Tschummi v. Fegan

Opinion

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CAROLYN TSCHUMMI v. KIMBERLY FEGAN (AC 47468) Cradle, C. J., and Wilson and Norcott, Js.*

Syllabus

Pursuant to a provision (§ 46b-553) of the Connecticut Parentage Act (act) (§ 46b-450 et seq.), the provisions of the act only “apply to a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.”

The respondent, who had previously been in an intimate relationship with the petitioner, appealed from the trial court’s judgment adjudicating the petitioner as a legal parent of the respondent’s minor child, M, pursuant to the act. She claimed, inter alia, that, because the court had previously dismissed a custody action brought by the petitioner in 2021 on the ground that the petitioner was not a legal parent of M and, thus, lacked standing, the court improperly denied her motion to dismiss the petitioner’s parentage petition. Held:

The trial court erred in denying the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition seeking an adjudication of parentage, as, pursuant to § 46b-553, the court’s dismissal of the petitioner’s prior custody action constituted an adjudication of the petitioner’s parentage by a court of competent jurisdiction prior to January 1, 2022; thus, the petitioner did not have standing to bring the parentage petition and, accordingly, this court reversed the judgment recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of M.

Argued February 17—officially released September 8, 2026

Procedural History

Petition for the adjudication of the parentage of a minor child, and for other relief, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of Tolland, where the court, M. Murphy, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss; thereafter, the court, Caron, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss; subsequently, the case was tried to the court, Caron, J.; judgment adjudicating the petitioner a parent of the minor child, from which

*

The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

the respondent appealed to this court. Reversed; judgment directed.

Mark J. Claflin, for the appellant (respondent). Kevin B. F. Emerson, for the appellee (petitioner).

Opinion

WILSON, J. The respondent, Kimberly Fegan, appeals from the judgment of the trial court, Caron, J., adjudicating the petitioner, Carolyn Tschummi, a legal parent of a minor child, M, under the Connecticut Parentage Act (act), General Statutes § 46b-450 et seq. On appeal, the respondent claims, inter alia, that the trial court, M. Murphy, J., improperly failed to dismiss the petitioner’s parentage petition brought under the act due to lack of standing under General Statutes § 46b-475 on the ground that her parentage as to M had already been adjudicated in a prior custody action (custody action) before the effective date of the act and that her petition was therefore barred by the act’s “transitional provision” set forth in General Statutes § 46b-553.1 The respondent also claims that the court, Caron, J., improperly concluded that the petitioner had standing under General Statutes § 46b-458 by overlooking its provision incorporating the standing requirements of General Statutes §§ 46b-488 (a) and 46b-553. The respondent claims that, because the court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate the parentage petition, the parentage adjudication cannot stand. We agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of M and 1 In addition to the respondent’s claim that the court, M. Murphy, J., improperly denied her motion to dismiss because the petitioner lacked standing to bring the petition, the respondent claims that the court, Caron, J., in adjudicating parentage, improperly applied the act retroactively in violation of Connecticut law; lacked statutory authority to hear the petition; improperly determined the best interest of the child; improperly excluded relevant admissible evidence; and that the court’s decision was against the weight of the evidence and clearly erroneous. Because we conclude that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction , and the respondent’s motion to dismiss should have been granted, we need not reach these additional claims.

remand the case to the trial court with direction to grant the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for an adjudication of parentage under the act.

The following facts and procedural history as set forth in the trial court’s memorandum of decision and the record are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. The petitioner and the respondent were in an intimate relationship with one another beginning in September 2011 but were never married. In October 2015, the respondent moved into the petitioner’s home in Somers.

During the early years of their relationship, the parties discussed the possibility of having children. Being a same-sex couple, the parties decided to pursue in vitro fertilization (IVF). The respondent took on the primary role of choosing the sperm donor and she paid for all the expenses associated with securing the sperm. On the basis of discussions that the parties had, the respondent narrowed down the search to donors who most resembled the petitioner in terms of traits including physical appearance , intellect, and ethnicity. The respondent showed the petitioner the donor profile that she preferred and asked the petitioner her opinion. The petitioner concurred, and they jointly chose that donor. Following successful IVF treatment, the respondent gave birth to M at Baystate Medical Center in Massachusetts in April 2018, by way of a planned cesarean section.

After M was born, the parties remained in a committed intimate relationship until late 2019, when the relationship ended. They continued to live together in the petitioner ’s home, with the petitioner moving into a separate bedroom in the home. This arrangement continued until the respondent moved out of the petitioner’s home in late January 2021. On January 28, 2021, the petitioner returned home from work to find that the respondent had moved out, taking M with her to Massachusetts. The respondent also removed from the family home all of her personal items, clothing and a significant amount of furniture, as well as all of M’s belongings, including M’s clothing, toys, books, and furniture.

On February 3, 2021, in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-61, the petitioner filed a custody application in Superior Court. As required by § 46b-61 (a), in her application for custody, the petitioner stated that, by the first scheduled date the matter appeared on the docket, she would file “accompanying documents” as defined in § 46b-61 (b). The petitioner also filed an application for an emergency ex parte order of custody, which the court, Macierowski, J., granted on February 3, 2021, ordering that the respondent may not remove M from the state of Connecticut and giving the petitioner shared parenting time consistent with their prior practice. On February 10, 2021, the court, while keeping the ex parte orders then in effect, continued the matter for three weeks so that the petitioner’s counsel could effectuate service on the respondent. On March 3, 2021, the court entered further orders, including that the child be returned to Connecticut , that the petitioner have primary residence, and that the parties share parenting time in accordance with their prior practice. The petitioner hired a Massachusetts attorney to have the Connecticut orders enforced in Massachusetts . On March 22, 2021, the petitioner traveled to Plymouth, Massachusetts, where the respondent and M were living with the respondent’s sister, and, with the assistance of marshals, returned the child to Connecticut . On that same day, the respondent filed her own application for an emergency ex parte order of custody in Connecticut and the court ordered that she could have regular visits with M in Connecticut. The respondent traveled to Connecticut and stayed in a hotel for four nights so she could visit with the child.

