LAY, Circuit Judge.
Ronald Maurice Stump, a state prisoner, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. Stump was convicted of murder in the second degree in the Polk County, Iowa, District Court in the slaying of one Michael Daly. On December 11, 1961, he was sentenced to a term of seventy-five years’ imprisonment. Stump asserted as a sole defense at his trial that it was impossible for him to have been present at the place of the crime since he was driving on the highway between Des Moines and Knoxville when the shooting took place. He offered witnesses in an attempt to verify this fact. The state trial court placed upon the defendant the burden of proving his alibi by a preponderance of the evidence. The conviction was affirmed by the Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Stump, 254 Iowa 1181, 119 N.W.2d 210 (1963) (the vote of the Iowa court was 5 to 3, with one judge not participating), cert. denied 375 U.S. 853, 84 S.Ct. 113, 11 L.Ed.2d 80 (1963).
After exhausting his state remedies,1 Stump petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, alleging among other grounds that the state trial court’s instructions placed upon the defendant the burden of proving his sole defense of alibi by the preponderance of the evidence, and that Iowa Code Ann. § 777.18 requires a defendant raising an alibi defense to give to the state timely notice of such defense, as well as the names and addresses of any corroborating witnesses, without a reciprocal exchange of the state’s witnesses relating to the same issue. Petitioner claims, as he did below, that both grounds constitute a denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment. We need not discuss the other grounds raised on this appeal. We hold that the Iowa rule shifting the burden of proof to the defendant reached the level of constitutional error and was prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment. We reverse and remand with directions.
The due process clause permits a state a wide berth in developing rules of procedure and evidence. Spencer v. State of Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). A consti[114]*114tutional violation cannot rest upon our independent judgment or personal appraisal of what seems the fairer or the better procedure. See Leland v. State of Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 799, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952). The fundamental bases of “due process” relate to adequate notice and reasonable opportunity to be heard. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 413-418, 17 S.Ct. 841, 42 L.Ed. 215 (1897). Beyond these minimal standards only oppressive and arbitrary state procedural rules command federal review. Federal intervention is justified only when the state law “offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), or frustrates a right “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,” Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937).
We thus reflect cautiously upon the rule before us. Iowa is one of only two states 2 which now require a defendant to assume the burden of persuasion by a preponderance of evidence in establishing an alibi. Six other states have permitted instructions which require a defendant to present sufficient evidence of alibi to establish in the minds of the jurors a reasonable doubt of his guilt, but these states do not at any time shift the burden of persuasion as is done under the Iowa rule.3 Analytically, these states simply shift to the defendant the burden of going forward with the evidence as to the alibi itself. All of the seven United States Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue, including this Circuit, agree that in a federal prosecution the burden of persuasion of an alibi defense may not be shifted to the defendant. United States v. Vigorito, 67 F.2d 329, 330 (2 Cir. 1933) (dictum); United States v. Marcus, 166 F.2d 497, 503-504 (3 Cir. 1948); Falgout v. United States, 279 F. 513, 515, 29 A.L.R. 1115 (5 Cir. 1922); Cangelosi v. United States, 19 F.2d 923 (6 Cir. 1927); Glover v. United States, 147 F. 426, 430-433 (8 Cir. 1906); Thomas v. United States, 213 F.2d 30, 32-34 (9 Cir. 1954); Reavis v. United States, 93 F.2d 307, 308 (10 Cir. 1937). And even the Iowa Supreme Court subsequent to the Stump case 4 expressed doubt about future applications [115]*115of the rule. State v. Post, 255 Iowa 573, 123 N.W.2d 11, 18 (1963). But neither polling other states’ positions nor comparing Iowa law with federal procedure is a conclusive ground for a finding on constitutional infirmity. Such weight of authority guides us at most to a “consideration” of whether the rule “offends” principles so fundamental as to be within constitutional protection. Iceland v. State of Oregon, 343 U.S. at 798, 72 S.Ct. 1002; cf. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). We analyze the problem in three parts:
I. Is the instruction patently erroneous ?
II. Does it violate due process ?
III. And if so, considering the instructions as a whole, is it “harmless” constitutional error beyond “a reasonable doubt”? Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
I.
The Iowa trial court instructed the jury, in part, as follows:
“ * * * before you can acquit the defendant by reason of this defense [alibi] you must find that he has established it by a preponderance or greater weight of the evidence bearing upon it.” 5 (Emphasis ours.)
There exist many bases for considering the instruction erroneous.
(a) The original premise behind placing the burden of proof upon the defendant is that “alibi” is an affirmative defense. See State v. Vincent, 24 Iowa 570 (1868); State v. Stump, supra, 119 N.W.2d at 218. This view has now been rejected by almost every state as well as by all federal courts which have had the proposition before them. See, e. g., Halko v. State, 4 Storey 180, 54 Del. 180, 175 A.2d 42, 48-49 (1961); Commonwealth v. Bonomo, 396 Pa. 222, [116]*116151 A.2d 441, 444-446 (Pa.Sup.Ct.1959) ; State v. Garvin, 44 N.J. 268, 208 A.2d 402 (1965); State v. Hubbard, 351 Mo. 143, 171 S.W.2d 701, 706-709 (1943). In asserting alibi the defendant simply denies the possibility of his having committed the crime by reason of being elsewhere when it was committed, whereas an affirmative defense generally applies. to justification for his admitted participation in the act itself. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2512 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 321 at 683 (1954); 2 Underhill, Criminal Evidence § 441 (5th ed. 1956); Note, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 590 (1964).
(b) The instruction itself is inconsistent and confusing, as is pointed out by the federal district court below. The jury is told that before it can acquit the defendant by reason of this defense the defendant must establish it by the preponderance of evidence. Yet the jury is also told that if any evidence creates a reasonable doubt as to the crime as a whole, then it can return a verdict of not guilty. This court, of course, has consistently adhered to the general rule that instructions are to be viewed in their entirety. See, for example, Smith v. Wire Rope Corp. of America, 383 F.2d 186,188 (8 Cir. 1967), and Jiffy Markets, Inc. v. Yogel, 340 F.2d 495, 500 (8 Cir. 1965). But even when so viewed, the presence of serious confusion here as to burden of proof seems inescapable. If we presume, as we must, that the jury follows the court’s instructions, which instruction is the jury to follow?
(c) Upon a plea of alibi, the presumption of innocence is permanently shattered as to the evidence relating to (1) the presence of the defendant, (2) the time, and (3) the place of the crime itself. In Glover v. United States, 147 F. at 431, this court pointed out that proof of alibi is a denial of the essential elements of the crime. This court said: “Included in the indictment is the
charge that the defendant did then and there commit the assault. Whereby the prosecution undertook to show by evidence that the defendant was present at the time and place. On this issue thus tendered the burden rested upon the prosecution. It never shifted. So when the defendant introduced evidence to show that he was not ‘then and there’ present, he was but rebutting the proof offered by the prosecution tending to maintain the allegation that he was then and there. The protection of any reasonable doubt in favor of the defendant applies in such instance as to any other affirmative issue tendered in the charge.”
(d) By shifting the burden of proof to a person who claims to have been elsewhere at the time of the crime, there is created an irrational and arbitrary presumption of guilt. It arises not by reason of a proof of fact from which a fair inference might be drawn but from the mere happening that the defendant offers testimony in an attempt to establish innocence. When this occurs, unless the defendant can succeed in overbalancing the state’s evidence, the jury is expressly told he cannot be acquitted \by reason of his sole claim to innocence. [There is thus a prejudgment of “a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition. * * * [T]his presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime. * * * [I] ncriminating presumptions are not to be improvised by the judiciary.” See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 275, 72 S.Ct. 240, 256, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952).
II.
However, as previously observed, mere error or confusion is not before us, unless we are convinced that it is so oppressive as to offend the due process clause. We resolve that question in the affirmative.
There are persuasive grounds to say that the denial of the presumption of innocence of an accused is a constitutional violation under the due process clause
[117]*117In Cummings v. State of Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 328, 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866), the Supreme Court said:
“The clauses in question subvert the presumptions of innocence, and alter the rules of evidence, which heretofore, under the universally recognized principles of the common law, have been supposed to be fundamental and unchangeable. They assume that the parties are guilty; they call upon the parties to establish their innocence; and they declare that such innocence can be shown only in one way — by an inquisition, in the form of an expur-gatory oath, into the consciences of the parties.”
The early history of the presumption of innocence is detailed in Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 39 L.Ed. 481 (1895), where the Court said:
“The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”
In Morrison v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 82, 54. S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934), the Court held:
“In such circumstances the conviction of Morrison because he failed to assume the burden of disproving a conspiracy was a denial of due process that vitiates the judgment as to him.” Id. at 93, 54 S.Ct. at 286. (Emphasis ours.)
In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460 (1958), the Court said:
“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending value — as a criminal defendant his liberty — this margin of error is reduced as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of producing a sufficiency of proof in the first instance, and of persuading
the factfinder at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of producing the evidence and convincing the factfinder of his guilt.” (Emphasis ours.)
And Mr. Justice Douglas, in concurring, 357 U.S. at 535, 78 S.Ct. at 1345, pointed out:
“If one conspires to overthrow the Government, he commits a crime. To make him swear he is innocent to avoid the consequences of a law is to put on him the burden of proving his innocence. That method does not square with our standards of procedural due process, as the opinion of the Court points out.” (Emphasis ours.)
In Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 471, 81 S.Ct. 1587, 6 L.Ed.2d 963 (1961), the Court said:
' “ ‘In fulfillment of their obligation under this statute, the courts must accord to the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defendants in all other criminal cases.’ [Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 208, 77 S.Ct. 1173, 1 L.Ed.2d 1273 (1957).] ‘One of the rightful boasts of Western civilization is that the [prosecution] has the burden of establishing guilt solely on the basis of evidence produced in court and under circumstances assuring an accused all the safeguards of a fair procedure.’ Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729, [81 S.Ct. 1639, 1646, 6 L.Ed.2d 751] (concurring opinion). Among these is the presumption of the defendant’s innocence. Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. [263], at 296-297, [49 S.Ct. 268, 73 L.Ed. 692]; Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. [147] at 151, [79 S.Ct. 191, 3 L. Ed.2d 183].” (Emphasis ours.)
In Glover v. United States, 147 F. 426, 431, this court said:
“The underlying vice in the foregoing charge of the court is in the assumption that in respect of the alibi the burden of proof ‘by a preponder-[118]*118anee of evidence, that is, by the greater and superior evidence,’ shifted to .the defendant. It loses sight of the fundamental rule in criminal procedure that the defendant is presumed to be innocent of the offense with which he is charged; that this is a continuing presumption which attends him like a guarding spirit throughout the ordeal of his trial, and imposes upon the prosecution the burden of overcoming such presumption by such weight of evidence as will satisfy the minds of the triers beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” (Emphasis ours.)
See also Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 485-489, 16 S.Ct. 353, 40 L.Ed. 499 (1895).
The presumption of innocence in itself is no longer considered to function as evidence. See Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253, 31 S.Ct. 2, 54 L.Ed. 1021 (1910); Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36, 51-52, 17 S.Ct. 235, 41 L.Ed. 624 (1897); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2511 at 409-12. Nor is it the precise equivalent of the burden of proof. It simply serves to regulate the complete burden of proof in a criminal trial, not only in going forward with the evidence, but more importantly in placing the burden of persuasion itself on the government.
