Tyrone Houston v. Charles Greiner

174 F.3d 287, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8008, 1999 WL 235898
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit
DecidedApril 23, 1999
DocketDocket 99-2146
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 174 F.3d 287 (Tyrone Houston v. Charles Greiner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tyrone Houston v. Charles Greiner, 174 F.3d 287, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8008, 1999 WL 235898 (2d Cir. 1999).

Opinion

JON 0. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge:

This sua sponte dismissal of an untimely appeal merits an opinion to alert the bar to inconsistencies in court docketing practices that, if not understood, might result in some uncertainty concerning the date from which the strict time limits for filing a notice of appeal begin to run. The point to be understood is that the date of entry of a civil judgment on the clerk’s docket, the event that starts the time for appeal, is often not explicitly shown on a docket sheet but in fact is the same date shown on the docket sheet as the filing date, unless a later entry date is explicitly shown.

Tyrone Houston, an incarcerated state prisoner, appeals from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Frederick Block, District Judge) dismissing his habe-as corpus petition, filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging a state court conviction. The judgment was dated October 16, 1998, filed October 19, 1998, and entered on the docket October 19, 1998. Appellant filed his notice of appeal on March 1, 1999. The notice of appeal was filed more than four months after the date of entry, well beyond the 30-day period prescribed for civil appeals. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a) (30-day period from date of entry for notice of appeal in civil cases in which United States *288 not a party); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1) (same). The notice was plainly untimely, even if a few days are allowed in recognition of the interval between the date the pro se prisoner handed his notice of appeal to prison authorities for mailing and the date of filing of the notice in the District Court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-71, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). 1

Because the time limits for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdictional, see Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982), we dismiss the appeal sua sponte for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

In inspecting the docket sheet, however, we note that the docket entry recording the judgment does not reveal an explicit notation of the date the judgment was entered on the docket of the Clerk’s Office of the District Court. Before considering whether that circumstance has significance, we set forth the basics of this somewhat arcane area of court procedure.

The time for filing a notice of appeal from a final judgment or order runs from the date the judgment or order “is entered.” See Fed. R.App. 4(a)(1)(A) (civil cases); id. 4(b)(1)(A) (criminal cases, unless the Government files a notice of appeal); Sup.Ct. R. 13(1) (petition to Supreme Court seeking writ of certiorari); Kanematsu-Gosho, Ltd. v. M/T Messiniaki Aigli, 805 F.2d 47, 48 (2d Cir.1986) (judgment); Yaretsky v. Blum, 592 F.2d 65, 66 (2d Cir.1979) (post-trial orders). 2 “Entry of judgment,” which is required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, is the act of recording in a docket maintained by the clerk of a court the fact that a judgment has been rendered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a). The “entry” date is not necessarily the same date that the judgment is dated, i.e., signed by the judge or court clerk, nor the same date that it is filed, i.e., date and time-stamped as officially received by the clerk’s office, thereby then formally becoming part of the clerk’s office file. See Weedon v. Gaden, 419 F.2d 303, 305-06 (D.C.Cir.1969). See generally Michael Zachary, Rules 58 and 79(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Appellate Jurisdiction and the Separate Judgment and Docket Entry Requirements, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L.Rev. 409 (1996).

Every docket entry shows, in the left-hand column of the docket sheet, the date that the document being entered on the docket was filed. The docket entry then states the general nature of the document being entered, including, in the case of a judgment, the “substance” of the judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 79(a). Some, but not all, docket entries include a notation that explicitly shows the date the document was entered. This appears as a bracketed phrase, for example, “[Entry date 04/01/99]” or “[EOD 4/1/99].” 3

We are informed that the computer program used in district courts for making docket entries in civil cases is designed to show an explicit notation of an entry date only when the entry date is later than the *289 filing date. The generation of this notation is explained in the margin. 4 Whenever the entry date for a document docketed in a civil case is the same as the filing date, the docket sheet does not show an explicit notation of an entry date. The person reading the docket sheet is supposed to infer that the absence of an explicit notation of an entry date means that the document, e.g., the judgment, was entered on the filing’date shown in the left-hand column of the docket sheet. The reader will of course know, from seeing the docket entry reflecting the judgment, that the judgment was entered on the docket, but might not always appreciate that the unexpressed entry date is the same as the filing date, in the absence of an explicit notation of an entry date.

This absence of an explicit entry date arguably violates Rule 79, which states, “The entry of an order or judgment shall show the date the entry is made.” The absence might also mislead those not aware of docketing practices. Since for all items docketed after the filing date an explicit notation of an entry date is shown, a docket sheet reader might well wonder what the entry date was for an item that bears no explicit notation of an entry date.

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Bluebook (online)
174 F.3d 287, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 8008, 1999 WL 235898, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tyrone-houston-v-charles-greiner-ca2-1999.