Tyler Joseph Barefield v. State of Arkansas

2024 Ark. 141, 696 S.W.3d 822

• Court: Supreme Court of Arkansas
• Decided: September 26, 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2024 Ark. 141 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-23-706

Opinion Delivered: September 26, 2024 TYLER JOSEPH BAREFIELD APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE POPE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 58CR-16-764]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE DAVID N. LASER, APPELLEE JUDGE BY ASSIGNMENT

AFFIRMED.

CODY HILAND, Associate Justice

Tyler Joseph Barefield appeals from the denial of postconviction relief under Rule 37

of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Barefield contends that the Pope County

Circuit Court erred in determining that his trial counsel’s actions were sufficient and

nonprejudicial. As the appellant’s claims are without merit, we affirm.

I. Factual Background

In 2017, a Pope County jury convicted Barefield of two counts of capital murder for

the deliberate and premeditated murders of Aaron Brock and Beau Dewitt. Barefield was

sentenced to life without parole for each count. Additionally, the jury convicted Barefield

for his use of a firearm to commit each murder and sentenced him to an additional 180-

month term of imprisonment for such use. This court affirmed Barefield’s convictions on

direct appeal. See Barefield v. State, 2019 Ark. 149, at 1, 574 S.W.3d 142, 144. The facts

surrounding Barefield’s murder of Brock and Dewitt are straightforward.

1 On September 16, 2016, Barefield learned of a large opening in his salvage yard’s

fence and expressed his intention to stop the suspected trespassers from using it that evening.

In anticipation of the trespassers’ arrival, Barefield donned camouflage, armed himself with

a rifle, and lay in wait for them. Brock and Dewitt eventually arrived at Barefield’s salvage

yard and entered the property under the surrounding fence. Shortly after midnight the next

morning, a witness called 911 and reported hearing four gunshots. Barefield ambushed

Brock and Dewitt as they trespassed upon his salvage yard.

Barefield then left the salvage yard and returned to his business office with his rifle in

hand. He then left the property altogether. Later that morning, Barefield returned to the

premises and continued normal operations. A few days later, Brock’s and Dewitt’s bodies

were found in a stack of crushed vehicles inside Barefield’s salvage yard. Barefield was then

subsequently charged with the capital murder of Brock and Dewitt. Barefield’s trial took

place in October and November 2017, and he was convicted by a Pope County jury.

Substantial evidence proved that Barefield murdered Brock and Dewitt and subsequently

disposed of their bodies by placing them in a vehicle and crushing them in an industrial

compactor.

On direct appeal, Barefield argued two points. We affirmed on both. Barefield then

filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, which was denied. See

Barefield v. State, 140 S. Ct. 671 (2019). Thereafter, we issued the mandate in his direct

appeal. After our ruling, Barefield filed a petition for postconviction relief to the Pope

County Circuit Court under Rule 37, which he later amended. Barefield alleged many

failures on the part of his trial counsel. The Pope County Circuit Court denied Barefield’s

2 Rule 37 petition and adopted the State’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 1

Barefield now appeals, and we affirm.

II. Law and Analysis

This court will not overturn the denial of postconviction relief absent a finding of

clear error. Harmon v. State, 2023 Ark. 179, at 2, 678 S.W.3d 390, 392; Williams v. State,

2016 Ark. 459, at 2, 504 S.W.3d 603, 605. A finding is considered clearly erroneous when,

despite some supporting evidence, our review of the entire record leaves us with a definite

and firm conviction that an error has occurred. Id. at 2, 678 S.W.3d at 392; Id. at 2, 504

S.W.3d at 605.

We review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims using the two-step analysis arising

out of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Harmon, 2023 Ark. 179, at 4, 678

S.W.3d at 393. Under Strickland, a petitioner is required to show that their trial counsel’s

performance was deficient and then due to such deficiencies it prejudiced their defense. Id.

at 4, 678 S.W.3d at 393.