On March 31, 2021, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petitioner’s application for custody on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner was not a legal parent of the minor child and had no standing to apply for custody.

Pending a hearing and ruling on the motion to dismiss , on April 1, 2021, the court entered further orders that the parties were to have shared parenting with M in their respective homes. On April 9, 2021, the court entered temporary orders that the petitioner would have at least two consecutive overnights per week with M and encouraged the parties and their attorneys to work out a mutually agreeable schedule until the parties could return to court. M returned to the respondent’s home in Massachusetts on April 9, 2021, and the petitioner had M in her home in Connecticut every other weekend. The petitioner altered her work schedule so she could have access with M in Connecticut, and the parties negotiated certain changes to the access schedule during this time.

The petitioner’s access with M continued until November 4, 2021, at which time, after evidentiary hearings had been held on the respondent’s motion to dismiss, the court, Macierowski, J., determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s custody action because the petitioner “is not a legal parent , and therefore, does not have standing to pursue this claim.” Significantly, the court considered whether the petitioner was able to establish that she had the rights of a legal parent as to M under “[the] four recognized statutory or legal pathways to parentage under current Connecticut law . . . .” The court observed that it did not have the equitable authority “to define or determine who is a legal parent . . . .” The court, therefore, confined its analysis to the legally defined methods of establishing parentage under existing law, as described by our Supreme Court in Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 689, 12 A.3d 783 (2011). Consequently, the custody case was dismissed. Following the judgment of dismissal, the petitioner did not bring an appeal.

Thereafter, on January 6, 2022, the petitioner filed the petition in the present case to adjudicate parentage under the act, which became effective on January 1, 2022. In her petition, the petitioner alleged that, pursuant to § 46b-458 (4), “she is a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent under the provisions of the Connecticut Parentage Act . . . [t]he [respondent] is the biological parent of the minor child; [t]he petitioner and the [respondent] were never married; [t]here was one minor child born during the parties’ relationship, to wit [M], born [in] April . . . 2018; [t]he petitioner reside[d] in this state at the time of the filing of this petition; [t]he petitioner is a presumed parent of the minor child under [§ 46b-488 (a) (3)] of the act in that the petitioner jointly with another parent resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as the petitioner’s own child from the time the child was born or adopted and for a period of at least two years thereafter, including any period of temporary absence; [t]he petitioner and the [respondent] entered into assisted reproduction (IVF) together as a couple; [t]he petitioner is an intended parent under [General Statutes §§ 46b-511 and 46b-512] of the act as the petitioner manifested an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction; [o]nly the petitioner and the [respondent] claim parentage of the minor child; [i]t is in the best interest of the minor child that the petitioner be adjudicated a parent pursuant to the factors set forth in [§ 46b-475] of the act; [and] [n]either the petitioner, the [respondent] nor the minor child have received any aid from the state of Connecticut.”

On February 10, 2022, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner lacked standing. The respondent asserted that the petitioner lacked standing because she was previously adjudged, on November 4, 2021, in the custody action, not to be a legal parent of M, and § 46b-553 expressly provides that the provisions of the act “apply to a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.” General Statutes § 46b-553. The respondent further claimed that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-115k.2 2 The jurisdictional issue raised by the respondent in the present appeal is based solely on the application of § 46b-553 of the act and not on §

On May 3, 2022, the petitioner filed an objection to the motion to dismiss and argued that there was no adjudication of parentage in the previous custody action and that, even if there was an adjudication of parentage, there is no question that the ruling was without prejudice.

The court, M. Murphy, J., heard oral argument on the motion on May 6, 2022, and, thereafter, on July 25, 2022, denied the motion to dismiss and sustained the petitioner’s objection to the motion. The court stated in its ruling on the motion: “The court in the custody application case . . . dismissed the application for custody without prejudice. When asked by [the petitioner’s] counsel if the court was making an adjudication about whether the [petitioner] was a parent of [M] in dismissing the custody application, the court responded that it was not deciding about the parentage of [M] . . . . After reviewing the records in [the custody application case], this court finds that no court has made an adjudication regarding the parents of [M].” (Citation omitted.)

Prior to proceeding on the merits of the petition, on March 9, 2023, the respondent filed a second motion to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . The court, Caron, J., heard oral argument on the motion on May 5, 2023. Although the respondent challenged the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, she did not reiterate her earlier claim that the petitioner lacked standing under § 46b-553 because of the prior adjudication of parentage.3 The court, Caron, J., in denying the 46b-115k. We therefore limit our analysis of whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petitioner’s parentage petition to whether § 46b-553 applies thereto.

3 The respondent argued that Connecticut courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction over any matters related to custody or visitation of M because the child had not resided in Connecticut in more than two years and, thus, the court could not make necessary findings related to M’s best interest “to determine custody, visitation, or any other purpose.” The respondent also argued that any ruling rendering the petitioner a legal parent “would grievously and permanently impair [the respondent ’s] parental liberty rights” because Connecticut lacks any interest, let alone a compelling interest, in entertaining an action that should have been brought in Massachusetts. According to the respondent, the motion to dismiss in an oral ruling on May 5, 2023, prior to the trial on the merits of the parentage petition, did not address that distinct ground, which is the basis of the petitioner’s present claim before this court.4 Nevertheless , because a challenge to a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, and the record is adequate for us to review the claim, we will consider its merits. See Milford Redevelopment & Housing Partnership v. Glicklin, 228 Conn. App. 593, 602, 325 A.3d 971 (2024) (“claim that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the proceedings, including on appeal”).

