FILED Apr 27 2026, 8:46 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Tyler Vestal, Devin Vestal, Seth Vestal, and Kathleen Duszynski, Appellant-Defendants/Counterclaim-Plaintiffs
v.
Estate of Philip J. Duszynski, Appellee-Plaintiff/Counterclaim-Defendant
April 27, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-PL-1101 Appeal from the Lake Superior Court The Honorable John M. Sedia, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 45D01-2305-PL-361
Opinion by Judge Kenworthy Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bailey concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 1 of 19 Kenworthy, Judge.
Case Summary [1] While they were married, Philip Duszynski and Kathleen Duszynski bought
certain property and placed it in a land trust of which they were the
beneficiaries and Kathleen’s grandchildren, Tyler, Devin, and Seth Vestal
(collectively, the “Vestals”), were the contingent beneficiaries. 1 When Philip
and Kathleen divorced, the property was awarded to Philip, and Kathleen was
ordered to execute all necessary paperwork to remove herself from the trust.
Kathleen did not immediately do so, but after Philip died, she signed an
“Assignment of the Beneficial Interest” form related to the trust. Thereafter,
the trustee issued a Trustee’s Deed to the Vestals based on their status as
contingent beneficiaries.
[2] The Estate of Philip Duszynski (the “Estate”) then filed a complaint against
Kathleen and the Vestals for unjust enrichment and to quiet title in the Estate.
The Vestals filed a counterclaim to quiet title in the Vestals, among other claims
not at issue in this appeal. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment on these claims. The Vestals now appeal the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment to the Estate on the Estate’s unjust enrichment
1 Initially, the contingent beneficiary was “Laurie Vestal as Custodian for Tyler Vestal, Devin Vestal and Seth Vestal under the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 92; see Ind. Code ch. 30-2- 8.5 (1989). Each of the Vestals has since become an “adult” as defined by the Act. I.C. § 30-2-8.5-1 (defining an “adult” as an individual who is at least twenty-one years of age); see also I.C. § 30-2-8.5-35 (stating the custodian “shall transfer in an appropriate manner the custodial property to the minor or the minor’s estate upon the earlier of: (1) the minor’s attaining twenty-one (21) years of age; or (2) the minor’s death”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 2 of 19 claim and denying summary judgment to the Vestals on their counterclaim to
quiet title. The Vestals raise two issues for our review: (1) Did the trial court err
in granting summary judgment to the Estate on the Estate’s unjust enrichment
claim?; and (2) Did the trial court err in denying the Vestals’ motion and
granting the Estate’s motion for summary judgment on the competing quiet title
claims? We reverse and remand.
Facts and Procedural History 2 [3] Philip and Kathleen were married in 1989. No children were born of their
marriage, though both had heirs from previous relationships. In 2006, the
Duszynskis entered into a land trust agreement and signed a Deed Into Trust
conveying jointly owned property in Hammond (“1021 Bauer Street”) to
Indiana Land Trust Company 3 as trustee of the trust (“Trust 5743”). The trust
agreement provided, in relevant part:
BENEFICIARIES:
***
2 An appellee may file an appendix, but “the appellee’s Appendix shall not contain any materials already contained in appellant’s Appendix, unless necessary for completeness or context.” Ind. Appellate Rule 50(A)(3). Further, “[b]ecause the Transcript is transmitted to the Court on Appeal pursuant to [Appellate] Rule 12(B), parties should not reproduce any portion of the Transcript in the Appendix.” App. R. 50(F). Contrary to these rules, the Estate filed an Appellee’s Appendix containing materials already contained in the Appellant’s Appendix and included the full transcript of the summary judgment hearing. We remind counsel that compliance with the Appellate Rules is expected. 3 Indiana Land Trust Company was known at the time of the conveyance as Lake County Trust Company.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 3 of 19 Philip J. Duszynski and Kathleen R. Duszynski, as joint tenants with rights of survivorship. Upon the death of the survivor of them, any interest remaining hereunder shall pass to Laurie Vestal as Custodian for Tyler Vestal, Devin Vestal and Seth Vestal under the Uniform Transfer to Minors Act.
POWER OF DIRECTION:
It is understood and agreed by the parties to this agreement and by any person who may hereafter acquire any interest in this trust that the power of direction referred to on the reverse side hereof shall be in:
Philip J. Duszynski OR Kathleen R. Duszynski
By amendment in writing delivered to and accepted by the trustee, any beneficiary having a vested interest hereunder shall at any time or times have the right to revoke, alter or amend the provisions of this trust agreement relative to the person or persons who may be entitled from time to time to the ownership and enjoyment of said beneficiary’s interest hereunder.