Regarding the threshold issue of deficiency, we presume that a trial counsel’s

performance was sufficient. Holland v. State, 2022 Ark. 138, at 2, 645 S.W.3d 318, 321. To

overcome that strong presumption, the petitioner must demonstrate specific acts and

1 Barefield attempts to assert a preliminary argument that the circuit court erred when its oral order differed from its final written order. Barefield claims that such error entitles him to relief on all points. He is mistaken. We maintain that “an oral order announced from the bench does not become effective until reduced to writing and filed.” Perkins v. State, 2019 Ark. 247, at 3, 582 S.W.3d 1, 3 (emphasis added) (quoting Zimmerman v. Circuit Ct. of Miller Cnty., 2018 Ark. 264, at 5, 555 S.W.3d 406, 409). A judgment in any matter is only effective when the clerk marks or stamps it with the date and time and the word “filed.” Zimmerman, 2018 Ark. 264, at 5, 555 S.W.3d at 409. Thus, a circuit court’s written order controls.

3 omissions that—when viewed from the trial counsel’s perspective over the course of the

trial—could not have been the result of “reasonable professional judgment.” Id. at 2, 645

S.W.3d at 321. Allegations without factual substantiation are insufficient. Thomas v. State,

2022 Ark. 12, at 4, 637 S.W.3d 268, 272. Furthermore, merely conclusory statements that

one’s counsel was ineffective cannot be the basis for postconviction relief. Id. at 4, 637

S.W.3d at 272.

As for the remaining issue of prejudice, a petitioner must affirmatively demonstrate

that the deficiency resulted in a prejudicial outcome. Id. at 2, 645 S.W.3d at 321. They must

show that there is a reasonable probability that the fact-finder’s decision would have been

different absent their trial counsel’s deficiencies. Id. at 2, 645 S.W.3d at 321. This is a high

bar. If a Rule 37 petition fails at the threshold issue of deficiency, we need not address the

remaining prong that weighs its potential prejudicial effect. Arnold v. State, 2022 Ark. 191,

at 12, 653 S.W.3d 781, 789.

A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Barefield argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for several reasons and that the

circuit court erred in finding otherwise. We parse out Barefield’s claims and address them

each in turn.

1. Trial strategy

For his first claim, Barefield alleges that assistance of counsel was ineffective in many

facets regarding trial strategy. We cannot find that counsel’s assistance was ineffective as the

matters-in-question fell solely within the ambit of reasonable trial strategy. We address

Barefield’s first claim in three distinct subparts.

4 To assert his claim, Barefield relies on McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (2018). In

McCoy, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States

Constitution guarantees each criminal defendant the “Assistance of Counsel for his

defen[s]e.” Id. at 414. As the State points out, Barefield’s use of McCoy in this situation is

misguided and incorrect. McCoy bars a licensed attorney from admitting their client’s guilt

over the client’s express objection. Id. at 427–28. This is not at issue presently.

The court recognizes that McCoy requires that some decisions are indeed “reserved

for the client[.]” Id. at 422. Such decisions include “whether to plead guilty, waive the right

to a jury trial, testify in one’s own behalf, and forgo an appeal.” Id. However, McCoy also

stands for the concrete notion that trial management shall always remain the “lawyer’s

province[.]” Id. Licensed attorneys have considerable discretion in providing their

professional assistance, which includes determining which arguments to pursue, which

evidentiary objections to raise, and what agreements to make regarding the admissibility of

evidence. Id. This standard applies to each of the following subparts under Barefield’s first

claim.

a. Alleged failure to consult

First, Barefield alleges ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel did not consult

with him regarding the defense of his case. Barefield fails to draw this court’s attention to

sufficient specific acts and/or omissions where counsel failed to consult with him in violation

of the law. Barefield cites one instance where counsel failed to discuss his defense strategy

with him. Specifically, Barefield asserts that counsel did not address the detailed aspects of

5 the murders or whether the recovered bullet casing came from Barefield’s firearm or

another’s.

We affirm the circuit court’s finding that counsel’s refrain was strategic and

reasonable, given the potential implications of such discussions. No fact or assertion leads us

to believe that counsel abandoned his reasonable professional judgment as Barefield alleges.

Counsel consulted with his client when necessary. Counsel’s representation was rooted in

reasonable professional judgment, and Barefield’s allegations are unsubstantiated and merely

conclusory. Thus, we maintain our presumption that counsel was sufficient and

nonprejudicial.

b. Alleged failure in the opening statement

Second, Barefield contends that counsel provided ineffective assistance by directing

co-counsel to claim in the opening statement that Barefield potentially fired a shot from his

firearm in self-defense. Barefield argues that this statement was misleading because counsel

later abandoned this theory without further mention or evidence. We affirm the circuit

court’s finding that counsel’s assistance was effective as the matter-in-question was one of

shifting defense strategy and tactics.

