Tran v. Jefferson Parish School Board

• Court: District Court, E.D. Louisiana
• Decided: March 25, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-02777
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MY THI NHU TRAN, ET AL. CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NUMBER: 24-2777

JEFFERSON PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL. SECTION: “P”(5)

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is the Motion for Leave to File Third Superseding Amended and Supplemental Complaint (rec. doc. 29) filed by Plaintiffs. Defendants Children’s Hospital New Orleans and Louisiana Children’s Medical Center d/b/a LCMC Health (“LCMC”) and the Jefferson Parish School Board (“JPSB”) (collectively, “Defendants”) oppose the motion. 1 (Rec. docs. 38, 39). Plaintiffs have replied to the two oppositions. (Rec. docs. 40, 42). HI. avingB reavcikegwreodu nthde pleadings and the case law, the Court rules as follows.

The numerous Complaints allege as follows. This lawsuit arises under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 2000d for federal civil rights violations and state-law claims for false arrest and imprisonment and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress following an incident on December 1, 2023 at C.T. Janet Elementary School (“the School”). On that date, the minor Plaintiff, T.V., allegedly uttered alarming and threatening statements that were overheard by a JPSB employee, who reported the statements to the principal of the School, Jennifer Miles. T.V.’s statements included references to a “hit list” and burning down the school. 1 Plaintiffs also filed a third reply to an opposition from Defendant Joseph P. Lopinto, III. (Rec. doc. 41). After learning of these threatening statements, principal Miles asked the School’s Mental Health Professional, Dr. Jamal Boudion, and its counselor, Tanya Drachenberg, to help her to complete a Threat of Violence Assessment. Such an assessment involves

interviewing/counseling session(s) with the Mental Health Professional, the school’s principal, and the individual who made the threat in order to hear from and take statements from all parties involved for the purpose of determining whether the individual who made the threats has the intent and/or ability to act upon such threat(s). Here, after three interview/counseling sessions, Boudion, Miles, and Drachenberg determined that T.V.’s threats were transient. However, as a result of the statements made by T.V. in these interview/counseling sessions, Boudion, Miles, and Drachenberg expressed serious concerns for T.V.’s emotional

and physical well-being. In the interview/counseling sessions, T.V. expressed that she had experienced auditory and visual hallucinations, the desire to self-harm in dreams, and had thoughts about burning down the school. As a result of these serious statements and out of concern for T.V.’s well-being, Boudion contacted a 911 dispatcher, which dispatched EMS and law enforcement to the school. At no point in time did Boudion or any other emspclhooyoele. of the JPSB order either the JPSO or the Hospital to transport T.V. from the Thereafter, T.V. was transported by EMS to the Hospital for further evaluation. Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint on November 28, 2024. (Rec. doc. 1). On

January 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint, which is near identical to the Plaintiffs’ original Complaint. (Rec. doc. 7). Plaintiffs then filed a Motion for Leave to File Second Superseding Amended and Supplemental Complaint on January 28, 2025. (Rec. doc. 18.). The proposed Second Superseding, Amended, and Supplemental Complaint expanded on both Plaintiffs’ original Complaint and First Amended Complaint, and increased the page count from 17 pages to 55 pages and included numerous new claims and a claim for declaratory relief. (Rec. docs. 1, 7, 18-4).

On February 6, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave to Withdraw their Motion for Leave to File Second Superseding, Amended and Supplemental Complaint, which was granted by this Court on February 10, 2025. (Rec. docs. 31, 34). Both LCMC and the JPSB filed Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) for Failure to State a Claim in response to Plaintiffs’ Complaints. (Rec. doc. 12, 35). Plaintiffs now seek to amend their Original Complaint for a third time. The proposed pleading includes new claims for fraud, negligence and negligent misrepresentation, vicarious liability/respondeat superior, negligent hiring and

supervision, invasion of privacy, and defamation along with a prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief. (Rec. doc. 29-4). The Complaint has expanded from a 55-page document toId 6. 8 pages and includes two newly-named Defendants, Dr. Fernandez and Dr. Maraynes. ( ). In short, Plaintiffs’ proposed Third Superseding, Amended and Supplemental CIodm. plaint includes 13 claims for relief and a prayer for injunctive and declaratory relief. (II. ). Legal Standard

Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may amend its

pleading once as a matter of course” within 21 days of service or 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f). Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A), (B). In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading with the opposing party's written Id. consent or leave of court, which leave should be freely granted when justice so requires. 15(a)(2). As Plaintiff requested this amendment outside of the 21 days to plead as a matter of

course and does not have consent, this motion for leave to amend is governed by Rule 15(a)(2). UnderId R.ule 15(a)(2), the “court should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” A court must balance the difficult task of assuring a party a fair opportunity to present its claims and defenses while at the same time proteGcrteinggo rtyh ve. Mdiisttcrhicetl lcourt from being imposed upon by the presentation of theories seriatim. , 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th CirC. a1r9ro8l1l )v (. cFiotartti oJanm oemsitted). Denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion. , 470 F.3d 1171, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Absent a “substantial reason,” the coMuarty'esa duixs cvr.e Ltiao.n H “e‘iasl tnho tS berrvo.a &d

Ienndoeumgh. Ctoo .permit denial’” of a request for leave to amend. M artin's Herend Imps., Inc. v. Diamond &, G3e7m6 TFra.3ddin 4g 2U0n, it4e2d5 S t(a5teths oCf iAr.m 2. C0o0.4) (quoting , 195 FA.v3adt a7r6 5E,x 7p7l.0, I(n5ct. hv C. Cirh. e1v9r9o9n) )U. SA, Inc. Leave to amend is not, however, automatic. , 933 F.2d 314, 320 (5th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). While Rule 15 favors granting leave to amend, denial of leave is justified in certain circumIsdt.a nces, such as when a movant unduly delays or acts with bad faith or dilatory motive. (citation omitted). The five factors considered in determining whether leave to amend is appropriate or whether there is

substantial reason to deny the request are: (1) undue delay, (2) bad faith or dilatory motive, (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous amFoemndamn ev.n Dtsa, v(is4) undue prejudice to the oFplpaonsniingga pna vr. tUy,n aivnedr s(a5l) S ftueteill iAtym o.,f Itnhce. amendment. , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); , No. CV 22-3080, 2023 WL 11918265, report and recommendation adopted at *4 (E.D. La. June 29, 2023), SMH Enters., L.L.C. v. Krispy Kr,u Nncoh. yC VFo 2o2d-s3, 0L8.L0.C, .2024 WL 4041322 (E.D. La. Sept. 4, 2024); , 340 FII.IR. .D. 5A5n4a, 5ly5s9i-s60 (E.D. La. 2022).

Plaintiffs seek to amend their Complaint for the following reasons: (1) to clarify and supplement certain factual allegations; (2) to join additional necessary parties; (3) to address new facts arising after the filing of the original complaint; (4) to respond to the defendants’ filings and ensure a complete record for adjudication; and (5) to make editorial changes to correct and improve the pleading. For their part, Defendants ask the Court to deny Plaintiffs’ motion to amend because Plaintiffs have been dilatory (undue delay), have filed the claims in bad faith, will impose undue prejudice on Defendants, and Plaintiffs’

claims aAr.e futiUlen. d ue Delay/Dilatory Smith v. EMC CoRrupl.e 15(a)(2) does not itself impose a time limit on seeking leave to amend. , 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that Rsuelee a1l5so( aM) udloliens vn. oBta ilmickpiose a time limit “‘for permissive amendment’”) (citation omitted); , 875 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (“Lacking a time limit or an outer bound on when amendment is permissible, [Rule 15(a)(2)] instructs courts to freely give leave to amend when justice so requires.”). However, a litigant's failure to assert a claim as soon as

he could Chaarvseo nd ov.n Peo slole yis a proper factor to consider in deciding whether to grant leave to amend. , 689 F.2d 562, 584 (5th Cir. 1982) (finding late assertion of claim acceptable when all other factors pointed in favor of movant, no pretrial order or pretrial conference had been held, and no evidence of bad faith). At some point, a plaintiff's delay Smith Whitaker v. City of Houston can be procedurally fatal. , 393 F.3d at 595 (citing , 963 F.2d 831, 836 (5th Cir. 1992)). In that situation, a plaintiff must meet the burden Iodf. showing that the dseelea ya l“swo aPsa rdisuhe vt.o F roavzeiresright, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.”

