Tyson v. Dunn (DEATH PENALTY)

District Court, M.D. Alabama·Decided November 4, 2020·No. 3:17-cv-00719·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA EASTERN DIVISION

ANTHONY TYSON, ) ) Petitioner, ) ) v. ) CASE NO. 3:17-CV-719-WKW ) JEFFERSON S. DUNN, Comm’r, ) Alabama Department of Corrections, ) ) Respondent. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

On October 20, 2017, Petitioner Anthony Tyson, a death-sentenced inmate in the custody of the Alabama Department of Corrections, filed this habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He challenges his conviction in the Macon County Circuit Court for the capital murders of Derek Cowan and Damien Thompson in 1997, and the death sentence he received in 1998. (Doc. # 1.) Tyson brings this action against Jefferson S. Dunn, the Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Corrections (“the State”), alleging that his conviction and death sentence were obtained in violation of his rights under the United States Constitution. For the reasons detailed in its May 29, 2020 Order, the court (1) construed Tyson’s reply (Doc. # 27) to the State’s answer (Doc. # 23) as an amended petition; (2) granted Tyson’s request for leave to file an amended petition; (3) directed Tyson to re-file his reply and to caption it as a second amended petition; (4) established

June 15, 2020, as the deadline for Tyson to file his second amended petition; and (5) set July 15, 2020, as the deadline for the State to file its responsive pleading, with copies of the state court proceedings relative to Tyson’s Batson claim to be filed

thirty days later. Tyson timely filed his second amended petition on June 15, 2020. (Doc. # 40.) However, the State did not file a responsive pleading or the state court proceedings concerning Tyson’s Batson claim by the court-ordered deadlines. On September 15, 2020, Tyson moved the court to order the State to show

cause for its failure to comply with the May 29, 2020 Order. (Doc. # 41.) On September 16, 2020, the State responded to Tyson’s motion and moved for an extension of time, pursuant to Rule 6(b)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, until October 16, 2020, to comply with the May 29, 2020 Order. (Doc. # 43.) On September 17, 2020, Tyson filed a reply. (Doc. # 44.) On October 16, 2020, the State filed a Motion to Accept Answer as Timely Filed (Doc. # 45) and submitted its Response to Tyson’s Second Amended Habeas Petition. (Doc. # 46.)

Tyson’s motion to order the State to show cause is due to be granted. However, because the State has demonstrated excusable neglect for its failure to comply with the May 29, 2020 Order, the State’s motion for an extension of time is

due to be granted. II. BACKGROUND A. Tyson’s Motion to Require the State to Show Cause

Tyson’s motion tracks the procedural history of this case and points out the State’s failure to comply with the deadlines in the May 29, 2020 Order. Tyson requests an order directing the State to show cause for its deficiencies and further

requests a default judgment granting the relief requested in the habeas petition if the State failed to show cause. (Doc. # 41.) On September 16, 2020, the day after Tyson’s motion was filed, the State responded and described a series of events that resulted in its failure to comply with

its filing deadlines in the May 29, 2020 Order. The State explains: 3. All litigation in cases in which the death penalty was imposed are handled by the Capital Litigation Division of the Alabama Attorney General’s Office. Prior counsel for Respondent, Assistant Attorney General John Selden, left the Capital Litigation Division prior to this Court’s May 29, 2020, order. Ordinarily, in such instances, service would continue to be received by the docketing clerk for the Capital Litigation Division. However, through an apparent administrative error, filings in this matter were also reassigned. Consequently, the Capital Litigation Division’s docketing clerk did not receive, docket, or calendar this Court’s order, the subsequent Amended Petition, or Petitioner’s motion, and none of these documents were entered into the Attorney General’s Office’s case management system. Additionally, due to the COVID-19 situation in Alabama, and particularly in the city of Montgomery, many Alabama Attorney General personnel have been working remotely. This has further inhibited effective communication among office personnel.

4. Yesterday afternoon, undersigned counsel was made aware of Petitioner’s motion (Doc. 41), immediately began attempting to determine what had happened, and consequently learned of the prior actions in this matter. Earlier today, undersigned counsel entered a notice of appearance in this matter (Doc. 42) and will be responsible for representing Respondent going forward.

(Doc. # 43 at 2–3.)

The State contends that the sanctions Tyson proposes are excessive and unwarranted, and the State submits that its “failure to comply with the July 15 deadline was due to excusable neglect caused by miscommunication and clerical error, compounded by an unprecedented COVID-19 pandemic situation that impeded administrative efficiency and communication.” (Doc. # 43 at 4–5.) In reply, Tyson avers that the State’s response is insufficient to excuse its failure to comply with the May 29, 2020 Order and that regardless of its explanation, the State should be sanctioned for its noncompliance. B. The State’s Rule 6(b)(1)(B) Motion for Extension of Time Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b)(1) provides in part that, “[w]hen an act

may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time: . . . (B) on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). The State has moved for a thirty-day extension to comply with the May 29,

2020 Order. The State argues that it has shown excusable neglect for its failure to meet the filing deadlines. Tyson counters that the State’s neglect is not excusable. III. DISCUSSION

When the government fails to timely comply with a court’s order to file a response in a habeas proceeding, “the appropriate procedure is to issue an order to show cause, and if appropriate impose a proper sanction.” Sparrow v. United States, 174 F.R.D. 491, 493 (D. Utah 1997); see also Harris v. United States, No. CIV.A.

09-00671-WS, 2011 WL 5597281, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ala. May 12) (noting that “default judgments are inappropriate in habeas corpus cases”), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV.A. 09-00671-WS, 2011 WL 5597263 (S.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2011); Rivero v. McDaniel, No. 3:09CV00284LRHVPC, 2009 WL 3464841, at *1 (D. Nev.

Oct. 27, 2009) (“Default judgments are disfavored in habeas corpus cases and petitioner is not entitled to a default judgment merely because respondents have failed to file an answer or other response.”).

Tyson requests a default judgment against the State as a sanction for its violation of the May 29, 2020 Order. At a minimum, Tyson proposes that the court should require the State to stand on its previously filed answer (Doc. # 23) and to submit the state court records relevant to Tyson’s Batson claim in an expedited

manner. In support of his request for sanctions, Tyson relies on several cases from other jurisdictions. In Ruiz v. Cady, 660 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1981), for example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a default judgment entered against the state in a habeas

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Tyson v. Dunn (DEATH PENALTY), (M.D. Ala. 2020).

Tyson v. Dunn (DEATH PENALTY) (Tyson v. Dunn (DEATH PENALTY)) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Frank J. Ruiz v. Elmer O. Cady
660 F.2d 337 (Seventh Circuit, 1981)
Beall v. Cockrell
174 F. Supp. 2d 512 (N.D. Texas, 2001)
Wilkerson v. Jones
211 F. Supp. 2d 856 (E.D. Michigan, 2002)
Curtis v. Perini
301 F. Supp. 444 (N.D. Ohio, 1968)
Sparrow v. United States
174 F.R.D. 491 (D. Utah, 1997)