Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 29, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DR. RACHEL TUDOR,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-6207 (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00480-JD) EZRA YOUNG; BRITTANY STEWART, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendants - Appellants,
and
MARIE E. GALINDO; THE LAW OFFICE OF JILLIAN T. WEISS, P.C.; TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.,
Defendants. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Before us is an interlocutory appeal from a ruling in a statutory interpleader
action. Appellants Ezra Young and Brittany Stewart seek to collect their contested
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 2
attorney fees. They contend that we have jurisdiction under the collateral-order
doctrine to resolve their appeal, despite the pendency of proceedings in the district
court. But because the collateral-order doctrine does not apply in these
circumstances, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Appellee, Rachel Tudor, was the prevailing party in a previous employment
dispute that we remanded for calculation of attorney fees owed her. Tudor v. Se.
Okla. State Univ., 13 F.4th 1019, 1049 (10th Cir. 2021). On remand she settled for
$1,725,000 on all claims, including attorney fees. Appellants are among Tudor’s five
former counsel, who made competing claims for fees out of the settlement amount.
The contract fee for all attorney representation was set at one third of the settlement
amount, less litigation expenses, which came to $563,823.10. Because the total of
the claims of the five attorneys exceeded that amount, Tudor instituted this
interpleader action, naming her five former counsel as claimant-defendants, and she
sought permission to deposit $563,823.10 into the district court’s registry, leaving
proper allocation of the funds to the court. Appellants opposed the request and
claimed the full value of their fees, naming Tudor and her original attorney as
counterclaim defendants, and naming the defendants in Tudor as third-party
defendants. Appellants argued that $563,823.10 was insufficient to satisfy an
estimated $2.1 million in combined fees claimed by all five former counsel, and that
Tudor’s failure to deposit the estimated $2.1 million was insufficient “to comply with
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1)’s requirement that she pay the full amount of money due into
2 Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 3
the registry of the court.” Aplt. App. at 60, ¶10. They argued that because Tudor
failed to deposit sufficient funds, the district court was obliged to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Tudor and the defendants from Tudor filed separate motions to dismiss
Appellants’ claims against them. Before ruling on the motions to dismiss, however,
the district court ordered the parties to brief whether Tudor’s proposed deposit of less
than the entire $2.1 million was a jurisdictional defect. Once briefing was complete,
the district court issued a jurisdictional ruling that Tudor’s proposed deposit of
$563,823.10 sufficed to invoke the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The district
court directed her to deposit that amount into the court registry, stating that once she
did so, it would take up the motions to dismiss and other pending matters.
That same day, however, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the district
court’s jurisdictional ruling. Tudor soon thereafter deposited $563,823.10 into the
court’s registry, and the district court later stayed the case pending this appeal.
Given the pendency of proceedings in the district court, we directed
Appellants to brief our appellate jurisdiction. In response, Appellants contend we
have jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Tudor, however, responds that
we must dismiss this appeal because the collateral-order doctrine does not allow us to
hear this appeal.
II
We have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A ‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291 is
3 Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 4
normally limited to an order that resolves the entire case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v.
Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). But § 1291 “encompasses not only
judgments that terminate an action, but also a small class of collateral rulings that,
although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed final.” Mohawk
Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An interlocutory order is within that small class only if “(1) the order is conclusive
on the question it decides, (2) the order resolves important questions separate from
the merits, and (3) the order is effectively unreviewable if not presented in an
interlocutory appeal.” Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic LLC, 98 F.4th 1320, 1323
(10th Cir. 2024) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
These three criteria are “stringent” because “the class of collaterally
appealable orders must remain narrow and selective.” Id. at 1323-24 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[I]mmediate appeals under the collateral-order doctrine
are the exception, not the rule.” Id. at 1324 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Allowing too many piecemeal, prejudgment appeals encroaches upon the
prerogatives of district court judges, who play a special role in managing ongoing
litigation; threatens those proceedings with delay, adding costs and diminishing
coherence; and risks additional and unnecessary appellate court work.” Id. (brackets,
ellipsis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
We need consider only the third criterion. The collateral-order doctrine does
not help Appellants because an appeal at this stage of the proceeding is “not
necessary to ensure effective review” of the district court’s ruling. Mohawk,
4 Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 5
558 U.S. at 108.
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Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT October 29, 2025 _________________________________ Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court DR. RACHEL TUDOR,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 24-6207 (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00480-JD) EZRA YOUNG; BRITTANY STEWART, (W.D. Okla.)
Defendants - Appellants,
and
MARIE E. GALINDO; THE LAW OFFICE OF JILLIAN T. WEISS, P.C.; TRANSGENDER LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND, INC.,
Defendants. _________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. _________________________________
Before us is an interlocutory appeal from a ruling in a statutory interpleader
action. Appellants Ezra Young and Brittany Stewart seek to collect their contested
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined *
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 2
attorney fees. They contend that we have jurisdiction under the collateral-order
doctrine to resolve their appeal, despite the pendency of proceedings in the district
court. But because the collateral-order doctrine does not apply in these
circumstances, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Appellee, Rachel Tudor, was the prevailing party in a previous employment
dispute that we remanded for calculation of attorney fees owed her. Tudor v. Se.
