1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CLAUDIE TYLER, Case No. 25-cv-01337-CAB-DEB CDCR #K-19763, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR MATRUZ, Captain, et al., FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 16 Defendants. REQUIRED BY 17 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
18 [Doc. No. 4] 19 20 21 Plaintiff Claudie Tyler, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 22 Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 23 complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., Doc. No. 1.) Tyler claims more 24 than a dozen named and unnamed RJD officials failed to protect him from being assaulted 25 by a cellmate in 2021, charged him with false disciplinary violations, and engaged in 26 various acts of racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation, “abuse” and “oppression” 27 against him on several occasions throughout 2023 and 2024. (Id. at 5‒13.) He seeks $200 28 million in general and punitive damages. (Id. at 20.) 1 Tyler did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil 2 action at the time he filed his Complaint; but he has since filed a motion to proceed in 3 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See Doc. No. 4.) For the reasons 4 explained below, the Court DENIES Tyler’s IFP motion and DISMISSES this civil action 5 without prejudice. 6 I. IFP MOTION 7 A. Legal Standard 8 When someone files a lawsuit (other than a writ of habeas corpus) in a federal district 9 court, the filer must pay a statutory fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 Absent fee 10 payment, the action may proceed only if the filer seeks and the court grants him leave to 11 IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 12 Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”). “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore 13 v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like 14 Tyler, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. 15 “To help staunch a ‘flood of nonmeritorious’ prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation 16 Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established what has become known as the three-strikes rule.” 17 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting Jones v. 18 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). “That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing 19 suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if he has had three 20 or more prior suits ‘dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or 21 fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(g)); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). “A negative consequence that 23 may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on his ability to 24 25 26 1 The court charges an additional $55 administrative fee, but “[t]his fee does not apply to 27 . . . persons granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (Jud. Conf. Schedule of Fees, Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023); see 28 1 file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 2 (9th Cir. 2017). 3 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 4 of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is 5 whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a 6 claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. 7 Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, “[a] strike-call under Section 8 1915(g) [] hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s 9 prejudicial effect.” Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724–25. “[I]f a case was not dismissed on one 10 of the specific enumerated grounds, it does not count as a strike under § 1915(g).” Harris 11 v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 12 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]o qualify as a strike for § 1915(g), a case as a whole, not just 13 some of its individual claims, must be dismissed for a qualifying reason.”) (citing 14 Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). 15 Once a prisoner accumulates three strikes, however, § 1915(g) precludes his ability to 16 proceed IFP in any other civil actions or appeals in federal court unless he “makes a 17 plausible allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 18 of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 19 B. Discussion 20 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 21 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, but “in some instances, the district court docket 22 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 23 under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 24 (9th Cir. 2005). This is one of those instances, as this Court’s dockets show that Tyler is 25 no longer eligible to proceed IFP because while incarcerated, he has had more than three 26 prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, 27 or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of 28 Evidence 201(b)(2), this Court may take judicial notice of the docket records in Tyler’s 1 prior cases. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120; United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 2 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other 3 cases, as well as other courts’ records).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CLAUDIE TYLER, Case No. 25-cv-01337-CAB-DEB CDCR #K-19763, 12 ORDER DENYING MOTION TO Plaintiff, 13 PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS vs. AS BARRED BY 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) 14 AND DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION
15 WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR MATRUZ, Captain, et al., FAILURE TO PAY FILING FEE 16 Defendants. REQUIRED BY 17 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)