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 92–93. The residence on the property was rented and
the Duszynskis never lived there.
[4] In 2018, Kathleen petitioned for dissolution of marriage. The parties entered
into a settlement agreement that was incorporated into the Decree of
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 4 of 19 Dissolution signed by the dissolution court. Among the provisions of the
settlement agreement was one regarding the property at 1021 Bauer Street:
[Philip] shall be awarded as his sole and separate property the real estate and residence located at 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana. [Kathleen] shall execute any and all paperwork necessary, including documentation to remove her involvement in the trust associated with said property in order to effectuate this provision.
Id. at 104.
[5] Philip died on January 17, 2023. At that time, Kathleen had not executed any
paperwork regarding her involvement in Trust 5743. On February 6, Kathleen
signed an Indiana Land Trust Company form titled Assignment of the
Beneficial Interest. The form states Kathleen “hereby sell(s), assign[s],
transfer(s) and set(s) over unto Tyler Vestal, Devin Vestal and Seth Vestal, as
joint tenants w/rights of survivor . . . [a]ll of [her] rights, powers, privileges and
beneficial interest” to Trust 5743. Id. at 108. 4 In March, Indiana Land Trust
4 On February 22, 2023—after Kathleen had signed the assignment of beneficial interest form—the Estate petitioned in the Estate case for a turnover order, alleging disposition of several assets divided by the dissolution decree had not been completed, including 1021 Bauer Street. See id. at 187. The next day, the court in the Estate case ordered Kathleen to (among other things) “[e]xecute any and all paperwork necessary, including documentation to remove her involvement in the trust associated with the real estate located at 1021 Bauer St., Hammond, IN.” Id. at 195. To the extent the Estate’s argument on appeal rests on this order, we note Kathleen had already signed the necessary paperwork when the order was requested and issued. See Appellee’s Br. at 9 (stating the Vestals’ “claim to the title of the real estate was created by an act done in direct violation of a court order”).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 5 of 19 Company issued a Trustee’s Deed to 1021 Bauer Street to the Vestals as joint
tenants.
[6] An unsupervised estate was opened for Philip shortly after his passing. The
Estate filed a complaint against Kathleen, the Vestals, and Indiana Land Trust
Company for unjust enrichment and to quiet title to 1021 Bauer Street in the
Estate. The unjust enrichment claim alleged Kathleen fraudulently completed
the assignment of beneficial interest form because she failed to provide Indiana
Land Trust Company with a copy of the dissolution decree and “[d]ue to the
misrepresentations, negligence, and fraudulent conduct of [Kathleen], [the
Vestals] have been unjustly enriched to the detriment of the [Estate]” which is
“the rightful owner” of the property. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 24. The Estate’s
quiet title claim asserted Philip was the legal owner of the property at the time
of his death, the Vestals “have no interest in the property” as far as the Estate
can ascertain, and any interest the Vestals claim is adverse to the Estate and
“without any right whatsoever[.]” Id. at 26.
[7] The Vestals answered the complaint and filed a counterclaim of their own to
quiet title. The quiet title claim asserted the Vestals were contingent
beneficiaries of the trust, Philip did not revoke their contingent beneficiary
status before he died, and the Vestals are owners of the property by virtue of a
recorded Trustee’s Deed issued after Philip’s passing.
[8] The Vestals moved for partial summary judgment alleging they were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on both counts of the Estate’s complaint and on the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 6 of 19 unjust enrichment and quiet title counts of their counterclaim. 5 Kathleen joined
in the motion. 6 Among other items, the Vestals designated the trust agreement
and deed placing 1021 Bauer Street into Trust 5743, the Duszynskis’ decree of
dissolution, and the Trustee’s Deed conveying the property from the trust to the
Vestals. They also designated the affidavit of Kelli A. Wyzykowski, Trust
Counsel responsible for reviewing land trust agreements administered by
Indiana Land Trust Company. Wyzykowski stated under oath:
6. I was asked on February 6, 2023, by Trust Officer Vicky Bostick with Indiana Land Trust Company to review Trust 5743.
7. Land Trust 5743 was executed on April 4, 2006 by Philip J. Duszynski and Kathleen R. Duszynski for the real-estate known as 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana.
