Troutt Bros., Inc. v. Emison

841 S.W.2d 604, 311 Ark. 27, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2098, 1992 Ark. LEXIS 674
CourtSupreme Court of Arkansas
DecidedNovember 9, 1992
Docket92-522
StatusPublished
Cited by20 cases

This text of 841 S.W.2d 604 (Troutt Bros., Inc. v. Emison) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Arkansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Troutt Bros., Inc. v. Emison, 841 S.W.2d 604, 311 Ark. 27, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2098, 1992 Ark. LEXIS 674 (Ark. 1992).

Opinions

Robert H. Dudley, Justice.

This appeal requires us to construe the Freedom of Information Act, Ark. Code Ann. §§ 25-19-101 — 108 (Repl. 1992). Two sixteen-year-old girls and one fifteen-year old girl were arrested in Mississippi County. One was arrested for stabbing a victim to death, another for carrying a deadly weapon, and the third for felony theft. After their arrests, the three were transported to the Craighead County Juvenile Detention Center, a regional facility. Under the governing statutes, the two sixteen-year-old girls could have been charged as adults, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318 (Repl. 1991), and treated as adults, or they could have been charged as juveniles and would have remained in the juvenile detention facility until the juvenile division of the chancery court ordered otherwise. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 9-27-326, 327 (Repl. 1991) & § 9-28-209 (Supp. 1991). If the fifteen-year-old were the one arrested for stabbing her victim to death she too might have been charged as an adult, see Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-318(b)(1) (Repl. 1991), or she might have been charged as a delinquent juvenile offender. See Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-303(11) (Repl. 1991). The salient fact is that none of the juveniles had been charged in the juvenile division of chancery court at the time the issue in this case arose, and, therefore, no juvenile proceedings had been commenced. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-310 (Repl. 1991). Subsequent testimony showed that both of the sixteen-year-old girls were later charged as adults in circuit court, one being charged with capital murder, and the other being charged in connection with another homicide. The fifteen-year-old was charged as a delinquent juvenile.

While in the regional juvenile facility, the three detainees attacked a matron, broke several of her ribs while overpowering her, took the keys to the facility and to her car, got out of the facility with one of the keys, and, with the use of the other key, escaped in her car. Newsroom employees of the Jonesboro Sun heard the police broadcasts of the escape through use of a radio scanner. Larry Fugate, the managing editor of the Sun, immediately went to the facility to ask what had happened. The Craighead County Juvenile Detention Facility is located in the same building as the Craighead County Jail, or adult jail, but the two facilities are separate. They have separate entrances, separate facilities, separate records, separate personnel, and separate standards. Upon arriving at the building Fugate asked Dickie Howell, Chief Deputy Sheriff of Craighead County, for the names of the escapees. The deputy sheriff responded that he understood the law to be that the names of juvenile offenders were not to be released and, accordingly, did not divulge the girls’ names. Later, he refused to allow Fugate to see the logs and booking sheets on the girls. The Sun filed suit in circuit court against Sheriff Larry Emison and Deputy Dickie Howell asking that the names and records be made public information. The trial court examined applicable statutes, considered the possibility that the General Assembly did not word one of statutes as it intended, and, in this case of first impression, concluded that the public policy in favor of keeping juveniles’ names confidential outweighed the public policy represented by the Freedom of Information Act. Accordingly, the trial court found no violation of the Freedom of Information Act. We reverse, primarily because the legislative branch rather than the judicial branch can create exceptions to the act, and the legislature has not created an exception specifically applicable to this set of facts.

The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act provides in pertinent part:

Except as otherwise specifically provided by this section or by laws specifically enacted to provide otherwise, all public records shall be open to inspection and copying by any citizen of the State of Arkansas during the regular business hours of the custodian of the records.

Ark. Code Ann. § 25-19-105(a) (Repl. 1992) (emphasis added). This language provides that only the General Assembly can create exceptions to the FOIA. We have followed this directive and have required that a statute specifically provide for nondisclosure before we will exempt a public record from the act. See Legislative Joint Auditing Comm. v. Woosley, 291 Ark. 89, 722 S.W.2d 581 (1987). Therefore, the issue is whether there is a statute that specifically provides for the exemption of the names of juveniles arrested for felonies, but not. charged as delinquent juveniles, and whether detention facility logs and booking sheets of juvenile detention facilities are exempt.

Deputy Sheriff Howell obviously thought that a part of the juvenile code, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-348 (Repl. 1991), provided for the exemption. However, the language of that exemption is as follows:

No information whereby the name or identity of a juvenile who is the subject of proceedings under this subchapter may be ascertained shall be published by the news media without written order of the juvenile court. [Emphasis supplied.]

Another statute, Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-310(a) (Repl. 1991), provides that juvenile “[proceedings shall be commenced by filing a petition with the clerk of the chancery court or by transfer by another court.” Thus, these juveniles were not “the subject of proceedings,” and the exemption does not specifically apply. This construction of the statute is confirmed by the phrase “without written order of the juvenile court,” which clearly means that the exemption is to apply only to cases filed in the juvenile court.

One might argue that our construction of these statutes defeats, to some extent, the public policy of shielding juvenile offenders since our construction leaves a window of time, between the arrest and the charge, in which the name of a delinquent juvenile can be discovered. However, that result is in accordance with the language of the statute. If it is to be changed, it should be changed by the General Assembly and not by this court. If the General Assembly wants to declare the public policy to be that the names of all juvenile offenders are exempt public records, whether the juvenile is charged, or if charged, whether charged in juvenile court or in circuit court, it knows how to do so.

However, the General Assembly might not choose to create such a blanket exemption. One of these cases is a good example. There was testimony that the juvenile, who was charged as an adult with the crime of capital murder, stabbed her victim twenty-two times, then attacked the matron, escaped, and was loose in public. The General Assembly might well think that, for its safety, the public had a right to know the name or see a picture of such a dangerous escapee. But again, that is not for this court to decide. Our long standing position is clear. FOIA exemptions are to be narrowly construed, Hengel v. City of Pine Bluff, 307 Ark. 457, 821 S.W.2d 761 (1991), and when the legislature “is less than clear in its intendments, then privacy must yield to openness and secrecy to the public’s right to know.” Ragland v. Yeargan, 288 Ark. 81, 86, 702 S.W.2d 23, 25 (1986). Accordingly, we hold that this statute does not provide an exemption to FOIA.

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Troutt Bros., Inc. v. Emison
841 S.W.2d 604 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1992)

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Bluebook (online)
841 S.W.2d 604, 311 Ark. 27, 20 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2098, 1992 Ark. LEXIS 674, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/troutt-bros-inc-v-emison-ark-1992.