Torres-Gonzalez v. Hima San Pablo Caguas

650 F. Supp. 2d 131, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81388, 2009 WL 2868848
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedSeptember 8, 2009
DocketCivil 09-1463 (SEC)
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 650 F. Supp. 2d 131 (Torres-Gonzalez v. Hima San Pablo Caguas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torres-Gonzalez v. Hima San Pablo Caguas, 650 F. Supp. 2d 131, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81388, 2009 WL 2868848 (prd 2009).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

SALVADOR E. CASELLAS, Senior District Judge.

On July 14, 2009, Centro Medico del Turabo, Inc. d/b/a HIMA San Pablo Caguas (“HIMA”) filed a motion to dismiss. Docket # 16. The Municipality of Caguas, and Borinquen Memorial filed respective motions for joinder. Dockets # 24 and 27. Plaintiff Radames Torres-González (“Torres” or “Plaintiff’) opposed (Docket # 28), the Municipality replied (Docket #31), and Plaintiff filed a motion supplementing his prior opposition (Docket # 35). After reviewing the filings, and the applicable law, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

*133 Factual Background

Plaintiff filed suit against HIMA, the Municipality of Caguas, and Borinquen Memorial (collectively “Defendants”), pursuant to diversity jurisdiction, 1 seeking relief under Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31 § 5141 & 5142 (2007). According to the complaint, on January 13, 2009, Carlos I. Collazo-Torres (“Collazo”) died in the intensive care unit at HIMA. Plaintiff avers that, after Collazo’s death, HIMA did not place the body in the morgue allegedly because it did not fit due to Collazo’s morbid obesity. Plaintiff argues that, as a result thereof, Collazo’s body began to decompose, and was in an advanced state of decomposition when the funeral was held several days later. He further alleges that Borinquen Memorial refused to hold a service in the chapel because Collazo’s family did not purchase the coffin and the mausoleum from said company, depriving him of “his right to wake his beloved cousin in the way he deserved.” Docket # 1, p. 4. Additionally, Plaintiff avers that the Municipality of Caguas’ cemetery employees mocked, laughed, and ridiculed their family because the coffin did not fit in a traditional funeral car, and instead was transported using a flatbed truck. Lastly, according to Plaintiff, due to the cemetery employees’ failure to secure the coffin while lowering it into the grave, it fell five feet, and as a result, his cousin’s body fell out of the coffin in the presence of all the mourners. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff, as Collazo’s cousin, seeks indemnization for the personal pain and suffering allegedly caused by Defendants’ negligence.

On July 14, 2009, HIMA filed a motion to dismiss. Docket # 16. Therein, HIMA argues that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Plaintiffs claim does not meet the amount in controversy requirement. HIMA also alleges that Plaintiff fails to state a claim arising under the state tort statute insofar as there is no “right to wake a beloved cousin.” Docket # 16, p. 7. Shortly thereafter, Borinquen Memorial and the Municipality of Caguas joined HIMA’s motion to dismiss. Dockets #24 and 27. In opposition, Plaintiff contends that, considering the allegations in the complaint, the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. He further avers that Article 1802 extends to any negligent conduct that causes damages, and is not limited to a particular set of facts. On August 27, 2009, Plaintiff filed an unsworn declara-. tion in support of his opposition, wherein he describes his relationship with Collazo, and the pain and suffering he endured as a result of Defendants’ alleged negligence.

Standard of Review

Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)

Rule 12(b)(1) is the proper vehicle for challenging a court’s subject matter jurisdiction. Valentín v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362-63 (1st Cir.2001). Under this rule, a wide variety of challenges to the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be asserted, among them those based on sovereign immunity, ripeness, mootness, and the existence of a federal question. Id. (citations omitted); see also Hernández-Santiago v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2005) (discussing application of Rule 12(b)(1) challenge in cases where the court allegedly has diversity jurisdiction). Justiciability is a component of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction, and, as such, must be reviewed following Rule 12(b)(l)’s standards. Sumitomo v. Quantum, 434 F.Supp.2d 93 (D.P.R.2006). A court faced with a Rule 12(b)(1) motion should give it preference. Dynamic Im *134 age Technologies, Inc. v. U.S., 221 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir.2000).

A plaintiff faced with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction has the burden to demonstrate that such jurisdiction exists. See Lord v. Casco Bay Weekly, Inc., 789 F.Supp. 32, 33 (D.Me.1992); see also SURCCO v. PRASA 157 F.Supp.2d 160, 163 (D.P.R.2001). In this context, a court is empowered to resolve factual disputes by making reference to evidence in the record, beyond the plaintiffs allegations, without having to convert the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment. Id. Moreover, “[w]here a party challenges the accuracy of the pleaded jurisdictional facts, the court may conduct a broad inquiry, taking evidence and making findings of fact.” Hernández-Santiago v. Ecolab, Inc., 397 F.3d 30 (1st Cir.2005). Therefore, the court may consider extrinsic materials, “and, to the extent it engages in jurisdictional fact-finding, is free to test the truthfulness of the plaintiffs allegations.” Dynamic, 221 F.3d at 38. That is, the principle of conversion of a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment when extrinsic materials are reviewed, does not apply in regards to a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id.

Applicable Law and Analysis

The Supreme Court has held that, in order for the Court to hear a case, subject matter jurisdiction must “be established as a threshold matter.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998). Therefore this Court must first address any jurisdictional issue. Subject matter jurisdiction is granted to federal courts by either “28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for ‘[fjederal-question’ jurisdiction, [or] § 1332, which provides for ‘[diversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). Historically, diversity jurisdiction requires complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants. Connectu LLC v. Zuckerberg, 522 F.3d 82, 91 (1st Cir.2008). In this case, there is complete diversity insofar as Plaintiff is a resident of Ohio, and all Defendants reside in Puerto Rico.

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Bluebook (online)
650 F. Supp. 2d 131, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81388, 2009 WL 2868848, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/torres-gonzalez-v-hima-san-pablo-caguas-prd-2009.