Amelio v. Quicken Loans, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: June 30, 2026
• Docket: 24-1619
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

24-1619 Amelio et al. v. Quicken Loans, Inc., et al.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 30th day of June, two thousand twenty-six.

PRESENT: GUIDO CALABRESI, GERARD E. LYNCH, RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

ALFONSO AMELIO, CARMINE P. AMELIO,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

CLEMENTE AMELIO,

Plaintiff,

v. No. 24-1619 QUICKEN LOANS, INC., FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, MCCABE, WEISBURG & CONWAY, P.C., FEIN, SUCH, & CRANE, LLP, SETERUS, LLC, CONCRETE PROPERTIES, LLC, OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC, SANDELANDS EYET LLP, ONE WEST BANK, N.A., HAROLD KOFMAN, ESQ., *

Defendants-Appellees. _____________________________________

For Plaintiffs-Appellants: CARMINE P. AMELIO, pro se, (Alfonso Amelio, pro se, Milford, CT, on the brief), Milford, CT.

For Defendant-Appellee WILLIAM E. EVANS (Levi Swank, Goodwin Quicken Loans, Inc.: Procter LLP, Washington, DC, on the brief), Goodwin Procter LLP, Boston, MA.

For Defendants- Brian P. Scibetta, McCalla Raymer Leibert Appellees Federal Pierce, LLP, New York, NY. National Mortgage Association, Seterus, LLC, and One West Bank, N.A.:

For Defendant-Appellee McCabe Andrew Morganstern, Jamie C. Krapf, Weisburg & Conway, P.C.: McCabe, Weisberg & Conway LLC, Melville, NY.

For Defendants-Appellees Fein, No appearance. Such & Crane, LLP, Sandelands Eyet LLP, and Harold Kofman, Esq.:

* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the caption as above.

2 For Defendant-Appellee Concrete Jonathan B. Nelson, Dorf Nelson & Properties, LLC: Zauderer LLP, Rye, NY.

For Defendant-Appellee Ocwen Steven Lazar, Greenberg Traurig, LLP, Loan Servicing, LLC: Garden City, NY.

Appeal from a judgment and orders of the United States District Court for

the Southern District of New York (Andrew L. Carter, Jr., Judge).

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the district court’s September 29, 2023

judgment is AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED IN PART, and the case is

REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

Alfonso and Carmine Amelio (the “Amelios”), proceeding pro se, appeal

from the district court’s dismissal of their third amended complaint against a

collection of mortgage servicers, lenders, law firms, debt collectors, the Federal

National Mortgage Association, and the successful bidder at a referee sale for their

former home (collectively, “Defendants”). In broad strokes, the Amelios allege

that Defendants deceived them into taking out a fraudulent mortgage backed by

forged and stolen notes and then conspired to unlawfully foreclose upon and take

possession of their upstate New York property. On appeal, the Amelios argue

that the district court erred when it (i) dismissed their complaint for lack of subject-

matter jurisdiction under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine; and (ii) denied their motion

3 for reconsideration of that decision. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only

as necessary to explain our decision.

I. The Amelios’ Appeal is Timely.

As a preliminary matter, Ocwen Loan Servicing (“Ocwen”) contends that

the Amelios’ appeal is untimely. We disagree.

Ordinarily, in a civil case, a “notice of appeal . . . must be filed with the

district clerk within [thirty] days after entry of the judgment or order appealed

from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). But if a party timely files a motion for

reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), then “the time to file

an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of [that

motion].” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv). Thus, “a motion for reconsideration

under Civil Rule 59(e) tolls the time to appeal if it is timely filed in the district court

no later than twenty-eight days after entry of the judgment.” Malek v.

Feigenbaum, 116 F.4th 118, 127 (2d Cir. 2024) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iv)

and Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e)). 1

1 Ocwen’s suggestion that S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 6.3 requires such motions to be filed within fourteen days of the entry of judgment is contradicted by the very authority it cites. See S.D.N.Y. Local Rule 6.3. (imposing a fourteen-day time limit on motions for reconsideration “[u]nless otherwise provided by the court or by statute or rule (such as Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, 52, and 59)”); see

4 The date that judgment is considered “entered” is controlled by the

“notation that explicitly shows the date the document was entered,” rather than the

date the document was filed or signed. Houston v. Greiner, 174 F.3d 287, 288–89

(2d Cir. 1999). Here, the judgment’s docket entry contains a notation explicitly

stating “(Entered: 10/02/2023),” Docket Sheet Entry No. 191, Amelio v. Quicken

Loans, 19-cv-08761 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 2023), meaning that October 2, 2023 was

the date that “the entry of judgment” occurred for the purpose of Fed. R. Civ.

