Larry Trimble v. Leroy Stynchcombe, Sheriff

Fifth Circuit

Larry Trimble v. Leroy Stynchcombe, Sheriff

481 F.2d 1175, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8537

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

DecidedJuly 31, 1973

Docket73-1753

StatusPublished

Cited by10 cases

This text of 481 F.2d 1175 (Larry Trimble v. Leroy Stynchcombe, Sheriff) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Larry Trimble v. Leroy Stynchcombe, Sheriff, 481 F.2d 1175, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8537 (5th Cir. 1973).

Pincite

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Trimble was convicted of rape in the Georgia State Court. Having exhausted his state remedies by appealing his conviction to the Georgia Supreme Court, Trimble v. State, 1972, 229 Ga. 399, 191 S.E.2d 857, he filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the district court, alleging that his conviction and sentence was unconstitutionally invalid because the trial judge placed the burden of proving alibi on Trimble when instructing the jury. The district court, while acknowledging that the instruction was error, nevertheless held that it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse.

We agree with the district court that the instructions given in Bassett v. Smith, 5 Cir.1972, 464 F.2d 347, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 1509, 36 L.Ed.2d 190 (1973) and in Smith v. Smith, 5 Cir.1971, 454 F.2d 572, cert. denied, 1972, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S.Ct. 99, 34 L.Ed.2d 141, were the same as the instruction given in this case and that it erroneously shifted the burden of proof to the accused in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

We disagree, however, with the district court’s view that the instruction given was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The harmless error principle is inapplicable where, as here, the alibi instruction is wholly inconsistent with the reasonable doubt instruction. Perez v. United States, 5 Cir.1961, 297 F.2d 12. Furthermore, “The argument for ‘harmless error’ is somewhat difficult to digest where the denial of the right undermines a defendant’s only claim to innocence. But perhaps more important, ‘harmless error’ should not be a determinant when a defendant has been forced to choose between two valuable constitutional rights, or has been denied the equal protection of the law.” Stump v. Bennett, 8 Cir.1968, 398 F.2d 111, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001, 89 S.Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 466.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to grant the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, unless the State of Georgia shall, within ninety days, retry Trimble.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

PER CURIAM.

Trimble was convicted of rape in the Georgia State Court. Having exhausted his state remedies by appealing his conviction to the Georgia Supreme Court, Trimble v. State, 1972, 229 Ga. 399, 191 S.E.2d 857, he filed a petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus in the district court, alleging that his conviction and sentence was unconstitutionally invalid because the trial judge placed the burden of proving alibi on Trimble when instructing the jury. The district court, while acknowledging that the instruction was error, nevertheless held that it was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. We reverse.

We agree with the district court that the instructions given in Bassett v. Smith, 5 Cir.1972, 464 F.2d 347, cert. denied, 410 U.S. 991, 93 S.Ct. 1509, 36 L.Ed.2d 190 (1973) and in Smith v. Smith, 5 Cir.1971, 454 F.2d 572, cert. denied, 1972, 409 U.S. 885, 93 S.Ct. 99, 34 L.Ed.2d 141, were the same as the instruction given in this case and that it erroneously shifted the burden of proof to the accused in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.

We disagree, however, with the district court’s view that the instruction given was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. The harmless error principle is inapplicable where, as here, the alibi instruction is wholly inconsistent with the reasonable doubt instruction. Perez v. United States, 5 Cir.1961, 297 F.2d 12. Furthermore, “The argument for ‘harmless error’ is somewhat difficult to digest where the denial of the right undermines a defendant’s only claim to innocence. But perhaps more important, ‘harmless error’ should not be a determinant when a defendant has been forced to choose between two valuable constitutional rights, or has been denied the equal protection of the law.” Stump v. Bennett, 8 Cir.1968, 398 F.2d 111, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1001, 89 S.Ct. 483, 21 L.Ed.2d 466.

The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case is remanded with directions to grant the petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, unless the State of Georgia shall, within ninety days, retry Trimble.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

481 F.2d 1175, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 8537, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/larry-trimble-v-leroy-stynchcombe-sheriff-ca5-1973.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack