Tosado v. Miller

720 N.E.2d 1075, 188 Ill. 2d 186, 242 Ill. Dec. 120, 1999 Ill. LEXIS 975

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Decided: October 21, 1999
• Docket: 84712
• Status: Published

Opinions

JUSTICE MILLER

delivered the judgment of the court:

Plaintiffs brought separate actions in the circuit court of Cook County seeking to recover damages against defendants for alleged medical malpractice. Defendants were local public entities or their employees. In each case, defendants filed motions to dismiss. In the motions, defendants alleged that the one-year limitation period found in section 8 — 101 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 et seq. (West 1996)) barred plaintiffs’ actions. The circuit court denied defendants’ motions to dismiss. The appellate court consolidated these cases on appeal and reversed. 293 Ill. App. 3d 544. We allowed plaintiffs’ joint petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a). In addition, we granted the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association leave to submit a brief as amicus curiae. 155 Ill. 2d R. 345. We now affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

BACKGROUND

Cause No. 92 — L—4475

Plaintiff, Linnette Concepcion Tosado, commenced her action on April 10, 1992, by filing a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. The complaint alleged that Drs. Miller, Kopolovic, Cohen, Barnett, and Padilla, all Cook County Hospital employees, were negligent in failing to assess the likelihood of scarring in connection with her surgery. The complaint further alleged that defendants were negligent in failing to warn her of the risks and consequences associated with the surgery and that her consent to the surgery was therefore uninformed.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2 — 619 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 619 (West 1992)). In their motion, defendants argued that Tosado’s claim must fail because her complaint was filed more than one year after the date of the injury or discovery of a cause of action. Defendants relied on the one-year limitation period contained in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act. Following a hearing, the trial judge denied defendants’ motion believing that a two-year statute of limitation applied. The trial judge, however, found that the case involved a question of law as to which there is a substantial ground for difference of opinion and certified to the appellate court, in substance, the following question:

In a medical malpractice case against a local entity and/or its employees, does the one-year limitation period in the Tort Immunity Act or the two-year limitation period in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a) (West 1992)) apply?

Defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal in the appellate court and leave was granted. The appellate court consolidated this cause with cause No. 94 — L— 15720 and reversed the circuit courts’ denial of defendants’ motions to dismiss. 293 Ill. App. 3d 544. In doing so, the appellate court held that “the one-year limitations period of the Tort Immunity Act controls because it is a more specific statute and because this construction comports with the plain language of the Tort Immunity Act.” 293 Ill. App. 3d at 546. We allowed plaintiffs’ joint petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

Cause No. 94 — L—15720

In cause No. 94 — L—15720, plaintiff, Gail Phipps, commenced her action on December 12, 1994, by filing a complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. Phipps subsequently filed a nine-count amended complaint. According to the allegations in the amended complaint, defendants, Cook County Hospital, Dr. K. Naidoo, an employee of the hospital, and Lincoln Medical Center, Ltd., a professional medical corporation, were negligent in providing Phipps medical care during her pregnancy.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss counts IV through IX of the amended complaint, those counts naming Cook County Hospital and its employee, Dr. K. Naidoo, as defendants, pursuant to section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 et seq. (West 1996)). Counts I through III were filed against a private corporation and are not at issue in this appeal. In their motion, defendants argued that Phipps’ action was untimely under the one-year limitation period found in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act. Phipps responded by asserting that section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure set forth the applicable limitation period.

Following a hearing, the trial judge denied defendants’ motion. The trial judge, however, found that the order involved a question of law about which there are substantial grounds for a difference of an opinion. The trial judge certified to the appellate court substantially the same question as did the judge in cause No. 92 — L— 4475.

Defendants filed a petition for leave to appeal in the appellate court. The appellate court granted defendants’ petition. As noted above, the appellate court consolidated these causes for appeal and reversed the circuit courts’ denial of defendants’ motions. 293 Ill. App. 3d 544. We allowed plaintiffs’ joint petition for leave to appeal. 177 Ill. 2d R. 315(a).

DISCUSSION

The issue presented in this case is whether the two-year limitation period in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure or the one-year limitation period in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to medical malpractice actions against local governmental entities and/or their employees.

Section 13 — 212 of the Code provides in pertinent part:

“Physician or hospital, (a) Except as provided in Section 13 — 215 of this Act, no action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, *** of the injury or death ***.” 735 ILCS 5/13 — 212(a) (West 1992). Section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act provides:

“No civil action may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. For purposes of this Article, the term ‘civil action’ includes any action, whether based upon the common law or statutes or Constitution of this State.” 745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 (West 1996).

