USCA4 Appeal: 25-1657 Doc: 63 Filed: 05/26/2026 Pg: 1 of 21
PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 25-1657
TONY A. MESSER; KEVIN N. MUMPOWER; JANICE L. BOOHER; PATRICIA C. EADS; PHILIP E. BARBROW; BENJIE G. HICKS; KENDALL W. LUTTRELL; DARRELL G. MURRAY; DAVID A. STOVALL; DENNIS J. STILTNER; TIMOTHY M. WAMPLER; MICHAEL L. PARKER; CHARLES E. VESTAL; JIMMY AMBERGEY; DAVE S. BOOHER; LARRY RICHARDS, on behalf of themselves and on behalf of others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
GARRISON INVESTMENT GROUP, LP; JOSEPH B. TANSEY; STEVEN SCOTT STUART; GIG GP LLC; JTSS BORROWER LLC; JOSHUA BRANDT; JULIAN WELDON; BRIAN STEVEN CHASE; GARRISON SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES GP LLC; GARRISON COMMERCIAL FUNDING VIII LLC; GARRISON FINANCIAL ASSETS MM LLC; GARRISON SPECIAL OPPORTUNITIES HOLDINGS GP LLC; BCPI ACQUISITIONS, INC; GARRISON BRISTOL LLC; GARRISON BRISTOL HOLDINGS LLC,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, Senior District Judge. (1:24-cv-00037-JPJ-PMS)
Argued: March 17, 2026 Decided: May 26, 2026
Before KING, GREGORY, and THACKER, Circuit Judges. USCA4 Appeal: 25-1657 Doc: 63 Filed: 05/26/2026 Pg: 2 of 21
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Thacker wrote the opinion in which Judge King and Judge Gregory joined.
Mary Lynn Tate, TATE LAW P.C., Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellants. Mark Hunter Churchill, HOLLAND & KNIGHT LLP, Tysons, Virginia, for Appellees.
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THACKER, Circuit Judge:
Following a bench trial, Appellants, former employees of Bristol Compressors
International, LLC (“BCI”), obtained a class action money judgment against BCI for
violations of the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988 (“the Warn
Act”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”). When efforts to
collect the judgment from BCI failed, the former employees pivoted and filed this action
seeking to enforce the BCI judgment against Garrison Investment Group, LP (“Garrison”)
-- a party they voluntarily dismissed from the suit against BCI.
The district court concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the
complaint sought to enforce the previous judgment against a party that was never found
liable for the WARN Act and ERISA violations, and the complaint lacked an independent
jurisdictional basis. Therefore, the district court dismissed the lawsuit.
The district court was correct to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
A.
The Underlying Class Action Lawsuit -- Messer I
Appellants worked at a BCI manufacturing facility in Bristol, Virgina. On July 1,
2018, BCI announced that it was going to cease operations and close “by or about August
31, 2018,” and that employment terminations would commence immediately. J.A. 25. 1
1 Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this appeal.
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The first wave of terminations took place between July 31 and August 2, 2018.
Terminations continued throughout September and November, and the facility ultimately
closed on or about November 16, 2018.
On October 19, 2018, Appellants filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of themselves
and others similarly situated, against BCI and Garrison, as the alter ego and successor of
BCI. Messer, et al. v. Bristol Compressors International, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-00040 (W.D.
Va.) (“Messer I”). Appellants alleged in their complaint that BCI did not comply with the
WARN Act because it did not provide sufficient notice to the employees of the plant before
it closed, and that BCI failed to validly terminate the employee severance plan in violation
of ERISA. Appellants also named Garrison as a defendant. They alleged that Garrison
was a jointly liable alter ego and successor of BCI because Garrison “acquired an interest
in [BCI] and participated in or directed its recent operations including the structure and
sequence of closing the plant and employee termination.” J.A. 193. Therefore, Appellants
alleged that BCI and Garrison were liable as a single employer pursuant to the WARN Act.
In support of this theory, Appellants claimed that BCI and Garrison each “participated in
and [were] responsible for implementing the plant closing structure and management
decisions that form the basis of the instant action.” Id.