We have held before that an attorney’s failure to produce evidence presented in an

opening statement can be “unreasonable and prejudicial” and thus deny criminal defendants

effective assistance of counsel. Conley v. State, 2014 Ark. 172, at 7, 433 S.W.3d 234, 240.

However, we have also noted that a defense strategy can evolve. See id. at 7, 433 S.W.3d

at 240. Trials are long and arduous, and their ever-developing nature can “affect and alter

an original defense strategy . . . .” Id. at 7, 433 S.W.3d at 240. Ultimately, whether a change

6 in the defense strategy rises to that of unreasonableness is determined on a case-by-case basis.

Id. at 7–8, 433 S.W.3d at 240–41 (This court will look at the “nature and extent of the

promises made in opening statement[s], any strategic justifications for the subsequent

decision not to produce the evidence, the explanation provided to the jury for the failure

to produce the evidence, the presentation of other evidence supporting the promised theory,

and generally, the impact upon the defense at trial and upon the jury.”).

As we have said before, trial counsel is afforded “great leeway” in making strategic

and tactical decisions regarding the defense of their client. Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. 459,

at 3, 504 S.W.3d 603, 605. These matters, even if arguably improvident, fall within the

realm of an attorney’s professional judgment and are simply not grounds for a finding of

ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 3, 504 S.W.3d at 605.

Given this precedent, we affirm the circuit court’s finding that counsel’s trial strategy

to shift his defense approach from one theory of the case to another was wholly within the

bounds of reasonable professional judgment. As counsel testified in the Rule 37 hearing, the

evidence presented at trial leaned heavily in favor of one theory of the case—that a shell

casing was planted by the investigating law enforcement officers—versus another,

unsubstantiated theory—that the shell casing was found because Barefield fired his weapon

in potential self-defense. The decision whether to call witnesses or pursue a certain defense

is a matter of an attorney’s professional judgment. Id. Here, that is clearly the case.

Therefore, Barefield’s argument that counsel was ineffective in providing his assistance by

pursuing the aforementioned theory and abandoning the latter fails.

c. Alleged failure in the use of a witness

7 Last, Barefield alleges that counsel’s assistance was ineffective for ignoring the “raging

controversy” surrounding comparative ballistics analysis and that it was error to not consult

a ballistics expert. We find no such argument persuasive. As stated previously, determining

the theory of the case that the defense will pursue is the epitome of trial strategy. The record

indicates that counsel’s defense strategy involved challenging the inconsistencies in the State

ballistic expert’s testimony and arguing that the shell-casing evidence had been planted by

the investigating officers.

We agree with the circuit court that counsel “made clear tactical decisions” based on

his defense theory of the case and that his strategy concerning the planting of evidence was

supported by reasonable professional judgment. It is ultimately an attorney’s choice which

witnesses are best to put on the stand to testify on their client’s behalf. Thus, Barefield’s

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim fails here as well.

2. Denial of expert testimony and failure to challenge the autopsies

For his second claim, Barefield alleges that the circuit court erred by finding that Col.

Arthur Alphin was not qualified to give expert medical testimony regarding the victims’

cause of death. Our jurisprudence on the qualification of expert witnesses is clear: such

decisions fall solely within the sound discretion of the circuit court. Nelson v. State, 2024

Ark. 24, at 20, 683 S.W.3d 177, 193. Thus, we will not reverse a circuit court’s decision

on who qualifies as an expert absent a clear abuse of their discretion. Id. at 20, 683 S.W.3d

at 193. Abuse of discretion is a high threshold that does not simply require error in the

circuit court’s decision, but requires that the circuit court act improvidently, thoughtlessly,

8 or without due consideration. Id. at 16, 683 S.W.3d at 191. The circuit court in this matter

acted well within its discretion and without error.

To determine whether one qualifies as an expert, a circuit court judge must weigh

whether the witness is qualified as an expert by their “knowledge, skill, experience, training,

or education,” and once reconciled, they “may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or

otherwise.” Nelson, 2024 Ark. at 20, 683 S.W.3d at 193. Ultimately, circuit courts are

responsible for determining, on the basis of the witness’s qualification, whether they have

“knowledge of a subject at hand which is beyond that of ordinary persons.” Id. at 20, 683

S.W.3d at 193. Colonel Alphin is not a medical expert qualified to comment intelligently

on the cause of the victims’ death in this or any other case.

