[272]*272RUIZ, Associate Judge:
This case presents us with the question whether The District of Columbia Bail Reform Act, D.C.Code § 28-1322 (1996), provides to a person sought to be detained pretrial the right to present evidence challenging the government’s evidence of the charged offense. The government contends that once a grand jury has found probable cause sufficient to return an indictment, the person charged has no right to present evidence concerning the charged offense unless the government is itself relying on circumstances surrounding the charged offense as a reason for pretrial detention. We hold that, notwithstanding the return of an indictment by the grand jury, the express provisions of D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(l) entitle a person charged with a crime to present evidence about the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and “the weight of the evidence against” him or her for the purpose of providing information that the trial court must consider in making an individualized determination whether the charged person should be detained pretrial.
I. Facts of the Case
Mark Tyler was arrested and presented on a warrant on January 31, 1995, on a one-count complaint of carnal knowledge of a minor.1 The government requested preventive detention pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1322(b), and a hearing was set for February 7,1997.2 Five days before the hearing date, a grand jury returned an indictment against Tyler for his conduct with a minor, charging him with one count of carnal knowledge and one count of sodomy.3
At the pretrial detention hearing, the government relied on the indictment as establishing probable cause that Tyler committed the offenses of which he was indicted. The government offered no further evidence of the underlying charged offenses and turned, instead, to offer evidence that Tyler was dangerous and should be detained because of his prior convictions for similar offenses against young girls and the fact that he was on probation on the prior convictions at the time of the charged offenses.4
The trial court first ruled that once the government had shown probable cause — in this case, through the indictment — and had not proffered any additional evidence of the underlying charges to establish dangerousness, Tyler could not challenge the government’s evidence of the charged offenses. Although the trial court subsequently altered its position and allowed a continuance so that Tyler could subpoena witnesses and conduct further investigation into the charged offenses, the trial court eventually returned to its original ruling after requesting further briefing on the issue from both parties. In a written order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court concluded that the pretrial detention hearing would be limited to “the presentation of evidence on the issue of defendant’s dangerousness, but this showing may not be made through evidence relating to the weakness of the government’s case.” The trial court expressed concern that a pretrial detention hearing not be used by the defendant “as a trial on the underlying indictment or as a method for getting discovery from potential witnesses.” Tyler was permitted to present evidence relevant to whether he presented a danger to the community,5 but he was not [273]*273permitted to introduce evidence he proffered, through the testimony of witnesses, that the complainant had fabricated the charges against him.6 The trial court ordered that Tyler be detained pretrial, concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness on alternative grounds: “based on the charges on which he has been indicted in conjunction with these prior convictions” and based solely on his prior convictions (“frankly, without even consideration of the indictment ... we’re talking about an individual within a very short period of time who has five convictions”).
Tyler promptly appealed the trial court’s detention order and moved for summary reversal. On May 5, 1995, this court denied the motion for summary reversal and affirmed the order on appeal, with one dissent. On May 8,1995, three days before the scheduled trial date, Tyler entered a plea of guilty to enticing a minor child under D.C.Code § 22-4110; the government agreed to dismiss the indicted charge of carnal knowledge. On July 18, 1995, Tyler was sentenced to a split sentence of twenty months to five years, with suspended execution of all but a year, and a trial court recommendation for work release in a halfway-house program. The trial court also placed Tyler on probation for five years, with the first six months under intensive supervision, including reporting, continued employment, participation in treatment for his alcohol abuse and sexual problems and a requirement that he not be alone with young girls.
We granted Tyler’s petition for rehearing en banc on March 12, 1996, and vacated our order of May 5, 1995, affirming the trial court’s order of pretrial detention.
II. Mootness
Even though we granted the petition for rehearing en banc after we were informed that Tyler had entered a guilty plea, the government continues to argue that Tyler’s appeal should be dismissed as moot. Thus, we consider first whether Tyler’s guilty plea and conviction renders this appeal non-justiciable.
