TARUS WALKER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS

CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedSeptember 11, 2025
DocketCR-24-610
StatusPublished

This text of TARUS WALKER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS (TARUS WALKER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
TARUS WALKER v. STATE OF ARKANSAS, (Ark. 2025).

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. 127 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CR-24-610

Opinion Delivered: September 11, 2025

TARUS WALKER APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE MILLER COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 46CR-23-316]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE CARLTON D. APPELLEE JONES, JUDGE

AFFIRMED.

SHAWN A. WOMACK, Associate Justice

A Miller County jury convicted Tarus Walker of capital murder, and the circuit

court sentenced him to life imprisonment. On appeal, Walker contends the circuit court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial after a detective testified—during the

State’s questioning—that a warrant had been issued for Walker’s arrest on charges of capital

murder and felon in possession. He further contends that this reference to his status as a

felon caused incurable prejudice, despite the curative instruction given to the jury. We

affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural Background

On Christmas Day, 2022, Walker shot and killed Aaron Bruce, the boyfriend of the

mother of Walker’s children. That day, Bruce went to the apartment of his cousin, Patrick

Ross, after encountering Walker outside. Bruce was dating Charnetta Grayton, the mother

of Walker’s children, and the two men had an ongoing conflict following an alleged domestic disturbance the previous day. When Bruce and Ross went outside, they

confronted Walker, who was armed with an AK-style rifle. Ross testified that he pleaded

with Walker not to shoot, but Walker stated that Bruce “was going to die today” and then

shot him multiple times, killing him. Other witnesses corroborated either hearing or seeing

the gunfire and Walker leaving the scene. Evidence also showed that shortly before the

shooting, Walker had called a relative of Grayton’s seeking Bruce’s address.

Walker does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his capital-

murder conviction; he argues only that a mistrial was warranted. Accordingly, the relevant

facts are from Walker’s trial. At trial, Detective Dakota Easley, who obtained Walker’s arrest

warrant, was questioned by the State about his role in the investigation:

PROSECUTOR: Now at some point in your investigation did you believe or come to believe that Mr. Walker had committed an offense?

DETECTIVE EASLEY: Yes, ma’am.

PROSECUTOR: When an investigation leads to an individual and you develop or believe that individual has committed an offense, what do you do?

DETECTIVE EASLEY: We type out a probable cause affidavit to get a warrant for his arrest.

PROSECUTOR: And just so there’s no misunderstanding, a probable cause affidavit, and please if I get this wrong correct me, is saying that we believe that this individual has committed an offense and we would like the court to issue a warrant?

PROSECUTOR: And is that what was done in this particular case?

2 PROSECUTOR: And was a warrant for Mr. Walker issued?

PROSECUTOR: And what was the offense for which the warrant was issued?

DETECTIVE EASLEY: Capital murder and felon in possession of firearm by certain person.

Defense counsel immediately approached the bench and moved for a mistrial.

Because it was near the lunch break, the court excused the jury and advised counsel that it

wished to research the issue before ruling. After the recess, the court heard arguments from

both the State and the defense, then recessed again to conduct additional research, noting

that it thought this was a “close call” and that it wanted to “get this right.”

Ultimately, the court denied Walker’s motion, concluding that any prejudice could

be cured by a proper instruction. Counsel and the court agreed on the language, and upon

the jury’s return, the court instructed:

You are here today to hear the case of State of Arkansas versus Tarus Walker for the offense of capital murder. Any testimony you may have heard regarding any offense or warrant other than capital murder shall not be considered by you in deliberations in this matter.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Walker guilty of committing the offense

of capital murder. He was then sentenced by the circuit court to life imprisonment. Walker

appeals, asking this court to reverse his conviction and remand the case to Miller County

for a new trial on the charge of capital murder.

II. Discussion

Walker’s sole argument on appeal is that the circuit court abused its discretion in

denying his mistrial motion after Detective Easley testified that a warrant had been issued

3 for Walker’s arrest on charges of capital murder and felon in possession. He contends that

this reference to his status as a felon caused manifest prejudice and that the court’s curative

instruction was inadequate to remedy it. He is mistaken.

Mistrials are not to be granted lightly.1 A mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy,

appropriate only when an error is so prejudicial that it cannot be cured by an admonition

or instruction—in other words, when justice cannot be served by continuing the trial. 2 The

decision to deny a mistrial lies within the discretion of the circuit court, and we will not

reverse absent an abuse of that discretion.3 Generally an abuse occurs when the circuit court

acts improvidently, thoughtlessly, or without due consideration.4 In assessing whether an

abuse occurred in this context, the critical factors we consider are whether the prosecutor

deliberately provoked the prejudicial response and whether an admonition or instruction

could have cured the resulting prejudice.5

In this case, the relevant factors all support the conclusion that the circuit court acted

within its discretion in denying Walker’s mistrial motion. First, the record shows that the

1 Meacham v. State, 2025 Ark. 27, at 12, 707 S.W.3d 473, 481 (citing Barefield v. State, 2024 Ark. 141, at 11, 696 S.W.3d 822, 830). 2 Smith v. State, 2024 Ark. 1, at 8–9, 680 S.W.3d 711, 717 (citing Thompson v. State, 2019 Ark. 290, 586 S.W.3d 163). 3 Smith, 2024 Ark. 1, at 8 (citing Williams v. State, 2011 Ark. 432, 385 S.W.3d 157). 4 Meacham, 2025 Ark. 27, at 6 (citing Threadgill v. State, 347 Ark. 986, 993, 69 S.W.3d 423, 428 (2002)). 5 McDaniel v. State, 2019 Ark. 56, at 3, 567 S.W.3d 847, 848 (citing Armstrong v. State, 366 Ark. 105, 113, 233 S.W.3d 627, 634 (2006)).

4 prosecutor did not deliberately provoke Detective Easley’s reference to Walker’s status as a

felon. Second, the stray remark did not create prejudice so severe that it could not be cured

by an instruction. Third, the circuit court reached its ruling only after hearing arguments

from counsel and conducting independent research. Because Walker concedes the first and

third points, our analysis focuses on the second.

Although Detective Easley’s improper testimony created some prejudice, such

prejudice is inevitable whenever a jury hears of a defendant’s prior conviction. This is so

whether the conviction comes in under a proper exception or, as here, slips in through a

witness’s inadvertence. That prejudice, however, does not automatically require a mistrial.

We have long held that a single, inadvertent reference to a prior conviction or incarceration

is ordinarily curable by an instruction.6 By contrast, we have reversed only when the

testimony involved highly inflammatory allegations of other serious crimes—such as the

witness’s statement in Moore v.

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Related

Green v. State
231 S.W.3d 638 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2006)
Kimble v. State
959 S.W.2d 43 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1998)
Armstrong v. State
233 S.W.3d 627 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2006)
Threadgill v. State
69 S.W.3d 423 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2002)
Moore v. State
915 S.W.2d 284 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1996)
Williams v. State
2011 Ark. 432 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2011)
McDaniel v. State
2019 Ark. 56 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2019)
Marlon Smith v. State of Arkansas
2024 Ark. 1 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2024)
Tyler Joseph Barefield v. State of Arkansas
2024 Ark. 141 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2024)
Lavar T. Thompson v. State of Arkansas
2019 Ark. 290 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 2019)

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