Torpey v. Kansas City Public Service Co.

89 P.2d 899, 149 Kan. 735, 1939 Kan. LEXIS 121
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedMay 6, 1939
DocketNo. 34,004
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 89 P.2d 899 (Torpey v. Kansas City Public Service Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Torpey v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 89 P.2d 899, 149 Kan. 735, 1939 Kan. LEXIS 121 (kan 1939).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

AlleN, J.:

This was an action for damages for personal injuries which plaintiff claims to have received while alighting from one of defendant’s streetcars. The jury returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor and answered special questions. Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the special findings and a motion for a new trial. The motion for judgment on the special findings was sustained, and thereafter the motion for a new trial was overruled. From the judgment on the special findings the plaintiff appeals. Defendant filed a cross-appeal on the order overruling the motion for a new trial.

The car from which the plaintiff fell operates on a short feeder line of the defendant company, running a distance of about ten blocks. There is only one car on the line. It is known as a "double end” car, each end having the necessary mechanisms and controls for moving the car and the collection of fares from passengers. It does not turn around at the end of the line. On it there are two doors, one at each end, and on opposite sides of the car. However, only the one on the right-hand of the operator is used; that is, when the car is southbound the door available is on the right-hand of the south end, and when it is northbound .the door used is on the right-hand of the north end. The floor of the car is made of one-inch, flat oak boards. At each of the two entrances there is a tread plate three inches wide extending across the door opening. It is corrugated, the corrugations consisting of alternate ridges and grooves lengthwise with the plate, each approximately one-third of an inch wide. The floor of the car is approximately thirty inches from the pavement. At each entrance there is a folding step nine inches wide, made of one-inch oak lumber. It is 14% inches from the ground and 14% inches from the floor of the car, and folds up against the side of the [737]*737car when the door is closed, and drops down to a horizontal position when the door is opened.

At 7:30 o'clock, a. m., on the date of the accident, plaintiff boarded the car on this feeder line; the accident occurred as she was alighting from the car. The negligence charged in the amended petition is as follows:

. . That while plaintiff was in the act of alighting from said car at 13th and Central avenue as aforesaid by way of the front exit therefrom she was thrown violently to the ground and suffered injuries hereinafter set out as a direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendant, its agent, servants and employees at said time and place, in this, to wit: that said defendant had carelessly and negligently caused and permitted the step, which is the same as the platform and the treadle on the edge of the step, which is a continuation of the platform at the entrance to the car, on said car to be worn, old and out of repair, that defendant had placed upon said step an iron flange and had carelessly and negligently caused and permitted and suffered the same to become loose from said step and extend upward so that as plaintiff stepped down upon the same and while she was in the act of alighting therefrom, her heel caught upon the protruding iron flange and threw her violently to the pavement, injuring her as follows, to wit: . . .”

The case turns on the special findings of the jury, as follows:

“4. At the time and place plaintiff fell, state whether (a) a defect existed on the floor of defendant’s streetcar; or (b) a defect existed on the step of defendant's streetcar. A. (a) Yes; (b) referring to top step or platform (yes); referring to folding step (no).
“5. If you answer either (a) or (b) in the foregoing question in the affirmative, state what said defect consisted of and describe it. A. It was a crack between the metal tread and the wooden floor.”

The main contention of defendants is that the negligence charged in the petition as the proximate cause of appellant’s injury was a protruding iron flange on the step, while the jury found that the cause of the plaintiff’s fall was a crack between the metal tread and the wood on the floor of the streetcar.

Defendant argues that in answer to question 4 the jury found that a defect existed on the floor of defendant’s streetcar, whereas the negligence pleaded was that defendant had permitted the step and the treadle on the edge of the step to be worn, old and out of repair, and that defendant had placed upon the step an iron flange and had negligently permitted it to becóme loose and extend upward, so that the plaintiff, in the act of alighting from the car, caught her heel on the protruding iron flange, throwing her to the ground and causing the injury complained of.

[738]*738Starting with the assumption that the only negligence charged was a defect in the folding step of the car, defendant contends that under the special findings plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Defendant relies on the rule firmly established in this state that where the jury specifies negligence in its findings, all other negligence is excluded as a basis for the verdict. (Roberts v. Railway Co., 98 Kan. 705, 161 Pac. 590; Morlan v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Rly. Co., 118 Kan. 713, 236 Pac. 821.)

Defendant further contends that where the jury finds that the defendant is not guilty of any of the acts of negligence charged in the petition, the defendant is entitled to judgment on the answers to the special questions. (Bass v. St. Louis-S. F. Rly. Co., 143 Kan. 740, 57 P. 2d 467; Case v. Yoakum, 99 Kan. 253, 161 Pac. 642.)

But are these rules applicable to the record before us?

We are unable to agree with the assumption of defendant that the charge of negligence related to the folding step as distinguished from the platform or floor of the car. The petition alleged that the defendant “had carelessly and negligently caused and permitted the step, which is the same as the platform, and the treadle on the edge of the step, which is a continuation of the platform at the entrance to the car, to be worn, old and out of repair.” The pleader expressly alleges the step as the same as the platform — that it is a continuation of the platform. It is also clear that in the petition the terms “treadle” and “iron flange” are used interchangeably, and refer to the same thing.

The motorman on the car testified that there was a metal tread at the edge of the door — that it was about three inches wide. He further stated the car was about twenty years old and had been operated on several lines in the city.

Mildred Torpey, the plaintiff, testified that as she started to get off the car at the end of the line “her heel caught in the worn wooden flooring by the treadle and threw her forward out of the car.”

She further testified:

“Q. Now, when you got your heel caught on that treadle or step, as you said there, what happened to you? A. My foot just stuck there.”
“Q. Where was this place that your foot caught on the car? What part of the car was it? A. Well, the floor on those little cars is level. You don’t step down like in the vestibule, like in the large cars. The floor comes right out even, and at the end of the — right at the doorway is an iron treadle about that wide (indicating), and has ridges in it. The treadle goes across [739]*739here (indicating) and the floor had worn away, and that is where my heel tripped me.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
89 P.2d 899, 149 Kan. 735, 1939 Kan. LEXIS 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/torpey-v-kansas-city-public-service-co-kan-1939.