The district court certified three sub-classes of former BCI employees. After
completion of discovery, Garrison moved for summary judgment on Appellants’ single
employer theory of WARN Act liability, arguing that Garrison cannot be deemed
vicariously liable for the decisions of BCI. In addition to Garrison’s motion for summary
judgment, BCI and Garrison filed a number of other joint summary judgment motions
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challenging the viability of various sub-class ERISA and WARN Act claims. First, they
moved for judgment on Appellants’ ERISA claims for severance benefits on the grounds
that the plan had been properly terminated. Second, they moved for judgment on all claims
brought by the sub-class of employees who had received and signed a Stay Bonus Letter
Agreement (“SBLA”), which released all claims related to their employment. 2 And finally,
they moved for judgment on all WARN Act claims brought by the sub-class of Appellants
who had received 60 days’ notice of the plant closure as required by the WARN Act.
Critically, for purposes of this appeal, Appellants opted not to file a response in
opposition to Garrison’s motion for summary judgment on the single employer theory.
Instead, Appellants moved to voluntarily dismiss Garrison without prejudice in Messer I
pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appellants assert that
they moved to voluntarily dismiss Garrison in order “to preserve counsel, party and court
resources as the parties complete briefing and argue [BCI’s] Motions for Partial Summary
Judgment and prepare for the pending [] March trial, which [Appellants] believe should
focus on the liability of [BCI] for the Warn Act violations alleged in the complaint.” J.A.
194.
2 BCI sent a memorandum to the employees who remained employed following the first wave of terminations offering them a $1,000 bonus for working throughout the company’s wind down process. To receive the bonus, employees were required to execute an SBLA, which released all claims related to their employment, including an express waiver of all WARN Act claims and the right to join the lawsuit. Messer, et al. v. Bristol Compressors International, LLC, No. 1:18-CV-00040, 2019 WL 2550328, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 20, 2019).
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Garrison opposed Appellants’ motion to dismiss it without prejudice. Garrison
argued:
[Appellants] know that [BCI] is insolvent. The company is, and will remain, incapable of satisfying any judgment [Appellants] could obtain. That reality is why [Appellants] named Garrison as a defendant and asserted the single employer theory under the Department of Labor regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2). And that reality is why the claim against Garrison must be dismissed with prejudice now, or litigated to a conclusion with Garrison remaining a party to the case.
J.A. 194 (emphasis supplied). Nevertheless, the district court granted Appellants’ motion
to dismiss Garrison in Messer I without prejudice, finding that Garrison had not “shown
sufficient legal prejudice to justify denying” the motion. J.A. 194.
In the same order granting Appellants’ motion to dismiss Garrison, the district court
also considered whether BCI’s severance pay plan was an employee welfare plan governed
by ERISA. Ultimately, although the court found that the severance plan was such a plan,
it held that ERISA had not been violated and granted partial summary judgment to BCI on
that issue. The district court also granted BCI’s partial summary judgment motion on all
claims by the sub-class of employees who signed an SBLA. And the district court granted
BCI’s motion for partial summary judgment concerning the sufficiency of the WARN
notice, finding that the WARN Act had not been violated as to that sub-class of employees.
Following the dismissal of Garrison and the grant of BCI’s partial motions for
summary judgment, the district court held a bench trial on all remaining WARN Act
claims. BCI, the only remaining defendant, did not appear at the trial. At the conclusion
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of the trial, BCI was found liable for violating the WARN Act, and Appellants were
awarded a judgment against BCI in the amount of $1,392,915.40.
B.
The Messer I Appeal
Appellants appealed the adverse aspects of the summary judgment rulings against
them in Messer I. We affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded the case. Messer v.
Bristol Compressors Int’l, LLC, No. 21-2363, 2023 WL 2759052 (4th Cir. Apr. 3, 2023).
Specifically, we affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of BCI on the claims by
employees who signed an SBLA and released their claims. But, relevant here, we vacated
the summary judgment rulings in favor of BCI related to the elimination of the severance
plan pursuant to ERISA and the WARN Act claims. In doing so, we held that (1) the
severance plan was covered by ERISA; and (2) BCI did not properly terminate the plan in
compliance with ERISA in light of the established BCI employee handbook procedures
requiring BCI’s human resources department to effectuate the elimination of the plan in
writing.
Following remand, Appellants moved for summary judgment with respect to both
the ERISA and the WARN Act claims. Yet again, BCI did not appear or file a response.
