Mitchell v. Cooper

121 So. 3d 736, 2013 WL 3816401, 2013 La. App. LEXIS 1495
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedJuly 24, 2013
DocketNo. 48,125-CA
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 121 So. 3d 736 (Mitchell v. Cooper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mitchell v. Cooper, 121 So. 3d 736, 2013 WL 3816401, 2013 La. App. LEXIS 1495 (La. Ct. App. 2013).

Opinion

DREW, J.

11 Josephine Douglas-Peters appeals a judgment ordering a partition by licitation without benefit of an appraisal of three noncontiguous rural tracts.

We affirm.

FACTS

The land at issue consists of three tracts of land located several miles from Haugh-ton in Bossier Parish. Tract One contains 21 acres in the shape of a rectangle base with an “arm” running east-west from the base’s southwest corner. Tract Two is in the shape of a rectangle and measures approximately 18.5 acres. Tract Three is mostly in the shape of a rectangle. It measures approximately 78.5 acres.

As established at trial, co-owners shared undivided interests in the property in the following percentages:

• 25% Estelle Jones Gilbert and Harvey Aytch1

[738]*738• 25% Jones Estate Management

• 14.58% Scott Oliphant and Jerri Oliphant

• 8.38% Carey Jones

• 8.33% Len Jones

• 7.29% Robert Mitchell, III

• 4.17% Josephine Douglas-Peters

• 3.65% Kelsey Boyter

• 3.65% Robert Mitchell, IV

[ ^Robert Mitchell, III, Robert Mitchell, IV, Kelsey Boyter, Scott Oliphant, and Jerri Oliphant filed suit against the remaining co-owners seeking a partition by licitation. The plaintiffs asserted they were entitled to a partition by licitation on the ground that the defendants were absentees. However, as the lawsuit progressed, the defendants, or their representatives in some instances, filed answers. The plaintiffs established to the court and to the defendants prior to trial, as was shown in their pretrial memorandum,2 that the partition by licitation was now being sought because of the characteristics of the property. The plaintiffs’ evidence at trial likewise concerned the property’s characteristics.

Following a trial on the merits, the court ordered partition by licitation without benefit of appraisal, and awarded the plaintiffs $750 in attorney fees against the Succession of Harvey Aytch. Douglas-Peters has appealed.

DISCUSSION

Douglas-Peters argues on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering the tracts partitioned by licitation.

Unless otherwise provided by law or juridical act, no one may be compelled to hold a thing in indivisión with another, and a co-owner has a right to demand partition of a thing held in indivisión. La. C.C. art. 807; Ark-La-Miss Timber Co. v. Wilkins, 36,485 (La.App.2d Cir.12/11/02), 833 So.2d 1154.

The court shall decree a partition in kind when the thing held in indivisión is susceptible to division into as many lots of nearly equal value as there are shares and the aggregate value of all lots is not significantly lower than the value of the property in the state of indivisión. La. C.C. art. 810.

When the thing held in indivisión is not susceptible to partition in kind, the court shall decree a partition by licitation or by private sale and the proceeds shall be distributed to the co-owners in proportion to their shares. La. C.C. art. 811.

The burden of proof is on the party seeking partition by licitation to prove that the property cannot be divided in kind. Tri-State Concrete Co. v. Stephens, 406 So.2d 205 (La.1981).

The general rule is that partition in kind is favored over partition by licitation. Tri-State Concrete, supra. Except as otherwise provided by law, or unless the property is indivisible by nature or cannot conveniently be divided, the court shall order the partition to be made in kind. La. C.C.P. art. 4606.

Property cannot be conveniently divided when the division would result in a [739]*739diminution of its value, or loss or inconvenience to one of the owners. Entrada Co. v. Unopened Succession, 38,800 (La.App.2d Cir.9/22/04), 882 So.2d 661.

| ,,The decision of whether land should be divided in kind or by licitation is a question of fact to be decided by the trial court. Green v. Small, 227 La. 401, 79 So.2d 497 (La.1955).

The trial court had the benefit of expert testimony from Normand Roy on behalf of the plaintiffs, and from John Lloyd and Forrest Rayburn on behalf of the defendants. Lloyd and Roy testified as expert real estate appraisers. Rayburn testified as an expert surveyor.

Roy relied on soil conservation maps when assessing the suitability of the land after it became impossible for him to gain access to the interior of any of the tracts because of the existing underbrush. He learned that the tracts had similar sandy loam surfaces, which he felt left them with poor potential for farming and fair potential for use as a pasture, making forestry the best use of the property.

Rayburn was asked by Douglas-Peters to divide each tract equally into four sections. He walked the perimeters of the tracts, and entered some of the tracts in order to get a better sense of what they looked like. Rayburn examined the sites to study any survey problems, road access, utilities, and general property descriptions that would affect partitioning the property. Lloyd performed a site inspection of the properties.

The court also heard testimony from Robert Mitchell, III, regarding the conditions and physical characteristics of the property. Mitchell was familiar with the three tracts because not only was he raised near them, but he also owns property adjacent to some of the tracts. In particular, he owns | ¿property on two sides of Tract Two, as well as on the south side of Tract Three.

Mitchell stated that water pooled on the east end of Tract Two, which he said had a low area of four to five acres that remains wet. He also stated that there were ditches in the north and eastern areas of Tract Three that held water, and that its southeast corner stayed wet.

Roy could not completely assess the flood potential of the property since he was unable to walk on the tracts as a result of the underbrush. Nonetheless, he did not think there were any special flooding considerations. 'While there may have been areas where water stood longer after a rainstorm, the property was not in a flood plain, and the soil handbook indicated that the tracts drained fairly well and the sandy soil would allow for some absorption.

Tract One

Although Douglas-Peters told Lloyd that she was hoping to partition each tract into four parts, his focus was to appraise the three tracts regardless of her proposed partition.

Tract One, which is approximately 21 acres, had no road access. Lloyd appraised the tract as being valued at $168,000, which he made subject to a road being connected to Potter Road because the tract is landlocked.

Roy believed that partitioning Tract One by dividing it would be virtually impossible because if the owner with the largest interest took part of the “arm” and part of the base, it would leave the remaining owners ^without access to the remainder of the tract. Roy stated that even if Tract One were developed for residential use, which he would not recommend, rights of egress and ingress would need to be obtained, and the arm would have to be used as a road. Roy appraised Tract One as being worth $58,000.

[740]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
121 So. 3d 736, 2013 WL 3816401, 2013 La. App. LEXIS 1495, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mitchell-v-cooper-lactapp-2013.