The petition was tried to the court, Caron, J., on June 21, 26 and 30, July 7, August 28, and December 8 and 15, 2023. In its March 6, 2024 memorandum of decision finding parentage, the court, Caron, J., determined that the petitioner had standing to maintain a proceeding to establish parentage under the act because “the petitioner legislature did not provide enabling legislation permitting the court to exercise jurisdiction to decide the best interest of a child who has permanently resided in another state since January 2021, and the court lacked “[any] other source of authority, common-law, constitutional or otherwise to make such a determination.”

The court rejected the respondent’s argument and concluded that its jurisdiction was not based on M’s residency and that it had subject matter jurisdiction because the petitioner, a resident of Connecticut, sought to be adjudicated a parent under the act. The court also rejected the respondent’s argument that the facts relevant to a best interest analysis would not be available to it. The court also noted that, under the act, it need not be established “that there be no other court that might be able to establish jurisdiction over the issue. So, we’re not precluded from going ahead and hearing it here even though there’s a possibility that [a] Massachusetts [court] could also establish parentage.” Finally, the court rejected what it labeled the respondent’s “collateral estoppel argument” based upon the judgment in the custody action. The court reasoned that the custody action was brought under a different statute and that the judgment rendered in that action “was decided under the law in effect in Connecticut at the time of the decision.” The court also relied on the fact that Judge Macierowski, in the custody action, made it clear that the petitioner “should be free to be able to adjudicate her claim of parentage under the new [act].”

4 The respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing in the present case, which was denied by Judge Murphy, and from which the respondent appealed and which is presently before this court.

is seeking to be adjudicated a parent under the [act] and, as such, has standing under [§] 46b-458 to maintain these proceedings.” The court did not consider the prior parentage adjudication and the application of § 46b-553 in its determination that the petitioner had standing. The court further determined that it had personal jurisdiction over both the petitioner and the respondent. The court concluded, therefore, that it had jurisdiction over the matter to hear and decide the petitioner’s request to be adjudicated the parent of M. After hearing evidence on the merits of the petition, the court adjudicated the petitioner a legal parent of M. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

We begin with the standard of review and relevant legal principles. The standard of review that we apply to a trial court’s decision on a motion to dismiss is well settled. “A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction. . . . [O]ur review of the court’s ultimate legal conclusion and resulting [determination] of the motion to dismiss will be de novo. . . . In undertaking this review, we are mindful of the well established notion that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged. . . .

“Trial courts addressing motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . may encounter different situations, depending on the status of the record in the case. . . . Different rules and procedures will apply, depending on the state of the record at the time the motion is filed.

“When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations . . . in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations , construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. . . .

“In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather, those allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary undisputed facts]. . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a . . . motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the action without further proceedings. . . . If, however, the defendant submits either no proof to rebut the . . . jurisdictional allegations . . . or only evidence that fails to call those allegations into question . . . the plaintiff need not supply counteraffidavits or other evidence to support the complaint, but may rest on the jurisdictional allegations therein.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnotes omitted ; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 650–52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).

“[O]nce the question of lack of jurisdiction of a court is raised, [it] must be disposed of no matter in what form it is presented . . . and the court must fully resolve it before proceeding further with the case.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 689–90.

“The issue of standing implicates a court’s subject matter jurisdiction and is subject to plenary review. . . . Standing is the legal right to set judicial machinery in motion. One cannot rightfully invoke the jurisdiction of the court unless he [or she] has, in an individual or representative capacity, some real interest in the cause of action, or a legal or equitable right, title or interest in the subject matter of the controversy. . . . When standing is put in issue, the question is whether the person whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of the issue . . . . Standing is not a technical rule intended to keep aggrieved parties out of court; nor is it a test of substantive rights. Rather it is a practical concept designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate nonjusticiable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) V. V. v. V. V., 218 Conn. App. 157, 167, 291 A.3d 109 (2023).

We now turn to the respondent’s claim that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for parentage and therefore should have granted her motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the petitioner had no standing under the act because her parentage as to M was adjudicated prior to January 1, 2022, and the petition is therefore barred by § 46b-553 of the act. We note that this appeal raises an issue of first impression in that it requires us to determine, for the first time since the enactment of the act, who has standing under the act and, specifically, to interpret its transitional provision, § 46b-553.

Before addressing the merits of the respondent’s claims, it is important to outline the historical legal framework governing the establishment of parentage in Connecticut, particularly in light of the context surrounding this appeal. Prior to the enactment of the act, the legal landscape for establishing parentage in Connecticut was shaped by legal precedent and statutory provisions that defined parental rights and responsibilities . This historical overview is important to understand the evolution of parentage laws in this state prior to the passage of the act.

Prior to the passage of the act, “[our Supreme Court] [had] long recognized that there are three ways by which a person may become a parent: conception, adoption or pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes. . . . The definitional section of chapter 803 of the General

Statutes, which deals with termination of parental rights and adoption, defines [p]arent as a biological or adoptive parent. . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (5). The same definitional section defines [t]ermination of parental rights as the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities , between the child and the child’s parent or parents . . . . General Statutes § 45a-707 (8). Reading these two subdivisions of the same statute together suggests that only persons who are biological or adoptive parents have parental rights with respect to the subject children.

“In 1975, the legislature provided the third means by which a person may gain parental status. Public Acts 1975, No. 75-233, now codified at General Statutes § 45a-774. Section 45a-774 provides: Any child or children born as a result of A.I.D. shall be deemed to acquire, in all respects, the status of a naturally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife who consented to and requested the use of A.I.D. A.I.D. is defined as artificial insemination with the use of donated sperm or eggs from an identified or anonymous donor. General Statutes § 45a-771a (2). Artificial insemination is specifically defined to include both intrauterine insemination and in vitro fertilization. . . . General Statutes § 45a-771a (1). Accordingly, a child born to a married woman and conceived through artificial insemination by an egg or sperm donor is the child of the wife and husband who requested and consented to the use of A.I.D.” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 690–91.

