Travion McCraw v. United Parcel Service of America, Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: August 7, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-01197
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 JS-6 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TRAVION MCCRAW, Case No. 5:25-cv-01197-FLA (SHKx)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S 13 v. MOTION TO REMAND [DKT. 10]

14 UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF 15 AMERICA, INC., et al., 16 Defendants. 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 1 ORDER 2 Before the court is Plaintiff Travion McCraw’s (“Plaintiff”) Motion to Remand 3 Action to State Court (“Motion”). Dkt. 10 (“Mot.”). Defendants United Parcel 4 Services of America, Inc. (“UPS”), Deandre “Doe,” and Eric “Doe” (“Individual 5 Defendants”) (all collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the Motion. Dkt. 11 (“Opp’n”). 6 On June 26, 2025, the court found the Motion appropriate for resolution without oral 7 argument and vacated the hearing set for June 27, 2025. Dkt. 12; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 78(b); Local Rule 7-15. 9 For the reasons stated herein, the court GRANTS the Motion and REMANDS 10 this action to the Riverside County Superior Court. 11 BACKGROUND 12 This action arises from the purported retaliation, discriminatory treatment, and 13 failure to accommodate Plaintiff was allegedly subjected to during his employment as 14 a package handler for UPS. See generally Dkt. 1–2 (“Compl.”).1 15 On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff filed the Complaint in the Riverside County Superior 16 Court asserting sixteen causes of action for: (1) disability/medical condition 17 discrimination (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a)); (2) failure to provide reasonable 18 accommodations (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m)); (3) failure to engage in the 19 interactive process (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n)); (4) failure to prevent 20 discrimination, retaliation, and harassment (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(k)); 21 (5) whistleblower retaliation (Cal. Lab. Code § 98.6); (6) failure to provide rest breaks 22 (Cal. Lab. Code § 226.7); (7) failure to provide meal periods (Cal. Lab. Code 23 §§ 226.7, 512); (8) failure to pay all wages due upon separation from employment 24 (Cal. Lab. Code § 203); (9) failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements (Cal. 25 Lab. Code § 226); (10 and 11) retaliation (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 1102.5, 232.5; (12) sick 26

27 1 The court cites documents by the page numbers added by the court’s CM/ECF 28 system, rather than any page numbers that appear within the documents natively. 1 leave retaliation (Cal. Lab. Code §§ 233, 234, 246, 246.5, 248.6, et seq.); (13) 2 retaliation in violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”) (Cal. 3 Gov’t Code § 129400(h)); (14) retaliation in violation of the California Family Rights 4 Act (“CFRA”) (Cal. Gov’t Code § 12945.2); (15) unfair and unlawful business 5 practices (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 17200, et seq.); and (16) wrongful termination in 6 violation of public policy. Id. ¶¶ 38–169.2 7 On May 16, 2025, UPS removed this action to this court, alleging diversity 8 jurisdiction. Dkt. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). In the instant Motion, Plaintiff 9 contends complete diversity does not exist because Plaintiff and the Individual 10 Defendants are all California citizens. Mot. at 11. UPS, in opposition, argues the 11 Individual Defendants are “sham defendants” named solely to defeat subject matter 12 jurisdiction. Opp’n at 5. 13 DISCUSSION 14 I. Legal Standard 15 Federal courts are courts of “limited jurisdiction,” possessing “only that power 16 authorized by the Constitution and statute[.]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of 17 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “It is to be presumed 18 that a cause lies outside [of federal courts’] limited jurisdiction, and the burden of 19 establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 20 U.S. at 377 (citations omitted); Sopcak v. N. Mountain Helicopter Serv., 52 F.3d 817, 21 818 (9th Cir. 1995). 22 A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction “can be either facial, confining the 23 inquiry to allegations in the complaint, or factual, permitting the court to look beyond 24 the complaint.” Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th 25 Cir. 2003). Therefore, the court is not restricted to the face of the pleadings and may 26

27 2 As Plaintiffs’ claims 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, and 14 are all related to FEHA, the court will 28 collectively refer to them as the “FEHA claims.” 1 review evidence, such as declarations and testimony, to resolve any factual disputes 2 concerning the existence of jurisdiction. See McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 3 558, 560 (9th Cir. 1988). 4 Federal courts have jurisdiction where each plaintiff’s citizenship is diverse 5 from each defendant’s citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, 6 exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Diversity jurisdiction 7 requires “complete diversity, meaning that each plaintiff must be of a different 8 citizenship from each defendant.” Grancare, LLC v. Thrower, 889 F.3d 543, 548 (9th 9 Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). 10 “In determining whether there is complete diversity, district courts may 11 disregard the citizenship of a non-diverse defendant who has been fraudulently 12 joined.” Id. (citation omitted). “A defendant invoking federal court diversity 13 jurisdiction on the basis of fraudulent joinder bears a ‘heavy burden’ since there is a 14 general presumption against finding fraudulent joinder.” Id. (cleaned up); see also 15 Hamilton Materials, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Corp., 494 F.3d 1203, 1206 (9th Cir. 2007) 16 (“Fraudulent joinder must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.”). 17 “There are two ways to establish fraudulent joinder: (1) actual fraud in the 18 pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the plaintiff to establish a cause of 19 action against the non-diverse party in state court.” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 20 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Fraudulent joinder is established 21 the second way if a defendant shows that an individual joined in the action cannot be 22 liable on any theory.” Id. (cleaned up). “But if there is a possibility that a state court 23 would find that the complaint states a cause of action against any of the resident 24 defendants, the federal court must find that the joinder was proper and remand the 25 case to the state court.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis in original). 26 / / / 27 / / / 28 / / / 1 II. Analysis 2 A. Hostile Work Environment Under FEHA 3 Under FEHA, an employee who harasses another employee may be held 4 personally liable. Lewis v. City of Benicia, 224 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1524 (2014) 5 (citing Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(j)(3)). To establish a prima facie case of a hostile 6 work environment, a plaintiff must show: 7 (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her 8 protected status; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her 9 work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) defendants are liable for the harassment. 10 11 Ortiz v. Dameron Hosp. Ass’n, 37 Cal. App. 5th 568, 581 (2019). 12 To show “unreasonable interference,” 13 the plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible productivity has 14 declined as a result of the harassment. It suffices to prove that a reasonable person subjected to the discriminatory conduct would find, 15 as the plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered working conditions 16 as to make it more difficult to do the job. 17 Cal. Gov’t Code § 12923(a) (approving standard set forth in Harris v. Forklift Sys., 18 Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)) (quotation marks omitted). 19 Additionally, to be actionable, the conduct must be “severe or pervasive enough 20 to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment—an environment that a 21 reasonable person would find hostile or abusive[.]” Bailey v. S.F. Dist. Att’ys Off., 16 22 Cal. 5th 611, 628 (2024). As the California Supreme Court explained: 23 Whether a work environment is reasonably perceived as hostile or 24 abusive is not, and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. The working environment must be evaluated in light of the 25 totality of the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the 26 discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether 27 it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance. The 28 required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the 1 pcoemrvmaseivnetsn,e asns do ris forleaqteude nicnyc iodfe nthtse (cuonnldesusc te.x tSriemmpelley tseearsiionugs,) o afrfeh annodt 2 sufficient to create an actionable claim of harassment. 3 Id. (cleaned up). “[A]n isolated act of harassment may be actionable if it is 4 sufficiently severe in light of the totality of the circumstances[.]” Id. at 620. “The 5 objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a 6 reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.” Id. at 629. 7 “[H]arassment is generally concerned with the message conveyed to an 8 employee, and therefore with the social environment of the workplace, whereas 9 discrimination is concerned with explicit changes in the terms or conditions of 10 employment.” Roby v. McKesson Corp., 47 Cal. 4th 686, 708 (2009) (emphasis in 11 original). “[I]n some cases the hostile message that constitutes the harassment is 12 conveyed through official employment actions, and therefore evidence that would 13 otherwise be associated with a discrimination claim can form the basis of a 14 harassment claim.” Id. 15 B. Citizenship of Individual Defendants 16 UPS argues the Individual Defendants qualify as “Does” under California law 17 because their identities and, therefore, citizenship are uncertain. Opp’n at 3. Plaintiff 18 responds the Individual Defendants have been sufficiently identified as California 19 residents in the Complaint, so their citizenship should be considered for diversity 20 purposes. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4. 21 Generally, courts cannot consider a fictitious or Doe defendant when 22 determining diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). However, if a complaint 23 provides a description of a partially named defendant so that the defendant’s identity 24 can be reasonably ascertained, then the court should consider the defendant’s 25 citizenship when determining diversity jurisdiction. See Green v. Mut. of Omaha, 550 26 F. Supp. 815, 818 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (“Application of the reasoning contained in [prior 27 cases] requires that this court consider the citizenship of the Doe defendants named in 28 1 the identity of the fictitious defendant”); Barnes v. Costco Wholesale Corp., Case No. 2 2:19-cv-7977-DMG (JPRx), 2019 WL 6608735, at *2–3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 4, 2019) 3 (Doe defendants’ citizenship is considered for diversity purposes where “Plaintiffs’ 4 description of Doe defendants or their activities is specific enough as to suggest their 5 identity, citizenship, or relationship to the action”) (citation omitted). 