2026 IL App (1st) 260138-U No. 1-26-0138
Order filed August 27, 2026
Fourth Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________
ANTHONY TYLOR, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 2024 L 205 )
BIKE TAXI, LLC, ) The Honorable ) Thomas M. Donnelly, Defendant-Appellee. ) Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE NAVARRO delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Ocasio and Quish concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm the trial court’s judgment finding in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.
¶2 Plaintiff-appellant, Anthony Tylor, appeals from the trial court’s judgment finding in favor of defendant-appellee, Bike Taxi, LLC (Bike Taxi), and against him on his claim for negligence. This action arises from an incident occurring in September 2022, when a pedicab owned by defendant, and plaintiff, who was riding an electric scooter, collided on the Chicago lakefront path.
Plaintiff’s brief does not comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Despite the violations, we review the appeal and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The record on appeal includes the common law record, but it does not include a report of proceedings.
¶5 In September 2022, plaintiff, who was riding on an electric scooter, and a pedicab, which was owned by Bike Taxi collided on the Chicago lakefront path. Plaintiff subsequently filed a claim with defendant’s insurance company. The insurance company assigned the claim to Minutemen Adjusters, after which Nancy Haag, an employee of Minutemen Adjusters, assigned the claim for investigation to David Morse & Associates and the independent adjuster, Robert Trlak.
¶6 In January 2024, Plaintiff filed a civil action cover sheet alleging fraud against Bike Taxi as well as Minutemen Adjusters, Nancy Haag, David Morse & Associates, and Robert Trlak (“Adjuster Defendants”). In an email attached to the civil action cover sheet, plaintiff alleged, among other things, that on September 10, 2022, a pedicab, which was going too fast, ran into him and his girlfriend while they were riding electric scooters on the lakefront path. He alleged Nancy Haag from Minutemen Adjusters referred him to David Morse & Associates and Robert Trlak, who “began to hang the phone up while speaking to them addressing this matter.”
¶7 In August 2024, plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging that Bike Taxi and Minutemen Adjusters made an oral agreement to pay for his medical bills, damages to his scooter, and lost wages. The Adjuster Defendants and Bike Taxi moved to dismiss the amended complaint, which the trial court granted. Thereafter, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, in which he
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alleged similar allegations, including that Bike Taxi and the Adjuster Defendants agreed to pay for his medical expenses and damages to his scooter. In a written order, the trial court struck plaintiff’s second amended complaint.
¶8 On November 6, 2024, plaintiff filed a third amended complaint, in which he requested a jury trial and asserted five claims: “Negligence – Operation of Electric-Assist Pedicab in Prohibited Area” (Count I); “Negligence – General” (Count II); “Negligence – Failure to Display Pedicab Chauffeur License” (Count III); “Violation of Pedicab Chauffeur License Display Requirements” (Count IV); and “Violation of Municipal Code Regarding Alcohol Consumption in a Pedicab” (Count V).
¶9 In the negligence claim (Count II), plaintiff alleged that, on September 10, 2022, he was lawfully operating his electric scooter on a designated bike path on the lakefront path, when the pedicab owned by Bike Taxi collided with him, resulting in injuries and damages. He alleged, among other things, that the pedicab was not legally permitted on the designated bike path under the Municipal Code of Chicago.
¶ 10 In September 2025, Bike Taxi and the Adjuster Defendants moved to dismiss Counts I, III, IV, and V of plaintiff’s third amended complaint pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)). Thereafter, in a written order, the court granted defendants’ motion and dismissed all of plaintiff’s claims except for the negligence claim against Bike Taxi alleged in Count II. The court also dismissed the Adjuster Defendants from the action, noting that they were not the proper defendants.
¶ 11 Thereafter, on October 3, 2025, Bike Taxi moved to withdraw its jury demand that it had filed with its appearance on June 26, 2024, and it requested the case proceed to a bench trial. On
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that same day, plaintiff filed a motion demanding a jury trial. Thereafter, on October 7, 2025, plaintiff filed another motion requesting the case proceed to a jury trial.
¶ 12 On October 27, 2025, following the parties’ arguments on plaintiff’s late jury demand, the court denied plaintiff’s request, and the case proceeded to a bench trial. Following the bench trial, in a written order that same day, the court entered judgment in favor of Bike Taxi.
¶ 13 Thereafter, plaintiff filed numerous posttrial motions, including “to enter evidence to the official record” and to “vacate judgment, correct the record, and set aside the proceedings due to transcript fraud, due process violations, and defendant’s misconduct.”
¶ 14 On January 8, 2026, in a written order, the court denied plaintiff’s posttrial motions “for the reasons stated on the record.”
¶ 15 Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to supplement and correct the record as well as a statement of proceedings pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). In response, Bike Taxi argued that plaintiff did not identify any “concrete, verifiable omission or inaccuracy supported by stenographic notes, audio recordings, or a sworn statement from the court reporter to substantiate claimed inaccuracies or alterations.” Bike Taxi also argued that plaintiff’s proposed statement of proceedings was improper because there was a verbatim transcript of the proceedings available, as there was a court reporter present at trial, and plaintiff’s proposed statement did not accurately reflect what occurred at the bench trial.
¶ 16 On January 22, 2026, in a written order, the court denied plaintiff’s motion to supplement and correct the record “for the reasons stated on the record.” This appeal follows.
¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS
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¶ 18 Plaintiff appeals from the trial court’s orders granting judgment in favor of Bike Taxi, denying his posttrial motions, and denying his motion to supplement and correct the record. He contends the trial court erred in denying his jury trial demand and by excluding the admission of the certified police report into evidence. He also claims the trial court’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, that “misconduct and irregularities undermined the fairness of the proceedings,” and that the court’s denial of his motion to correct the record pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 329 (eff. July 1, 2017) deprived him of meaningful appellate review.
¶ 19 Initially, we note that Bike Taxi argues that plaintiff’s brief violates Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) in a number of ways, including that he provides only conclusory assertions unsupported by legal analysis or authority, and that his statement of facts is argumentative, not stated accurately, and does not contain the necessary facts to understand the case. Bike Taxi asserts that, based on the alleged violations, we should strike plaintiff’s brief and dismiss the appeal. We agree that plaintiff’s brief violates Rule 341(h).
¶ 20 Rule 341(h) sets forth the content and format required for appellate briefs. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020); Voris v. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8. “The purpose of the appellate rules of procedure is to require the parties before the reviewing court to present clear and orderly arguments so that the court can properly ascertain and dispose of the issues presented.” Ammar v. Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, LLP, 2017 IL App (1st) 162931, ¶ 11. These procedural rules are mandatory. Voris, 2011 IL App (1st) 103814, ¶ 8. When a party is a self-represented litigant, as here, he or she must still comply with the rules. Teton, Tack & Feed, LLC v. Jimenez, 2016 IL App (1st) 150584, ¶ 19; Ellis v. Regional Transportation Authority, 2023 IL App (1st) 221412-U, ¶ 13.
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¶ 21 Specifically, Rule 341(h)(7) requires the appellant’s opening brief to “present reasoned argument and citation to legal authority and to specific portions of the record in support of his claim of error.” McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 15 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020)). “The failure to elaborate on an argument, cite persuasive authority, or present a well-reasoned theory violates Rule 341(h)(7) and results in forfeiture of the argument.” Trilisky v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 182189, ¶ 54. Rule 341(h)(7) “is especially important because, when reviewing a case, the appellate court starts with the presumption that the circuit court’s ruling was in conformity with the law and the facts.” McCann, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291,
¶ 15.
¶ 22 Here, plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with Rule 341(h)(7) because he does not develop or elaborate on his contentions on appeal, present reasoned argument, or include any citations to relevant or persuasive legal authority to support his claims of error. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020).
¶ 23 Additionally, Rule 341(h)(6) requires the appellant’s statement of facts to “contain the facts necessary to an understanding of the case, stated accurately and fairly without argument or comment, and with appropriate reference to the pages of the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(6) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Plaintiff’s statement of facts does not comply with Rule 341(h)(6) because it does not accurately state the facts necessary for a complete understanding of the case, and it includes inappropriate argument.
¶ 24 When a party does not comply with the applicable rules of appellate procedure, we may strike a brief and dismiss the appeal. McCann, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. As such, because plaintiff’s brief fails to comply with Rule 341(h), we may strike his brief and dismiss his appeal.
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Zale v. Moraine Valley Community College, 2019 IL App (1st) 190197, ¶ 32. However, striking an appellate brief is “a harsh sanction and is appropriate only when the violations of procedural rules hinder our review.” Hall v. Naper Gold Hospitality LLC, 2012 IL App (2d) 111151, ¶ 15. Here, because we have the benefit of Bike Taxi’s cogent appellee brief, we will not strike plaintiff’s brief or dismiss his appeal based on his failure to comply with Rule 341(h). See Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill. App. 3d 509, 511 (2001); Matlock v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 16.
¶ 25 However, as discussed below, our review of plaintiff’s contentions is hindered because we do not have a record of the proceedings that took place in the trial court. See Pate v. Wiseman, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17. On appeal, “[i]t is well established that the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings in the trial court to support a claim of error.” Scatchell v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners for Village of Melrose Park, 2022 IL App (1st) 201361, ¶ 129. When the record is incomplete, as here, “we must presume that the order entered by the trial court conformed with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.” O’Malley v. Udo, 2022 IL App (1st) 200007, ¶ 60. We must resolve any doubts that may arise based on the ambiguity of the record against appellant. Teton, Tack & Feed, 2016 IL App (1st) 150584, ¶ 19. We also note that Bike Taxi asserts that transcripts of the trial court proceedings are available, but that plaintiff did not order them.
¶ 26 Additionally, we note that the common law record includes some pages of the transcript from the bench trial, as Bike Taxi attached certain pages of the transcript to its response to plaintiff’s motion to vacate judgment and for new trial. However, the complete transcript of the bench trial proceedings is not attached. In addition, “[a] post-trial motion is not a substitute for a
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report of proceedings.” Altek, Inc. v. Vulcan Tube & Metals Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 226, 229 (1979). Rule 323, which governs the report of proceedings, requires court reporting personnel to certify the accuracy of a report of proceedings such that the record on appeal is authenticated. Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(b) (eff. July 1, 2017); 832 Oakdale Condominium Ass'n v. McBride, 2025 IL App (1st) 240834-U, ¶ 30. Rule 323 does not “allow[] a party to rely on a copy of a transcript contained in the record on appeal by virtue of being an exhibit to a motion in lieu of that transcript being part of a properly authenticated report of proceedings.” 832 Oakdale Condominium Ass'n, 2025 IL App (1st) 240834-U, ¶ 32. Importantly, “[a] properly authenticated report of proceedings is essential to the presentation of a record of sufficient completeness to permit a challenge to the evidence on the issues raised at trial.” W.E. Mundy Landscaping & Garden Center, Inc. v. Hish, 187 Ill. App. 3d 164, 166 (1989). Accordingly, to the extent the parties rely on the various pages of the transcript of the bench trial attached to Bike Taxi’s response to plaintiff’s posttrial motion, those pages of the transcript are not properly before this court, and we will not consider them. See 832 Oakdale Condominium Ass'n, 2025 IL App (1st) 240834-U, ¶ 32.
¶ 27 Turning to plaintiff’s contentions, plaintiff argues the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury trial. Under section 2-1105(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1105(a) (West 2024)), “[a] plaintiff desirous of a trial by jury must file a demand therefor with the clerk at the time the action is commenced.” When a plaintiff fails to do so, he or she waives a jury trial. Id.; Themas v. Green’s Tap, Inc., 2014 IL App (2d) 140023, ¶ 8. However, if a plaintiff establishes good cause, a trial court may allow a plaintiff to file a late jury demand. Hernandez v. Power Construction Co., 73 Ill. 2d 90, 95 (1978). It is within the trial court’s discretion to allow a plaintiff to file a late jury demand, and we will not reverse that ruling absent an abuse of discretion. Id. On appeal, the
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question is whether the trial court’s decision was a reasonable exercise of sound discretion, not whether, as an appellate court, we would have allowed the motion. Id.
¶ 28 Here, plaintiff did not file a jury demand when he commenced the action on January 8, 2024. Rather, plaintiff requested a jury trial for the first time on November 6, 2024, when he included a demand for a jury trial in his third amended complaint. We note that plaintiff claims he “filed an Appearance and Jury Demand,” but, to support this assertion, he cites to the Appearance and Jury Demand filed by Bike Taxi on June 26, 2024. As such, because plaintiff did not file a jury demand when he commenced the action, he had to establish good cause for his late request.