5 The Vestals asserted a counterclaim against the Estate for abuse of process and a counterclaim against the tenant of the property for ejectment. Those claims are not at issue in this appeal as they were not part of the summary judgment motions. The Vestals also asserted a counterclaim for unjust enrichment against the Estate based on the Estate directing the tenant of the property to pay rent to the Estate “despite [the Estate] having no ownership interest in the subject property.” Id. at 57. They stated in their motion for summary judgment that they sought summary judgment in their favor on this counterclaim. See id. at 72 (motion stating the Vestals seek summary judgment as to “Counts 1) Quiet Title and 2) Unjust Enrichment of The Vestals’ Counter- Complaint”). However, they did not make an argument about their own unjust enrichment claim in the accompanying memorandum, and they did not designate any evidence relevant to this claim. Moreover, the trial court did not make a ruling on this claim, and the Vestals do not present an argument about it on appeal. Therefore, we do not discuss it. 6 Kathleen also answered the Estate’s complaint and filed a counterclaim against the Estate for abuse of process. That counterclaim is not at issue in this appeal.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 7 of 19 8. The initial beneficiaries to Land Trust 5743 are Philip J. Duszynski and Kathleen R. Duszynski who had vested interests in Land Trust 5743 upon the executed date of April 4, 2006.
9. The contingent beneficiaries to Land Trust 5743 are Tyler Vestal, Devin Vestal and Seth Vestal.
10. That Land Trust 5743 allows for any vested beneficiary to revoke, alter or amend the provisions of the trust agreement by delivering notice of his/her intent to the trustee.
11. That on April 18, 2006, a Trustee Deed was filed and accepted by the Lake County, Indiana Recorder’s Office placing title to 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana into Land Trust 5743.
12. That Indiana Land Trust Company was informed that Philip J. Duszynski passed away on January 17, 2023.
13. That title to 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana remained in Land Trust 5743 on Philip J. Duszynski’s passing on January 17, 2023.
14. I conducted a diligent search of the records kept in the ordinary course of business at Indiana Land Trust Company and there is no record of Philip J. Duszynski ever requesting to revoke Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal as beneficiaries under Land Trust 5743.
15. I was provided the April 26, 2021 Decree of Dissolution between Kathleen R. Duszysnki and Philip Duszynski which awards Philip Duszysnki 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana and requires Kathleen Duszysnki to execute all necessary
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 8 of 19 paperwork to remove her involvement in the trust associated with 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana.
16. That on February 6, 2023, Kathleen R. Duszynski executed an assignment of beneficial interest in Trust 5743 which removed her interest in the 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana.
17. That in February, 2023, Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal requested Indiana Land Trust Company issue a Trustee Deed to Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal as joint tenants.
18. That based on my 12 YEARS of knowledge and experience as trust counsel, because Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal were the contingent beneficiaries under Trust 5743, Indiana Land Trust Company through its trust officer and Assistant Vice President Vicky L. Bostick executed a Trustee’s Deed on March 15, 2023 to Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal as joint tenants.
19. That if it was Philip Duszysnki’s intention to revoke Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal as contingent beneficiaries, since Trust 5743 allowed for unilateral revocation by a vested beneficiary, of a non-vested beneficiary, nothing under the terms set forth in Trust 5743 prevented Philip Duszynski from doing so.
20. That had Philip Duszynski presented Indiana Land Trust Company with a written request to revoke Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal as contingent beneficiaries under Trust 5743 at any time prior to his passing, Indiana Land Trust Company would have approved the request and removed Tyler Vestal, Seth Vestal and Devin Vestal from Trust 5743.
Id. at 100–02.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 9 of 19 [9] In their motion for summary judgment, the Vestals claimed:
15. The designated evidence establishes that no genuine issues of material fact as to the Estate[’s] claims for unjust enrichment because the benefit conferred upon the Vestals was a gift or unrequested benefit which precludes an action for unjust enrichment as a matter of law.
16. The designated evidence establishes that no genuine issues of material fact exist as to both the claim/counterclaims for quiet title because the Vestals have fee simple title and there is no evidence of any defects that would render the deed void.
Id. at 73 (citations omitted). The Estate filed a cross-motion requesting the trial
court “to enter summary judgment in its favor and to deny [the Vestals’] motion
for summary judgment[.]” Id. at 137.
