phillips Petroleum Company is a major oil producer and petroleum products retailer. Appellee Bridges is Phillips’ jobber in Helena. He performs the function of Phillips’ agent. He leases four service stations from Phillips in Helena, operating one himself and subleasing the others to appellees Cullen, Gardner, and Norwood, who each operates the station leased by him. Bridges purchases Phillips’ products from Phillips and in turn sells them to his lessees. He receives no commissions from Phillips for performing the function of jobber. Phillips owns all the permanent fixtures which comprise the four stations in Helena, but the individual lessees own their respective inventories.
In its complaint Uniform Oil alleged that the appellees had conspired to restrain trade and eliminate competition, in violation of the Sherman Act, by engaging in price fixing in the retail gasoline market in Helena, Montana. In reviewing the District Court’s directed verdict, we are required to decide “whether the evidence in its entirety would rationally support a verdict for the plaintiff, assuming that the jury took, as it would be entitled to take, a view of the evidence most favorable to the plaintiff.” Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 65, 69 S.Ct. 413, 93 L.Ed. 497 (1949) (Frankfurter, J„ concurring). Viewed in this light, the evidence would support the determination, had it been made, not only that the individual appellees entered into a price-fixing agreement among themselves, but also that Phillips was involved in the conspiracy. It is, of course, well settled that, within the scope of the Sherman Act, price fixing is illegal per se. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 78 S.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed. 2d 545 (1958).
The district judge believed that although there may have been an agree *269 ment among the individual appellees to fix prices, the fact that they agreed to lower, rather than raise, the prices negated any unlawful intent. He also concluded that there was absence of proof that Phillips was a party to whatever agreement or conspiracy the individual appellees may have undertaken. Uniform Oil’s contentions on appeal with regard to these points appear to have merit, but we do not reach them. Nor do we need consider the appellees’ contention that Uniform Oil failed to prove the amount of damages, if any, sustained by it.
The directed verdict was proper because Uniform Oil failed to offer adequate proof that the activity in question was in interstate commerce or had a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. 1 As the Supreme Court has recently stated, “it is well established that an activity which does not itself occur in interstate commerce comes within the scope of the Sherman Act if it substantially affects interstate commerce.” Burke v. Ford, 389 U.S. 320, 321, 88 S.Ct. 443, 444, 19 L.Ed.2d 554 (1967) (emphasis in original). The alleged illegal activities of which Uniform Oil complained occurred only in the city of Helena and were, therefore, intrastate in nature. This being so, Uniform Oil was required to prove that the transactions in question had a “not insubstantial” effect upon interstate commerce. Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6, 78 Sup.Ct. 514, 2 L.Ed.2d 545 (1958).
Uniform Oil established that it purchased some petroleum products — an undefined quantity — from a refinery in Billings, Montana. This refinery obtained its crude oil from the Elk Basin Field in Wyoming. Uniform Oil also made purchases from a refinery in the Kevin-Sunburst Field in Montana. There is no evidence as to the volume or dollar amount of the purchases which Uniform Oil made from these two refineries. Uniform Oil honored all major oil company credit cards under an arrangement to be paid for such credit sales through credit-card processing by an oil company located in Spokane, Washington. Submission of the accounts by Uniform Oil and payment by this other oil company was to be accomplished by mail. But Uniform Oil offered no evidence to establish its gross or net sales or the amount or portion of sales, if any, which were completed by credit-card payment through interstate commerce. Uniform Oil introduced no other evidence relating to the effect which its business, or any decline thereof, would have upon interstate commerce. 2
*270 Therefore, assuming that there was involvement with interstate commerce in the appellant’s operation, there was nothing upon which the jury might have based an assessment of the substantiality of that involvement. Such proof may have been, and probably was, readily available. Nevertheless, it was not produced, and speculation as to its probable availability cannot cure the manifest insufficiency of evidence upon the record and be held to supply the required proof that the effect was “not insubstantial.” The absence of such indispensable proof deprived the District Court of jurisdiction over the Sherman Act claims.
“Whether a purely local or intrastate conspiracy unreasonably restrains interstate commerce is primarily a factual question, i. e. does the local price fixing conspiracy affect substantially the flow of interstate commerce? If the answer is yes, then only are we concerned with the effect of the price-fixing under the per se doctrine. In fact, unless there is a finding that the local and intrastate activities complained of and as alleged in the indictment, substantially affected interstate commerce, there is no jurisdiction in a district court over the alleged Sherman Act violation.”
Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass’n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 747 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 348 U.S. 817, 75 S.Ct. 29, 99 L.Ed. 645 (1954).
Affirmed.
. This issue was one of the grounds offered by the appellees to the District Court in support of their motion for a directed verdict. The District Court, however, apparently did not reach the point of ruling upon this question.
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400 F.2d 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/uniform-oil-company-v-phillips-petroleum-company-a-delaware-corp-ca9-1968.