(citation omitted); , 195 F.3d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1999) (citations omitted). Further, “d eil.ae.y alone is an insufficient basis for denial of leave to amend: The delay must be undue, Ma, yite amuuxst prejudice the nonmoving party or impose unwarranted burdens on the court.” , 376 F.3d 420, 427 (5th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). The Court finds no undue delay here. Plaintiffs filed this motion for leave to amend early in the proceeding, and the Court has not issued a scheduling order. There are no pendingB .d eadlBinaeds .F Tahitehre is no basis for finding undue delay.

The Fifth Circuit has defined bad faith generally as implying or involving actual or constructive fraud, or a design to mislead or deceive another, or a neglect or refusal to fulfill some duty or some contractual obligation, not prompted by an honest mistake as to one's rights or duties but by some interested or sinister motive. The term bad faith means more than mere bad judgment or negligence, it implies the conscious Industrdiaosi nMga ogfr ao mwerro nCgu eforor sd yis hPoienleess tS o.Ar. mv.o Lraa.l lBy aqyuoeus tFiuonrsa bInlec .motives.

, 293 F.3d 912, 922 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted) (interpreting Louisiana law). On this record, this Court cannot find that Plaintiffs consciously committed a wrong for dishonest or mio.er.ally questionable motives. While Plaintiffs may have possessed T.V.s medical records – , and knew the names of the medical providers that they now seek to add – this Court cannot state without a doubt that all legal routes were fully considered when Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint. Plaintiffs filed their original Complaint near the legal theories after filing their initial complaint in an attempt to avoid any prescriptive pitfall. The Court thus has no evidence before it that the request for leave to amend is in bad faitCh., invoPlvreesj ufrdaiucde, or is designed to mislead or deceive.

The Fifth Circuit and other courts have found prejudice when the amendment is asserted after the close of discovery; after dispositSievee Smmoitthions have been filed, briefed, or decided; or on the eve of or in the middle of trial. , 393 F.3d at 594-96 (affirming denial of leave to amend based on undue delay and prejudice wCahmenp baemlle vn. dEmmeonryt wCloinuilcd add a new claim in the middle of trial after discovery had closed); , 166 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted) (“Prejudice and undue delay are inherent in an amendment asserted after the cSloolsoem oonf dv.i sNc.o Avmer.y L iafen d& aCfates.r I ndsi.s Cpoo.sitive

motions have been filed, briefed, and decided.”); , 151 F.3d 1132, 1139 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming denial ofs eleea avleso t oR uabmye Snldip wpehre Cna tfhe,e L p.Lla.Cin. vti. fBf efilloeud the motion “on the eve of the discovery deadline”); , No. 18-01548, 2018 WL 11179117, at *2 (E.D. La. July 3, 2018) (looking to whether the filing is within the court-imposed deadlines or would require the re-opening of discovery to assess undue delay and prejudice). A defendant is prejudiced if an amendment would require that the defendant “reopen discovery aSnmd itphrepare a defense for a claimD udgifgfeinres nvt. fSrtoemak th‘Ne [Sohnaek]e ,. .I n. cth. at was before the court.” , 393 F.3d at 596 (quoting

, 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999)). Likewise, ameInn drme eAnmts. tIhnta'tl fRuenfidnaemrye, nIntacl.ly alter the nature of the case are considered prejudicial. , 676 F.3d 455, 467 & n.12 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding leave properly denied when proposed amendment was based on documents known to plaintiff for over a year and added new causes of action that would have “dramatically altered the subject matter of the sMuaity eaatu xa late juncture. . . requir[ing] expansive [additional] discovery and litigation”); , 376 F.3d at 427-28 (finding that complaint would be “fundamentally altered”

when proposed amendment would destroy jurisdiction and “effectively reconstruct the case anew.”). Defendants argue that they have filed Rule 12 motions to dismiss and are purportedly prejudiced by having to re-file another Rule 12 motion in response to the amended complaint. But the mere inconvenience of being required to file a second motion to dismiss cannToet sblae, Itnhce. vt.y Lpae. Aouf t“ou. nDdeuaele rpsr eAjsusd'nice” necessary to foreclose amendment under Rule 15. , No. CV 22-2982, 2023 WL 9059650, at *6 (E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2023).

