Trisvan v. Mayor of New York Eric Adams

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedAugust 14, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-09051
StatusUnknown

This text of Trisvan v. Mayor of New York Eric Adams (Trisvan v. Mayor of New York Eric Adams) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trisvan v. Mayor of New York Eric Adams, (E.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ------------------------------------x

JOHN TRISVAN,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER 23-cv-9051 (EK)(LB)

-against-

THE CITY OF NEW YORK; MAYOR OF NEW YORK CITY ERIC ADAMS; NYPD COMMISSIONER EDWARD CABAN; and NYPD POLICE OFFICER HALERAS RODRIGUEZ,

Defendants.

------------------------------------x ERIC KOMITEE, United States District Judge: Plaintiff John Trisvan, proceeding pro se, filed this action against a series of defendants, alleging that New York City’s open container law violates his constitutional rights. Compl., ECF No. 1. The Court grants Trivan’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). ECF No. 2. The complaint, however, is dismissed with prejudice. Legal Standard A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and “allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).1 At the pleading stage, the court must assume the truth of “all well-pleaded, nonconclusory factual allegations” in the complaint. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111,

123 (2d Cir. 2010). But the court need not accept “legal conclusions” as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se complaint like Trisvan’s is to be liberally construed, and “must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Ceara v. Deacon, 916 F.3d 208, 213 (2d Cir. 2019). Still, a pro se plaintiff is not exempt from “compliance with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). A district court shall dismiss an in forma pauperis action where it is satisfied that the action “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Discussion Trisvan’s complaint alleges that on October 4, 2023, he was “told by Defendant Rodriquez that he was not to have an open container of alcohol in public according to Admin. Code

1 Unless otherwise noted, when quoting judicial decisions this order accepts all alterations and omits all citations, footnotes, and internal quotation marks. Rule 10-125B2 and was given a summons.” Compl. at 2. “Although Plaintiff Trisvan admitted to being in public with alcohol, he in no way was breaking the law by doing so according to the U.S. Constitution.” Id. Trisvan seeks declaratory and injunctive relief as well as $275,000. Id. at 3.

Given that Trisvan has invoked his constitutional rights, the Court construes the action as brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This section “creates no substantive rights; it provides only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.” Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993). In order to maintain a Section 1983 action, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted to deprive the plaintiff of a right arising under the Constitution or federal law. Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). Even under a liberal reading of the complaint, Trisvan

has failed to allege facts to support a claim. He cites Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment for the proposition that defendant Rodriguez was “infringing upon” his “right to possess and consume alcohol” by enforcing the open container law. Id.3

2 The New York City Administrative Code provides that “[n]o person shall drink or consume an alcoholic beverage, or possess, with intent to drink or consume, an open container containing an alcoholic beverage in any public place except at a block party, feast or similar function for which a permit has been obtained.” N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 10-125(b).

3 Section 2 of the Twenty-first Amendment states: “The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for Trisvan’s reliance on the Twenty-First Amendment is misplaced — the Amendment provides no such right. To the contrary, “[t]he aim of the Twenty-first Amendment was to allow

States to maintain an effective and uniform system for controlling liquor by regulating its transportation, importation, and use.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 US 460, 484 (2005). Therefore, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Filing Injunction — Warning The ability to litigate in forma pauperis is a privilege that may be denied. In re Anderson, 511 U.S. 364 (1994); In re Sindram, 498 U.S. 177, 179–180 (1991) (“In order to prevent frivolous petitions for extraordinary relief from unsettling the fair administration of justice, the Court has a duty to deny in forma pauperis status to those individuals who have abused the system.”); Polanco v. Hopkins, 510 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 2007) (right to proceed in forma pauperis “is not a

constitutional right, but rather a congressionally created benefit”). The Second Circuit has held that a district court’s “constitutional obligation” may be implicated by a litigant who repeatedly files frivolous or vexatious claims. See In re Martin–Trigona, 737 F.2d 1254, 1261 (2d Cir. 1984) (“Federal

delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.” U.S. Const., amend. XXI, § 2. courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs their ability to carry out Article III functions.”). At

the same time, it is “[t]he unequivocal rule in this Circuit . . . that the district court may not impose a filing injunction on a litigant sua sponte without providing the litigant with notice and an opportunity to be heard.” Iwachiw v. N.Y. State Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 396 F.3d 525, 529 (2d Cir. 2005). Trisvan is a frequent litigant in this District.4 The Court takes the opportunity here to warn him that if he persists in filing frivolous or vexatious actions, the Court may enter an order barring the filing of any future in forma pauperis complaint without prior leave of the Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1651; see, e.g., In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d at 227-29; Iwachiw, 396 F.3d at 529; Lau v. Meddaugh, 229 F.3d 121

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
In Re Sindram
498 U.S. 177 (Supreme Court, 1991)
Granholm v. Heald
544 U.S. 460 (Supreme Court, 2005)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.
621 F.3d 111 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Gilbert Lau v. Mark M. Meddaugh
229 F.3d 121 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Grullon v. City of New Haven
720 F.3d 133 (Second Circuit, 2013)
In Re Anderson
511 U.S. 364 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Cornejo v. Bell
592 F.3d 121 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Polanco v. Hopkins
510 F.3d 152 (Second Circuit, 2007)
Ceara v. Deacon
916 F.3d 208 (Second Circuit, 2019)

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Trisvan v. Mayor of New York Eric Adams, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trisvan-v-mayor-of-new-york-eric-adams-nyed-2024.