18 [Doc. No. 4] 19 20 21 Plaintiff Claudie Tyler, currently incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional 22 Facility (“RJD”) in San Diego, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a civil rights 23 complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (See Compl., Doc. No. 1.) Tyler claims more 24 than a dozen named and unnamed RJD officials failed to protect him from being assaulted 25 by a cellmate in 2021, charged him with false disciplinary violations, and engaged in 26 various acts of racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation, “abuse” and “oppression” 27 against him on several occasions throughout 2023 and 2024. (Id. at 5‒13.) He seeks $200 28 million in general and punitive damages. (Id. at 20.) 1 Tyler did not pay the filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) to commence a civil 2 action at the time he filed his Complaint; but he has since filed a motion to proceed in 3 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (See Doc. No. 4.) For the reasons 4 explained below, the Court DENIES Tyler’s IFP motion and DISMISSES this civil action 5 without prejudice. 6 I. IFP MOTION 7 A. Legal Standard 8 When someone files a lawsuit (other than a writ of habeas corpus) in a federal district 9 court, the filer must pay a statutory fee of $350. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).1 Absent fee 10 payment, the action may proceed only if the filer seeks and the court grants him leave to 11 IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Andrews v. Cervantes, 493 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th 12 Cir. 2007) (“Cervantes”). “All persons, not just prisoners, may seek IFP status.” Moore 13 v. Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 657 F.3d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 2011). Prisoners like 14 Tyler, however, “face an additional hurdle.” Id. 15 “To help staunch a ‘flood of nonmeritorious’ prisoner litigation, the Prison Litigation 16 Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) established what has become known as the three-strikes rule.” 17 Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 590 U.S. __, 140 S. Ct. 1721, 1723 (2020) (quoting Jones v. 18 Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007)). “That rule generally prevents a prisoner from bringing 19 suit in forma pauperis (IFP)—that is, without first paying the filing fee—if he has had three 20 or more prior suits ‘dismissed on the grounds that [they were] frivolous, malicious, or 21 fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 22 § 1915(g)); Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022). “A negative consequence that 23 may impact a prisoner who files [] frivolous complaint[s] is a restriction on his ability to 24 25 26 1 The court charges an additional $55 administrative fee, but “[t]his fee does not apply to 27 . . . persons granted in forma pauperis status under 28 U.S.C. § 1915.” 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (Jud. Conf. Schedule of Fees, Dist. Ct. Misc. Fee Schedule § 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023); see 28 1 file future cases without prepaying filing fees.” Harris v. Mangum, 863 F.3d 1133, 1139 2 (9th Cir. 2017). 3 When courts “review a dismissal to determine whether it counts as a strike, the style 4 of the dismissal or the procedural posture is immaterial. Instead, the central question is 5 whether the dismissal ‘rang the PLRA bells of frivolous, malicious, or failure to state a 6 claim.’” El-Shaddai v. Zamora, 833 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Blakely v. 7 Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 615 (4th Cir. 2013)). In other words, “[a] strike-call under Section 8 1915(g) [] hinges exclusively on the basis for the dismissal, regardless of the decision’s 9 prejudicial effect.” Lomax, 140 S. Ct. at 1724–25. “[I]f a case was not dismissed on one 10 of the specific enumerated grounds, it does not count as a strike under § 1915(g).” Harris 11 v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019); see also Hoffman v. Pulido, 928 F.3d 1147, 12 1152 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]o qualify as a strike for § 1915(g), a case as a whole, not just 13 some of its individual claims, must be dismissed for a qualifying reason.”) (citing 14 Washington v. Los Angeles Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 833 F.3d 1048, 1057 (9th Cir. 2016)). 15 Once a prisoner accumulates three strikes, however, § 1915(g) precludes his ability to 16 proceed IFP in any other civil actions or appeals in federal court unless he “makes a 17 plausible allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of serious physical injury’ at the time 18 of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1051‒52 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). 19 B. Discussion 20 Defendants typically carry the initial burden to produce evidence demonstrating a 21 prisoner is not entitled to proceed IFP, but “in some instances, the district court docket 22 records may be sufficient to show that a prior dismissal satisfies at least one on the criteria 23 under § 1915(g) and therefore counts as a strike.” Andrews v. King, 398 F.3d 1113, 1120 24 (9th Cir. 2005). This is one of those instances, as this Court’s dockets show that Tyler is 25 no longer eligible to proceed IFP because while incarcerated, he has had more than three 26 prior prisoner civil actions dismissed on the grounds that they were frivolous, malicious, 27 or failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Pursuant to Federal Rule of 28 Evidence 201(b)(2), this Court may take judicial notice of the docket records in Tyler’s 1 prior cases. See Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120; United States v. Wilson, 631 F.2d 118, 119 2 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that a court may take judicial notice of its own records in other 3 cases, as well as other courts’ records). The following records sufficiently show that Tyler 4 has five qualifying strikes: 5 (1) Tyler v. Gomez, No. 3:22-CV-1906-DMS-DEB, 2023 WL 2567349, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 17, 2023) (Doc. No. 13) (Order dismissing second 6 amended complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1915A); 8 (2) Tyler v. Gomze, et al., No. 3:23-CV-00724-MMA-MSB (S.D. Cal. May 9 17, 2023) (Doc. No. 7) (Order dismissing complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and for failure to comply with 10 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8); id. (S.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2023) (Doc. No. 8) (Order 11 dismissing civil action for failure to prosecute in compliance with Court Order);2 12 (3) Tyler v. Vega, et al., No. 3:2:23-CV-00451-JLS-JLB (S.D. Cal. Dec. 13 19, 2023) (Doc. No. 15) (Order dismissing second amended complaint 14 for failing to state a claim without leave to amend pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); 15
