Trinsey v. Mitchell

851 F. Supp. 167, 1994 WL 159862

• Court: District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
• Decided: March 28, 1994
• Docket: Civ. A. 94-0976
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM

CAHN, Chief Judge.

This case involves the constitutionality of Pennsylvania’s ballot access laws for senato­rial and gubernatorial candidates of major political parties, as well as peripheral chal­lenges to other aspects of the election scheme. Plaintiff Jack Trinsey (“Trinsey”), appearing pro se, 1 challenges the constitu­tionality of certain signature requirements of the Pennsylvania Election Code (“Election Code”). Additionally, Trinsey asks this court for an order rescheduling Pennsylvania’s pri­mary election for a later date, and for a monetary judgment against the Republican State Committee of Pennsylvania (“RSC”). Jurisdiction in this matter exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Before the court is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint. For the rea­sons discussed below, the court will grant defendants’ motion to dismiss.

1. Legal Standard

The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) mo­tion is to test the legal sufficiency of a com­plaint. Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1111 (3d Cir.1987). A complaint may not be dis­missed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be grant­ed unless “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which could entitle him to relief.” Perry v. Grant, 775 F.Supp. 821, 824 (M.D.Pa.1991) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(6), the court must “accept as true all the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Rocks v. Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir.1989). Dismissal is not appropriate un­less it clearly appears that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Robb v. Philadel­phia, 733 F.2d 286, 290 (3d Cir.1984).

II.Background

On February 14, 1994, Trinsey, a self-­described “rank and file member of the Re­publican Party” (Compl. at 3, ¶7a), who is “relentlessly litigating for more fair and equi­table voter rights not only in this Honorable Court but in every State in the Union” (Compl. at 3, ¶ 7b), filed a three-count com­plaint seeking the following relief:

(1) a declaratory judgment that sections of the Election Code, which require that per­sons seeking the nomination of a major political party file a nomination petition bearing a requisite number of signatures in an allotted time frame, pose an unconsti­tutional burden on candidates. See 25 P.S. §§ 2868, 2872.1 and 2873.

(2) an order rescheduling the primary election.

(3) a monetary judgment against the Re­publican State Committee of Pennsylvania “in an amount equal to [Trinsey’s] fair share of 1994 Republican Primary Cam­paign Funds.” (Compl. at 8, ¶ 15).

Each argument will be dealt with seriatim. 2

III.Discussion

A. Constitutionality of Election Code Provisions

Trinsey challenges the constitutionality of that portion of the Election Code which re­quires a prospective senatorial or gubernato­rial candidate to obtain two thousand signa­tures of registered and enrolled members of the proper party within a total of 22 days. 3 Trinsey claims that the requirement that he gather 2,000 signatures within the short time period allotted violates his constitutional rights. 4

Trinsey’s argument is meritless. It is beyond dispute that states may impose rea­sonable restrictions to limit access to the ballot. Perry, 775 F.Supp. at 825. The Su­preme Court has consistently held that states have an “undoubted right to require candi­dates to make a preliminary showing of sub­ stantial support in order to qualify for a place on the ballot....” Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 194, 107 S.Ct. 533, 537, 93 L.Ed.2d 499 (1986) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-­789 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1569-1570 n. 9, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)). See also American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 783, 94 S.Ct. 1296, 1307, 39 L.Ed.2d 744 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). As the Court said in Anderson, supra:

We have recognized that, “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial regula­tion of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.” To achieve these necessary objectives, States have enacted compre­hensive and sometimes complex election codes_ [T]he State’s important regula­tory interests are generally sufficient to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory re­strictions.

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788, 103 S.Ct. at 1569-­1570 (citation omitted).

The signature requirements chal­lenged by Trinsey in this case do not pose an unreasonable burden on candidates of major political parties. 5 As Judge Shapiro said in Consumer Party, supra, in passing reference to the statute at issue here: “With regard to the major parties, the [signature] require­ment [of § 2872.1] imposes a de minimus burden.” Consumer Party, 633 F.Supp. at 888. In fact, signature requirements more burdensome than those at issue here have withstood constitutional scrutiny. See, e.g., Storer, 415 U.S. at 740, 94 S.Ct. at 1284 (noting that gathering 325,000 signatures in 24 days not per se unconstitutional); Valenti v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288, 299-300 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that eight to nine day period to collect 1,000 signatures not per se unconstitu­tional); Perry, 775 F.Supp. at 826-27 (up­holding as constitutional requirement to col­lect 41,305 signatures within 149 days); Black v. Cook County Officers Electoral Bd., 750 F.Supp. 901, 908 (N.D.Ill.1990) (granting defendants’ motion to dismiss and holding that requirement to gather 25,000 signatures not unconstitutional); Williams v. Tucker, 382 F.Supp. 381, 386 (M.D.Pa.1974) (holding requirement to gather 2,452 signatures with­in 21 days constitutional). In light of the above precedent, this court finds Trinsey’s suggestion that collecting 2,000 signatures within 22 days violates the Constitution is quite simply without merit. 6