We believe the language of the statutes is plain and unambiguous. As such, there is no occasion to use aids in the construction of either statute and the plain meaning of the statutes should prevail. Fosco v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 213 Ill. App. 3d 842 (1991). However, because either section 13 — 212(a) of the Code or section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act could apply to plaintiffs’ actions in the absence of the other, we must decide which of these conflicting provisions must be given effect. In doing so, we must determine which of the two statutes more specifically applies to the case at hand. Zimmer v. Village of Willowbrook, 242 Ill. App. 3d 437, 442 (1993).

Plaintiffs argue that section 13 — 212(a), containing the two-year limitation period, is the more specific statute and accordingly should be applied to this case. They assert that section 13 — 212 more narrowly defines defendants, specifying physicians, dentists, registered nurses and hospitals, rather than setting forth the broader category of all governmental entities and their employees. In addition, plaintiffs argue that section 13— 212 more narrowly defines plaintiffs and the nature of the claim, specifying that the action must arise out of patient care, as opposed to the broader language of section 8 — 101 that applies to any injury.

In support of these contentions, plaintiffs rely upon two appellate court decisions, Lanxon v. Magnus, 296 Ill. App. 3d 377 (3d Dist. 1998), and Cleaver v. Marrese, 253 Ill. App. 3d 778 (5th Dist. 1993), and one federal district court decision, Murry v. Sheahan, 991 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1998), all of which considered the question presented here.

In Cleaver v. Marrese, 253 Ill. App. 3d 778 (5th Dist. 1993), plaintiff, Donna Cleaver, filed a medical malpractice action against Dr. R. Anthony Marrese and the Wood River Township Hospital. The trial court granted the hospital’s motion for summary judgment because plaintiff filed her complaint within two years, but more than one year after the date on which the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, finding that the two-year limitation period contained in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure applied. The appellate court stated that, “[Biased on the type of claim plaintiff has filed, an analysis of the conflicting statutes of limitations, and the rules of statutory construction, we conclude that section 13 — 212 more specifically applies to the instant case.” Cleaver, 253 Ill. App. 3d at 783.

In Lanxon v. Magnus, 296 Ill. App. 3d 377 (3d Dist. 1998), a case decided in the appellate court after the appellate court’s decision in the present case, plaintiffs Susan and Jeffery Meusel and plaintiff Amelia Lanxon, in separate cases, brought actions against Community-General Hospital Medical Center (CGH), a municipal corporation, and various other defendants for medical malpractice. In both cases, plaintiffs filed their complaints more than one year, but less than two years, after the accrual of their causes of actions.

CGH moved for summary judgment arguing that plaintiffs’ claims, in both cases, were barred by the one-year limitation period set forth in section 8 — 101. Plaintiffs argued that their suits were timely filed because the applicable limitation period was the two-year period found in section 13 — 212(a). The same trial judge denied summary judgment in each case, finding the two-year limitation period in section 13 — 212(a) applicable.

Because of the identity of the issues presented, the appellate court consolidated the Meusel and Lanxon cases on appeal and held that section 13 — 212(a) of the Code, containing the two-year limitation period, was more specifically applicable to the plaintiffs’ cases. The court explained:

“In applying the more traditional analysis of considering the nature of the claims and the type of injuries sustained by the instant plaintiffs, we find section 13— 212(a) more specifically applicable to their cases. Section 8 — 101 applies generally to civil actions for any injury, while section 13 — 212(a) applies specifically and exclusively to actions for injuries arising out of patient care. Accordingly, section 13 — 212(a) is the more specific statute and should prevail.” (Emphasis in original.) Lanxon, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 381.

Likewise, in Murry v. Sheahan, 991 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1998), a federal district court was asked to consider the question of whether section 13 — 212 or section 8 — 101 applied to pendent state law medical malpractice claims brought against Cook County and its agents. In that case, the then-presiding district judge originally denied defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that the two-year statute of limitations applied. The court was then asked to reconsider its ruling in light of the appellate court’s decision in this case. On reconsideration, a magistrate judge again held that the two-year limitation period applied. The judge explained:

“Here, the Physician or Hospital’s section of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure *** provides a statute of limitations period tailored to a specific cause of action and directed at a specific class of potential defendants: ‘actions for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital.’ 735 ILCS 5/13 — 212. In contrast, the *** Tort Immunity Act provides a statute of limitations period for a broad range of civil actions and potential liabilities: ‘civil actions against a local entity.’ 745 ILCS 10/8 — 101.”