Barefield asserts that Colonel Alphin’s experience consulting with medical doctors

and coroners on bullet wounds and “big game” animal necropsies somehow matches the

expertise of a tenured medical doctor, pathologist, or medical examiner. It is quite a stretch

to equate those credentials with a formal medical background. We cannot find that the

circuit court abused its discretion on the basis of these facts alone. The circuit court did not

act improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration when it held that his

knowledge fell below the standard of a state-licensed, formally trained medical expert.

Therefore, Barefield’s claim fails.

To the extent that Barefield claims counsel was ineffective for pursuing a different

theory regarding the victims’ head wounds and not calling Colonel Alphin as a witness, the

circuit court correctly found these allegations to be conclusory. Additionally, the court

correctly noted that they were unsupported by any relevant facts.

9 We have said before that when it comes to an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim

and an attorney’s decision to not call a witness, such matters are considered trial strategy and

fall outside the purview of Rule 37. Feuget v. State, 2015 Ark. 43, at 5, 454 S.W.3d 734,

739. Therefore, counsel’s decision to pursue a different approach and not call Colonel

Alphin as a witness falls within the realm of trial strategy and is excluded from Rule 37 as a

ground for a successful ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Barefield fails here as well.

3. Failure to request a mistrial or further relief

For his final claim on appeal, Barefield argues that counsel was ineffective for not

seeking a mistrial or any additional relief after successfully objecting to a few statements

made by the prosecution during its closing arguments.

First, the decision not to request a judicial admonition is a matter of trial strategy.

Sims v. State, 2015 Ark. 363, at 14, 472 S.W.3d 107, 117. As we have already stated several

times before in our opinion, matters of trial strategy—even if improvident—fall within the

trial attorney’s professional judgment and are not grounds for an ineffective-assistance-of-

counsel claim. Id. at 14, 472 S.W.3d at 117. Here, Barefield asserts that counsel was

ineffective for failing to seek admonitions against the prosecution for statements made during

their closing arguments.

The facts indicate that there were three instances where the prosecution made

questionable “I statements.” The record indicates that counsel immediately objected to each

statement. In each scenario the prosecution apologized and corrected their phrasing.

Counsel’s reaction time and understanding of the law proves his attentiveness and the care

10 provided to Barefield. Any such error by the prosecution team on this matter was quickly

cured, harmless, and does not warrant the dire remedy of a mistrial.

Following each objection, the prosecution and the circuit court agreed that the

statements should not have been made in that manner. Thus, as the State points out, it

cannot be said that counsel’s decision to avoid further reprimand was anything other than

trial strategy. As we held in Sims, the circuit court did not err for holding that such a decision

was one of trial strategy. Id. at 14–15, 472 S.W.3d at 117. The decision to avoid further

admonition was in the client’s best interest as it circumvented calling more attention to the

statements in front of the jury. Id., 472 S.W.3d at 117. Because counsel properly objected

to the prosecution’s statements and the circuit court sustained said objections, the

prosecution was properly and equitably reprimanded for its statements. No further action

was necessary or required.

Second, mistrials are not to be granted lightly. Declaring a mistrial is an extreme and

drastic remedy that is appropriate only when the error at hand is so prejudicial that justice

cannot be served by continuing the trial or when the fundamental fairness of the trial has

been manifestly affected. McClendon v. State, 2019 Ark. 88, at 6, 570 S.W.3d 450, 454.

Here, the facts do not rise to the level of requiring a mistrial. As the State points out, counsel

noted that the prosecution’s arguments came close to shifting the burden to Barefield and

commented on Barefield’s decision to not testify.

Counsel admonished the prosecution and reminded them that they “need to stay

away from those issues” and that he would “rather stop it now than later.” We agree with

the circuit court that counsel’s objections alone cut short any arguments that the prosecution

11 teed up when it warned the prosecution in due course to not “go there.” These minute

issues do not rise to the level of (1) requiring counsel to request a mistrial for his client or

(2) that a mistrial would serve as an appropriate remedy here even if a request for a mistrial

had been made. Thus, Barefield’s claim again fails.

In sum, we hold that the Pope County Circuit Court’s decision to deny Barefield’s

relief under Rule 37 was not clearly erroneous.

Special Justice J. CLIFF MCKINNEY II joins in this opinion

KEMP, C.J., not participating.

Jeff Rosenzweig, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Jacob H. Jones, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.