Town of Hingham v. Slater

98 F. Supp. 2d 131, 1999 WL 1864939
CourtDistrict Court, D. Massachusetts
DecidedMay 30, 2000
DocketCiv.A. 96-11650-RCL
StatusPublished

This text of 98 F. Supp. 2d 131 (Town of Hingham v. Slater) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Massachusetts primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Town of Hingham v. Slater, 98 F. Supp. 2d 131, 1999 WL 1864939 (D. Mass. 2000).

Opinion

ORDER ON CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court are cross motions for summary judgment filed by the plaintiff (docket no. 109) and the defendants (docket nos. 122 and 129). These motions were referred to Chief Magistrate Judge Robert B. Collings for a report and recommendation. Judge Collings, in a detailed report, recommended that the motion for summary judgment of the plaintiff be denied, that the motions of the defendants be granted, and that judgment be entered in favor of the defendants as a matter of law. The plaintiff filed a timely objection to both recommendations. On May 8, 2000, however, the plaintiff notified the court that the plaintiff has withdrawn its objection to the report of Judge Collings and to the entry of judgment as recommended in the report.

Accordingly, the court adopts, as its ruling in this case, the report and recommendation of Judge Collings and directs the clerk to enter judgment in favor of the defendants in accordance with that report.

SO ORDERED.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#109), MASSACHUSETTS BAY TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#122) AND FEDERAL DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#124)

COLLINGS, Chief United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction

This case now comes before the Court on motions for summary judgment filed by all parties which have been referred to the undersigned for the issuance of findings of fact and recommendations as to disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). 1 This civil action was instituted in mid-August, 1996, with the filing of the original complaint by the plaintiff, Town of Hingham (hereinafter “Hingham”), as against the defendants Federico Pena 2 in his official capacity as the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Transportation, Gordon Linton in his official capacity as the administrator of the Federal Transit Administration (hereinafter “FTA”), Richard Doyle in his official *133 capacity as the regional administrator of the FTA (hereinafter collectively “the federal defendants”), and James J. Kerasi-otes 3 in his official capacity as Chairman of the Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority (hereinafter “MBTA”). Hing-ham seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to stop construction of the Greenbush Line of the Old Colony Railroad Rehabilitation Project until such time as the defendants have complied with the requirements of certain federal laws alleged to be applicable to the project, to wit, Section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation (“DOT”) Act, 49 U.S.C. § 303 (hereinafter “Section 4(f)”), Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”), 16 U.S.C. § 470f, and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).

In October of 1996 the federal defendants joined in a motion to dismiss the complaint while the sole state defendant filed a separate comparable motion. In a report and recommendation that was subsequently accepted by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned, it was recommended that the dispositive motion submitted by the MBTA be denied and that the federal defendants’ motion be allowed to the extent that dismissal was sought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Fed.R.Civ.P., and otherwise denied. It was further recommended that the plaintiff be afforded the opportunity to file an amended complaint in order to cure the jurisdictional infirmity.

In due course Hingham filed its Amended Complaint For Declaratory And Injunc-tive Relief (# 57) as to which the defendants filed their respective answers. (58, 67) The administrative record was compiled and submitted on or about April 30, 1998.(# 71) 4 Approximately two months later Hingham filed a motion to supplement the administrative record (# 74) which the federal defendants opposed.!# 75) That motion was denied without prejudice by Judge Lindsay in mid-July, 1998. Shortly thereafter on or about August 7, 1998, the plaintiff filed another motion to supplement the administrative record (# 78) and, once again, the federal defendants objected. (# 81) After being referred to the undersigned for decision, that second motion, too, was denied after a hearing on December 28, 1998.

During a telephone conference in early January of this year, although the parties seemed to share the view that this case should be resolved via summary judgment motions, Hingham contended that documents outside the administrative record could be considered in deciding such motions while the defendants disagreed. Essentially this was the same issue raised by the prior motions to supplement albeit dressed in a different guise. In an effort finally to join this issue for ultimate resolution, the plaintiff was granted leave to file a motion for summary judgment together with a memorandum and materials in support by the close of business on January 27, 1999, and, by February 17, 1999, the defendants were granted leave either to file a motion to strike or a cross-motion for summary judgment. Hingham was to file any opposition to the defendants’ submission by March 10,1999.

*134 The defendants opted to file a motion to strike and' after a hearing, on May 11, 1999, a Memorandum and Order (# 106) issued wherein that joint motion was allowed with respect to nine of the eleven proposed exhibits, reserved with respect to another and denied with another. 5 Eighteen days later Hingham filed an amended motion for summary judgment (# 109) together with an amended memorandum in support (# 110) and an amended statement of facts (# 111). The defendants submitted a joint response to the plaintiffs amended statement of facts (# 121) as well as separate motions for summary judgment ( 122, 124) and supporting papers ( 123,125,126 6 ). The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ dispositive motions (# 129), and both the state defendant and the federal defendants filed reply briefs ( 133, 135). Oral argument was heard on October 5, 1999, and the three summary judgment motions now stand ready for resolution.

II. The Facts

Generally speaking there is little dispute with respect to the historical facts underlying this case. To the extent that any such disagreement does exist, it shall be duly noted.

At the outset, an identification of the players is in order. Established in 1635, Hingham is the northern-most town in Plymouth County, 18 miles southeast of Boston by land and 11 miles southeast by water.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

United States v. Sherwood
312 U.S. 584 (Supreme Court, 1941)
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe
401 U.S. 402 (Supreme Court, 1971)
Califano v. Sanders
430 U.S. 99 (Supreme Court, 1977)
Thomas v. Arn
474 U.S. 140 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council
490 U.S. 360 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Ross v. Federal Highway Administration
162 F.3d 1046 (Tenth Circuit, 1998)
Airport Impact Relief, Inc. v. Wykle
192 F.3d 197 (First Circuit, 1999)
City of Boston v. John A. Volpe
464 F.2d 254 (First Circuit, 1972)
Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Company
616 F.2d 603 (First Circuit, 1980)
United States v. Pablo Escoboza Vega
678 F.2d 376 (First Circuit, 1982)
Samuel E. Scott v. Richard S. Schweiker
702 F.2d 13 (First Circuit, 1983)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
98 F. Supp. 2d 131, 1999 WL 1864939, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/town-of-hingham-v-slater-mad-2000.