A case is considered to be moot if “there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation.” In re Morris, 482 A2d 369, 371 (D.C.1984) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There is no doubt that even if Tyler were to prevail on the merits of his appeal, the result would have no impact on him in this case because he is no longer being detained pretrial, but is serving the sentence imposed as a result of his guilty plea. However, we do not apply a strict rule of mootness to dismiss a case because it no longer affects the particular appellant, if it presents a matter of importance that is likely to recur, yet evade review with respect to others similarly situated. Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989); contra, Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183-84, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982). Specifically as concerns issues arising from pretrial detention, notwithstanding the defendant’s right to expedited consideration by way of a motion for summary reversal, we have recognized that it is altogether probable that the limited period during which a person may be detained pretrial could expire before an appeal is heard on the merits. See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1324 n. 2 (D.C.1981) (en bane).
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[272]*272RUIZ, Associate Judge:
This case presents us with the question whether The District of Columbia Bail Reform Act, D.C.Code § 28-1322 (1996), provides to a person sought to be detained pretrial the right to present evidence challenging the government’s evidence of the charged offense. The government contends that once a grand jury has found probable cause sufficient to return an indictment, the person charged has no right to present evidence concerning the charged offense unless the government is itself relying on circumstances surrounding the charged offense as a reason for pretrial detention. We hold that, notwithstanding the return of an indictment by the grand jury, the express provisions of D.C.Code § 23-1322(e)(l) entitle a person charged with a crime to present evidence about the “nature and circumstances of the offense” and “the weight of the evidence against” him or her for the purpose of providing information that the trial court must consider in making an individualized determination whether the charged person should be detained pretrial.
I. Facts of the Case
Mark Tyler was arrested and presented on a warrant on January 31, 1995, on a one-count complaint of carnal knowledge of a minor.1 The government requested preventive detention pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-1322(b), and a hearing was set for February 7,1997.2 Five days before the hearing date, a grand jury returned an indictment against Tyler for his conduct with a minor, charging him with one count of carnal knowledge and one count of sodomy.3
At the pretrial detention hearing, the government relied on the indictment as establishing probable cause that Tyler committed the offenses of which he was indicted. The government offered no further evidence of the underlying charged offenses and turned, instead, to offer evidence that Tyler was dangerous and should be detained because of his prior convictions for similar offenses against young girls and the fact that he was on probation on the prior convictions at the time of the charged offenses.4
The trial court first ruled that once the government had shown probable cause — in this case, through the indictment — and had not proffered any additional evidence of the underlying charges to establish dangerousness, Tyler could not challenge the government’s evidence of the charged offenses. Although the trial court subsequently altered its position and allowed a continuance so that Tyler could subpoena witnesses and conduct further investigation into the charged offenses, the trial court eventually returned to its original ruling after requesting further briefing on the issue from both parties. In a written order dated February 13, 1995, the trial court concluded that the pretrial detention hearing would be limited to “the presentation of evidence on the issue of defendant’s dangerousness, but this showing may not be made through evidence relating to the weakness of the government’s case.” The trial court expressed concern that a pretrial detention hearing not be used by the defendant “as a trial on the underlying indictment or as a method for getting discovery from potential witnesses.” Tyler was permitted to present evidence relevant to whether he presented a danger to the community,5 but he was not [273]*273permitted to introduce evidence he proffered, through the testimony of witnesses, that the complainant had fabricated the charges against him.6 The trial court ordered that Tyler be detained pretrial, concluding that there was clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness on alternative grounds: “based on the charges on which he has been indicted in conjunction with these prior convictions” and based solely on his prior convictions (“frankly, without even consideration of the indictment ... we’re talking about an individual within a very short period of time who has five convictions”).