[10] The trial court held a hearing and then issued an order granting the Estate’s
cross-motion for summary judgment and denying the Vestals’ motion. The
court found that Kathleen violated the provision of the dissolution decree that
required her to remove her involvement in the trust, “instead conveying her
interest in Land Trust 5743 to the Vestals.” Id. at 18. The court concluded the
Vestals obtained their interest in 1021 Bauer Street through Kathleen’s breach
of the settlement agreement and the Estate could proceed against the Vestals on
the theory of unjust enrichment. As a remedy, the court ordered Indiana Land
Trust Company to “transfer instanter the beneficial interests of [the Vestals] in
and to Land Trust 5743 to [the Estate]” and, finding no just reason for delay,
directed entry of final judgment. Id. at 20.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 10 of 19 Summary Judgment Standard of Review [11] We review a trial court’s summary judgment decision by applying the same
standard as the trial court. Isgrig v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 256 N.E.3d 1238, 1244
(Ind. 2025). In doing so, we consider only properly designated evidence that
would be admissible at trial. Hussain v. Salin Bank & Tr. Co., 143 N.E.3d 322,
328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied. Summary judgment is appropriate only
when “the designated evidentiary matter shows . . . there is no genuine issue as
to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Ind. Trial Rule 56(C). We resolve all factual inferences and all
doubts as to the existence of a material issue in favor of the
nonmovant. Zaragoza v. Wexford of Ind., LLC, 225 N.E.3d 146, 151 (Ind. 2024).
[12] The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of making a prima
facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wireman v. LaPorte Hosp. Co., 205
N.E.3d 1041, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. The movant “can make
this showing when undisputed evidence affirmatively negates a required
element” of the nonmovant’s claim. Cmty. Health Network, Inc. v. McKenzie, 185
N.E.3d 368, 377 (Ind. 2022). Only if the movant meets this burden does the
burden then shift to the nonmovant to show the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact. Wireman, 205 N.E.3d at 1045. That parties file cross-motions for
summary judgment “neither alters this standard nor changes our analysis—we
consider each motion separately to determine whether the moving party is
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 11 of 19 entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Erie Indem. Co. v. Est. of Harris, 99
N.E.3d 625, 629 (Ind. 2018) (internal quotation omitted).
[13] The appellant bears the burden of proving the trial court erred in its summary
judgment decision. Schwartz v. Heeter, 994 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind. 2013).
Special findings are neither required in summary judgment proceedings nor
binding on appeal. Akin v. Simons, 180 N.E.3d 366, 372 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021).
However, such findings offer valuable insight into the trial court’s rationale for
its decision and help facilitate our review. Id.
The trial court erred in denying the Vestals’ motion for summary judgment and in granting the Estate’s cross-motion. The Designated Evidence
[14] The designated evidence shows Philip and Kathleen deeded 1021 Bauer Street
to Indiana Land Trust Company as trustee of Trust 5743 “when [they] initially
made that purchase.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 168 (Kathleeen’s deposition).
Trust 5743 then became the legal owner of the property. See id. at 92 (trust
agreement explaining Indiana Land Trust Corporation “is about to take legal
and equitable title to” 1021 Bauer Street). Philip and Kathleen were the initial
beneficiaries with vested interests in the trust, and “[u]pon the death of the
survivor of them,” any remaining interest would pass to the Vestals as
contingent beneficiaries. Id. The power of direction to revoke, alter, or amend
the provisions of the trust agreement resided in Philip or Kathleen, who could
do so by delivering notice of their intent to the trustee.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 12 of 19 [15] When Philip and Kathleen divorced, they agreed the real estate and residence at
1021 Bauer would be Philip’s sole and separate property and Kathleen would
execute any paperwork necessary “to remove her involvement in the trust
associated with said property[.]” Id. at 104. The dissolution court incorporated
this agreement into its decree.
[16] Even before the divorce, Philip had the power to revoke, alter, or amend the
provisions of the trust agreement—including the contingent beneficiaries—on
his own due to the power of direction being in Philip or Kathleen. But on the
date of Philip’s death, title to 1021 Bauer Street remained in Trust 5743 and
Philip had not notified the trustee he wished to revoke the Vestals as
beneficiaries (or make any other change to the trust). See id. at 101. The trust
agreement states: “The death of any beneficiary shall not terminate the trust or
affect the rights or powers of the trustee or of the beneficiaries except as
provided by law.” Id. at 93.
[17] After Philip’s death, Wyzykowski was asked to review the trust. She was
provided with a copy of the Duszynskis’ dissolution decree that required
Kathleen to execute any necessary documents to remove her interest in the
trust. Counsel stated in her affidavit that the assignment of beneficial interest
“removed [Kathleen’s] interest in . . . 1021 Bauer Street, Hammond, Indiana.”