“Our [Supreme Court’s] decisions prior to the passage of [the act and the court’s decision in Raftopol] confirm[ed] that these three avenues were the exclusive means by which a person could acquire parental status. The question of the meaning of the term parent ha[d] most commonly arisen in the context of dissolution actions, when the parties [had] raised claims relating to custody or support.” Id., 692; see, e.g., Remkiewicz v.

Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117, 429 A.2d 833 (1980) (trial court’s judgment denying order of support was affirmed because defendant was not child’s biological father, he had not been adjudicated so in paternity proceeding and had not adopted child); see also Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998) (reaffirming principle under existing statutory scheme that parentage could arise only by conception, adoption or by way of artificial insemination statutes).

In Raftopol, which supersedes Doe, our Supreme Court established a fourth avenue by which parentage could be established. The court held that Connecticut law permitted an intended parent who was neither the biological nor the adoptive parent of a child to become a legal parent of that child by means of a valid gestational agreement.5 Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 698.

In Raftopol, the plaintiffs, Anthony Raftopol and Shawn Hargon, who were domestic partners, entered into a written gestational agreement with the defendant, Karma Ramey, in which she agreed to act as a gestational carrier for the plaintiffs. Id., 687. “Pursuant to the gestational agreement, Ramey had agreed to terminate her parental rights to any children resulting from the procedures , and to sign any forms necessary for the issuance of a replacement birth certificate naming the plaintiffs as the parents of such children. Ramey also had agreed to consent to the adoption of such children by Hargon and to cooperate fully to obtain this goal. 5 We note that, in bringing a petition for parentage under the act, the petitioner did not rely on a gestational agreement. In the custody action, however, the petitioner represented that, among the “accompanying documents” that she would present to the court, was “[a] gestational agreement giving [her] parental rights [with respect to M] . . . .” She failed to do so. We discuss Raftopol because it is an important part of the historical legal framework governing the establishment of parentage in Connecticut and it provides legal context for the underlying proceedings in the present case. Specifically, the court, in dismissing the custody action, concluded, under Raftopol, that the petitioner failed to demonstrate that she had an existing legal relationship with M by failing to provide “a legal document drafted with the intent of creating a legal parentage relationship or the obligations of a legal parent.”

“Prior to the expected delivery date, the plaintiffs brought [an] action [against Ramey and the department of public health (department)] seeking a declaratory judgment that the gestational agreement was valid, that the plaintiffs were the legal parents of the children and requesting that the court order [pursuant to General Statutes § 7-48a]6 the department to issue a replacement birth certificate reflecting that they, and not Ramey, were parents of the children. . . . Following a hearing, the trial court issued a ruling declaring that: (1) the gestational agreement [was] valid; (2) Raftopol [was] the genetic and legal father of the children; (3) Hargon [was] the legal father of the children; and (4) Ramey [was] not the genetic or legal mother of the children. The court therefore ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate pursuant to § 7-48a.” (Footnote added; footnotes omitted.) Id., 687–88.

Our Supreme Court in Raftopol affirmed the judgment of the trial court and concluded that, (1) because Ramey did not have any parental rights with respect to the children, the termination of those nonexistent rights was not a necessary prerequisite to a determination of Hargon’s parental status with respect to the children and (2) the court had jurisdiction to issue a declaratory 6 General Statutes § 7-48a provides in relevant part: “(b) If the birth is subject to a surrogacy agreement, the Department of Public Health shall create a replacement certificate of birth immediately upon: (1) Receipt of a certified copy of an order of a court of competent jurisdiction issuing an order of parentage pursuant to such surrogacy agreement, if such order is received by the department after the birth of the child, or (2) the filing of an original certificate of birth, if such order is received by the department prior to the birth of the child. The department shall prepare the replacement certificate of birth for the child born of the agreement in accordance with such order. The replacement certificate of birth shall include all information required to be included in a certificate of birth of this state as of the date of the birth, except that the intended parent or parents under the surrogacy agreement shall be named as the parent or parents of the child. When a certified copy of a certificate of birth is requested by an eligible party, as provided in section 7-51, for which a replacement certificate of birth has been created pursuant to this subsection, a copy of the replacement certificate of birth shall be provided. The department shall seal the original certificate of birth in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of section 19a-42. . . .”

ruling regarding Hargon’s parental status. Id., 689. The court further concluded that § 7-48a allowed an intended parent who is a party to a valid gestational agreement to become a parent without first adopting the children, without respect to that intended parent’s genetic relationship to the children. Id., 698. Consistent with that conclusion, the court “conclude[d] that the trial court properly ordered the department to issue a replacement birth certificate listing Hargon as parent of the children.” Id. The court “emphasize[d] that the [trial] court’s order to the department to place Hargon’s name on the replacement birth certificate follows from its declaratory judgment concluding that Hargon is a parent to the children.” (Emphasis omitted.) Id. The decision in Raftopol thus established a fourth avenue by which to establish parentage. After Raftopol, but prior to the passage of the act, the law in Connecticut was that parentage could be established in the following four ways: conception, adoption, pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes, or pursuant to a valid gestational agreement.

In January 2022, the Connecticut legislature passed the act, which “clarifies and broadens who can be included in the legal relationship between a child and a parent of the child.” A. Walsh, note, “All in the Family? Adopting the Uniform Parentage Act is One Step Towards Equality in Parentage,” 37 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 273, 274 (2024). The act is an adaptation of the Uniform Parentage Act, which was revised by the Uniform Law Commission in 2017, and provides equal access to parentage regardless of marital status, sexual orientation, or biological relationship. Id. The act “removes gender references to parental roles, thereby creating a more inclusive environment for children born to same-sex couples” and “expands recognition of non-biological parents, specifies criteria for adjudicating parentage, and provides the process for establishing acknowledged parentage.” Id.