B. Changing the Primary Date

Trinsey sets forth no basis for why this court should change the date of Pennsyl­vania’s primary election. Rather, Trinsey simply states: “The 1994 Spring Primary must be moved to September 13, 1994.” (Compl. at 8, ¶ 13) This suggestion is pat­ently frivolous. Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution provides that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof_” Pennsylvania has designated by statute that “[t]here shall be a General primary preceding each general election which shall be held on the- third Tuesday of May in all even-numbered years_” 25 P.S. § 2753. As the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted, “[t]he state’s interest in a timely and orderly election is strong” as is “[t]he strong state interest in holding its primary as sched­uled ” Valenti 962 F.2d at 301. This court finds no basis whatsoever to reschedule Pennsylvania’s primary.

C. Right to Funds from, Republican State Committee

Trinsey’s final allegation fares no better than his others. Trinsey suggests that as a “rank and file” member of the Republican Party who is attempting to be elected, he is entitled to “an equal right, fair share of the GOP funds available for the 1994 Republican primary.” (Compl. at • 8, ¶ 15) There is no constitutional basis or other theo­ry to support this argument. The RSC has a First Amendment right to support whichever candidate it chooses in the primary. See generally Eu v. San Francisco Democratic Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 224, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 1020, 103 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989) (holding that political organizations have the right to sup­port candidate of their choice).

IV. Conclusion

The court recognizes Trinsey’s continuing efforts in the election and voter rights arena. However, as the Supreme Court has continu­ally recognized, states have an interest in “preserving the integrity of the electoral pro­cess and in regulating the, number of candi­dates on the ballot_” Munro, 479 U.S. at 194, 107 S.Ct. at 537. Based on the forego­ing analysis, Trinsey’s complaint will be dis­missed. An appropriate order follows.

ORDER

.AND NOW, this 17th day of March, 1994, upon consideration of defendants’ motion to dismiss, and plaintiff’s response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that the defendants’ mo­ tion is GRANTED. The within case is here­by dismissed and the clerk of courts is or­dered to close the case for statistical pur­poses.

AND NOW, this 28 day of March, 1994, upon consideration of plaintiffs motions, it is hereby ORDERED that the following mo­tions are DENIED 1 :

(1) Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.

(2) Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Order.

(3) Plaintiffs Motion to Add Twenty-Sev­en Persons as Additional Defendants.

1 . Given the pro se posture of this case, this court has construed plaintiff's allegations liberally. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct 594, 595, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); Becker v. CIR, 751 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir.1984).

2 . Trinsey had alleged that preliminary injunctive relief was appropriate in this case, however, this court denied his request in an opinion issued February 28, 1994. Trinsey then requested re­consideration of the denial of injunctive relief; this court denied his request by Order dated March 10, 1994.

3 . The signature requirements for the United States Senate differ slightly from the require­ments for Governor. Section 2872.1 of the Elec­tion Code provides in relevant part:

Candidates for nomination of offices as listed below shall present a nominating petition con­taining at least as many valid signatures of regis­tered and enrolled members of the proper party as listed below:

(2) United States Senate: Two thousand.

(3) Governor: Two thousand including at least one hundred from each of at least ten counties.

25 P.S. § 2872.1 (Supp.1993).

The time period for circulating nomination pe­titions is set forth in 25 P.S. § 2868, which provides in relevant part: “No nomination peti­tion shall be circulated prior to the thirteenth Tuesday before the primary, and no signature shall be counted unless it bears a date affixed not earlier than the thirteenth Tuesday nor later than the tenth Tuesday prior to the primary.”

4 .The Complaint reads in relevant part:

[Pennsylvania's Election Scheme fail(s) to meet Constitutional muster for rank and file members of the Republican Party, who, as prospective candidates for the Office of Gover­nor and/or United States Senator, as Trinsey is, find that the terms of compliance of subject election scheme are impossible to achieve be­cause of the time restraints....

