Walker v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.

139 P.2d 157, 157 Kan. 170, 1943 Kan. LEXIS 157
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedJune 14, 1943
DocketNo. 35,026
StatusPublished
Cited by14 cases

This text of 139 P.2d 157 (Walker v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Walker v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 139 P.2d 157, 157 Kan. 170, 1943 Kan. LEXIS 157 (kan 1943).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Harvey, J.:

This was an action for damages for personal injuries in which plaintiff alleged that while in defendant’s employ he contracted asthma, an occupational disease, as a result of negligence of defendant. The jury answered special questions and returned a verdict for plaintiff for $3,000. Defendant moved to set aside most of the special questions. This motion was sustained in part and overruled in part. Defendant also moved for judgment in its favor on the answers to the special questions notwithstanding the general verdict. This motion was sustained. Plaintiff has appealed from the adverse rulings on both motions.

The action was filed May 13, 1938. The pleadings may be summarized as follows: Plaintiff, in his petition as amended, alleged that defendant is a manufacturer of soap, has a large manufacturing plant, with many buildings and numerous departments, among which are what is known as the Sea Foam, fatty-acid, caustic soda, soap chip and soap drying departments; that from March, 1934, to May 6, 1938, he was in the employ of defendant as a carpenter and millwright, it being his duty to make repairs to various parts of defendant’s buildings, machinery and equipment, and was compelled to be in or about each of the departments at various times; that in or about the departments defendant used various pieces of equipment in the manufacture of soap, and during all the time plaintiff worked in said departments there was a large amount of dust from soap, fumes from caustic soda, lye and other soap ingredients, the nature of which was unknown to plaintiff, which gave off large quantities of poisonous dust, fumes, vapor and gases; that by reason of his employment he was compelled to and did breathe large quantities of lye, caustic soda, soap dust and other poisonous chemicals and dust used in the manufacture of soap; that these harmful ingredients [172]*172also came in contact with parts of his body, with injurious effects, and were carried throughout his body, causing poisoning, asthma and chronic bronchitis, and that he had no knowledge of the dangerous character of the dust, fumes, gases and chemicals, or the effect they would have upon his health, until he was poisoned and injured, which results are more particularly described. He alleged defendant was negligent (a) in failing to provide plaintiff with a reasonably safe place in which to work; (b) in ordering plaintiff to work in departments of the plant under conditions which defendant knew, or by the exercise of due care should have known, would endanger plaintiff’s life and health; (c) in failing to cause the poisonous dust, fumes, gases and chemicals to be carried away by mechanical devices, artificial and natural ventilation; (d) in failing to provide him with an adequate mask or respirator or other device for the prevention of such industrial or occupational diseases as were incident to such work; (e) in failing to keep the floors, walls, ceiling, posts, equipment, machinery and the air in the rooms free from dust; (f) in failing to post notices in the plant or departments of the dangerous character of the poisonous fumes, gases, dust and chemicals, together with advice as to the best means of preventing injury therefrom; (g) in failing to have plaintiff examined by a physician at proper intervals to ascertain if he was being, affected with disease or illness incident to his work; (h) in assuring plaintiff there was no danger to him in working in the various departments and breathing the poisonous dust, fumes, gases and chemicals, which assurance of safety plaintiff relied upon.

Defendant’s answer contained a general denial and pleaded facts on which it based the defense of assumption of risk; alleged negligence of plaintiff which caused or contributed to his injury; alleged it was not guilty of any of the acts of negligence and other grievances alleged in plaintiff’s amended petition at any time within two years before the commencement of this action, and pleaded the statute of limitations. The reply was a general denial.

The trial by jury began May 15, 1939, and consumed ten days. The testimony of witnesses called on plaintiff’s behalf may be summarized from the abstract as follows:

W. J. Reese, defendant’s technical adviser and former chief chemist, produced an analysis of soap scrapings and testified from defendant’s formula book respecting the chemical contents of different kinds of soap:

[173]*173“Soap is a chemical substance which is the result of a reaction of fats and alkali. Caustic soda plus fat will produce soap and glycerine. . . . The kettle base, which is the base for all soap, has 6.5 per cent of alkali (caustic soda). Soda ash is used at the defendant’s plant but there is none in the kettle base. Soda ash and alkali are used in making soap powders.”

Soap is less corrosive than water and is widely used in medical practice as an antidote for poison, for enemas, etc.

“When soap is mixed with water the fatty acids and the alkalis that were used to make up the soap but which in the soap itself had lost their identity as acids and alkalis are released into their free state and again assume the attributes of alkalis and acids.”

Every kind of soap made by defendant contains 6.5 percent of caustic soda.

Harry Vance worked in defendant’s plant from 1935 to 1938, was a member of the union and its president in 1937. The union had a safety committee and he went to each department to investigate working conditions. In 1937 he talked with defendant’s superintendent, McVey, and Mr. Reese. McVey said:

“Confidentially, I am going to have to get rid of Walker, he has got to the place where he is no longer any good to the company because of his asthmatic condition,”

Defendant’s custom was to pay more than the regular wage to persons working in dusty departments. About the Palmolive dryer there was very little dust when it was running because the dust fans took most of the dust away, but when it was closed down and men were working there it was very dusty. In the Twitchell (fatty acid) department there was practically no dust, but at times were fumes. Before a dust collector was installed in the Palmolive Tex department one could hardly see an operator ten feet away. In 1937 the safety committee made complaints to the management about the dust collectors in several departments and suggested the installation of more dust collectors. The company installed two, but these were only 35 percent efficient. The dust was particularly thick in the Sea Foam dryer room, kettle house, Super Suds and Crystal White departments. The witness had colds nearly all winter when he worked there. The conditions were the same from 1934 to 1937 in all departments. After dust collectors were installed it was a little better, but the soap dust irritated the nose and throat. Defendant did not furnish respirators to mechanics and he never saw but two, and these were in the Sea Foam department. Most of the employees working in dusty departments tied rags or handkerchiefs over their noses and mouths.

[174]*174Mary Whipple worked in the Crystal White department from 1928 to 1930 and was compelled to quit. She again worked from 1932 to 1935 in the Sea Foam laundry soap, soap chip and other departments. The soap chip department was very dusty all the time. It was just like a fog. Many times one could hardly get his breath. The dust made her cough and sneeze and she got sick and had to quit.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
139 P.2d 157, 157 Kan. 170, 1943 Kan. LEXIS 157, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/walker-v-colgate-palmolive-peet-co-kan-1943.