Tyler promptly appealed the trial court’s detention order and moved for summary reversal. On May 5, 1995, this court denied the motion for summary reversal and affirmed the order on appeal, with one dissent. On May 8,1995, three days before the scheduled trial date, Tyler entered a plea of guilty to enticing a minor child under D.C.Code § 22-4110; the government agreed to dismiss the indicted charge of carnal knowledge. On July 18, 1995, Tyler was sentenced to a split sentence of twenty months to five years, with suspended execution of all but a year, and a trial court recommendation for work release in a halfway-house program. The trial court also placed Tyler on probation for five years, with the first six months under intensive supervision, including reporting, continued employment, participation in treatment for his alcohol abuse and sexual problems and a requirement that he not be alone with young girls.
We granted Tyler’s petition for rehearing en banc on March 12, 1996, and vacated our order of May 5, 1995, affirming the trial court’s order of pretrial detention.
II. Mootness
Even though we granted the petition for rehearing en banc after we were informed that Tyler had entered a guilty plea, the government continues to argue that Tyler’s appeal should be dismissed as moot. Thus, we consider first whether Tyler’s guilty plea and conviction renders this appeal non-justiciable.
A case is considered to be moot if “there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and ... interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the violation.” In re Morris, 482 A2d 369, 371 (D.C.1984) (quoting County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631, 99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). There is no doubt that even if Tyler were to prevail on the merits of his appeal, the result would have no impact on him in this case because he is no longer being detained pretrial, but is serving the sentence imposed as a result of his guilty plea. However, we do not apply a strict rule of mootness to dismiss a case because it no longer affects the particular appellant, if it presents a matter of importance that is likely to recur, yet evade review with respect to others similarly situated. Lynch v. United States, 557 A.2d 580, 582 (D.C.1989); contra, Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183-84, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982). Specifically as concerns issues arising from pretrial detention, notwithstanding the defendant’s right to expedited consideration by way of a motion for summary reversal, we have recognized that it is altogether probable that the limited period during which a person may be detained pretrial could expire before an appeal is heard on the merits. See United States v. Edwards, 430 A.2d 1321, 1324 n. 2 (D.C.1981) (en bane). That is particularly so in this case, where the appeal was first denied by a motions division of the court, but the full court subsequently decided to hear the matter en banc.7
[274]*274By deciding to hear the case en banc, we have indicated that the case raises an issue of “exceptional importance.” D.C.App. R. 40(e)(2). This issue is not limited to Tyler’s case; the trial court applied a per se rule, without considering the statutory requirements that apply in every case of pretrial detention under D.C.Code § 23-1322(b). The government and dissenting opinion argue that the precise sequence of events in Tyler’s case is unusual and unlikely to recur. The likelihood of recurrence, however, is more within the control of the government than the defendant. The government determines the timing of the presentment of the case to the grand jury and the return of the indictment, specifically, whether indictment occurs before or after a preventive detention hearing. The government also determines whether it will rely exclusively on prior criminal conduct to prove dangerousness. This case demonstrates that the appellate process, with its inherent delay, may not be effective to prevent prolonged pretrial detention before there can be en banc appellate review of the issue presented here. Finally, in this case we have the benefit of full briefing by the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the Public Defender Service, who represent interests that will continue to be controverted in future cases. Therefore, we conclude that we should consider and decide the appeal.
III. The Right to Present Evidence Challenging an Indicted Offense at a Pretrial Detention Hearing
We turn now to the question raised by this appeal: whether a defendant has the right, at a pretrial detention hearing, to present evidence challenging the government’s evidence that he or she committed an indicted offense. We hold that the defendant does have such right, as provided by the plain language of the Bail Reform Act of 1992, D.C.Code § 23-1322(d)(3) and (4) and (e)(2).
