Tri-R Systems, Ltd. v. Friedman & Son, Inc.

94 F.R.D. 726, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1457, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 850, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13540
CourtDistrict Court, D. Colorado
DecidedJuly 13, 1982
DocketCiv. A. No. 79-K-1436
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 94 F.R.D. 726 (Tri-R Systems, Ltd. v. Friedman & Son, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Colorado primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tri-R Systems, Ltd. v. Friedman & Son, Inc., 94 F.R.D. 726, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1457, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 850, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13540 (D. Colo. 1982).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, District Judge.

This is an antitrust action. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 15 and 28 U.S.C. § 1337. The plaintiff is a limited partnership in the business of buying and selling waste paper. The defendant, Friedman & Son, Inc., (“Friedman”), is one of the largest independent paper dealers in the country and is a competitor of the [727]*727plaintiff in the paper selling market. The defendants, Southwest Forest Industries, Inc., (“Southwest”) and Tamko Asphalt Products, Inc., of Kansas (“Tamko”) are manufacturers who purchase large quantities of paper from the defendant, Friedman. The plaintiff alleges that Friedman has engaged in two conspiracies: one with Southwest and the other with Tamko, in order to restrain trade and maintain its monopoly position in the paper selling market, in violation of sections one and two of the Sherman Act and section three of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 and 14. “Common to all of these claims is the element of a contract, combination or conspiracy which restrains trade, forecloses competition or monopolizes a part of interstate commerce.” Tri-R Systems, Ltd. v. Friedman & Son, Inc., 518 F.Supp. 1271, 1273 (D.Colo.1981).

I have previously denied the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, holding that there are genuine issues of fact regarding the existence of contracts, combinations or conspiracies between Friedman and the other defendants. See, id.1 This matter is now before me on the defendants, Southwest and Tamko’s motions for separate trials pursuant to Rule 42(b), F.R. Civ.P., requesting separate trials for the separate defendants.2 For the reasons expressed in this opinion, the motions are denied.

“The decision to grant or deny separate trials under Rule 42(b) is one committed to the sound discretion of the trial court.” Warner v. Rosignol, 513 F.2d 678, 684 (1st Cir. 1975); Martin v. Bell Helicopter, Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 658 (D.Colo.1980). In Martin, Chief Judge Finesilver of this district, in ruling on a Rule 42(b) motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages, enumerated ten factors which trial judges should weigh in exercising their discretion to grant or deny separate trials. Id. Of those ten factors, I find that three are applicable in determinations whether to order separate trials for separate defendants: 3

1. Whether separate trials will further the convenience of the parties;

2. Whether separate trials will promote judicial economy;

3. Whether separate trials will avoid substantial prejudice to the parties.

The first factor, convenience to the parties cuts both ways in the instant case. It would be convenient to the plaintiff to have one trial and thereby only have to marshal its time, money and effort once. However, it would be convenient to the defendants to have separate trials and not have to exhaust time, money and effort preparing for the additional considerations present in a joint trial. Each defendant would invariably take precautions to ensure that it is not damaged in the eyes of the jury, from the “spillover effect” of evidence directed against the other defendants.

[728]*728I find that in any event, the inconvenience to the parties is not particularly compelling. To the extent the plaintiff’s claims are meritorious and it prevails at the separate trials, it will be entitled to recoup much of its fees and costs expended in the additional trials. See Black Gold v. Rockwool, 529 F.Supp. 272 (D.Colo.1981). Further, the additional time needed by the defendants to prepare for the “spillover effect” in a joint trial does not seem substantial and can be aided by the court’s own efforts in determining the order of proof, preparing cautionary jury instructions, using special verdict forms and providing separate tables for the separate defendants.4

The second factor, judicial economy, weighs in favor of a joint trial. As previously mentioned, this case involves proof of two illegal conspiracies. The defendant-Friedman’s separate trial would involve evidence of its alleged conspiracy with Tamko and its alleged conspiracy with Southwest. The separate trials of Tamko and Southwest would merely repeat the evidence of those conspiracies developed in the Friedman trial with predominantly the same evidence, witnesses and legal issues.5

The plaintiff claims that in all of its cases it will present evidence concerning the nature and characteristics of the paper industry, the conduct of Friedman in the relevant buying and selling markets and the conduct of Tri-R in the same markets. Additionally the plaintiff’s expert witness will present analyses and conclusions concerning those markets, the market shares, the relevant business practices and the resulting effects on the plaintiff’s, business. The plaintiff further claims that its expert will apply the same principles and techniques of analysis to each defendant-buyer (Tamko and Southwest) and that only the actual practices and data from the defendant-buyers will differ. Accordingly, considerations of judicial economy weigh heavily against separate trials.

The third factor, prejudice to the parties, weighs in favor of separate trials. There is no apparent prejudice to the plaintiff from having separate trials. However, there is a danger of prejudice to the defendants Tamko and Southwest in the absence of separate trials, from the “spillover effect” of evidence that would be irrelevant and therefore inadmissible at separate trials.

“While economy and convenience may properly be considered in the decision [on a motion for separate trials], neither is the final objective.” Martin v. Bell Hellicopter, 85 F.R.D. at 658. Where there is substantial prejudice, considerations of time, economy and convenience must yield thereto. See Baker v. Waterman, 11 F.R.D. 440, 441 (S.D.N.Y.1957).

However, the mere possibility of some prejudice does not justify separate trials where such prejudice is not substantial and there are strong countervailing considerations of economy. See Eichinger v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company, 20 F.R.D. 204 (D.Neb.1957); Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 263 (D.Colo.1953). Courts recognize that where the degree of potential prejudice is not compelling, • the trial judge can often mitigate the suggested prejudice through appropriate jury instructions and other devices. Grissom at 263; accord, Anderson v. Francis I. DuPont & Co., 291 F.Supp. 705, 711-12 (D.Minn.1968); see supra at 727-728, of this opinion for a [729]*729listing of such devices.6

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94 F.R.D. 726, 34 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1457, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 850, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13540, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tri-r-systems-ltd-v-friedman-son-inc-cod-1982.