We agree with the result reached in the appellate court in the case before us and disagree with the result reached in Cleaver, Lanxon and Murry. We believe that the focus of the inquiry under the statutes at issue here should be on the nature of the defendants rather than on the type of the cause of action. We believe, therefore, that the one-year limitation period contained in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act is more specifically applicable to these defendants.

The legislature, when enacting the Tort Immunity Act, specifically stated that its purpose was “to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government.” 745 ILCS 10/ 1 — 101.1(a) (West 1994). In enacting the Tort Immunity Act the legislature focused on a particular category of potential defendants and granted local governmental entities and their employees greater protection than nongovernmental entities and their employees.

This court recognized the legislative intent behind the Tort Immunity Act in Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill. 2d 288 (1976). In Saragusa, this court stated that the purpose of the limitation period contained in section 8 — 101 “is to encourage early investigation into the claim asserted against the local government at a time when the matter is still fresh, witnesses are available, and conditions have not materially changed.” Saragusa, 63 Ill. 2d at 293. Such an investigation permits prompt settlement of meritorious claims and allows governmental entities to plan their budgets in light of potential liabilities. Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 Ill. 2d 339, 342 (1971). The court in Saragusa further stated that “[b]ecause a local government entity must anticipate that the number of claims made against it will far exceed those brought against a private individual, the provision of an abridged period of time within which a claim must be asserted is reasonable.” Saragusa, 63 Ill. 2d at 293.

In enacting section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act, we believe, the legislature intended to protect a specific class of defendants, local governmental entities and their employees. Thus, in medical malpractice actions against local governmental entities or their employees the focus should be on the defendants rather than the cause of action or the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs.

By focusing on the category of defendants at issue in this case, it is clear that section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act is more specific than section 13 — 212 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 8 — 101 specifically applies to defendants which are local entities and the employees of those entities which are a more specific category of defendant within the broader group of any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital described in section 13 — 212(a). Because section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act is the more specific statute when considering causes of action against local governmental entities and their employees, we believe the one-year limitation provision of section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act applies to actions against those defendants.

Plaintiffs further argue that significant policy reasons should preclude application of the one-year limitation period to actions against local entities and/or their employees. They contend that a claim for medical malpractice is often not immediately apparent to the injured party; that medical malpractice claims involve complex issues requiring substantial prefiling investigation; and that the fact that a hospital is a municipal hospital may not be readily apparent to someone who has been injured in such a facility. They, therefore, conclude that the status of the facility may not be obvious to an injured party until it is too late and that public policy should favor the two-year limitation period. Because these concerns compete with the legislative purposes of the limitation provision of the Tort Immunity Act we believe that they are questions appropriately left to the legislature.

We find the one-year limitation period in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act more specifically applies in this case. It specifically states that no civil action, which includes any action whether based upon the common law or statutes or the Constitution of this state, may be commenced in any court against a local entity or any of its employees for any injury unless it is commenced within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. See 745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 et seq. (West 1996).

Plaintiffs finally argue that if we determine the one-year limitation period applies to their causes of action, then our decision should be applied prospectively only. They believe that it would be unjust to apply retroactively any holding finding that section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act controls plaintiffs’ actions in this case. We disagree.

Generally, when a court issues an opinion, the decision is presumed to apply both retroactively and prospectively. Deichmueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 151 Ill. 2d 413, 416 (1992). However, this presumption is overcome when a court expressly states that its decision will be applied prospectively only. Aleckson v. Village of Round Lake Park, 176 Ill. 2d 82, 86 (1997).

In Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 92-94, we considered three factors in determining the question of prospective application. The three factors to be considered are: (1) whether the decision to be applied nonretroactively established a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) whether, given the purpose and history of the new rule, its operation will be retarded or promoted by prospective application; and (3) whether substantial inequitable results would be produced if the former decision is applied retroactively. Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 92-94. Applying these factors, we believe that retroactive application of today’s holding is appropriate.

Our decision in the cases at bar does not establish a new principle of law, for we believe that it was foreshadowed by the language of the statute, which, we have determined, requires this result. This initial consideration is a “threshold requirement” for prospective application of a new decision (Aleckson, 176 Ill. 2d at 88), and therefore we must deny prospective application in the circumstances shown here.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.