Before considering the specific statutory language, we pause to consider the matter in context. A person initially comes within the criminal justice system as a result of an arrest, based on probable cause.8 Typically, arrest upon a criminal complaint precedes indictment. The Fifth Amendment requires that a person -can be “tried for a [felony] only on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury.” Wooley v. United States, 697 A.2d 777, 779 (D.C;1997) (quoting U.S. Const, amend. V). A grand jury indictment represents an independent assessment by representatives of the community, albeit in a non-adversarial context, that there is probable cause that the defendant committed a specified offense. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 571, 96 S.Ct. 1768, 1773-74, 48 L.Ed.2d 212 (1976).' The grand jury’s probable cause determination is sufficient to authorize the government to proceed with its prosecution of the indicted charge and to require the defendant to answer the charge at trial. Notwithstanding indictment, however, a defendant continues to be entitled to the presumption of innocence until and unless the government meets its burden of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.08 (4th ed.1993). Punishment for crime may not be imposed unless the government first meets that burden. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 m 16, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872 n. 16, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979).
The Supreme Court has recognized that the compelling governmental interests in ensuring a defendant’s appearance at trial and community safety may justify preventive detention. Thus, in appropriate cases, pretrial detention is a constitutionally permissible regulatory vehicle to provide a temporary period during which a person charged with a serious crime may be detained even though that person’s guilt has not been established [275]*275beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748-50, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2102-03, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). Because the charged person’s liberty interest is at stake, however, due process requires substantive standards and procedural safeguards. Id. at 746, 107 S.Ct. at 2101; see also Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6, 72 S.Ct. 1, 4, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951) (“To infer from the fact of indictment alone a need for bail in an unusually high amount [that the person cannot meet] is an arbitrary act.”). The Supreme Court has determined that the federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (1994), which is based on the pretrial detention statute of the District of Columbia, satisfies constitutional due process requirements. Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at 751-52, 107 S.Ct. at 2103-04.
The District of Columbia has a comprehensive statutory scheme that permits pretrial detention for certain individuals subject to express procedural safeguards. D.C.Code §§ 23-1321 to -1325 (1996). Generally, a person is entitled to remain at liberty pretrial upon that person’s promise to appear for trial or execution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount set by the trial court, “unless the judicial officer determines that the release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the safety of any other person or the community.” D.C.Code § 23-1321(b). In the absence of that determination, the trial court must release the person under the least restrictive conditions designed to ensure the person’s appearance at trial and the safety of other persons and the community. D.C.Code § 23-1321(e)(l). It is only if there is probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed certain identified serious crimes and the trial court determines, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that no set of conditions of release will ensure appearance of the person as required or the safety of other persons and the community, that the trial court may order pretrial detention. D.C.Code § 23-1322(b); Scott v. United States, 633 A.2d 72, 73 (D.C.1993) (citing Lynch, supra, 557 A.2d at 581-82).9 The trial court’s determination, however, can be made only after a hearing “pursuant to the provision of subsection (d)” of D.C.Code § 23-1322.
D.C.Code § 23-1322(d) provides in pertinent part:
(2) At the hearing, the person has the right to be represented by counsel and, if financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed.
(3) The person shall be afforded an opportunity to testify....
(4) The person shall be afforded an opportunity to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise. The rules concerning admissibility of evidence in criminal trials do not apply to the presentation and consideration of information at the hearing.
The matters that the trial court must consider at the hearing are also set out in the statute:
(e) The judicial officer shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety 'of any other person and the community, take into account information available concerning:
(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or dangerous crime as these terms are defined in § 23-1331, or involves obstruction of justice as defined in § 22-722;
(2) The weight of the evidence against the person;
(3) The history and characteristics of the person, including:
(A) The person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in [276]*276the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and
(B) Whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under local, state, or federal law; and
(4) The nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release.
D.C.Code § 23-1322(e).10
The precise question presented by this appeal is whether the hearing at which Tyler was ordered to be detained pretrial satisfied the requirements of D.C.Code § 23-1322(d) and (e). We conclude that it did not because Tyler was not permitted, pursuant to his proffer,11 “to present witnesses” that would have explored the “nature and circumstances of the offense charged” and challenged the “weight of the evidence against” him, as expressly provided by the plain meaning of the statutory language. D.C.Code § 23 — 1322(d)(4) and (e)(1) and (2). The statute expressly provides that the trial court “shall, in determining whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, take into account information available concerning” such matters. D.C.Code § 23-1322(e) (emphasis added). This the trial court did not do. The trial court expressed the view that it “prefer[red] ... not to know anything about the case” and ordered Tyler to be detained pretrial based solely on the fact of the indictment-and his prior criminal history.