The act has broadened the ways in which to establish parentage beyond the four ways established by

Connecticut statutes and articulated in Connecticut decisional law prior to its enactment. See id., 277. “The [a]ct provides ten different ways for establishing a parent -child relationship.” Id.7 Notably, “[a] person is presumed to be the parent of a child if they or their spouse gave birth to the child, if the child is born within 300 days of the marriage ending, or if they resided with the child and held them out as their own. Along with this, a parent-child relationship is established if a person is adjudicated a parent of the child, the person adopts the child, or the person acknowledges parentage of the child, all as provided under the [act]. Such a relationship may also be established in situations utilizing assisted reproduction or surrogacy agreements.” (Footnotes omitted.) Id.

In the present case, the petitioner alleged in her petition in relevant part that, pursuant to § 46b-458 (4), “she is a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent under the provisions of the act; that she is a presumed parent of the minor child, [M] under [§ 46b-488 (a) (3)] of the 7 General Statutes § 46b-471 provides: “A parent-child relationship is established between a person and a child if:

“(1) The person gives birth to the child, except as otherwise provided in sections 46b-521 to 46b-538, inclusive;

“(2) There is a presumption under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection (a) of section 46b-488 of the person’s parentage of the child, unless the presumption is overcome in a judicial proceeding;

“(3) There is a presumption under subdivision (3) of subsection (a) of section 46b-488, and the person is adjudicated a parent of the child or acknowledges parentage of the child under sections 46b-476 to 46b- 487, inclusive;

“(4) The person is adjudicated a parent of the child under section 46b-490;

“(5) The person is adjudicated a parent of the child under sections 46b-495 to 46b-505, inclusive;

“(6) The person adopts the child; “(7) The person acknowledges parentage of the child under sections 46b-476 to 46b-487, inclusive, unless the acknowledgment is rescinded under section 46b-482 or successfully challenged under section 46b-483;

“(8) The person’s parentage of the child is established under sections 46b-509 to 46b-517, inclusive;

“(9) The person’s parentage of the child is established under sections 46b-521 to 46b-538, inclusive; or “(10) The court is deemed to have made an adjudication of parentage pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46b-468.”

act in that she jointly with another parent resided in the same household with the child and openly held out the child as the petitioner’s own child from the time the child was born or adopted and for a period of at least two years thereafter, including any period of temporary absence; that she and the respondent entered into assisted reproduction (IVF) together as a couple; that she is an intended parent under [§§ 46b-511 and 46b-512] of the act as she manifested an intent to be legally bound as a parent of a child conceived by assisted reproduction; and that it is in the best interest of the minor child that she be adjudicated a parent pursuant to the factors set forth in [§ 46b-475] of the act.”

As previously noted, in the present action, the court, M. Murphy, J., denied the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petitioner’s petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it determined that the court in the custody action had not adjudicated parentage and, therefore, the petitioner had standing to maintain the proceedings to establish parentage under the act. The court, Caron, J., in ruling on the respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss in the present action determined, without analysis, that, merely because the petitioner was seeking to be adjudicated a parent under the act, she had standing pursuant to § 46b-458 to maintain the proceedings to establish parentage and therefore that the court had subject matter jurisdiction.

The issue, therefore, for this court to decide is whether, under the act, the petitioner lacked standing to maintain the underlying parentage action. A determination of whether the petitioner lacked standing under the act requires this court to interpret the relevant statutory provisions that govern who has standing to maintain a proceeding to establish parentage under the act. This court must also determine whether the proceeding held on November 4, 2021, before Judge Macierowski in the custody action, was “a proceeding . . . with respect to a person’s parentage that [was] . . . adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.” General Statutes § 46b-553. Stated otherwise, we must consider whether, in the custody action, the court adjudicated the issue of whether the petitioner was M’s legal parent.

The respondent claims that the trial court improperly denied her motion to dismiss because the plain language of § 46b-553, which is incorporated into § 46b-458, bars a proceeding under the act if “parentage has already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law [prior to January 1, 2022, the effective date of the act].” The respondent claims that the petitioner’s parentage over M was previously adjudicated on November 4, 2021, in the custody action before Judge Macierowski, and that Judge Macierowski, after the submission of evidence at the evidentiary hearings on the motion to dismiss, made express findings as to the petitioner’s parentage and determined that the petitioner was not a legal parent.

The petitioner argues that her parentage over M was not adjudicated in the custody action, prior to the effective date of the act, because Judge Macierowski dismissed the action without prejudice to the petitioner filing a petition for parentage under the act, which was not in effect at the time of the dismissal. The petitioner argues that, because “the matter was dismissed for lack of standing under the existing law, Judge Macierowski did not allow the hearing to proceed on the merits with regard to the custody claim [and thus] no adjudication was made by Judge Macierowski.” We agree with the respondent.

The respondent’s claim requires us to interpret relevant statutory provisions under the act and determine their applicability to the present case. Accordingly, we apply the plenary standard of review. See, e.g., Seramonte CT, LLC v. Blau, 236 Conn. App. 861, 867, 349 A.3d 1096 (2025) (reviewing court applies plenary standard of review for issues of statutory interpretation and application), cert. denied, 354 Conn. 918, 351 A.3d 411 (2026).

“The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply. . . .

“When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holmes v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 171 Conn. App. 597, 606–607, 157 A.3d 1147 (2017).

“[P]ursuant to § 1-2z, [the court is] to go through the following initial steps: first, consider the language of the statute at issue, including its relationship to other statutes, as applied to the facts of the case; second, if after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude[s] that, as so applied, there is but one likely or plausible meaning of the statutory language, [the court] stop[s] there; but third, if after the completion of step one, [the court] conclude[s] that, as applied to the facts of the case, there is more than one likely or plausible meaning of the statute, [the court] may consult other sources, beyond the statutory language, to ascertain the meaning of the statute.

