Tracor, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company

519 F.2d 1288, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 13838
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
DecidedJuly 7, 1975
Docket74-1692
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 519 F.2d 1288 (Tracor, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Tracor, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company, 519 F.2d 1288, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 13838 (7th Cir. 1975).

Opinion

PER CURIAM.

Defendant-Appellant, Hewlett-Packard Company, appeals from a judgment order of the district court upholding the validity of U. S. Patent 3,601,609, “Ionization Detection Device Using a Nickel-63 Radioactive Source”, granted August *1289 24, 1971 and owned by plaintiff-appellee, Tracor, Inc., and finding that Hewlett-Packard had infringed claims 1, 2 and 11 of the patent.

The subject matter of Tracor’s patent, insofar as claims 1, 2 and 11 are concerned, is the use of the radioactive isotope nickel-63 as a radiation source in an electron capture device operative at temperatures in excess of 225° C for use with gas chromatographs. William L. Yauger, Jr. is named in the patent as the inventor. At the time of his invention in October, 1964, Yauger was employed as a Product Line Specialist in Gas Chromatography by Micro-Tek Instruments, Inc. located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Micro-Tek was subsequently purchased by Tracor, and the Yauger patent was assigned to Tracor.

On March 6, 1972, Tracor commenced this action charging Hewlett-Packard and three other companies 1 with patent infringement. 2 Hewlett-Packard filed a counterclaim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 — 02 for a declaratory judgment of invalidity, non-infringement, and unenforceability. As a basis for its claim of invalidity, Hewlett-Packard contended that (1) the patented invention was anticipated by the prior art and was not patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 102; (2) at the time of the invention, the subject matter of the patent was obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103; 3 and (3) “the patent does not comply with the statutory requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 with respect to sufficiency of disclosure and distinctness of claims”.

The case was tried without a jury. 4 At the outset of the trial, the court appointed a neutral expert, Dr. Leon M. Stock, Professor of Chemistry, University of Chicago, who listened to the testimony of the witnesses and studied the depositions and documentary evidence submitted by both parties. At the close of the testimony, he made an oral report, analyzing the testimony of the witnesses and expressing his own opinion. He was then examined by court and counsel. Following the trial, the district court adopted in full the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law submitted by Tracor, holding that the patent was valid and had been infringed by Hewlett-Packard. 5

*1290 As in the district court, the primary issue on appeal is whether the use of nickel-63 in an electron capture device was obvious to those skilled in the art, thus rendering the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Hewlett-Packard contends that: (1) the Yauger “invention” consists of nothing more than the substitution of one known material for another in an old device with no unexpected or surprising result, and under the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Sinclair and Carroll Co., Inc. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 65 S.Ct. 1143, 89 L.Ed. 1644 (1945) and this court in Johnson & Johnson v. Kendall Co., 327 F.2d 391 (7 Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 934, 84 S.Ct. 1337, 12 L.Ed.2d 297 (1964), Yauger’s invention is not patentable; (2) the high cost and unavailability of nickel-63 explains the fact that those working in the art failed to use nickel-63 in electron capture devices; and (3) Tracor failed to apprise the Patent Office of all relevant prior art and of the unavailability of nickel-63, so that the statutory presumption of validity which attends the grant of a patent is not applicable.

The district court properly recognized that,

“While the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law . . . , the § 103 condition . . . lends itself to several basic factual inquiries. Under § 103, the scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved. Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or nonobviousness, these inquiries have relevancy. See Note, Subtests of ‘Nonobviousness’: A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U.Pa.L. Rev. 1169 (1964).”

Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18, 86 S.Ct. 684, 694, 15 L.Ed.2d 545 (1966).

In making the basic factual inquiries set forth in Graham, the district court made numerous findings of fact and concluded that the claimed subject matter of Tracor’s patent was not obvious. After a careful review of the pleadings, transcripts, depositions and exhibits we cannot say that the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. We adopt the findings of the district court and affirm its decision that the use of nickel-63 in a high temperature electron capture device was not obvious within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 103. We are attaching as an appendix the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, setting forth verbatim the district court’s findings and conclusions specifically relating to the issue of obviousness and summarizing the remaining findings and conclusions.

Of the three reasons urged by appellant in support of its contention that the Tracor patent is invalid because its subject matter was obvious, only one was not fully considered and developed by the district court in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, i. e,, appellant’s first claim, that the invention was nothing more than the substitution of one material for another in an old device, with no unexpected or surprising result. As noted supra, appellant relies on Sinclair and Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corporation and Johnson & Johnson v. Kendall Co. We conclude that both are distinguishable.

In Sinclair, the Court invalidated a patent for a printing ink which would not dry at ordinary room temperatures on printer rollers, but which would dry instantly upon the application of heat to the printer sheet.

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Bluebook (online)
519 F.2d 1288, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 468, 1975 U.S. App. LEXIS 13838, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/tracor-inc-v-hewlett-packard-company-ca7-1975.