P. 59(e). Because the district court entered judgment on October 2, 2023, the

Amelios’ October 30, 2023 motion for reconsideration was timely and, accordingly,

postponed the thirty-day window to appeal until after the district court resolved

the motion. And since the Amelios then filed their notice of appeal within thirty

days of the order denying reconsideration, the appeal was timely.

II. The District Court Erred in Holding that the Rooker–Feldman Doctrine Barred All Nineteen of the Amelios’ Claims.

The Amelios contend that the district court erred when it concluded that the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine barred it from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over

their claims. We largely agree.

also, e.g., Singh v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc., 633 F. App’x 548, 549 n.2 (2d Cir. 2015).

5 “When reviewing the dismissal of a complaint for lack of subject[-]matter

jurisdiction, we review factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions

de novo, accepting all material facts alleged in the complaint as true and drawing

all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Liranzo v. United States, 690 F.3d

78, 84 (2d Cir. 2012). Because the Amelios have “been pro se throughout,” we

must construe their “pleadings and other filings . . . to raise the strongest claims

they suggest.” Sharikov v. Philips Med. Sys. MR, 103 F.4th 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2024).

And since the Rooker–Feldman doctrine concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, “it

must be addressed first before [any merits] issues raised on appeal.” Plymouth

Venture Partners, II v. GTR Source, 988 F.3d 634, 641 (2d Cir. 2021) (citing Sinochem

Int’l v. Malay. Int’l Shipping, 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007)).

The Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction

over “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-

court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and

inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.” Exxon Mobil

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005). The Supreme Court has

stressed that the doctrine occupies “narrow ground” and applies only in “limited

circumstances.” Id. at 284, 291. With that guidance in mind, this Circuit has

6 outlined a four-part test for determining whether the Rooker–Feldman doctrine bars

a litigant’s claims: (i) “the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state court”;

(ii) “the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment”;

(iii) “the plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment”;

and (iv) “the state-court judgment must have been rendered before the district

court proceedings commenced.” Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections,

422 F.3d 77, 85 (2d Cir. 2005), abrogated on other grounds by T.M. v. Univ. of Maryland

Medical Sys. Corp., No. 25-197, 2026 WL 1751823 (U.S. June 18, 2026). Courts must

apply this standard on a claim-by-claim basis. See Dorce v. City of New York,

2 F.4th 82, 103 (2d Cir. 2021) (subjecting each claim to this test).

The second prong – causation – is “the ‘core requirement from which the

other Rooker–Feldman requirements derive.’” Sung Cho v. City of New York,

910 F.3d 639, 646 (2d Cir. 2018) (alterations adopted) (quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d

at 87). Importantly, a state-court judgment causes the alleged injury for Rooker–

Feldman purposes only when it “produce[s]” – rather than “simply ratifie[s],

acquiesce[s] in, or le[aves] unpunished” – the alleged injury. Hoblock, 422 F.3d

at 88. Thus, claims premised on injuries from alleged fraud or misconduct that

preceded a state-court judgment, even if those injuries were subsequently ratified by

7 that judgment, are not barred by the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. See Dorce, 2 F.4th

at 104. The fact that an otherwise independent claim “denies a legal conclusion

that a state court has reached in a case to which [the plaintiff] was a party” does

not matter; in such cases, “state law determines whether the defendant prevails

under principles of preclusion.” Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 293 (internal quotation

marks omitted). 2

Under this causation standard, only one of the Amelios’ claims is barred by

the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. Broadly speaking, Counts Three and Six allege that

Defendants defrauded the Amelios when the latter took out the mortgage; Counts

Two, Seven, Eight, Nine, Eleven, and Thirteen allege that Defendants fraudulently

demanded and collected payments from the Amelios; Counts Ten and Twelve

allege that Defendants aided and abetted fraud and conspired to defraud; and

Count Fifteen alleges that by creating fraudulent mortgage-assignment

2 Relying on outdated, non-precedential cases (with incorrect citations), while ignoring this Court’s binding precedents, the district court erroneously invoked a less stringent framework, stating that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine “bars ‘claims that are inextricably intertwined with a state[-]court decision.’” Amelio v. McCabe, Weisberg & Conway, P.C., No. 19-cv-08761 (ALC), 2023 WL 6393400, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2023) (quoting Pharr v. Evergreen Garden, Inc., 123 F. App’x 420, 422–23 (2d Cir. 2005)). But we have expressly dismissed the “notion[] of inextricably intertwined” claims as a “simply descriptive label” without “substantive content independent of the four Exxon Mobil requirements,” and we accordingly focus more narrowly on the “causal relationship between the state-court judgment and the injury of which the party complains in federal court.” Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 72 (2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added), abrogated on other grounds by T.M. v. Univ. of Maryland Medical Sys. Corp., No. 25-197, 2026 WL 1751823 (U.S. June 18, 2026).