Complaint at 3.

The requirement to obtain 100 signatures in 10 counties for Gubernatorial prospective candi­dates is an impossible requirement and must be struck down....

Complaint at 5.

5 . In judging a ballot access law, the Supreme Court has made clear that such laws cannot be subjected to "any litmus-paper test that will sep­arate valid from invalid restrictions.” Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730, 94 S.Ct. 1274, 1279, 39 L.Ed.2d 714 (1974). Rather, the Court articu­lated in Anderson, supra, an approach for courts to follow:

[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend­ments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forth by the state as justifications for the burden imposed by the rule.

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. at 1570.

However, in evaluating a state's interest, it is clear that the State "need not make a particular­ized showing of the existence of voter confusion, ballot overcrowding or the presence of frivolous candidacies prior to the imposition of reasonable restrictions on ballot access." Munro, 479 U.S. at 194-95, 107 S.Ct. at 537. For purposes of this case, the court takes judicial notice that Pennsyl­vania’s ballot restrictions were passed in the interest of avoiding ballot clutter and confusion. Consumer Party v. Davis, 633 F.Supp. 877, 884 (E.D.Pa.1986) (citing Legislative Journal—House (Sept. 26, 1984 at pp. 2015-17)).

6 . In his complaint, Trinsey also suggested that the requirement that he obtain one hundred sig­natures from each of ten counties in order to run for Governor constituted an unconstitutional burden. (Compl. at 5, ¶ 7i) In the opinion deny­ing preliminary injunctive relief, this court point­ed out that an argument could be made that the county-distribution requirement is unconstitu­tional due to the dilutive impact such a scheme has on the signatures of voters who reside in more heavily populated counties. See Memoran­dum at 4, n. 4 (Feb. 28, 1994). It should be noted that the court brought the argument to Trinsey’s attention due to the pro se posture of the case and the court's familiarity with this issue. See generally Elliot v. Shapp, Civil Action No. 76-1277 (E.D.Pa. Mar. 9, 1979) (Cahn. J.) (holding 25 P.S. § 2872(a) of the election code unconstitutional as applied because of the county signature requirement at issue).

Defendants correctly point out, however, that in contrast to the case of Elliot v. Shapp, where the candidate had satisfied the overall signature requirements but not the county distributive re­quirement, Trinsey has not satisfied the overall signature requirement and thus would not be entitled to a place on the primary ballot as a Republican candidate for the Office of Governor even if the county distribution requirement did not pass constitutional muster. In Trinsey’s case, his nomination petition was not rejected because of a failure to comply with the county signature requirement but rather because he col­lected only a single signature when 2,000 signa­tures are required.

in order for a plaintiff to have standing as required under Article III, he must show that he "personally has suffered some actual or threat­ened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.” Rosetti v. Shalala, 12 F.3d 1216, 1224 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting Glad­stone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99, 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1607, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). Because Trinsey's nomination petition was rejected solely on the basis of his failure to comply with the 2,000 signature requirement, he is unable to demonstrate that he has suffered an injury "likely to be redressed by a favorable decision” with respect to the county distribution requirements. See Davis v. Thornburgh, 903 F.2d 212, 220 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 970, 111 S.Ct. 436, 112 L.Ed.2d 420 (1990). In short, Trinsey has “nothing to gain” by establish­ing that the county distribution requirement is constitutionally infirm. Id. Accordingly, Trin-­sey lacks standing to attack the county distribu­tion requirement. See generally LaRouche v. Monson, 599 F.Supp. 621, 624 (D.Utah 1984) (holding that plaintiff did not have standing to challenge constitutionality of early filing deadline where reason for denial of nomination petition was failure to comply with requirement that sig­natures be verified rather than failure to comply with filing deadline). But see Vote Choice, Inc. v. Di Stefano, 814 F.Supp. 195, 204 (D.R.I.1993) (citing cases which suggest standing require­ments are construed broadly in election context).

1 . On March 17, 1994, after a careful examination of the merits, this court issued an opinion dis­missing plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's latest motions are similarly without merit and are ac­cordingly denied.

Additionally, it has come to the court's atten­tion that this case was also litigated in the Com­monwealth Court of Pennsylvania. That court, the Honorable David W. Craig presiding, held a hearing in the case and then issued an opinion on March 16, 1994, dismissing all of plaintiff's claims. That decision is currently on appeal. Because Trinsey is barred by the prior adjudica­tion on the merits, this provides the court with an alternative basis for denying plaintiff’s mo­tions.