Okla. State Univ., 13 F.4th 1019, 1049 (10th Cir. 2021). On remand she settled for
$1,725,000 on all claims, including attorney fees. Appellants are among Tudor’s five
former counsel, who made competing claims for fees out of the settlement amount.
The contract fee for all attorney representation was set at one third of the settlement
amount, less litigation expenses, which came to $563,823.10. Because the total of
the claims of the five attorneys exceeded that amount, Tudor instituted this
interpleader action, naming her five former counsel as claimant-defendants, and she
sought permission to deposit $563,823.10 into the district court’s registry, leaving
proper allocation of the funds to the court. Appellants opposed the request and
claimed the full value of their fees, naming Tudor and her original attorney as
counterclaim defendants, and naming the defendants in Tudor as third-party
defendants. Appellants argued that $563,823.10 was insufficient to satisfy an
estimated $2.1 million in combined fees claimed by all five former counsel, and that
Tudor’s failure to deposit the estimated $2.1 million was insufficient “to comply with
28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1)’s requirement that she pay the full amount of money due into
2 Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 3
the registry of the court.” Aplt. App. at 60, ¶10. They argued that because Tudor
failed to deposit sufficient funds, the district court was obliged to dismiss the case for
lack of jurisdiction.
Tudor and the defendants from Tudor filed separate motions to dismiss
Appellants’ claims against them. Before ruling on the motions to dismiss, however,
the district court ordered the parties to brief whether Tudor’s proposed deposit of less
than the entire $2.1 million was a jurisdictional defect. Once briefing was complete,
the district court issued a jurisdictional ruling that Tudor’s proposed deposit of
$563,823.10 sufficed to invoke the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The district
court directed her to deposit that amount into the court registry, stating that once she
did so, it would take up the motions to dismiss and other pending matters.
That same day, however, Appellants filed a notice of appeal from the district
court’s jurisdictional ruling. Tudor soon thereafter deposited $563,823.10 into the
court’s registry, and the district court later stayed the case pending this appeal.
Given the pendency of proceedings in the district court, we directed
Appellants to brief our appellate jurisdiction. In response, Appellants contend we
have jurisdiction under the collateral-order doctrine. Tudor, however, responds that
we must dismiss this appeal because the collateral-order doctrine does not allow us to
hear this appeal.
II
We have jurisdiction over “appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “A ‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291 is
3 Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 4
normally limited to an order that resolves the entire case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v.
Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020). But § 1291 “encompasses not only
judgments that terminate an action, but also a small class of collateral rulings that,
although they do not end the litigation, are appropriately deemed final.” Mohawk
Indus. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
An interlocutory order is within that small class only if “(1) the order is conclusive
on the question it decides, (2) the order resolves important questions separate from
the merits, and (3) the order is effectively unreviewable if not presented in an
interlocutory appeal.” Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic LLC, 98 F.4th 1320, 1323
(10th Cir. 2024) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).
These three criteria are “stringent” because “the class of collaterally
appealable orders must remain narrow and selective.” Id. at 1323-24 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[I]mmediate appeals under the collateral-order doctrine
are the exception, not the rule.” Id. at 1324 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Allowing too many piecemeal, prejudgment appeals encroaches upon the
prerogatives of district court judges, who play a special role in managing ongoing
litigation; threatens those proceedings with delay, adding costs and diminishing
coherence; and risks additional and unnecessary appellate court work.” Id. (brackets,
ellipsis, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted).
We need consider only the third criterion. The collateral-order doctrine does
not help Appellants because an appeal at this stage of the proceeding is “not
necessary to ensure effective review” of the district court’s ruling. Mohawk,
4 Appellate Case: 24-6207 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2025 Page: 5
558 U.S. at 108. “The crucial question . . . is whether deferring review until final
judgment so imperils the interest [at stake] as to justify the cost of allowing
immediate appeal . . . .” Id. “Examples of these interests reflecting some particular
value of a high order include honoring the separation of powers, preserving the
efficiency of government and the initiative of its officials, respecting a State’s
dignitary interests, and mitigating the government’s advantage over the individual.”
Vivos Therapeutics, Inc. v. Ortho-Tain, Inc., 142 F.4th 1262, 1266 n.2 (10th Cir.
2025) (internal quotation marks omitted). Litigation between private parties almost
always falls short of this standard. See id. (noting “the Supreme Court has repeatedly
declined to extend collateral order treatment to orders stemming from litigation
between private parties”).
Appellants identify no substantial public interest or particular value of a high
order that warrants extending the collateral-order doctrine to their appeal. This is a
purely private dispute over attorney fees. We have little difficulty concluding that
Appellants have failed to show that the collateral-order doctrine affords us
jurisdiction to review their appeal.
III
This appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge