Tri-State Concrete Co., Inc. v. Stephens
This text of 395 So. 2d 894 (Tri-State Concrete Co., Inc. v. Stephens) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
TRI-STATE CONCRETE CO., INC., Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Ethel Reed STEPHENS, Defendant-Appellant.
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit.
*895 Samuel T. Singer, Winnsboro, for defendant-appellant.
Kitchens, Benton, Kitchens & Pearce by John B. Benton, Jr., Minden, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before HALL, MARVIN and JASPER E. JONES, JJ.
En Banc. Rehearing Denied March 27, 1981.
*896 HALL, Judge.
Tri-State Concrete Company, Inc., as the owner of undivided interests in two tracts of land, filed suit against Ethel Reed Stephens, the owner of the remaining undivided interests in the two tracts, seeking a partition by licitation. One tract located in Webster Parish contains 360 acres and is owned 5/6 by plaintiff and 1/6 by defendant. The other tract located in Bienville Parish contains 40 acres and is owned 4/5 by plaintiff and 1/5 by defendant. Defendant answered, contending the property should be divided in kind. After trial the district court ruled that the properties could not be divided in kind without diminution in value or loss or inconvenience to the owners and ordered the properties sold at public sales to effect the partition. Defendant appealed.
On appeal defendant contends primarily that plaintiff did not bear its burden of proving that the properties could not be conveniently divided or that a partition in kind would result in loss or inconvenience to the owners, that the evidence supported a partition in kind of both tracts, and that the trial court failed to give appropriate consideration to the unequal bidding power of the respective parties.
Applicable Law
No one can be compelled to hold property with another; any owner of an undivided interest has a right to demand the division of the property held in common by the action of partition. LSA-C.C. Arts. 1289 and 1308. The court shall order the partition to be made in kind unless it is proved that the property is indivisible by its nature or that a diminution of its value or loss or inconvenience of one of the owners would be the consequence of dividing it in kind. LSA-C.C. Arts. 1337, 1339, and 1340; LSA-C.C.P. Art. 4606. The burden of proof is on the party seeking partition by judicial sale to prove that the property cannot be divided in kind. National American Bank of New Orleans v. Cleveland, 273 So.2d 848 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ refused 276 So.2d 701 (La.1973).
To effect a partition in kind the property must be divided into lots, which lots are afterward drawn for by the parties. LSA-C.C. Arts. 1364 and 1367. A certain part or parts of the property cannot be set apart or allocated to any one of the co-owners. The lots are set apart to the different co-owners by chance, by drawing for them. There must be as many lots as there are shares or roots involved. Raceland Bank & Trust Co. v. Toups, 173 La. 742, 138 So. 652 (1931); Pryor v. Desha, 204 La. 575, 15 So.2d 891 (1943); Taylor v. Bell, 155 So.2d 68 (La.App. 2d Cir. 1963).
To effect a partition in kind of the properties involved in this case, the Webster Parish property would be divided into six lots or tracts, five to be drawn by plaintiff and one to be drawn by defendant. Similarly, the Bienville Parish property would be divided into five tracts, four to be drawn by plaintiff and one by defendant.
The judge who decides on a suit for a partition and on the mode of effecting it, has a right to regulate this mode as may appear to him most convenient and most advantageous for the general interest of the owners, in conformity, nevertheless, with the other provisions of the Civil Code. LSA-C.C. Art. 1336. Except as provided in LSA-C.C.P. Art. 4606 which requires the court to order a partition in kind unless the property is indivisible in nature or cannot be conveniently divided, the court has discretion to direct the manner and conditions of effecting the partition so that it will be most advantageous and convenient to the parties. LSA-C.C.P. Art. 4605. According to the official revision comments under LSA-C.C.P. Art. 4605, this article of the Code of Civil Procedure, unlike Article 1336 of the Civil Code which subjects the discretion of the court in the mode of effecting a partition to other provisions of the Code, gives the court full and unrestricted discretion in directing the manner in which the partition is to be made.
The 360-Acre Tract
The 360-acre tract is irregularly shaped, has creeks or streams crossing it, has several *897 producing oil or gas wells on it, has numerous rights-of-way crossing it, and has road frontage only along part of the east boundary. It is partly hardwood bottom land, partly cut-over pineland and partly abandoned agricultural land. As testified to by plaintiff's well-qualified expert, it is difficult to imagine how the property could possibly be divided into six tracts of equal value. Although defendant's equally-qualified expert testified he thought it could be so divided and offered a sample plan, he conceded that extensive survey work taking into account the physical characteristics of the property would have to be done before any plan could be drawn. The sample plan submitted by the expert shows six irregular and unusual tracts, long and narrow, L-shaped, and of doubtful desirability, utility or value.
Plaintiff's expert testified the highest and best use of the property is for mining sand and gravel. Sand and gravel operations have been conducted on three sides of the property, to the edge of the property on the north and east. Plaintiff paid a substantial price for the 5/6 interest in the property for the purpose of mining sand and gravel on it. Defendant's appraisers included the potential for mining sand and gravel as an element of value in their appraisal of the property.
The evidence establishes that to divide this tract into smaller tracts would make sand and gravel operations on the smaller tracts less feasible, particularly in view of the physical characteristics of the property described above, thereby reducing the value of the property for this purpose.
Because of the difficulty and perhaps impossibility of dividing the property into six tracts of equal value, and the fact that a division in kind of the property would reduce its value, the trial court was correct in ordering a partition by licitation.
One of the primary objectives of ordering the property sold at public sale to effect the partition rather than dividing it in kind is to allow each of the owners to realize the full present value of the property, which value would be diminished if the property were divided in kind. For this objective to be fulfilled, the property will have to bring a price at the public sale close to its market value as established by the appraisers.
Plaintiff is a substantial corporation engaged in concrete and sand and gravel businesses and is fully able to bid at the public sale to protect its interest. The plaintiff company paid $250,000 for this property and the much less valuable 40-acre tract when it bought its 5/6 interest from defendant's relatives a few weeks prior to the time this suit was filed. Defendant is an elderly widow of very limited means, with a relatively small fractional interest in the property. She does not have the resources to bid at the sale to protect her interest.
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395 So. 2d 894, 1981 La. App. LEXIS 3616, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tri-state-concrete-co-inc-v-stephens-lactapp-1981.