“It is useful to remind ourselves of what, in this context, we mean when we say that a statutory text has a plain meaning, or, what is the same, a plain and unambiguous meaning. [Our Supreme Court] has already defined that phrase. By that phrase we mean the meaning that is so strongly indicated or suggested by the language as applied to the facts of the case, without consideration , however, of its purpose or the other, extratextual sources of meaning . . . that, when the language is read as so applied, it appears to be the meaning and appears to preclude any other likely meaning. . . . Put another way, if the text of the statute at issue, considering its relationship to other statutes, would permit more than one likely or plausible meaning, its meaning cannot be said to be plain and unambiguous.” (Emphasis in original ; internal quotation marks omitted.) Commissioner of Public Safety v. Freedom of Information Commission, 137 Conn. App. 307, 314–15, 48 A.3d 694 (2012), aff’d, 312 Conn. 513, 93 A.3d 1142 (2014).

We begin our analysis with the relevant statutory provisions. Section 46b-458 governs who has standing to maintain a proceeding to adjudicate parentage under the act and provides in relevant part: “Subject to the provisions of sections 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive, a proceeding to adjudicate parentage may be maintained by . . . (4) a person who seeks to be adjudicated a parent under the provisions of sections 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive . . . .” (Emphasis added.)

The term “subject to” is not defined in § 46b-458 or in any other provisions of the act. “In the absence of a statutory definition, words and phrases in a particular statute are to be construed according to their common usage. . . . To ascertain that usage, we look to the dictionary definition of the term.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Rubin v. Brodie, 228 Conn. App. 617, 638–39, 325 A.3d 1096 (2024); see also General Statutes § 1-1 (a). “We may find evidence of such usage, and technical meaning, in dictionary definitions, as well as by reading the statutory language within the context of the broader legislative scheme.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greenwich Retail, LLC v. Greenwich, 233 Conn. App. 78, 87, 340 A.3d 463, aff’d, 355 Conn. 367, ___ A.3d ___

(2026); see also, e.g., Ledyard v. WMS Gaming, Inc., 338 Conn. 687, 697, 258 A.3d 1268 (2021) (“in the absence of statutory definitions, we look to the contemporaneous dictionary definitions of words to ascertain their commonly approved usage”).

This court, interpreting “subject to,” as that phrase appears in zoning regulations, has stated: “Merriam- Webster’s Online Dictionary defines ‘subject to’ to mean (1) ‘affected by or possibly affected by (something),’ (2) ‘likely to do, have, or suffer from (something)’ or (3) ‘dependent on something else to happen or be true.’ Merriam -Webster Online Dictionary, available at https:// www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/subject%20to (last visited April 22, 2024). Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘[s]ubject to’ to mean ‘[l]iable, subordinate, subservient , inferior, obedient to; governed or affected by; provided that; provided; answerable for.’ Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990) p. 1425; see also Black’s Law Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019) p. 1723 (defining ‘subject’ to mean, inter alia, ‘[d]ependent on or exposed to (some contingency); esp., being under discretionary authority ,’ with sample sentence reading, ‘funding is subject to the board’s approval’). These assorted definitions can support either a broad or limited reading of the phrase ‘subject to’ . . . .” (Emphasis added.) Lepkowski v. Planning Commission, 225 Conn. App. 120, 132, 315 A.3d 380 (2024).

Our Supreme Court, defining the term “subject to,” as it appears in deeds, has stated that the term is “language of qualification and not of contract, which renders it a provision of notice that will not by itself create an encumbrance in the absence of other circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Abel v. Johnson, 340 Conn. 240, 257, 263 A.3d 371 (2021). The court in Abel reasoned that the meaning of the term should be evaluated in light of the context in which it appears. See id., 258–59; id., 259 (“subject to language is contextual” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Section 46b-553 provides: “Sections 46b-450 to 46b-553,8 inclusive, apply to a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.” (Footnote added.) Under § 46b-553, General Statutes §§ 46b-450 through 46b-553, inclusive, which encompasses § 46b-458, only apply to a proceeding where there has been no adjudication of parentage prior to January 1, 2022. Thus, the term “subject to” only has one reasonable interpretation when we look at its placement in the act as a whole, which is that it limits those who have standing under § 46b-458. Moreover, when interpreting § 46b-458 together with § 46b-553, a person who seeks adjudication to be a parent under the provisions of §§ 46b-450 through 46b-553, inclusive, has standing provided that person’s parentage has not already been adjudicated prior to January 1, 2022.

The critical question for this court to answer in order to determine whether the petitioner had standing to maintain the underlying petition, therefore, is whether the proceeding held on November 4, 2021, before Judge Macierowski, on the respondent’s motion to dismiss the custody action, was an adjudication of the petitioner’s parentage of M. “Because [t]he construction of a judgment is a question of law for the court . . . our review of the . . . [issue] is plenary.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Perry v. Perry, 156 Conn. App. 587, 593, 113 A.3d 132, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 906, 114 A.3d 1220 (2015).

It is important to point out that, in her application for joint legal custody, the petitioner alleged that she was the mother of M and acknowledged that she would provide, in accordance with § 46b-61 (a), “accompanying documents,” as defined in § 46b-61 (b), to establish that 8 General Statutes § 46b-452 sets forth the scope of the act and provides in relevant part: “(a) Sections 46b-450 to 46b-553, inclusive, apply to a determination of parentage. . . .”

she was the legal parent of M. Thus, it was the petitioner herself who asserted parental rights as the basis upon which her application for custody should be granted.