In Leland v. State of Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), the Supreme Court upheld the shifting of the burden of persuasion of a plea of insanity under Oregon law. And the majority opinion points out that although the federal courts do not condone shifting the burden of persuasion with regard to insanity, nevertheless such a procedural rule does not involve any constitutional right; thus Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 16 S.Ct. 353 (1895) was held not to be controlling. Whether or not one interprets the treatment of Davis in Leland as denying a constitutional status to the “presumption of innocence,” this much is clear: when the burden of persuasion is shifted to the defendant to disprove essential elements of a crime, as it was in the instant case, then it is certain that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated. McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. 79, 86, 36 S.Ct. 498, 60 L.Ed. 899 (1916); Manley v. State of Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 6, 49 S.Ct. 215, 73 L.Ed. 575 (1929); Morrison v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. 82, 54 S.Ct. 281, 78 L.Ed. 664 (1934); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-275, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952); Speiser v. Randall, 257 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332 (1958); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. at 471, 81 S.Ct. 1587; United States v. Romano, 382 U.S. 136, 86 S.Ct. 279, 15 L.Ed.2d 210 (1965) ; Communist Party of United States v. United States, 118 U.S.App.D.C. 61, 331 F.2d 807, 815 (1964); Shaw v. United States, 357 F.2d 949, 960, 174 Ct.Cl. 899(1966).
In McFarland v. American Sugar Refining Co., 241 U.S. at 86, 36 S.Ct. at 501, the Supreme Court said:
“ * * * [0]f course the legislature may go a good way in * * * changing the burden of proof, but there are limits. * * * * [I] t is not within the province of a legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a crime.”
As Mr. Justice Cardozo concluded in Morrison v. People of State of Calif., 291 U.S. at 96, 54 S.Ct. at 287:
“There can be no escape from hardship and injustice, outweighing many times any procedural convenience, unless the burden of persuasion * * * [as to an element of crime] * * * is cast upon the People. “What has been written applies only to those provisions of the statute that prescribe the rule for criminad causes.” (Emphasis ours.)
See also 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2511 at 407; McCormick, Evidence § 313 at 661.
In the instant case, before the defendant assumed the burden of proof, the state produced an eye-witness who iden[119]*119tified Stump as the assailant at the time and place of the murder. It is true, this is not a case where evidential gaps were filled by use of presumption. Cf. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943). The vital prejudice here is that the instruction compels the jury to belive the state’s evidence6 relating to the defendant’s presence at the scene of the crime, unless the defendant is able to overcome its effect by preponderating proof. Thus, as Justice Adams early noted in dissent against the rule in State v. Hamilton, 57 Iowa 596, 11 N.W. 5, 6 (1881), the “true doctrine under such rule would seem to be that the evidence of guilt is aided by a presumption of guilt, if the evidence of innocence relied upon is the evidence of an alibi.” The presumptive jump here is at least as dangerous 7 as if it were made from an unrelated fact. In this case, it is created from no facts at all. Here the arbitrary, irrational presumption of guilt persists simply because a man may try to prove his only defense available, to-wit, non-presence.
“Each of the state enactments raises a presumption from the fact of injury caused by the running of locomotives or cars. The Mississippi statute created merely a temporary inference of fact that vanished upon the introduction of opposing evidence. Gulf, M. & N.R. Co. v. Brown, 138 Miss. 39, 66, [102 So. 855] et seq.; Columbus & G. Ry. Co. v. Fondren, 145 Miss. 679, [110 So. 365]. That of Georgia as construed in this case creates an inference that is given effect of evidence to be weighed against opposing testimony and is to prevail unless such testimony is found by the jury to preponderate.
It is clear that in Leland v. State of Oregon, supra, Mr. Justice Clark takes extreme care to point out (1) that the burden of persuasion as to the elements of the crime never shifts under Oregon law upon the plea of insanity, 343 U.S. at 795, 799, 800, 72 S.Ct. 1002, (2) that the state still has to prove all elements of the crime itself beyond a reasonable doubt, id. at 799, 72 S.Ct. 1002; (3) that the jury could acquit Leland if they found him mentally incapable of the requisite intent to sustain a first or second degree murder conviction, even though the proof fell short of legal insanity, id. at 794, 72 S.Ct. 1002; and (4) that the placing of the burden can be explained by the presumption of sanity recognized in all English courts, id. at 799, 72 S.Ct. 1002.