The district court granted summary judgment to Appellants, and Appellants were awarded
an additional $2,407,471.90 pursuant to the WARN Act and ERISA, as well as
$277,717.81 in attorneys’ fees and costs. J.A. 196; Messer I, No. 1:18-CV-00040, 2024
WL 1259270 (W.D. Va. Mar. 25, 2024). This brought the total judgment amount against
BCI to $4,078,105.11.
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C.
The Present Lawsuit and Appeal
As Garrison predicted, Appellants have been unable to collect on the judgment
against BCI due to BCI’s insolvency and dissolution. As a result, in August 2024,
Appellants filed the present action seeking to hold Garrison liable for the Messer I
judgment based on alter ego and veil piercing theories. In addition to suing Garrison,
Appellants sued 14 other individuals and entities (together with Garrison, “Appellees”)
who were never named parties in Messer I. 3
In their complaint, Appellants allege, “[t]his suit is a continuation of [Messer I] for
the purpose of collecting judgments for the [Appellants].” J.A. 11. Specifically,
Appellants assert that they are “seek[ing] judgment of liability and both equitable and legal
remedies against Garrison, its agents, related entities and individual owners as employers
and fiduciaries for their ‘instrumentality’ control, management and liquidation of BCI in
violation of the WARN ACT by unjustly and illegally depriving [Appellants] of required
notices of BCI plant closure, attendant backpay, and stay-pay, and the unjust and unlawful
denial of their vested employee benefit Severance Pay Plan (SSP) in violation of ERISA.”
Id. Appellants allege that Appellees are liable for the judgment because “[Appellees]
liquidated BCI and knowingly, recklessly and intentionally distributed the receipts while
failing to pay their legal and fiduciary obligations to [Appellants] under these statutes.” Id.
These additional named parties are “Garrison owners, agents and affiliated entities 3
and owners who managed, controlled and liquidated BCI.” J.A. 10.
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Appellants allege that ERISA and the WARN Act give rise to federal jurisdiction in
this case. And in their demand for relief, Appellants ask that the district court: (1) “[e]nter
judgment against [Appellees] and their owners individually, jointly and severally for all
amounts, due and owing [Appellants] under this Court’s judgments in the amount of
[$4,078,105.11] plus accumulated interest, fees, cost, and attorney’s fees for prosecuting
this matter, amounting to [$5,000,000]”; and (2) [g]rant [Appellants] . . . WARN Act
backpay, the payment of employer wage contributions and the [remaining] cost[s].” J.A.
30. Appellants claim they are entitled to this relief “[b]ecause the alter ego and
instrumentality doctrines for piercing the corporate veil and federal common law allow
derivative liability to be placed upon a corporation’s individuals [such as Appellees who]
are responsible for these judgments [in Messer I].” Id. at 27.
Appellees moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction, and failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), (2), and (6).
Alternatively, Appellees argued that Appellants’ claims are time barred pursuant to the
applicable statute of limitations for ERISA and the WARN Act.
The district court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss due to lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The court noted that although Appellants cited the WARN Act and ERISA as
sources of federal jurisdiction, they are demanding that judgment be entered against
Garrison for the previous judgment against BCI in a case from which Garrison was
dismissed. To that end, the court cited the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Peacock v.
Thomas for the proposition that federal courts lack “ancillary jurisdiction over new actions
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in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a money judgment on a
person not otherwise liable for the judgment.” 516 U.S. 349, 350–51 (1996). The district
court reasoned, “[b]ecause the Complaint seeks only to enforce the previous judgment
against Garrison, which was never found liable for the WARN Act or ERISA violations,
this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction.” J.A. 200. Alternatively, the court
held, “[e]ven if [Appellants] had not moved to dismiss their claims against Garrison and it
had been found liable [in Messer I], the statute of limitations on any WARN Act or ERISA
claim arising out of the plant closing has now run.” Id. at 202.
Appellants timely appealed, challenging both grounds for dismissal.
II.
“We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo.” Evans v. United States, 105 F.4th 606, 612 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing Durden v. United
States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013)). When a defendant challenges subject matter
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that it exists. See Evans v. B.F.
Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999).
III.
There are two relevant avenues that could provide federal jurisdiction over this
lawsuit. The first is 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which provides federal question jurisdiction. And
the second is federal common law ancillary jurisdiction. As we explain below, both
avenues fail to establish jurisdiction here.