Section 46b-61 governs custody cases in which the parents of a minor child live separately. Pursuant to § 46b-61 (a), “the superior court for the judicial district where any parent resides may, on the application of any parent and after notice is given to the other parent or parents, make any order as to the custody, care, education, visitation and support of any minor child of the parents . . . .” Section 46b-61 (b) provides: “As used in this section, ‘accompanying documents’ means documents that establish an existing legal relationship between the parents and the child for whom an application for custody, care, education , visitation and support is made under this section. ‘Accompanying documents’ include, but are not limited to, a copy of a birth certificate naming the applicant and the respondent as the parents of the child, a copy of a properly executed acknowledgment of parentage, a court order or decree naming the legally responsible parents, including adoptive parents, a surrogacy agreement as defined in section 7-36,9 documents showing that the minor child was born during the parents’ wedlock or other sufficient evidence within the discretion of the court.” (Footnote added.) The petitioner listed the following “accompanying documents” that she would file with the court: “A copy of a birth certificate naming [the petitioner] as one of the parents; [a] copy of a properly executed (finalized) acknowledgement of paternity; [a] court order or decree naming [the petitioner] as a legally responsible parent (including an adoptive parent); [a] gestational agreement giving [the petitioner] parental rights (see [General Statutes §] 7-36 . . . ); [d]ocument(s)

9 General Statutes § 7-36 provides in relevant part: “(16) ‘Surrogacy agreement’ means an agreement between one or more intended parents and a person who is not an intended parent in which such person agrees to become pregnant through assisted reproduction and which provides that each intended parent is a parent of a child conceived under the agreement. Unless the context otherwise requires, ‘surrogacy agreement’ includes an agreement with a person acting as a gestational surrogate and an agreement with a person acting as a genetic surrogate . . . .”

showing that the child or children was/were born during [the petitioner’s] marriage; or [a]ny other evidence [the petitioner deems] is sufficient (enough) to convince the court that [she is] a legal parent’ of the child or children.” The court, in denying the petition for custody, noted that the documents on which the petitioner relied were health-care provider forms, not documents that were drafted with the intent of creating a legal parentage relationship between the petitioner and M.

As previously discussed, prior to the enactment of the act, our Supreme Court and state legislature have long recognized that there were four ways by which a person could establish parentage: conception, adoption, pursuant to the artificial insemination statutes, or as established in Raftopol via a gestational agreement. See Raftopol v. Ramey, supra, 299 Conn. 690. Prior to the act, the definitional section of chapter 803 of the General Statutes, which deals with termination of parental rights and adoption, defined “ ‘[p]arent’ ” as “a biological or adoptive parent. . . .” General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 45a-707 (5). Thus, the “accompanying documents” that parents seeking custody under § 46b-61 were required to submit as evidence of an existing legal relationship between the parents and the child for whom an application for custody was being made were consistent with the four ways by which parentage could be established. Thus, in order to have standing to seek custody under § 46b-61, the person seeking custody must establish the existence of a legally recognized parental relationship with the child for whom custody is sought.

The petitioner argues that Judge Macierowski’s granting of the respondent’s motion to dismiss filed in the custody action did not preclude her from filing the underlying parentage petition pursuant to the act because the ruling on the motion to dismiss in the custody action was not a proceeding in which an adjudication of parentage occurred. The petitioner argues that, because the custody action was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction , due to the petitioner’s lack of standing, Judge

Macierowski did not allow the hearing to proceed on the merits with regard to the custody claim and, therefore, there was no adjudication of parentage by the court. In her ruling granting the motion to dismiss, Judge Macierowski stated that the respondent had accurately characterized “the . . . four recognized statutory or legal pathways to parentage under current Connecticut law . . . .” The court concluded that the petitioner had not established parentage under any of these four avenues. The court noted, in particular, that the “health-care documents” that had been submitted to the court had not been drafted “with the intent of creating a legal parentage relationship or the obligations of a legal parent.” Thus, the court concluded that the petitioner was unable to demonstrate that she was a legal parent pursuant to Raftopol. The court further noted that it lacked the equitable authority to determine who is a legal parent.

Although it granted the motion to dismiss, the court, however, referred to the act, which had not yet been enacted. It stated that it was dismissing the action “solely on the grounds of existing law, which is markedly different than the law that will take effect in just a few months, and so any dismissal is without prejudice to . . . the [petitioner’s] right to pursue a claim under other law . . . .” In claiming that the court’s ruling was not an adjudication of parentage, the petitioner relies on these statements, which she argues suggested that the issue of parentage was an issue that could be raised, or at least revisited, at a later date.10 Relying on the legislative history of the act, the petitioner further argues that the preclusive effect of 10 The petitioner filed her complaint in the custody action in March 2021. On March 31, 2021, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the custody action. On October 8, 2021, the petitioner filed a motion for request for leave to amend her complaint “to properly reflect the [petitioner ’s] intention to seek visitation rather than custody.” It is noteworthy that, in her memorandum of law in opposition to the petitioner’s request for leave to amend, the respondent argued that the petitioner’s motion was an improper delay tactic. Specifically, the respondent argued that the petitioner was unable to establish legal parentage and that her motion was an attempt to avoid an adverse decision on the motion to § 46b-553 reflects an attempt by our legislature to protect against persons she characterizes as “spiteful expartners ,” persons who would attempt to use the act to cause emotional harm to a legal parent without having “real desire to be a legal parent, only to exert that control .” The petitioner argues that the facts of this case, as reflected in the record, “establish that [she] is not one whose parentage claims fall within the category of a spiteful ex-partner without any real desire to be a parent . . . . Rather, the facts as set forth in the entirety of the record and as found by the trial judge establish that [she] meets the definition of parent under the [act] . . . .”

In the present case, the trial court, M. Murphy, J., likewise relied on the same statements in Judge Macierowski ’s ruling to conclude that there was no adjudication of parentage. In denying the motion to dismiss, the court stated: “The court in the custody application case . . . dismissed the application for custody without prejudice. When asked by [the petitioner’s] counsel if the court was making an adjudication about whether the [petitioner] was a parent of [M] in dismissing the custody application, the court responded that it was not deciding about the parentage of [M].”

