Township of Jackson v. Hamburger

2 N.J. Tax 430
CourtNew Jersey Tax Court
DecidedApril 27, 1981
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 2 N.J. Tax 430 (Township of Jackson v. Hamburger) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Township of Jackson v. Hamburger, 2 N.J. Tax 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981).

Opinion

RIMM, J. T. C.

This local property tax matter involves the right of the taxpayers to farmland assessment treatment for the tax years 1978 and 1979. The property is one tax lot of 22.06 acres in Block 84, originally assessed for the tax year 1978 as Lot 1 with a regular assessment for 10.06 acres and as Lot IQ with a farm qualified assessment for 12 acres as follows:

[432]*432Lot 1 Lot IQ
Land $.14,500 $ 4,000
Improvements 26,800 -0-
Total $ 41,300 $ 4,000

By judgment' of the Ocean County Board of Taxation the assessment for 1978 was determined to be as follows:

Lot 1 Lot IQ
Land 5,500 $ 4,100
Improvements 26,800 -0-
Total 32,300 $ 4,100

The judgment was based on a determination that 21.06 acres of the tract qualified for farmland assessment and one acre did not. The township appealed from the 1978 county board judgment to the Division of Tax Appeals.

For 1979 the same original assessments were made, and both the taxpayer and the township appealed to the county board of taxation. The taxpayer sought the same farmland qualification adjudicated by the board for 1978. The township sought determinations that the property did not qualify as farmland at all and that the total assessment should be increased to $93,000. The county board judgment for 1979 was the same as the judgment for 1978. The township then filed a complaint with the Tax Court for 1979, seeking a judgment increasing the assessment. The matter before the Division was transferred' to the Tax Court, N.J.S.A. 2A:3A-26, and consolidated for trial with the 1979 matter, R. 4:38-1.

The undisputed evidence at trial indicated that the taxpayers qualify for farmland assessment treatment on the basis of their income, and the only issue before the court, is the area of Block 84, Lot 1 devoted to agricultural use under the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964, N.J.S.A. 54:4-23.1 et seq.

[433]*433The first witness was a field man employed in the township assessor’s office who testified that defendants’ farm is located at the intersection of Leesville Road and Pleasant Grove Road in a rural residential area. The lot is irregular in shape, with 1178 feet of frontage on Pleasant Grove Road and 1028 feet of frontage of Leesville Road. During his testimony a hand-drawn diagram prepared by the witness was admitted into evidence. Referring to the diagram the witness testified that there was a 3.2 acre soybean field in the Pleasant Grove Road vicinity. In the Leesville Road area of the tract there were located two chicken coops, an egg house, a pump house, a .44-acre vegetable field, a shed and the farmhouse. The witness testified that he had made careful measurements of the fields and the structures and, including only the actual dimensions of the structures, the area of the two fields and the structures devoted to agricultural use totaled 4.05 acres. He further testified that he regarded defendants as egg farmers who sold eggs, chickens and vegetables and who rented the soybean field to the adjoining farmer. On examination by the court the witness conceded that at least one-half acre around the shed was used for farm purposes and that an additional area of from one-half acre to three-quarters of an acre around the chicken coops was also used for farm purposes. Finally, the witness described defendants’ activities and their use of a tractor and “wagon” on these areas. In response to questions on cross-examination by one of the defendants, the witness also conceded that there was a disposal pit on the farm used in connection with the defendants’ chicken-raising and egg-farming activities. No area was given for this pit. This witness also testified that approximately 14 acres of the entire 22.06 acres of the lot are wooded and swampy and could not be used for any purpose other than as woodland.

Defendants called as their first witness the Ocean County Agricultural Agent. He testified that defendants are primarily commercial egg producers and have been so at this location for approximately 20 years. He considered the tract to be a farm, a “viable entity” as he described it, with the open space between [434]*434the coops a part of the farming operation and the entire tract necessarily devoted to farm use because of the manure odor. The wooded and wet areas acted as a buffer area between defendants’ activities and the surrounding roads and lots.

Defendant wife testified that she and her husband have lived on and farmed the property since 1959; they have 4,500 chickens; they use trucks on the farm to transport both chickens and feed, and they dispose of the chicken manure on their farm tract, but at some distance from the coops. She also claimed that, in addition to the chicken-raising and egg-farming activities, four acres of the farm were in soybeans and vegetables, and not 3.64 acres as testified to by the assessor’s field man.

The original testimony of the field man, in which he testified that he included only the land actually under the farm structures as farmland, results from a misconception of N.J.S.A. 54:44-23.11. That section of the Farmland Assessment Act of 1964 provides that, in determining the total area of land actively devoted to agricultural use, “there shall be included the area of all land under bams, shed, silos, cribs, greenhouses and like structures.” The statute does not exclude from the area of land actively devoted to agriculture the land surrounding such structures, and if such surrounding land is devoted to such use it shall be included in the determination of the total area of land actively devoted to agricultural use. In determining what constitutes “devoted to agricultural” use, this court relies on East Orange v. Livingston Tp., 102 N.J.Super. 512, 246 A.2d 178 (Law Div. 1968), aff’d 54 N.J. 96, 253 A.2d 546 (1969). There the court said:

In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, the language employed should be given its ordinary and common significance .... the term “devote” must be understood in its usual significance and in a manner which will sensibly effectuate the salient statutory objective of providing tax relief with respect to lands committed to farming.
The verb “devote” denotes variously “1.... to set apart or dedicate by a solemn act; to consecrate; ... 2. to give up wholly; to addict; to direct the attention of wholly or chiefly”. A synonym is “to set apart” or “to appropriate”. [435]*435An equivalent verb is “to dedicate”. Webster’s New International Dictionary, 715 (1948 ed.), 715. [at 536-37; emphasis supplied]

Based on the field man’s testimony and that of the defendant wife and the agricultural agent, the court finds that the 1 to lVi additional acres of land surrounding the chicken coops and the shed were used for farm purposes and for no other purpose. These areas were given up wholly to agricultural use in the raising of chickens and the production of eggs. Land devoted to the production for sale of poultry and poultry products is deemed to be in agricultural use.

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2 N.J. Tax 430, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/township-of-jackson-v-hamburger-njtaxct-1981.