6 Here, the Complaint pleads sufficient facts to identify the Individual Defendants 7 as UPS employee supervisors/managers, who reside in California. Compl. ¶¶ 3–4. 8 Plaintiff also knew the Individual Defendants personally, had their telephone numbers, 9 and regularly communicated with them. See Dkt 10-2 at 3–5. Moreover, the 10 Complaint includes details describing how the Individual Defendants interacted with 11 Plaintiff. See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 19; see also Dkt. 10-2 ¶ 5 (“Defendants Deandre and 12 Eric were my managers and/or supervisors during my employment at Defendant 13 UPS’s Inland Empire Hub located at 20793 Krameria Avenue, Riverside, CA 14 92518”). 15 Because the Complaint describes the Individual Defendants in sufficient detail 16 making their identities ascertainable, neither defendant is a traditional “Doe.” See 17 Tipton v. Zimmer, Inc., Case No. 2:15-cv-04171-BRO (JCx), 2016 WL 3452744, at 18 *3–4 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2016) (where complaint described defendant as “territorial 19 manager, director, representative, and/or managing agent,” defendant was not “a doe 20 defendant whose citizenship [the] Court should disregard for diversity purposes.”). 21 Thus, the Individual Defendants have been sufficiently identified as California 22 citizens for diversity purposes. 23 C. Sufficiency of Plaintiff’s Allegations 24 With respect to the viability of Plaintiff’s FEHA claims against the Individual 25 Defendants, the Complaint alleges Plaintiff is a member of a protected class as he 26 suffers from an actual or perceived disability or medical condition, suffered a 27 workplace injury at UPS resulting in a strain to his back and shoulder that caused 28 1 muscle pain throughout his body, and the injury limited Plaintiff’s major life 2 activities, including his ability to work. Compl. ¶ 40. 3 The Complaint also pleads that despite Plaintiff’s provision of physician notes 4 excusing him from work and heavy lifting initially and later allowing him to return to 5 work with restrictions, the Individual Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with 6 reasonable accommodations for his disability. See id. ¶¶ 26–37. For example, the 7 Complaint alleges Plaintiff asked Defendant Deandre if he could return to work and 8 perform light duty, as he was still in pain, and that Deandre rejected the request and 9 told Plaintiff to “just go on leave.” Id. ¶ 30. The Complaint further alleges Defendant 10 Deandre rejected Plaintiff’s request to perform other duties consistent with his 11 physical limitations and told Plaintiff “[d]on’t come back [until] fully cleared.” Id. ¶ 12 32; see Gregory v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., Case No. 1:13-cv-2070 AWI SMS, 2015 13 WL 1956435, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2015) (finding that a 100% healed policy is a 14 “per se violation of FEHA”). The Complaint also accuses the Individual 15 Defendants—after learning of Plaintiff’s injury and work restrictions—of failing to 16 engage in an interactive process to find work Plaintiff could perform. Id. ¶ 36. 17 Plaintiff contends the lack of accommodation provided by the Individual Defendants 18 was substantially motivated by Plaintiff’s actual or perceived disability. Id. ¶ 55. 19 Here, the relevant question is whether “there is a possibility that a state court 20 would find that the complaint states a cause of action against [the Individual 21 Defendants].” Grancare, 889 F.3d at 548 (emphasis in original); see also Altman v. 22 HO Sports Co., Inc., No. 1:09–cv–1000 AWI SMS, 2009 WL 2590425, at *2 (E.D. 23 Cal. Aug. 20, 2009) (“Stated differently, if there is a non-fanciful possibility that the 24 plaintiffs can state a claim against the non-diverse defendant, the [district] court must 25 remand”) (cleaned up); Ybarra v. Universal City Studios, LLC, Case No. 2:13-cv- 26 4976-PSG (AJWx), 2013 WL 5522009, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2013) (having merely 27 a “glimmer of hope” that a plaintiff can establish a claim is sufficient to prevent 28 application of the fraudulent joinder doctrine). 1 Based on the facts pleaded and the evidence presented, a state court could find 2 | that the Individual Defendants created a hostile work environment for Plaintiff that 3 | was sufficiently severe or pervasive to state FEHA claims. See Bailey, 16 Cal. 5th at 4 | 629; Roby, 47 Cal. 4th at 708. Considering the strong presumption against removal 5 || jurisdiction and the principles governing pleading and amending, the court cannot 6 || conclude it is impossible or fanciful for Plaintiff to establish liability against the 7 | Individual Defendants. See Padilla v. AT&T Corp., 697 F. Supp. 2d 1156, 1159 (C.D. 8 || Cal. 2009) (remand must be granted unless defendant demonstrates plaintiff would not 9 | be given permission to amend his FEHA claims). 10 Accordingly, UPS has failed to meet its “heavy burden” to establish the 11 | Individual Defendants are sham defendants. Because there is a possibility Plaintiff 12 | can state a valid harassment claim against the Individual Defendants, the court 13 | declines to consider the parties’ remaining arguments. The court, therefore, GRANTS 14 | the Motion due to lack of complete diversity between Plaintiff and Defendants. See 1S | 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 16 CONCLUSION 17 For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS the Motion and REMANDS the 18 | action to the Riverside County Superior Court, Case No. CVRI2501738. All dates 19 | and deadlines in this court are VACATED. The clerk of the court shall close the 20 || action administratively. 21 22 IT IS SO ORDERED. 23 24 | Dated: August 7, 2025 5 FERNANDO L. AENLLE-ROCHA United States District Judge 26 27 28