16 (4) Tyler v. Lu, No. 3:23-CV-2284-LL-SBC, 2024 WL 923784, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 4, 2024) (Doc. No. 7) (Order dismissing complaint for failing 17 to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1915A(b)); id. (S.D. Cal. June 12, 2024) (Doc. No. 8) (Order dismissing civil action for failing to prosecute in compliance with Court 19 Order); 20 (5) Tyler v. Lewis, No. 3:23-CV-2278-BAS-MMP, 2024 WL 3557454, at 21 *5 (S.D. Cal. July 25, 2024) (Doc. No. 10) (Order dismissing amended 22 complaint for failing to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)); id., (S.D. Cal. Oct. 7, 2024) (Doc. No. 14) (Order dismissing action 23 without prejudice for failure to amend). 24 25 2 See Harris, 863 F.3d at 1142 (finding that a failure to amend does “not negate the 26 determination already made by the Court that the complaint [plaintiff] had filed ... failed to 27 state a claim.”). “A prisoner may not avoid incurring strikes simply by declining to take advantage of [an] opportunit[y] to amend.” Id. at 1143. 28 1 Because Tyler accumulated these prior qualifying dismissals while incarcerated, he 2 may not proceed IFP unless he meets § 1915(g)’s “imminent danger” exception.3 To do 3 so, his pleading must contain a “plausible allegation that [he] faced ‘imminent danger of 4 serious physical injury’ at the time of filing.” Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055 (quoting U.S.C. 5 § 1915(g)). Imminent danger requires a claimed harm that is “ready to take place” or 6 “hanging threateningly over one’s head.” Id. at 1056. The alleged danger must also “stem[] 7 from the violations of law alleged in [the] complaint.” Ray, 31 F.4th at 701. In short, 8 § 1915(g)’s exception “functions as a limited safety valve,” id., but it “cannot be triggered 9 solely by complaints of past injury or generalized fears of possible future harm.” 10 Hernandez v. Williams, No. 21-cv-347-MMA-KSC, 2021 WL 1317376, at *2 (S.D. Cal. 11 Apr. 8, 2021). 12 Tyler’s Complaint fails to include any plausible allegations that he faced imminent 13 physical danger at the time of filing. Instead, Tyler claims, as he has in other recently-filed 14 cases involving many of the same Defendants, that 16 named and unnamed RJD officials 15 failed to protect him from being assaulted by a cellmate in 2021, charged him with false 16 disciplinary violations, disrespected him, confiscated his CD player and headphones, and 17 engaged in various acts of racial discrimination, harassment, retaliation, “abuse,” and 18 “oppression” against him on several occasions throughout 2023 and 2024. (See Doc. No. 19 1 at 5‒13.) But past assaults, random acts of racial discrimination or harassment, and 20 sprawling allegations of conspiracy and retaliation do not meet § 1915(g)’s exception for 21 “imminent danger.” See e.g., Harper v. Williams, No. 2:24-CV-1278-CKD P, 2025 WL 22 791694, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:24- 23
24 25 3 In fact, Tyler has since been denied leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) in this Court on four other occasions. See Tyler v. Escalera, No. 3:25-CV-00718-AJB- 26 DDL, 2025 WL 1159882, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2025); Tyler v. Delgado, No. 24-CV- 27 02341-RSH-DEB, 2025 WL 1181302, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2025); Tyler v. Manjarrez, No. 3:25-CV-00714-BTM-BLM (S.D. Cal. April 25, 2025) (Doc. No. 4); and Tyler v. 28 1 CV-01278-DJC-CKD P, 2025 WL 1003863 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2025); see also Law v. 2 Austin, No. 2:17-CV-2060 JAM AC P, 2020 WL 373575, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 2020) 3 (finding prisoner’s fear of potential future assault, “no matter how real, d[id] not 4 demonstrate an imminent threat or ‘high probability’ of further sexual assault” at the time 5 of filing); Byrd v. Dir. of Corr., No. 3:15-CV-2339-GPC-KSC, 2016 WL 773229, at *2 6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 29, 2016) (finding prisoner’s allegations of having been denied access to 7 court and discriminated against based on race and religion insufficient to invoke 8 § 1915(g)’s imminent danger exception); K’napp v. Beard, 2014 WL 584404, at *2 (E.D. 9 Cal. Feb. 12, 2014) (finding conclusory allegations of “retaliation, harassment, 10 indifference, discrimination, oppression and abuse” insufficient to qualify as “imminent 11 danger” under § 1915(g)). Consequently, Tyler does not qualify for a § 1915(g) exception 12 and may not proceed IFP in this case. See Cervantes, 493 F.3d at 1055; Ray, 31 F.4th at 13 701. 14 II. CONCLUSION 15 For the reasons explained, the Court: (1) DENIES Tyler’s Motion to Proceed IFP 16 (Doc. No. 4) as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); (2) DISMISSES this civil action without 17 prejudice based on Tyler’s failure to pay the full $405 civil filing fee required by 28 U.S.C. 18 § 1914(a); (3) CERTIFIES that an IFP appeal would not be taken in good faith pursuant 19 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), and (4) DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to enter a judgment of 20 dismissal and to close the file. 21 IT IS SO ORDERED. 22 23 Dated: August 25, 2025 24 Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo United States District Judge 25
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