Opinion
PER CURIAM.
This is a consolidated appeal1 emanating from a decision of the Connecticut siting council (council), the named defendant in the first case, approving, subject to certain modifications and conditions, an application of the defendant Célico Partnership (Célico), doing business as Bell Atlantic Mobile, filed pursuant to the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act; General Statutes § 16-50g et seq.; for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the construction, operation and maintenance of a telecommunications tower facility (tower) to be located in the town of Westport (town). Cellco’s application proposed to share the tower with four other wireless telecommu[268]*268nication service providers,2 including both cellular and noncellular providers. The council approved the application following three public hearings held pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50m,3 at which the town participated and opposed Cellco’s application. In addition, the [269]*269four other service providers participated as intervenors in the council proceedings.4
The council’s decision approving the application was predicated on its determination that it had jurisdiction over the proposed facility because the facility would be “used in a cellular system” within the meaning of General Statutes § 16-50i (a) (6).5 Indeed, the council asserted that, pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50x (a),6 [270]*270it had exclusive authority, maintaining that the town does not retain jurisdiction to enforce its own municipal laws, despite the fact that the proposed tower would have both cellular and noncellular attachments. In addressing the merits of whether to issue the certificate, the council found that Cellco’s existing facilities in the area did not provide adequate coverage or capacity in the northern portion of the town and noted similar deficiencies by the other carriers. The council determined that shared access to the tower by the cellular and noncellular service providers would be consistent with state law and policy promoting shared use. With regard to the potential environmental impact of the facility, the council made extensive findings supporting its conclusions that “[development of the . . . site would involve minimal land disturbance and would not substantially alter the character of the natural resources including wetlands and watercourse, vegetative composition, and wildlife habitats. Furthermore, there are no environmental constraints at this site [that] would justify denial of this site.” Finally, in response to concerns raised by the town, in order to minimize the impact on the residential neighborhood, the scenic quality of the Merritt Parkway and the Poplar Plains brook that traversed the proposed site, the council ordered that the tower be reduced in height and relocated on the lot further away from the inland wetlands and the watercourse than proposed by Célico.
Following the council’s approval of the application and grant of the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need, subject to certain conditions, Célico [271]*271proceeded with plans to construct the approved tower. It submitted the certificate to the town zoning enforcement officer in order to receive the zoning certification necessary to obtain a building permit. The zoning officer informed Célico that its failure to comply with the town’s zoning regulations prevented the issuance of the permit. Célico appealed from the zoning enforcement officer’s decision to the zoning board of appeals, which thereafter denied the appeal.
Pursuant to General Statutes § § 4-183 and 16-50q,7 the town appealed from the council’s decision approving Cellco’s application for the certificate of environmental compatibility, and pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-8 and 8-10,8 Célico appealed from the zoning board of [272]*272appeals’ decision denying its appeal from the zoning officer’s denial of its application for a certificate of zoning compliance. See Westport v. Connecticut Siting Council, 47 Conn. Sup. 382, 797 A.2d 655 (2001). Because the claims overlapped, the trial court consolidated the appeals.
The trial court first considered Cellco’s claim that, because the council has exclusive jurisdiction over the siting of a telecommunications tower, pursuant to the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, and the town had no direct role in the siting process, the town was not aggrieved and, therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the town’s appeal. See Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 214 Conn. 726, 729, 573 A.2d 736 (1990) (party must be aggrieved to have standing to bring administrative appeal). The trial court rejected that contention, however, concluding that, because, under the town’s theory, a mixed use of cellular and noncellular providers, as in this case, would allow the town to apply its local laws and ordinances, the decision of the council interfering with the town’s rights made it an aggrieved party.
Turning to the merits of the consolidated appeals, the trial court addressed the issue of whether the council improperly asserted its exclusive authority in locating the tower and, concomitantly, whether the zoning board of appeals improperly denied Cellco’s appeal from the denial of its application for a certificate of zoning compliance necessary for the issuance of a building permit. The trial court determined, based upon its reading of §§ 16-50x (a) and 16-50i (a) (6),9 in conjunction with General Statutes § 16-50p (b) (1) (B) and (b) (2),10 that [273]*273the legislature intended to give the council exclusive jurisdiction over telecommunication towers, including those that are shared by cellular and noncellular carriers. The trial court next considered the town’s argument that the council’s actions were procedurally and substantively illegal. Applying a limited standard of review pursuant to § 4-183 (j), the court examined whether the council’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether its decision approving the application subject to certain modifications reflected a proper application of the pertinent statutory factors set forth in the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act. Concluding that the council’s actions were proper, the trial court next turned to the town’s procedural claim that the council had acted improperly by deferring any consideration of the town’s zoning regulations until after the council’s approval of the [274]*274application for the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need.
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Opinion
PER CURIAM.
This is a consolidated appeal1 emanating from a decision of the Connecticut siting council (council), the named defendant in the first case, approving, subject to certain modifications and conditions, an application of the defendant Célico Partnership (Célico), doing business as Bell Atlantic Mobile, filed pursuant to the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act; General Statutes § 16-50g et seq.; for a certificate of environmental compatibility and public need for the construction, operation and maintenance of a telecommunications tower facility (tower) to be located in the town of Westport (town). Cellco’s application proposed to share the tower with four other wireless telecommu[268]*268nication service providers,2 including both cellular and noncellular providers. The council approved the application following three public hearings held pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50m,3 at which the town participated and opposed Cellco’s application. In addition, the [269]*269four other service providers participated as intervenors in the council proceedings.4
The council’s decision approving the application was predicated on its determination that it had jurisdiction over the proposed facility because the facility would be “used in a cellular system” within the meaning of General Statutes § 16-50i (a) (6).5 Indeed, the council asserted that, pursuant to General Statutes § 16-50x (a),6 [270]*270it had exclusive authority, maintaining that the town does not retain jurisdiction to enforce its own municipal laws, despite the fact that the proposed tower would have both cellular and noncellular attachments. In addressing the merits of whether to issue the certificate, the council found that Cellco’s existing facilities in the area did not provide adequate coverage or capacity in the northern portion of the town and noted similar deficiencies by the other carriers. The council determined that shared access to the tower by the cellular and noncellular service providers would be consistent with state law and policy promoting shared use. With regard to the potential environmental impact of the facility, the council made extensive findings supporting its conclusions that “[development of the . . . site would involve minimal land disturbance and would not substantially alter the character of the natural resources including wetlands and watercourse, vegetative composition, and wildlife habitats. Furthermore, there are no environmental constraints at this site [that] would justify denial of this site.” Finally, in response to concerns raised by the town, in order to minimize the impact on the residential neighborhood, the scenic quality of the Merritt Parkway and the Poplar Plains brook that traversed the proposed site, the council ordered that the tower be reduced in height and relocated on the lot further away from the inland wetlands and the watercourse than proposed by Célico.
Following the council’s approval of the application and grant of the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need, subject to certain conditions, Célico [271]*271proceeded with plans to construct the approved tower. It submitted the certificate to the town zoning enforcement officer in order to receive the zoning certification necessary to obtain a building permit. The zoning officer informed Célico that its failure to comply with the town’s zoning regulations prevented the issuance of the permit. Célico appealed from the zoning enforcement officer’s decision to the zoning board of appeals, which thereafter denied the appeal.
Pursuant to General Statutes § § 4-183 and 16-50q,7 the town appealed from the council’s decision approving Cellco’s application for the certificate of environmental compatibility, and pursuant to General Statutes §§ 8-8 and 8-10,8 Célico appealed from the zoning board of [272]*272appeals’ decision denying its appeal from the zoning officer’s denial of its application for a certificate of zoning compliance. See Westport v. Connecticut Siting Council, 47 Conn. Sup. 382, 797 A.2d 655 (2001). Because the claims overlapped, the trial court consolidated the appeals.
The trial court first considered Cellco’s claim that, because the council has exclusive jurisdiction over the siting of a telecommunications tower, pursuant to the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act, and the town had no direct role in the siting process, the town was not aggrieved and, therefore, the court did not have jurisdiction to consider the town’s appeal. See Connecticut Business & Industry Assn., Inc. v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 214 Conn. 726, 729, 573 A.2d 736 (1990) (party must be aggrieved to have standing to bring administrative appeal). The trial court rejected that contention, however, concluding that, because, under the town’s theory, a mixed use of cellular and noncellular providers, as in this case, would allow the town to apply its local laws and ordinances, the decision of the council interfering with the town’s rights made it an aggrieved party.
Turning to the merits of the consolidated appeals, the trial court addressed the issue of whether the council improperly asserted its exclusive authority in locating the tower and, concomitantly, whether the zoning board of appeals improperly denied Cellco’s appeal from the denial of its application for a certificate of zoning compliance necessary for the issuance of a building permit. The trial court determined, based upon its reading of §§ 16-50x (a) and 16-50i (a) (6),9 in conjunction with General Statutes § 16-50p (b) (1) (B) and (b) (2),10 that [273]*273the legislature intended to give the council exclusive jurisdiction over telecommunication towers, including those that are shared by cellular and noncellular carriers. The trial court next considered the town’s argument that the council’s actions were procedurally and substantively illegal. Applying a limited standard of review pursuant to § 4-183 (j), the court examined whether the council’s findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record and whether its decision approving the application subject to certain modifications reflected a proper application of the pertinent statutory factors set forth in the Public Utility Environmental Standards Act. Concluding that the council’s actions were proper, the trial court next turned to the town’s procedural claim that the council had acted improperly by deferring any consideration of the town’s zoning regulations until after the council’s approval of the [274]*274application for the certificate of environmental compatibility and public need. Following its examination of the record before the council, which included testimony and exhibits relating to the town’s zoning and other regulatory concerns, the court rejected the town’s procedural claim, concluding that the council had recognized the town’s concerns, including the factors encompassing environmental and residential objections, prior to the application approval, as evidenced, in part, by it conditioning its approval on Cellco’s compliance with some of the town’s recommendations. Accordingly, the trial court, in separate judgments, dismissed the town’s appeal and sustained Cellco’s appeal. This appeal followed.
Our careful examination of the record, coupled with the briefs and arguments of the parties, persuades us that the judgments of the trial court should be affirmed. The question of aggrievement, and the issues pertaining to whether the council’s jurisdiction was exclusive and whether there existed any prejudicial procedural impropriety, were properly resolved in the thoughtful and comprehensive memorandum of decision filed by the trial court. See Westport v. Connecticut Siting Council, supra, 47 Conn. Sup. 392-408. Because that memorandum of decision fully addresses the arguments raised in the present appeal, it would serve no useful purpose for us to repeat the discussion therein contained. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court’s well reasoned decision. See Walsh v. National Safety Associates, Inc., 241 Conn. 278, 282, 694 A.2d 795 (1997); Molnar v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 239 Conn. 233, 235, 685 A.2d 1107 (1996); Greater Bridgeport Transit District v. State Board of Labor Relations, 232 Conn. 57, 64, 653 A.2d 151 (1995); Advanced Business Systems, Inc. v. Crystal, 231 Conn. 378, 380-81, 650 A.2d 540 (1994).
The judgments are affirmed.