Defendants also contend that they will suffer undue prejudice by being forced to incur additional costs for filing a second motion to dismiss after having fully briefed the iSneiet iLalo umisoitainoan . v S. uBcahn ka dodf iAtimon. aClo crops.ts, while unfortunate, do not constitute undue prejudice. , No. 19-638, 2020 WL 3966875, at *3 (M.D. La. July 13, 2020) (rejecting argument thaMt coolisntas avn. Cda elixbpeern Hseo mofe fLiloinagn s“,y Ientc a.nother motion to dismiss” constituted undue prejudice); , No: 3:15-CV-00757, 2016 WL 3660621, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 15, 2016) (“As to being unduly prejudiced because of time and money already expended in filing two motions to dismiss, while the Court desires

and supports litigation economy, it also recognizes that justice may require some repetition of effort and notes the probability that much of the work already done likely can be resubmitted with minimal additional expense and effort.”). There is simply no undue prejudice to Defendants here. D. Futility

Consideration of the futility factor requires the Court i.eto. assess whether the amended complaint wouldM asururvcicvi eS pao rRtsu, lLe. L1.C2. (vb. )N(6a)t 'lm Cootllieogni a(te A, thwlehteict hAesrs 'nit states a

plausible claim foSr trreiplileinf)g. v. Jordan Prod. Co. , 751 F.3d 368, 378 (citing , 234 F.3d 863, 87A3s h(5crtohf tC vir. .I q2b0a0l0)). The Supreme Court clBaerlilf iAedtl atnhtei cR Cuoler p1. 2v(. bT)w(6o)m sbtalyndard of review in , 556 U.S. 662 (2009), and , 550 U.S. 544 (2007). To avoid dismissal, a complainit. em. ust contain sufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face ( , the factTuwalo malblelgyations must “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). , 550 U.S. at 555. It is not enough to allege facts consistent with a claim because thIed .allegations mIqubsat lmove past possibility and to plausibility of

“entitlement to relief.” at 557-58; , 556 U.S. at 678. If the “facts” alleged are “merely consistent” with those minimally required to estaIbqlbisahl liability, the complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility.” , 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not “shown” – “that the pleader is entitled Id. to relief.” see also Gonzales v.

Ka yat 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)) (internal citation omitted); , 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted) (stating that when the facts do not allow the court to infer more than a mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint does not show that the pleader is entitled to relief). Although the Court must accept all well-pleaded Court should not accFepertr aesr tvr.u Ce h“ecvornocnlu Csoorryp .allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal concGluesnitoinlesl.l”o v. Rege , 484 F.3d 776, 780 (5th Cir. 2007) (sceitea tailosno oTmwoitmtebdl)y; , 627 F.3d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted);

, 550 U.S. at 555 (The “obligation to provide the grounds of [ ] entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). While Plaintiffs add new causes of action and two new Defendants to this lawsuit, in order to address the futility objection, this Court would have to address some of the very issues raised in the motions to dismiss pending before Judge Papillion. For example, LCMC argues that Plaintiff’s claims in their amended Complaint are futile because they arise under the Louisiana Medical Malpractice Act (“LMMA”) and are thus premature. But LCMC

asserts the same argument in its motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint. This Court lacks authority to address substantive issues that have not been referred, however, and those issues are best addressed in the context of resolving the pending substantive mSeoet ioCnitsy toof Bdiastmonis Rs oaungde//oEr. aBnayto snu Rboseuqgue ePnatrly. -vf.i lBeadn mk ootfi oAnms. , aNd.dAr.essing substantive issues. , N 19-725, 2020 WL 13033205, at *3 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2020). IV. Conclusion

FITo rI tSh eO fRoDreEgRoEinDg reasons, that Motion for GLReaAvNeT tEoD File Third Superseding Amended and

Supplemental Complaint (rec. doc. 29) is . The Court warns Plaintiffs, however, that it will view any further attempt to amend for a fourth time with great skepticism. 25th March New Orleans, Louisiana, this day of , 2025.

MICHAEL B. NORTH UNIT ED ST ATES M AGIST RATE JUDGE