Umber v. Umber

1979 OK 24, 591 P.2d 299, 1979 Okla. LEXIS 216
CourtSupreme Court of Oklahoma
DecidedFebruary 20, 1979
Docket50927
StatusPublished
Cited by33 cases

This text of 1979 OK 24 (Umber v. Umber) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Oklahoma primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Umber v. Umber, 1979 OK 24, 591 P.2d 299, 1979 Okla. LEXIS 216 (Okla. 1979).

Opinion

HODGES, Justice.

The principal question on appeal is whether the trial court properly determined that federal social security benefits received by the appellee were his separate property and not subject to division as property settlement in a divorce proceeding.

The parties owned and operated a pharmacy. The appellant, Novaline Umber, was a registered pharmacist and the appellee, Herbert L. Umber, managed the pharmacy. The wife did not receive a salary, although she worked four or five hours per day. Social security taxes were paid on the husband’s income. The wife did not request, nor did she receive alimony; the assets of the parties were equally divided. The appellant requested a division of appellee’s social security benefits because she had contributed to the payment of FICA taxes by her joint industry in the store. The trial court refused to consider the benefits in its determination of property settlement.

Appellant argues that the appellee’s social security basis was from business profits, and that she directly contributed earnings which were the foundation for social security benefits. 1 Appellant relies on Baker v. Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okl.1975) in which this Court held that the husband’s military pension could not be treated as property acquired during coverture for the purpose of property division. 2

I

This is a case of first impression in this jurisdiction. 3 The identical question was considered recently by California in In Re Marriage of Nizenkoff, 65 Cal.App.3d 136, 135 Cal.Rptr. 189 (1977) rev’d. and collaterally discussed by the United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, - U.S. -, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979). 4

In Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960) the United States Supreme Court rejected the argument that the Social Security Act created either property or contract rights. The Court held that the Act created a public benefit which could be reduced or altered if there was a logical basis for doing *301 so. The Court’s rationalization was based on 1) the social security system is a tax and 2) 42 U.S.C. § 1304 5 reserves the right to alter or repeal any provision of the Act which is not arbitrary. It was determined that § 1304 was essential to secure the flexibility of the system.

The state has a constitutional right to declare and maintain a policy regarding marriage and divorce concerning persons domiciled within its borders. 6 Federal courts have repeatedly refused to assert jurisdiction over divorces if no federal questions are presented. 7 However, the interpretation of the Social Security Act is not to be determined by deviations and idiosyncrasies of the various jurisdictions. 8

The Court in Hisquierdo determined that the pertinent questions to be considered are: whether the right of the spouse to benefits conflicts with the express terms of federal law; and whether its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program to require non-recognition. Social Security benefits are not contractual. Congress may alter or even eliminate them at any time. Taxes paid on behalf of an employee do not necessarily correlate with the benefits to which an employee may be entitled, and benefits have traditionally been protected from creditors and tax collectors.

The primary concern in Hisquierdo was the Railroad Retirement Act Plan. However, social security benefits were simultaneously discussed. The Court acknowledged that with the enactment of 42 U.S.C. § 659, notwithstanding any contrary law, social security benefits could be reached to satisfy a legal obligation for child support or alimony. 9 It was also recognized that in 1977, Congress enacted a definitional statute, 10 which related to § 659 and limited alimony to its classic canonical definition of spousal support. The statute specifically precluded payment of property settlement within the definition of alimony.

Social Security provides for certain divorced spouses, and the statutes compel the conclusion that Congress intended to specify the distribution of benefits between spouses at the time of divorce, thus placing such questions beyond state control. 11 It is not the province of state courts to reach a *302 result different from the one Congress intended. Social Security benefits are not an item to be considered in determination of property settlement; they are the separate property of the employee-spouse. To decide otherwise would seriously interfere with the express statutory scheme of the Social Security Act and is forbidden by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, Art. VI § 2. 12

II

Appellee, in his cross-petition, asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to set aside to him certain property which he owned prior to the marriage of the parties.

It was undisputed that at the time of the marriage appellee had at least $25,000.00 which he had received from the sale of a drug store. Appellant brought $3,700.00, in addition to an automobile and certain items of furniture, to the marriage. The funds were commingled and utilized to purchase a pharmacy. In order to operate the pharmacy, it was essential that one of the parties be a registered pharmacist. Appellant obtained her pharmacy degree and worked in the store. Although the appellant did not receive a salary from the pharmacy, she actively contributed to the accumulation and enhancement of the marital estate. As the result of the joint industry of the parties, $150,000.00 was accumulated over the twenty year period of the marriage.

In our opinion the property acquired before marriage lost its character as a separate property, and we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the property on an equal basis. 13

AFFIRMED.

LAVENDER, C. J., IRWIN, V. C. J., and WILLIAMS, BARNES, DOOLIN, HARGRAVE and OPALA, JJ. SIMMS, J., concurs in part, dissents in part.
1

.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

PAYTON v. APPLEGATE
2024 OK 41 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2024)
WILLIAMS v. WILLIAMS
2024 OK CIV APP 8 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 2023)
OWENS v. OWENS
2023 OK 12 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 2023)
Forrester v. Forrester
953 A.2d 175 (Supreme Court of Delaware, 2008)
Nelson v. Nelson
1998 OK 10 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1998)
Boulter v. Boulter
930 P.2d 112 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1997)
Crocker v. Crocker
1991 OK 130 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1991)
Olson v. Olson
445 N.W.2d 1 (North Dakota Supreme Court, 1989)
Rudden v. Rudden
765 S.W.2d 719 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1989)
Rice v. Rice
1988 OK 83 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1988)
Matter of Marriage of Swan and Swan
720 P.2d 747 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1986)
Opinion No. (1985)
Oklahoma Attorney General Reports, 1985
Mothershed v. Mothershed
701 P.2d 405 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1985)
Stevenson v. Stevenson
680 P.2d 642 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1984)
Carpenter v. Carpenter
657 P.2d 646 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1983)
Carlton v. Carlton
648 P.2d 1280 (Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, 1982)
Paxton v. Paxton
420 N.E.2d 1346 (Indiana Court of Appeals, 1981)
Meadows v. Meadows
619 P.2d 598 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1980)
Udall Ex Rel. State Treasurer v. Udall
1980 OK 99 (Supreme Court of Oklahoma, 1980)
Evans v. Evans
296 N.W.2d 248 (Michigan Court of Appeals, 1980)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
1979 OK 24, 591 P.2d 299, 1979 Okla. LEXIS 216, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/umber-v-umber-okla-1979.