The respondent argues that, after several evidentiary hearings on the motion to dismiss, oral arguments, and the submission of briefs, Judge Macierowski expressly adjudicated the petitioner’s parentage over M in the custody action, finding, after considering the evidence that was submitted during the course of the hearings, that, because the petitioner did not establish parentage, she was not a legal parent and lacked standing to seek custody dismiss prior to December 31, 2021, so that she may seek custody of M under the act rather than in light of then existing parentage law. The respondent also argued that it would be legally improper for the court to grant the petitioner’s motion while the motion to dismiss was pending. On October 29, 2021, the court denied the petitioner’s motion. We note that, even if the court had permitted the petition to be amended, the petitioner, pursuant to § 46b-61, would still have had to establish that she had standing pursuant to her claim for visitation by demonstrating a legal relationship with M.

of M. Consequently, Judge Macierowski dismissed the custody action. The respondent, like the petitioner, relies on statements made by Judge Macierowski during her ruling on the motion to dismiss to support her claim that there was a prior adjudication of parentage. The respondent claims that Judge Macierowski expressly stated that she was adjudicating parentage and that the petitioner had an obligation, pursuant to § 46b-61 (a), to file documents on or before the first hearing date establishing a legal relationship or parentage to support her claims relating to custody, which she failed to do. The respondent argues that Judge Macierowski’s statement that she was granting the motion to dismiss “without prejudice” to the petitioner filing a petition under the new act was dicta and that, once the court determined it was without jurisdiction to proceed with the action, it had no legal authority to preempt the legislative mandate that the new act should not apply to persons such as the petitioner whose parentage had been decided before the effective date of the act. The respondent argues that Judge Macierowski had no jurisdiction or other legal authority to rule on an issue that might arise in a future case on a law not yet in effect.

We agree with the respondent that Judge Macierowski ’s statement that the motion to dismiss was granted “without prejudice” and her statements regarding the plaintiff’s ability to file a petition under the act, which had not yet been enacted, were dicta and that, once she granted the motion, she had no legal authority to preempt the legislative mandate under § 46b-553 that the new act does not apply to the petitioner. “[I]t is axiomatic that once the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is raised, it must be immediately acted upon by the court. . . . As our Supreme Court observed more than a century ago, [w]henever the absence of jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court . . . cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction. . . . Indeed, [o]nce it becomes clear that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs’ complaint, any further discussion of the merits is pure dicta. Lacking jurisdiction, neither the trial court nor this court should deliver an advisory opinion on matters entirely beyond our power to adjudicate . . . . For that reason, as soon as the jurisdiction of the court to decide an issue is called into question, all other action in the case must come to a halt until such a determination is made.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gianetti v. Dunsby, 182 Conn. App. 855, 860–61, 191 A.3d 260 (2018).

Further, we recognize that the proceeding before Judge Macierowski was on a motion to dismiss a custody action for lack of standing, and not on a petition for an adjudication of parentage. Nor was the proceeding before Judge Macierowski a petition for an adjudication of parentage under the act, which was not in existence at the time of the court’s ruling. We also recognize, however, that the application for custody brought by the petitioner necessarily required the court to determine whether the petitioner was a legal parent of M as she alleged, and, therefore, we conclude that it was a proceeding on an adjudication of the petitioner’s parentage of M that occurred prior to January 1, 2022. The court’s judgment granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss and dismissing the custody action for lack of standing was necessarily dependent on an adjudication of parentage. In fact, the court expressly indicated that it was determining parentage based on the law as it existed at the time, as set forth in Raftopol. The limitation on the application of the act, set forth in § 46b-553, provides that the act only applies to “a proceeding in which no judgment has entered before January 1, 2022, with respect to a person’s parentage that has not already been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction or determined by operation of law.”

To the extent the petitioner contends that the court’s determination in the custody action was not a “proceeding ” as contemplated by § 46b-553, we disagree. The language in the provision does not define “proceeding”

nor does it limit its application to a certain type of proceeding . The provision states that the application of the act applies to “a proceeding” in which no prior adjudication of parentage has occurred. Thus, if a “proceeding” in which parentage was adjudicated occurred prior to January 1, 2022, the act does not apply. Contrary to the petitioner’s argument that we should restrict the types of proceedings to which the limitation in § 46b-553 applies, we are bound to construe statutes as they are written, and we may not rewrite a statute to accomplish a particular result. See Del Rio v. Amazon.com Services, Inc., 354 Conn. 151, 172, 349 A.3d 570 (2026); see also Housing Authority v. Cyr, 234 Conn. App. 527, 541, 344 A.3d 527 (2025).11 Moreover, because the act does not define the term “proceeding,” we must look to the commonly approved usage of the term. “[T]he term proceeding, as ordinarily used, is generic in meaning and broad enough to include all methods involving the action of courts. . . . Other definitions are similarly broad. A proceeding is defined as any application to a court of justice, however made, for aid in the enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, for damages, or for any remedial object. Ballentine’s Law Dictionary (3d Ed. 1969) [p. 1000].” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn. App. 589, 596, 749 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000). We readily conclude that a hearing on a motion to dismiss in a custody action falls within the broad definition of “proceeding.”

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the hearing on the motion to dismiss was a proceeding that occurred prior to January 1, 2022, in which there was 11 As previously noted, the petitioner also argues that § 46b-553 does not apply to her because she is not within the category of a “spiteful ex-partner” without any real desire to be a parent, the type of claim the petitioner argues § 46b-553 was intended to protect against. We decline to adopt the petitioner’s narrow interpretation of § 46b-553, which effectively would make that provision applicable only to “spiteful expartners ” because it lacks any support in the statute’s plain language.

an adjudication of parentage by a court of competent jurisdiction. To conclude otherwise, as the petitioner urges us to do, would require us to disregard the fact that the petitioner raised and fully litigated the issue of parentage at that prior proceeding and that it was the dispositive factor that led the court to dismiss the custody action. Accordingly, pursuant to § 46b-553, the petitioner did not have standing to bring the petition seeking an adjudication of parentage and therefore the motion to dismiss should have been granted.

The judgment recognizing the petitioner as a legal parent of the minor child is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to grant the respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition for an adjudication of parentage under the act.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.