Id. at 101. Based on counsel’s knowledge and experience and review of Trust
5743, a Trustee’s Deed naming the Vestals as joint tenants was issued at their
request, and the Vestals recorded it in Lake County on March 21, 2023.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 13 of 19 [18] Shortly after the deed was recorded, the Estate sent a letter to Indiana Land
Trust Company alleging the assignment was in violation of the dissolution
decree and stating, “As a result of the invalid assignment this property needs to
be transferred to the estate.” Id. at 196. On behalf of Indiana Land Trust
Company, Wyzykowski responded, “Unfortunately, we are unable to
accommodate your request as the property has been removed from the land
trust via a trustee’s deed[.] Given that the deed has been recorded, there is no
practical method for Indiana Land Trust Company to undo a recorded trustee’s
deed.” Id. at 197. Trust Counsel also stated if the Estate chose to file an asset
recovery action, and Indiana Land Trust Company was named as a necessary
party, it “will not object [and] will provide all cooperation that is reasonably
feasible[.]” Id. The Estate filed its complaint for unjust enrichment and to quiet
title in May 2023.
The Estate’s Claim for Unjust Enrichment
[19] The Vestals sought summary judgment on the Estate’s claim for unjust
enrichment, but the trial court denied their motion. Unjust enrichment is a
legal fiction that permits recovery “where the circumstances are such that under
the law of natural and immutable justice there should be a recovery[.]” Zoeller
v. E. Chicago Second Century, Inc., 904 N.E.2d 213, 220 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Bayh
v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 408 (Ind. 1991)). Unjust enrichment “requires a
party who has been unjustly enriched at another’s expense to make restitution
to the aggrieved party.” Andrew Nemeth Props., LLC v. Panzica, 271 N.E.3d
1100, 1114 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 296 (Ind. 2012)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 14 of 19 [20] To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, a plaintiff must show “that he
rendered a benefit to the defendant at the defendant’s express or implied
request, that the plaintiff expected payment from the defendant, and that
allowing the defendant to retain the benefit without restitution would be
unjust.” Reed, 980 N.E.2d at 296. “Put another way, ‘a plaintiff must establish
that a measurable benefit has been conferred on the defendant under such
circumstances that the defendant’s retention of the benefit without payment
would be unjust.’” Woodruff v. Ind. Fam. & Soc. Servs. Admin., 964 N.E.2d 784,
791 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 408), cert. denied.
[21] The designated evidence described above negates an essential element of the
Estate’s claim for unjust enrichment—that the enrichment be unjust. The
Estate alleged in its complaint that Kathleen “never completed the required
paperwork to transfer the property located at 1021 Bauer St. . . . to Philip . . . as
required by the Decree of Dissolution” and that due to her fraud, Indiana Land
Trust Company issued a deed to the Vestals, unjustly enriching them to the
Estate’s detriment. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 23–24 (emphasis added). The
Estate misreads the language and effect of the dissolution decree. 7
[22] The designated evidence shows the property at 1021 Bauer Street was not
ordered to be transferred to Philip personally. Rather, when the dissolution
7 The Estate claims declaring the Vestals the rightful owners of the property “would be modifying the Dissolution Decree in violation of Ind. Code § 31-15-2-17.” Appellee’s Br. at 13. To the contrary, this result gives effect to the provisions of the decree. The decree did not purport to dissolve the trust or eliminate the contingent beneficiary designation; it only removed Kathleen’s beneficial interest.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 15 of 19 court incorporated the settlement agreement into its decree, Philip remained a
vested beneficiary of Trust 5743 and holder of the power of direction; Kathleen
agreed as part of the settlement agreement to give up her beneficial status and
power of direction in the trust. See Murdock v. Est. of Murdock, 935 N.E.2d 270,
273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Settlement agreements become binding contracts
when incorporated into the dissolution decree[.]”) (emphasis omitted). In this
respect, the Estate is correct that the decree “severed [Kathleen’s] interest in and
to the real estate,” but it is mistaken when it says that the decree “awarded [the
property] to Philip . . . free and clear of the terms of the trust.” Appellee’s Br. at
10. Moreover, the Estate is mistaken when it says this provision “placed the
onus of dissolving the trust” on Kathleen. Id. at 14. The dissolution decree did
not alter anything about the trust but Kathleen’s interest. The contingent
beneficiary designation was not changed by the decree, and Philip never
changed it although he had the power to do so. The property remained in the
trust, and the Vestals remained the contingent beneficiaries. Therefore, when
Philip died, the remaining interest in Trust 5743 passed to the Vestals.
