Torea Consulting, LTD v. Stanfill
Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TOREA CONSULTING, LTD. : JUDGES:
: Hon. John W. Wise, P.J.
Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J.
: Hon. Andrew J. King, J.
-vs- :
:
DAVID STANFILL, ET AL. : Case No. 2024CA00023 :
Defendant-Appellee : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2022CV00974
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT: August 29, 2024
APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee
SCOTT J. FRIEDMAN JACK B. COOPER 600 IMG Building P.O. Box 35459 1360 East Ninth Street 4684 Douglas Circle, NW Cleveland, OH 44114 Canton, OH 44735
King, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-Appellant, Torea Consulting, LTD, appeals the January 31, 2024 judgment entry of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County, Ohio, granting summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee, David Stanfill. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 2} Appellant is a Canadian based company owned by Paul Billinger that invests in cryptocurrency. Stanfill was the CEO of Squirrels Research Labs ("SQRL") located in North Canton, Ohio. SQRL manufactured and sold computer devices known as "cards" to mine cryptocurrency. Appellant purchased several cards, but they remained at the SQRL facility. For a fee, SQRL would use the cards to mine cryptocurrency and then send the cryptocurrency to appellant.
{¶ 3} In March 2021, the parties entered into an agreement wherein SQRL would rent the cards from appellant and use the cards to mine cryptocurrency for its own benefit. Thereafter, a dispute arose as to how much SQRL owed appellant. SQRL employees asked Stanfill to intervene and deal with appellant.
{¶ 4} On April 12, 2021, appellant and Stanfill entered into an agreement for the purchase of the cards. Appellant agreed to sell the cards to SQRL, and SQRL agreed to pay appellant 160.2 units of a cryptocurrency known as Ethereum ("ETH"). The agreement did not have a date certain for the payment as SQRL needed time to convert U.S. dollars to ETH. The value of ETH was volatile. The agreement was negotiated over a messaging application called Discord, an application commonly used by members of the cryptocurrency mining community. Shortly after the agreement, SQRL sold some of the cards to Michael Maranda.
Stark County, Case No. 2024CA00023 3
{¶ 5} SQRL was unable to acquire the ETH due to a delayed pending transaction with a third party. Thus, on April 20, 2021, Stanfill paid appellant 24 ETH out of his personal funds. Thereafter, in late April early May 2021, SQRL offered to pay appellant in U.S. dollars. Appellant rejected the offer. On June 7, 2021, SQRL tendered payment of the remaining 136.2 ETH. Appellant refused to accept the tender.
{¶ 6} On August 3, 2021, appellant filed a complaint against SQRL because it had not been paid in full for the cards. SQRL filed for bankruptcy and appellant voluntarily dismissed the complaint.
{¶ 7} On June 21, 2022, appellant filed a complaint against Stanfill and Maranda, alleging fraudulent inducement, unjust enrichment, conversion, civil conspiracy, and defalcation/breach of fiduciary duty over the unpaid cards. Appellant filed an amended complaint on July 8, 2022, to refine the claims. Appellant was unable to locate Maranda.
{¶ 8} On October 13, 2023, Stanfill filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming no genuine issues of material facts to exist. In support, Stanfill submitted his own affidavit, copies of the Discord messages, and a transcript of his examination taken in the bankruptcy proceeding. Appellant filed a response and attached an affidavit of Paul Billinger, excerpts of the Stanfill examination, Discord messages, and an April 2021 purchase agreement between SQRL and Maranda. Appellant did not argue the civil conspiracy claim as it failed to locate Maranda and planned to dismiss that count. By judgment entry filed January 31, 2024, the trial court agreed with Stanfill's arguments and granted the motion.
{¶ 9} Appellant filed an appeal with the following assignment of error:
I
{¶ 10} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DAVID STANFILL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT."
I
{¶ 11} In his sole assignment of error, appellant claims the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Stanfill. We disagree.
{¶ 12} Summary judgment motions are to be resolved in light of the dictates of Civ.R. 56. Regarding summary judgment, the Supreme Court stated the following in State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447 (1996):
Civ.R. 56(C) provides that before summary judgment may be granted, it must be determined that (1) no genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. State ex. rel.
Parsons v. Fleming (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 509, 511, 628 N.E.2d 1377, 1379, citing Temple v. Wean United, Inc. (1977), 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 4 O.O.3d 466, 472, 364 N.E.2d 267, 274.
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{¶ 13} In Leech v. Schumaker, 2015-Ohio-4444, ¶ 13 (5th Dist.), this court explained the following:
It is well established the party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that no issues of material fact exist for trial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986), 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The standard for granting summary judgment is delineated in Dresher v. Burt (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 280 at 293: " * * * a party seeking summary judgment, on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s)
of the nonmoving party's claims. The moving party cannot discharge its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 simply by making a conclusory assertion the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Rather, the moving party must be able to specifically point to some evidence of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C) which affirmatively demonstrates the nonmoving party has no evidence to support the nonmoving party's claims. If the moving party fails to satisfy its initial burden, the motion for summary judgment must be denied. However, if the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the nonmoving party then has a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E) to set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial and, if the nonmovant does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall
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be entered against the nonmoving party." The record on summary judgment must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.
Williams v. First United Church of Christ (1974), 37 Ohio St.2d 150.
{¶ 14} As an appellate court reviewing summary judgment motions, we stand in place of the trial court and review the issues de novo, under the same standards and evidence as the trial court. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996).
Fraudulent Inducement
{¶ 15} The elements of fraudulent inducement are: "(1) a representation material to the transaction; (2) made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with utter disregard and recklessness regarding its truth or falsity; (3) with the intent to mislead another into reliance; (4) justifiable reliance on the representation or concealment; (5) and injury proximately resulting from such reliance." Isaac v. Alabanza Corp., 2007-Ohio-1396, ¶ 20 (7th Dist.), citing Burr v. Stark County Board of Commissioners, 23 Ohio St.3d 69 (1986).
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