8 instruments, Defendants slandered the Amelios’ title. These claims survive the

Rooker–Feldman doctrine because, as we have explained above, the doctrine

permits “claims based on an opponent’s misconduct that precedes the state[-]court

proceeding, if the plaintiffs’ alleged injuries were merely ratified by the state-court

judgments rather than caused by them.” Dorce, 2 F.4th at 104 (internal quotation

marks omitted).

Count Four alleges that, by pursuing the above activities, defendants

engaged in a RICO enterprise to defraud, deceive, and injure the Amelios.

Because the Amelios’ claim “under . . . RICO . . . speak[s] not to the propriety of

the state[-]court judgment[], but to the fraudulent course of conduct that

[D]efendants pursued in obtaining such judgment[],” the Rooker–Feldman doctrine

is likewise no bar to Count Four. Sykes v. Mel S. Harris and Assocs., 780 F.3d 70,

94–95 (2d Cir. 2015). And because Counts One (abuse of process for initiating

state-court proceedings), Five (fraud premised on Ocwen’s alleged violations of a

judgment requiring it to refrain from unfair, deceptive, or unlawful practices), and

Fourteen (intentional infliction of emotional distress premised on the Amelios’

alleged psychological harm caused by Defendants’ purported scheme) seek

monetary relief premised on conduct that preceded – and is entirely independent

9 of – the state-court judgment, they too fall outside the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.

See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85.

For similar reasons, Count Sixteen, which seeks to void the original

mortgage note as produced by fraud, survives because the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine permits a claim for “a declaratory judgment that [a] bank lacked the

evidence required to invoke foreclosure.” See Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home

Lenders, 773 F.3d 423, 428 n.2 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Truong v. Bank of America,

717 F.3d 377 (5th Cir. 2013)). Count Seventeen also survives because it merely

asked the district court to compel Defendants to provide access to a copy of the

note associated with the mortgage. See Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85 (holding that

Rooker–Feldman doctrine applies only where plaintiff “complain[s] of injuries

caused by a state-court judgment” and “invite[s] district court review and rejection

of that judgment” (internal quotation marks omitted)). And Count Nineteen –

which, liberally construed, alleges that one Defendant violated the First and

Thirteenth Amendments by filing a motion for sanctions during the state-court

proceedings – survives because it does not pertain to the state-court foreclosure

judgment. See id. (explaining that, where an injury was not caused by a state-

court judgment, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not apply).

10 Only Count Eighteen, which asked the district court to declare the Amelios

the “lawful owner[s] of the subject property,” Amelio App’x at 61, directly

contravenes the state-court judgment. Because seeking to have a state-court

judgment voided paradigmatically shows that the relevant injury is the state-court

judgment itself, see Vossbrinck, 773 F.3d at 427, and because the other three Hoblock

factors are plainly satisfied, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked

subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim pursuant to the Rooker–Feldman

doctrine, see Dorce, 2 F.4th at 104. But the remaining claims asserted by the

Amelios are readily distinguishable and survive Rooker–Feldman scrutiny. 3

III. On Remand, the District Court May Consider Other Grounds for Dismissal.

That the district court misapplied the Rooker–Feldman doctrine as to the

majority of the Amelios’ claims is not to say that those claims are meritorious.

Defendants understandably urge this Court to affirm the district court’s dismissal

3 The Amelios also appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for reconsideration of the

dismissal of their complaint. Because we agree with the district court that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine requires the dismissal of Count Eighteen, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying reconsideration of its judgment as to that count. See Smith v. Hogan, 794 F.3d 249, 253 (2d Cir. 2015) (reviewing district court’s denial of motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion). We dismiss, however, the remainder of the Amelios’ appeal of this order as moot in light of our decision to vacate the district court’s dismissal of the complaint’s other counts. See Marvin v. Goord, 255 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding appeal of order denying reconsideration to be moot to extent that it pertained to parts of judgment vacated by appellate court).

11 order on one of several alternative grounds, particularly res judicata or collateral

estoppel. But while the district court claimed to have weighed these arguments

below, see Amelio App’x at 65, the record is clear that it never in fact engaged in

such review, relying exclusively on the Rooker–Feldman doctrine as the basis for its

dismissal, see id. at 159–63. Mindful that preclusion doctrines often require a

demanding, fact-bound inquiry, we decline to consider Defendants’ alternative

arguments for the first time on appeal. We are, after all, “a court of review, not

first view.” City of Hialeah Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Peloton Interactive, 153 F.4th 288, 301

(2d Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). On remand, however,

Defendants may urge the district court to consider these arguments in the first

instance.

* * *

12 We have considered the Amelios’ remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM IN PART AND VACATE IN PART

the district court’s September 29, 2023 judgment, and REMAND for further

proceedings consistent with this summary order. 4

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

4 On October 2, 2025, Appellee Concrete Properties moved for summary affirmance. In light of our decision today, we DENY that motion as moot.