[23] Kathleen was removed as a vested beneficiary of the trust by operation of the
decree and she has never claimed otherwise. She was removed as a beneficiary
on paper by executing the assignment of beneficial interest. The Estate contends
Kathleen “assigned the trust to her grandchildren” through this action.
Appellee’s Br. at 6. To the extent Kathleen’s execution of the assignment form
did more than formally memorialize her earlier removal from the trust, it could
only have assigned whatever interest she retained at the time—which was none.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 16 of 19 [24] The trial court denied the Vestals’ motion for summary judgment on the
Estate’s unjust enrichment claim based upon its finding—in agreement with the
Estate’s argument—that the Vestals obtained their interest in 1021 Bauer
“through Kathleen’s breach[.]” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 20. This is contrary to
the designated evidence which shows as an undisputed material fact the Vestals
have had a continuous contingent interest in the property since 2006, when
Trust 5743 was created, not through Kathleen’s actions after Philip’s death.
The Vestals negated at least one element of the Estate’s claim, and the Estate
did not meet its burden to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.
The Estate does not contend that it in any way rendered a benefit to the Vestals
at the Vestals’ request; nor does the Estate allege that it expected to be paid by
the Vestals. And the Vestals have not been unjustly enriched to the detriment
of the Estate by the property passing to them. The property passed to the
Vestals through the terms of the trust, not through any wrongdoing by
Kathleen. This is simply an inheritance.
[25] The Estate’s claim fails as a matter of law, and the trial court erred in denying
the Vestals’ motion for summary judgment on the Estate’s unjust enrichment
claim.
Quiet Title
[26] Both sides requested the trial court quiet title. The trial court denied the
Vestals’ motion to quiet title in them and granted the Estate’s cross-motion,
treating the quiet title relief as a remedy for the unjust enrichment it found. See
id. at 19 (trial court order stating, “Having found Kathleen breached the Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 17 of 19 Agreement with Philip and violated a Court order, what is the appropriate
remedy for the Estate?”). The Estate’s claim to title is that Philip “was the legal
own[er] of [the] property at the time of his death” and the Vestals “have no
interest in the property.” Id. at 25–26. The Vestals’ counterclaim to quiet title
is based on the trust provisions and the recorded Trustee’s Deed in their names.
[27] As for the Estate’s claim, “[i]n an action to quiet title . . . the plaintiff must
recover, if at all, on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of his
adversary’s title.” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Holland, 993 N.E.2d 184, 191
(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). The plaintiff “must show that he has legal title with a
present right of possession paramount to the title of the defendant.” Chmiel v.
US Bank Nat’l Assoc., 109 N.E.3d 398, 407 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). In the context
of this case, the Vestals can defeat the Estate’s claim by showing the Estate
“does not have title or interest in the property.” Id.
[28] Measured against this standard, the Estate’s claim fails. The Estate has not
designated evidence establishing its own legal title to the property—it has only
challenged the Vestals’ title. Conversely, the Vestals designated a certified copy
of a recorded Trustee’s Deed naming each of them as joint tenants. “[R]ecord
title is the highest evidence of ownership and is not easily defeated.” Ritz v. Ind.
& Ohio R.R., Inc., 632 N.E.2d 769, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Est. of Mark
v. H.H. Smith Co., 547 N.E.2d 796, 800 (Ind. 1989)), trans. denied. Evidence of
fee simple title establishes a prima facie case for quiet title. Id. The Vestals
have shown prima facie evidence of a valid title in fee simple, and the Estate
has not proved any defects that would render the Trustee’s Deed void. The trial
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 18 of 19 court erred in granting the Estate’s motion for summary judgment and denying
the Vestals’ motion for summary judgment with respect to title to the property.
Conclusion [29] The trial court’s order is reversed, and the court is instructed to enter judgment
for the Vestals on the Estate’s claims and on the Vestals’ counterclaim to quiet
title. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
[30] Reversed and remanded.
Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS TYLER VESTAL, DEVIN VESTAL, AND SETH VESTAL Daniel J. Calhoun Calhoun Law LLC Crown Point, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT KATHLEEN DUSZYNSKI Guy S. DiMartino Guy S. DiMartino, PC Valparaiso, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE D. Eric Neff Law Offices of D. Eric Neff, P.C. Crown Point, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-PL-1101 | April 27, 2026 Page 19 of 19