Trailmobile Division, Pullman Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board

407 F.2d 1006, 70 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2849, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 8828
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedFebruary 20, 1969
Docket25470_1
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 407 F.2d 1006 (Trailmobile Division, Pullman Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Trailmobile Division, Pullman Incorporated v. National Labor Relations Board, 407 F.2d 1006, 70 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2849, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 8828 (5th Cir. 1969).

Opinions

BOOTLE, District Judge:

This case is before the court on the petition of Trailmobile to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board and on the cross-petition of the Board to enforce the order. The Board’s decision and order are reported at 168 NLRB No. 31. The petition to review and set aside will be granted in part and denied in part; the petition to enforce will be granted in part and denied in part.

The labor relations difficulties being experienced at the Longview, Texas plant of petitioner have been considered by this court in two recent opinions. See Trailmobile Division, Pullman Incorporated v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1967) , (order to bargain set aside); Trailmobile Division, Pullman Incorporated v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1968) , (order involving § 8(a) (1) violations enforced; order involving § 8(a) (3) and (1) violation denied enforcement).

This most recent chapter in the continuing struggle between Trailmobile and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW), AFL-CIO, involves an economic strike and the failure to reinstate employees to their former positions either in whole or in part. It also involves an order finding coercive interrogation of one employee and the improper disciplining of another.

The record supports the finding of coercive interrogation in violation of § 8(a) (1) of the Act with respect to employee Hill and the order is due to be enforced as it respects this activity. 29 U.S.C.'A. § 158(a) (1); NLRB v. Harbison-Fischer Manufacturing Company, 304 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1962).

[1008]*1008Another § 8(a) (1) violation rests on the disciplining of union secretary Green for attempting to present employee grievances to the company. Green was elected secretary of the union in 1965. Between January and July of 1966 he attempted on three separate occasions to present grievances on behalf of other employees to management. One grievance centered around Green’s contention that welders were not being promoted from within the plant ranks; on another occasion he complained of written reprimands being given to two fellow employees; and another involved the seniority rights of an employee. The third occasion, involving the welders, resulting in the plant superintendent issuing a written warning to Green to the effect that Green was involving himself in matters with which he was not personally concerned. The warning provided that no further harassment of management representatives would be tolerated even if it was necessary to discharge Green.

We have held in at least two cases that the presentation of grievances of the type in cuestión is protected by § 7 of the Act. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., Inc., 369 F.2d 859, 866 (5th Cir. 1966) ; NLRB v. Bowman Transportation, Inc., 314 F.2d 497, 498 (5th Cir. 1963). Trailmobile failed to call these cases to our attention; rather it chooses to rely on NLRB v. I. Posner, Inc., 342 F.2d 826 (2d Cir. 1965), where the court pointed out that § 8(a) (5) was restricted to the presentation of grievances by bargaining representatives enjoying majority support. The union there did not enjoy majority status. The employer refused to talk with a group of employees while a union representative was present. This was held not to violate § 8(a) (1). That decision is clearly inapposite for here the attempted presentation of the grievances and the warning occurred during the time when Green was occupying his official status as secretary of the union and during the time when the union was enjoying certification as the bargaining representative. It is true that Trailmobile had refused to bargain and was pursuing its remedy of review and that this court eventually set aside the order. This, however, was much later, in fact on June 21, 1967. We conclude that our prior decisions are controlling; that presentation of the grievances under the circumstances was within the protective ambit of § 7 of the Act. The Board did not err in holding that § 8(a) (1) of the Act was violated by the threat against Green.

The Board found § 8(a) (3) and (1) violations in the refusal to reinstate two employees, Hammock and Hill, to their old jobs following the termination of the economic strike. They were given other and less desirable positions. The record supports this holding of the Board. Trailmobile failed to show “legitimate and substantial business justifications” for its refusal to reinstate them to their former positions. NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailers Co., 389 U.S. 375, 88 S.Ct. 543, 19 L.Ed.2d 614, 617 (1967); NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1968).

This leaves for decision the postponed reinstatement of employee Green from January 21, 1966, after the termination of the economic strike on January 20th, until his full reinstatement on January 27, 1966, and the permanent discharges of employees Felts, Gray, and Colley. These four employees were officials of the union: Green, Secretary; Gray, Vice President; Felts and Colley, both trustees, and all four, members of the negotiating committee. On Friday night, November 26, 1965, after spending a substantial portion of the day at the picket booth, these four men engaged in pugilistic and terroristic activities involving three non-union employees, Travis Higginbotham, Gerald Cox, and D. G. Clark, who were continuing to work during the strike, these activities beginning at the Horseshoe Lounge, a Longview night spot, at about 8:30 p. m. and ending on the highway in [1009]*1009an adjoining county in front of the home of one of the non-striking employees, D. G. Clark, between 11 and 12 o’clock that night. It will be necessary to outline as briefly as possible some of the evening’s activities and in doing so let us note carefully the accounts given by the union men themselves since the examiner chose to accept the testimony of Green, Felts, and Colley, rejecting that of Higginbotham and Clark.

Pausing first at the Pig Trail Inn where they had a beer or two the four striking employees arrived at the Horse Shoe Lounge shortly after 8 p. m. where some of them had another beer. About 8:30 the three non-striking employees, having paused first at the Mardi Gras and having had some beer also, arrived at the Horse Shoe Lounge not knowing of the presence there of the first four men. Felts, Colley, and Green were seated in a booth (Gray was dancing or playing a juke box or both) when Clark, Higginbotham, and. Cox walked in through the rear door. The Lounge was dimly lighted and Colley recognized the late arrivals before the latter could see those already present. What happened then is covered by the Examiner’s findings as follows:

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407 F.2d 1006, 70 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2849, 1969 U.S. App. LEXIS 8828, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/trailmobile-division-pullman-incorporated-v-national-labor-relations-ca5-1969.