¶ 29 Plaintiff has failed to show that he established good cause or that the court abused its discretion in denying his late jury trial demand for failure to establish good cause. We do not have a transcript of the proceedings from the bench trial on October 27, 2025, at which the court denied plaintiff’s late request for a jury trial. As previously discussed, when the record is incomplete, we presume the court entered the order in conformity with the law and it had a sufficient factual basis, and we resolve any ambiguities against plaintiff, as the appellant. See Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984) (“[I]n the absence of [a complete record] on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis” and “[a]ny doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant”). Additionally, when we review a trial court’s ruling under the abuse of discretion standard, as here, we “generally will not reverse that ruling in the absence of a record sufficient to show the basis for the court’s decision.” Pate, 2019 IL App (1st) 190449, ¶ 17. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s late demand for a jury trial.
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¶ 30 Next, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying admission of the police report into evidence. “The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and a reviewing court will not reverse the trial court absent a clear abuse of that discretion.” Toushin v. Ruggiero, 2021 IL App (1st) 192171, ¶ 87. A trial court is considered to have abused its discretion if its ruling “is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” Hoffman v. Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corp., 2017 IL App (1st) 170537, ¶ 41. “Generally, written police reports are not admissible because they summarize information obtained from various sources during an investigation and, thus, are the product of the secondhand knowledge of the reporting officer and hearsay.” Capsel v. Burwell, 2024 IL App (3d) 230170, ¶ 31.
¶ 31 Here, we do not have a complete transcript of the bench trial when the court denied plaintiff’s request to admit the police report into evidence. Again, because we have an incomplete record, we presume the court’s order denying the request for admission was in conformity with the law. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92. As such, plaintiff has failed to establish that the court’s ruling denying the admission of the police report into evidence was arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable such that no reasonable person would agree with it. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying the admission of the police report into evidence.
¶ 32 Plaintiff next argues that the trial court’s findings after the bench trial are against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 33 “The standard of review that this court applies to a trial court’s decision following a bench trial is to determine if the judgment is based on facts that are against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Wade v. Stewart Title Guaranty Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 161765, ¶ 59. “A decision is
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against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” Eychaner v. Gross, 202 Ill. 2d 228, 252 (2002). Under this standard we give “great deference to the trial court because the trial court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe witnesses’ demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cadle Properties of Illinois, Inc. v. Fortune Investments, LLC, 2021 IL App (1st) 200556,
¶ 23. We will also “not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court.” Staes & Scallan, P.C. v. Orlich, 2012 IL App (1st) 112974, ¶ 35.
¶ 34 To support his argument that the trial court’s findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, plaintiff asserts that the “pedicab exceeded the width of the bike lane and operated across both lanes.” According to plaintiff, these “physical facts demonstrate that the collision was unavoidable” and the court’s findings “ignoring these facts are against the manifest weight of the evidence.”
¶ 35 Plaintiff has failed to support his assertion with appropriate citation to the record or developed argument showing how the court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. As such, we may decline to address this argument. See Matlock, 2019 IL App (1st) 180645, ¶ 15 (“[W]e may decline to address any arguments that do not contain appropriate citation.”).