We are unpersuaded by the argument that to permit the defendant to present evidence challenging the ‘¿weight of the [government’s] evidence” where there has been an indictment is tantamount to challenging the indictment itself, in contravention of established case law that an indictment conclusively determines the existence of probable cause for purposes of detention. See, e.g.,. Scott, supra, 633 A.2d at 73 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n. 19, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865 n. 19, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975)).- This argument misses the thrust of the-, statutory scheme and ignores the plain language of the statute. Here, the indictment was relied upon by the trial court as the “conclusive determination” of “probable cause” that Tyler had committed the charged offenses, the first of two requirements that must be met before a person may be detained, pretrial.12 The probable cause requirement is constitutional, for without probable cause a person may not even be bound over for trial, much less detained pretrial before his or her guilt is proven at trial. Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at 125, 95 S.Ct. at 868-69 (holding that Fourth Amendment requires “a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest”).
The statute, however, imposes additional requirements, consistent with due process considerations, before a person may be deprived of liberty pretrial for an extended period of time. Once the baseline probable [277]*277cause determination has been made by a judicial officer or, as here, supplied by a grand jury indictment, the statute does not use the term “probable cause” at all. Rather, because much more than being held answerable for a crime at trial is at stake at a pretrial detention hearing, the statute requires “clear and convincing evidence” of the expressed standard that “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required, and the safety of any other person and the community.” D.C.Code § 23-1322(b)(2); cf. Lynch, supra, 557 A.2d at 581 (requiring clear and convincing evidence of dangerousness before a person charged with first-degree murder may be detained pretrial, without a prescribed time limit).13 The statutory scheme creates increasingly elaborate mechanisms and heightened standards as the charged person’s liberty is restrained, resulting, ultimately, in pretrial detention. The statutory scheme and language make clear that the trial court’s determination that there is “clear and convincing evidence” of dangerousness justifying pretrial detention is to be based on an individualized assessment of information concerning specified items that pertain to the crime charged, the history and characteristics of the person, and the danger that may be posed to others if the person is released. Here, the trial court considered Tyler’s prior criminal history and the danger that his demonstrated sexual proclivities might pose to the complainant and other youngsters in the community if he were to be released. But the trial court flatly refused to consider Tyler’s proffered evidence concerning the “nature and circumstances” of the charged offenses and the “weight of the evidence against” him.14 Consideration of both was expressly required by the statute and the trial court did not have discretion to disregard them.15 See Salerno, supra, 481 U.S. at 742, 107 S.Ct. at 2098-99.
We do not attempt to dictate to trial courts the details of how § 23-1322 hearings are to be managed. As with any other situation where the trial court is required to hold a hearing, it is within the trial court’s sound discretion to determine the appropriate scope and extent of evidentiary [278]*278presentations and cross-examination, in light of the proffer made and the trial court’s assessment of the evidence developed at the hearing. Considerations of judicial efficiency caution against permitting a pretrial' detention hearing to turn into a trial of the indicted offense or a means of discovery. Cf. Gerstein, supra, 420 U.S. at 122 n. 28, 95 S.Ct. at 867 n. 23. The clear mandate of the statute, however, does not permit the trial court either to completely forego consideration of the specific items which the statute requires be taken into account, or to prohibit the defendant from using the procedural safeguards that the statute expressly provides.16
On appeal from an order of detention we. affirm if the order “is supported by the proceedings below. If the order is not so supported, the court may remand the case for a further hearing, or .... order the person released.” D.C.Code § 23-1324(b). . Because Tyler’s pretrial detention hearing did not comport with statutory requirements, the trial court’s detention order is not “supported” by the required proceedings. In light of Tyler’s subsequent guilty plea, we do not remand the case or order Tyler’s release, but vacate the detention order.
So ordered.