The defense of alibi is readily distinguishable from the plea of insanity. Basically, alibi relates to the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime.8 Proof of the defendant’s presence and participation is a wholly indispensable factor to the government’s case; [120]*120it is a sine qua non to sustain a verdict of guilty. In reality the Iowa instruction shifts the burden of persuasion on an essential element of the crime and thus requires the defendant to assume the onus of proving a negative averment, i. e., non-presence. In contrast to an insanity plea, Stump’s defense did not admit the act in any way, or any element of the crime, but rather denied any knowledge of it. Nor is the shift here based upon any conflicting legal presumption involved, as in insanity.
[119]*119“The presumption raised by § 2780 is unreasonable and arbitrary and violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
“Although the defendant did testify that he was not present at the time and place the holdup was committed, and stated that he was in a tavern some four blocks away at the time, we are not prepared to say that when the defendant testifies in his own defense and claims he was some other place at the time of the crime, an instruction on alibi is required or is proper. The burden of establishing defendant’s guilt of the offense charged, of course, does not shift, and we made that clear in the Stump case.
“It is well established in this State that in the absence of the alibi notice required by section 777.18, Code of Iowa, 1962, I.C.A., the defendant may take the stand and claim he was far from the- scene of the crime, and only the credibility of his testimony is left to the jury, with the burden to prove he was at the scene of the crime still resting on the State. State v. Stump, [120]*120supra. We also pointed out in the Stump case that it is only when defendant elects to go farther and call witnesses to support his alibi contention that he assumes a burden, i.e. to establish his affirmative allegation or defense.” (Emphasis ours.)
It is also plain that the state cannot justify shifting the burden of persuasion on the basis of the standards set out in Morrison v. People of State of California, 291 U.S. at 88-93, 54 S.Ct. 281, for here the shift does subject the defendant to undue and arbitrary “hardship” and “oppression.” There is no “excuse” or “explanation,” nor any “balancing of convenience” nor “a greater opportunity for knowledge” on the defendant’s part. In fact, under the Iowa statute, Iowa Code Ann. § 777.18,9 the defendant must give the names of all his witnesses as to the alibi issue to the state but the state has no reciprocal duty. Under such a rule, it is not easy to perceive how the defendant has the balance of knowledge.
Beyond violating petitioner’s' right to have the state assume the burden to prove (beyond a reasonable doubt) his presence at the crime, we think the Iowa instruction and its judicial application is patently offensive in other ways to the defendant’s basic constitutional rights. Under the Iowa rule, a defendant pleading alibi faces an anomalous situation. If he does not plead and offer witnesses to corroborate the defense of alibi, the burden of proof never shifts to him and he may rely upon the state’s failure to establish his identity and presence beyond a reasonable doubt. This, of course, is often done by attacking the credibility of the state’s witnesses, especially by challenging their capacity to have made proper observation. Or if the defendant chooses to rely solely on his own persuasive powers and testify, under the Iowa rule he can still assert an alibi defense without any jeopardy to his basic rights. It is only when the defendant seeks to produce witnesses to corroborate his non-presence that the Iowa rule incongruously penalizes him with the burden of persuasion as to his non-presence. See State v. Stump, 119 N.W.2d at 218 and the more complete explanation of this strange rule in State v. Post, supra note 8, 123 N.W.2d at 18-19. Thus an innocent person, whose only refuge of innocence may be proof of his non-presence and non-participation in the crime itself, must risk this greater burden because he tries to bring witnesses forward to substantiate his story.10 He must choose between the exercise of two constitutionally guaranteed rights. He must surrender either the right to offer corroborative evidence of his innocence or else his traditional right to have the state assume the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Iowa rule he cannot have both. Such a procedure can have no other purpose than to “chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who choose to exercise them * * * ” This is an impermissible burden. Cf. United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138 (1968); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. [121]*121967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968). Thus, a defendant must carefully consider the risk inherent in offering evidence of his full defense. Any deterrent to the right to be heard in full and to offer evidence in defense of life or liberty violates the oldest and deepest-rooted foundation of due process. The Supreme Court in Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932), characterized the right to be heard as an axiomatic essential of due process.
“It never has been doubted by this court, or any other so far as we know, that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforceable judgment, and that they, together with a • legally competent tribunal having jurisdiction of the case, constitute basic elements of the constitutional requirement of due process of law. The words of Webster, so often quoted, that by ‘the law of the land’ is intended ‘a law which hears before it condemns,’ have been repeated in varying forms of expression in a multitude of decisions. In Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 389, [18 S.Ct. 383, 42 L.Ed. 780], the necessity of due notice and an opportunity of being heard is described as among the ‘immutable principles of justice which 'inhere in the very idea of free government which no member of the Union may disregard.’ And Mr. Justice Field, in an earlier case, Galpin v. Page, 18 Wall. 350, 368-369, [21 L.Ed. 959], said that the rule that no one shall be personally bound until he has had his day in court was as old as the law, and it meant that he must be cited to appear and afforded an opportunity to be heard.”
See also Holt v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 381 U.S. 131, 136, 85 S.Ct. 1375, 14 L.Ed.2d 290 (1965).
The Iowa rule offers different procedural protection to those individuals pleading alibi who (1) are unable to produce witnesses to verify their defense
or (2) perhaps may be more willing to forego the production of witnesses to avoid incurring the burden of persuasion as to their innocence. To shift the burden because a particular defendant offering the identical defense happens to be able to present corroborating witnesses, is basically so unreasonable we deem it a patent denial of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. There can be no logical rationale behind such an arbitrary distinction. Although on its face the rule may be deemed one of evidence in which a state’s procedure is to be given great deference (cf. Salsburg v. State of Maryland, 346 U.S. 545, 74 S.Ct. 280, 98 L.Ed. 281 (1954)), nevertheless the denial of rights justified only as a penalty assessed to a defendant calling witnesses to testify on his behalf cannot be deemed a reasonable justification for the rule.11 The principle of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-374, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886), is still viable:
“Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discrimina-tions between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.”
III.
Last of all, given the constitutional infirmity, we must consider whether it was “harmless” under the circumstances. See Chapman v. State of California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967); Anderson v. Nelson, 390 U.S. 523, 88 S.Ct. 1133, 20 L.Ed.2d 81 (1968).
This issue must be resolved in the context of the state's contention that the complete instructions did not remove the state’s burden to prove the crime, and the elements thereof, beyond a reasonable doubt. It is in effect contended that if any inconsistency or error in shifting [122]*122the burden of proof as to alibi occurred, it was cured by instructing the jury that the state must still prove defendant’s guilt as to the “case as a whole” beyond a reasonable doubt.
The difficulty with this approach is that it denies all meaning to the first and second paragraphs of the instructions (see note 5, supra) which emphasize that to acquit the defendant on the defense of alibi he must prove it by the preponderance of the evidence. What purpose has the instruction on alibi if the court’s intent was to retract it or change its meaning in the next breath? Could not reasonable minds infer, particularly from the last paragraph of the instruction, that defendant still has the burden of showing non-presence, even though the burden remains with the state to prove “the crime as a whole"? Would not a jury feel the instruction on alibi is intended to mean what it says? Again, constitutional error must appear to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt before we can disregard it. Chapman v. State of California, supra. If inconsistent meanings are conveyed by the instruction, whereby a jury could derive an erroneous understanding of the burden, it is difficult to reason that a reasonable doubt does not exist as to the prejudice involved. We faced the identical question in Glover v. United States, 147 F. at 433, and held that such a curative charge did not remove the error.