¶ 36 Additionally, we do not have a record of the proceedings from the bench trial. As such, we do not know what evidence or arguments the parties presented, or the testimony of any of the witnesses. We also do not know what credibility or factual findings the court made, or its reasons for any such findings or for its judgment finding in favor of Bike Taxi. Because we do not have a
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transcript of the bench trial proceedings, we cannot review whether the court’s factual findings or basis for its legal conclusions and judgment finding in favor of Bike Taxi were against the manifest weight of the evidence. See Corral v. Mervis Industries, Inc., 217 Ill. 2d 144, 156 (2005) (“An issue relating to a circuit court’s factual findings and basis for its legal conclusions obviously cannot be reviewed absent a report or record of the proceeding.”). Accordingly, based on this record, we must presume the trial court entered its judgment finding in favor of Bike Taxi with a sufficient factual basis and in conformity with the law. See id. at 157 “(Without an adequate record preserving the claimed error, the reviewing court must presume the circuit court had a sufficient factual basis for its holding and that its order conforms with the law.”). The trial court’s judgment finding in favor of Bike Taxi was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 37 Plaintiff next asserts that the “misconduct and irregularities undermined the fairness of the proceedings.” He states he “was subjected to threats indicating that refusal to accept settlement would result in loss of jury trial” and “[t]he case proceeded as a bench trial consistent with those threats.” However, plaintiff has failed to cite to the record or provide any developed argument or authority to support these conclusory assertions. “It is well established that mere contentions, without argument or citation of authority, do not merit consideration on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Marriage of Lugo, 2025 IL App (1st) 231478, ¶ 102. As such, plaintiff’s argument is forfeited, and we will not consider it. See id. (finding the appellant’s argument forfeited and declining to consider the issue where the argument contained conclusory statements, undeveloped arguments, and no citation to authority).
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¶ 38 Next, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s order denying his posttrial motion to correct the record under Rule 329. He asserts that the “trial court’s refusal to correct the record deprived [him] of meaningful appellate review.”
¶ 39 Rule 323(b) provides that “[t]he report of proceedings shall be taken as true and correct unless shown to be otherwise and corrected in the manner permitted by Rule 329 for the record on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(b) (eff. July 1, 2017). Rule 329 sets forth the manner under which the record may be corrected and states: “Material omissions or inaccuracies or improper authentication may be corrected by stipulation of the parties or by the trial court, either before or after the record is transmitted to the reviewing court, or by the reviewing court or a judge thereof.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 329 (eff. July 1, 2017). Rule 329 also provides that “[a]ny controversy as to whether the record accurately discloses what occurred in the trial court shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform to the truth.” Id. “[A] party may not prove an inaccuracy in the record merely by presenting oral testimony” but must produce evidence “of some note or memorandum from the records or quasi-records of the court, or by the judge’s minutes, or by the papers on file in the cause.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Allen, 109 Ill. 2d 177, 184 (1985). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to supplement the record pursuant to Rule 329 under the abuse of discretion standard. See Court of Northbrook Condominium Ass'n v. Bhutani, 2014 IL App (1st) 130417, ¶¶ 36-38 (reviewing trial court’s order granting the plaintiff’s motion to supplement the appellate record under the abuse of discretion standard).
¶ 40 In plaintiff’s challenge to the court’s order denying his motion to supplement and correct the record, he asserts that the “resulting record contains unresolved conflicts, preventing meaningful appellate review and constituting reversible error.” However, plaintiff’s assertion is
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conclusory, and he does not provide any argument or citation to authority to support his argument. Because plaintiff failed to provide proper argument and authority, his challenge to the trial court’s order denying his motion to supplement and correct the record is forfeited. See Eisenberg v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 337 Ill. App. 3d 373, 383 (2003) (“A failure to provide proper argument and authority results in a forfeiture of the argument.”).
¶ 41 Forfeiture aside, in the court’s written order denying plaintiff’s motion to supplement and correct the record, it denied the motion “for the reasons stated on the record.” We do not have the transcript from the hearing when the court denied plaintiff’s motion. As such, because we do not have a complete record, we presume the court entered its order denying plaintiff’s motion to supplement the record in conformity with the law and with a sufficient factual basis. See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92.
¶ 42 We also note that plaintiff states that he submitted a Rule 323(c) bystander’s report. The record shows that plaintiff filed a “statement of proceedings” pursuant to Rule 323(c) with his motion to supplement and correct the record. Rule 323(c) governs the “Procedure If No Verbatim Transcript is Available” and provides that, “[i]f no verbatim transcript of the evidence of proceedings is obtainable the appellant may prepare a proposed report of proceedings from the best available sources, including recollection.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). However, Bike Taxi asserts, and plaintiff does not dispute, that there is a verbatim transcript of the bench trial proceedings available. As such, because a verbatim transcript of the proceedings is available, Rule 323(c) does not apply.
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¶ 43 Lastly, we note that, to the extent plaintiff raised new arguments in his reply brief, those arguments are forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).
¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court’s judgment finding in favor of defendant and against plaintiff.
¶ 46 Affirmed.