Trimble v. State

191 S.E.2d 857, 229 Ga. 399, 1972 Ga. LEXIS 624

• Court: Supreme Court of Georgia
• Decided: September 7, 1972
• Docket: 27259
• Status: Published

Opinions

Undercofler, Justice.

Larry Trimble was convicted of the offense of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appeals. Held:

The trial court gave the following charge on alibi: "Lady and gentlemen, alibi as a defense involves the impossibility of the presence of the accused at the scene of the offense at the time of its commission and the range of the evidence in respect to time and place must be such as reasonably precludes the possibility of the presence of the accused at the time and place of the offense. If you believe that a crime was committed as charged in this indictment but you do not believe that this defendant was present at the time and place of such offense, you should acquit him upon that ground. Alibi as a defense should be established to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury and not beyond a reasonable doubt. When testimony on the subject of alibi is offered on the trial of a case it is the duty of the jury to take that testimony along with all the other evidence in the case in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant and if considering that testimony along with all the other evidence in the case the jury should entertain a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant it is their duty to give him the benefit of that doubt and acquit. The law being that before you can convict you must believe the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defense of alibi should prevent you from believing the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt then and in such an event you should acquit him of the offense charged.”

Submitted July 11, 1972 Decided September 7, 1972. Glenn Zell, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carter Goode, Joel M. Feldman, Morris H. Rosenberg, Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Harold N. Hill, Jr., Executive Assistant Attorney General, Courtney Wilder Stanton, Richard S. Gault, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.

The appellant contends that the emphasized portion of this charge shifts the burden of proof from the State to the defendant and relieves the State of proving the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt which is in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

The contentions of the appellant are without merit for the reasons stated in Young v. State, 225 Ga. 255 (167 SE2d 586); Chaffin v. State, 225 Ga. 602 (170 SE2d 426) and Thornton v. State, 226 Ga. 837 (178 SE2d 193).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Hawes, Gunter and Jordan, JJ., who dissent.