In Perez v. United States, 297 F.2d 12, 16 (5 Cir. 1961), the court said:
“It is also fundamental to our jurisprudence that instructions to the jury must be consistent with each other, and not misleading to the jurors. Smith v. United States, 230 F.2d 935 (6th Cir. 1956). The fact that one instruction is correct does not cure the error in giving another that is inconsistent with it. Smith v. United States, supra. Most important, in no condition of proof is it permissible to leave with the jury the idea that it had become the duty of the defendant to establish his innocence to obtain an acquittal. See e. g., Ezzard v. United States, 7 F.2d 808 (8th Cir. 1925).”
See also Mann v. United States, 319 F.2d 404, 410 (5 Cir. 1963). Where there are “probabilities of confusion” to law-years as well as to laymen, we cannot ignore the prejudice. See Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 637, 66 S.Ct. 1172, 90 L.Ed. 1485 (1946). See also Blocker v. United States, 110 U.S.App.D.C. 41, 288 F.2d 853, 856 (1961). The argument for “harmless error” is somewhat difficult to digest where the denial of the right undermines a defendant’s only claim to innocence. But perhaps more important, “harmless error” should not be a determinant when a defendant has been forced to choose between two valuable constitutional rights, or has been denied the equal protection of the laws.
In summary, the Iowa instruction in its procedural application was arbitrary and oppressive to the defendant’s basic constitutional rights. It penalized the defendant for offering witnesses in his defense, denied him the equal protection of the laws, deprived him of the presumption of innocence and shifted to him the burden of persuasion to negative an indispensable element of the crime, to-wit, his presence and participation at the time and place involved.
That an oppressive shifting of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant violates due process is not a new doctrine within constitutional law. Under these circumstances we are not directly faced with issues of retroactivity. We recognize that a panel of this court, in Johnson v. Bennett, 386 F.2d 677, 682-683 (8 Cir. 1967), cert. granted 390 U.S. 1002, 88 S.Ct. 1247, 20 L.Ed.2d 102 (1968), also a habeas corpus proceeding by an Iowa state prisoner, refused relief as to a number of matters, including the alibi instruction. The Johnson case concededly has some factual distinctions from the present one. Also significant is the fact that in the Stump case, unlike Johnson, counsel has carefully preserved by objections throughout the trial and ap[123]*123pellate procedures his argument as to the unconstitutionality of the instruction.
In the present case the burden of proof, along with unilateral duty to disclose witnesses, is placed on the defendant on the only live issue of fact in the case. There was no issue on the fact of homicide, the means of homicide or the cause of death. Here the only live issue was the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime. ,
Subsidiary issues of deliberation and intent relate to the degree of the unjustifiable homicide. However, here the petitioner pleaded complete ignorance or lack of knowledge, and therefore even these issues depended in a significant degree solely on his establishing his alibi. The cumulative effect in this case was to deny due process by affecting the integrity of the fact finding process leading to the conviction. “In all kinds of litigation it is plain that where the burden of proof lies may be decisive of the outcome.” Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. at 525, 78 S.Ct. at 1342.
The State of Iowa is entitled to a reasonable time to retry this defendant for the crime charged. He must still face the alleged truth of the charge. If proven guilty, he will not go free. However, every person is entitled to the full protection of due process and the equal protection of the laws fundamental to a fair trial. This is singularly true when life or liberty of any individual be involved. A state cannot withhold these rights from some defendants and grant them to others similarly situated. Nor can this court deny these rights even if we felt the evidence conclusively demonstrated guilt. It is not for us to assess the evidence but only to safeguard constitutional guarantees.
Pending a retrial by the state, the district court is instructed to stay further proceedings. Upon retrial, the present petition of Stump for release on habeas corpus should be dismissed. If retrial is not granted within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year from the date of the mandate of this court, or in the event certiorari to the Supreme Court is applied for by the state, not to exceed one year from the mandate of the Supreme Court, the district court is directed to grant Stump’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The judgment appealed from is reversed and the ease remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.