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Section 1331 Federal Question Jurisdiction
Federal courts have jurisdiction over all cases “arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331; see also U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
Relevant here, a case most commonly “arises under federal law” and confers jurisdiction
“when federal law creates the cause of action asserted.” Flying Pigs, LLC v. RRAJ
Franchising, LLC, 757 F.3d 177, 181 (4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Appellants assert that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1331 because their claims arose under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (ERISA) and
29 U.S.C. § 2104 (the WARN Act). This avenue of conferring jurisdiction is often referred
to as the “federal question doctrine.” However, in this case, Appellants do not allege any
new or additional violations of the federal statutes at issue beyond those cited in Messer I.
Rather, the present action is solely an effort to collect on the BCI judgment from Messer I
because BCI is unable to pay. But, as explained below, the Supreme Court has determined
that this is an improper means by which to establish Section 1331 subject matter
jurisdiction. Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996).
1.
ERISA
In Peacock, the plaintiff (Thomas) sued his former employer, Tru-Tech, and
Peacock (an officer and shareholder of Tru-Tech), in an ERISA class action to recover
benefits due under the employer’s pension benefits plan. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 351. The
district court ruled that Tru-Tech breached its fiduciary duties, but that Peacock was not a
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fiduciary. Id. The court thus entered judgment against Tru-Tech only. Id. But when
Thomas was unable to collect the judgment from Tru-Tech, he brought a second action
against Peacock seeking to pierce the corporate veil in order to satisfy the original
judgment. Id. at 352.
The Supreme Court held that there was no subject matter jurisdiction over the
second action. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 351. In doing so, the Court first rejected Thomas’
reliance on ERISA as the source of federal jurisdiction, observing, “[w]e are not aware of,
and Thomas does not point to, any provision of ERISA that provides for imposing liability
for an extant ERISA judgment against a third party.” Id. at 353. Instead, the Court held
that there must be an underlying violation of ERISA to sustain subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 353–54 (“Thomas could invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts only by
independently alleging a violation of an ERISA provision or term of the plan.” (emphasis
supplied)). And the Court held that the attempt by Thomas to frame Peacock’s liability
under the corporate veil piercing doctrine as an underlying violation of the federal statute
was improper because “[p]iercing the corporate veil is not itself an independent ERISA
cause of action.” Id. Ultimately, the Court held that because the second action did not
allege a new violation of any federal law, the district court did not possess federal question
jurisdiction in the second suit.
The same is true here. There is no dispute that the present action does not concern
any new or additional violations of ERISA. Instead, Appellants seek only to enforce the
previous judgment against BCI from Messer I against Garrison in this case. Indeed, as
Appellants plainly state, “[t]his suit is a continuation of the prior class action, Messer I, for
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the purpose of collecting judgments directly from the owner, lender and fiduciary,
Garrison, for [Appellants].” Appellants’ Opening Br. at 4.
Therefore, because Appellants do not allege any additional ERISA violations
beyond those litigated in Messer I, there is no independent basis for subject matter
jurisdiction. See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 354 (“Because Thomas alleged no ‘underlying’
violation of any provision of ERISA or an ERISA plan, neither ERISA’s jurisdictional
provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1), nor 28 U.S.C. § 1331 supplied the District Court with
subject-matter jurisdiction over this suit.”). And, as the Court instructed, ERISA does not
provide an independent cause of action sufficient to pierce the corporate veil. Id.
2.
The WARN Act
Appellants’ WARN Act claims are also proscribed by Peacock. Although Peacock
was decided within the context of an ERISA action rather than the WARN Act, the
underlying proposition still squarely applies here -- without any new or additional
violations of the federal statute at issue, there is no independent basis for federal question
jurisdiction.
The WARN Act provides a cause of action for an “employee who suffers an
employment loss as a result of [a plant] closing or [mass] layoff.” 29 U.S.C. § 2104(a)(1).
The statute thus authorizes a “person seeking to enforce such liability” to sue in a federal
district court. Id. § 2104(a)(5).
Here again, there are no allegations of new WARN Act violations. Appellants are
merely attempting to collect from Garrison the judgment entered in Messer I against BCI.
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But the WARN Act goes on to declare that the “remedies provided for in this section shall
be the exclusive remedies for any violation of this chapter.” Id. § 2104(b). Thus, where
the WARN Act is the substantive basis for an employee’s claims, the sole remedy for that
employee is the WARN Act itself. To recover for a WARN Act violation, a plaintiff must
rely on the WARN Act rather than alternative theories such as piercing the corporate veil.
Were there any doubt about this conclusion, the WARN Act regulations
promulgated by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) foreclose the applicability of
duplicative theories of recovery such as piercing the corporate veil. The DOL regulations
specify “factors to be considered” in determining whether a related entity is so intertwined
with the employer that the two may be considered a single employer, such that the related
entity may be liable for the actual employer’s WARN Act violation. 20 C.F.R.
§ 639.3(a)(2). These factors include: “(i) common ownership, (ii) common directors and/or
officers, (iii) de facto exercise of control, (iv) unity of personnel policies emanating from
a common source, and (v) the dependency of operations.” 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(a)(2); see
also Fleming v. Bayou Steel BD Holdings II LLC., 83 F.4th 278, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2023)
(“The WARN Act does not address when a related entity may be held liable under a single
employer theory. But the [DOL] has done so via regulation.”). And we regularly apply
these DOL factors. See, e.g., Pennington v. Fluor Corp., 19 F.4th 589, 600 (4th Cir. 2021)
(“In short, the five Department of Labor factors make clear that this case does not meet the
standard for single-employer liability. Any different result would need to await the action
of Congress.”).
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Thus, utilizing veil piercing for WARN Act liability would be redundant because in
the context of the WARN Act, the corporate veil piercing doctrine, which allows courts to
“disregard the corporate entity [and] treat[] the parent corporation and its subsidiary as a
single entity,” Vitol, S.A. v. Primerose Shipping Co., 708 F.3d 527, 544 (4th Cir. 2013),
serves the same purpose as the DOL regulations in determining whether parent companies,
owners, or creditors should be treated as single employers for WARN Act violations. See
e.g., Kane v. PaCap Aviation Fin., LLC, No. CV 19-00574, 2024 WL 5485919, at *51 (D.
Haw. Sep. 13, 2024).
Our sister circuits have likewise declined to authorize alternate theories of liability
for underlying WARN Act violations in light of the DOL regulations. See, e.g., Pearson
v. Component Technology Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 483–91 (3d Cir. 2001) (describing the
various tests courts have adopted to analyze single employer liability pursuant to the
WARN Act, including veil piercing, and ultimately concluding that “the appropriate test is
the one specifically delineated in the DOL regulation”); In re Bluffton Casting Corp., 186
F.3d 857, 860–61 (7th Cir. 1999) (ruling that employees could not re-litigate WARN Act
claims in a new complaint because the WARN Act permits “rights or remedies based on
the same facts, as long as the substantive basis for these rights and remedies is not the
WARN Act itself”) (emphasis supplied), overruled on other grounds by In Re Bentz Metal
Prods. Co., 253 F.3d 283 (7th Cir. 2001).
In sum, permitting Appellants to proceed on their veil piercing theory would expand
WARN Act liability beyond the scope set by the Supreme Court, our court, other Circuits,
and the DOL.
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Appellants have thus failed to meet their burden to establish that subject matter
jurisdiction exists here via either ERISA or the WARN Act.
3.
Allegations of Independent ERISA and WARN Act Violations
Appellants argue that they are in fact asserting independent ERISA and WARN Act
claims against Appellees. But, this argument does not withstand a review of the record.
For example, in their complaint, Appellants argue, “[b]ecause the alter ego and
instrumentality doctrines for piercing the corporate veil and federal common law allow
derivative liability to be placed upon a corporation’s individuals, [Appellees] are
responsible for the[] judgments [in Messer I].” J.A. 27. Appellants further assert, “[t]his
suit is a continuation of the prior class action [Messer I] for the purpose of collecting
judgments for [Appellants].” Id. at 11. And in their demand for relief, Appellants sought
entry of “judgment against [Appellees] for all amounts, due and owing [Appellants] under
this Court’s judgments.” Id. at 30. These excerpts clearly highlight that the present action
is not an attempt to separately allege new ERISA or WARN Act violations against
Appellees but is instead an attempt to pierce the corporate veil in order to establish.
Appellees’ liability for the original judgment against BCI. And we lack federal question
jurisdiction to review such claims.
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Ancillary Jurisdiction
Absent allegations of independent violations of the federal statutes purportedly
supporting federal question jurisdiction, we are left to determine whether we may
nonetheless exercise ancillary jurisdiction over this action. We may not.
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power
authorized by Constitution and statute . . . which is not to be expanded by judicial decree.”
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted).
“But sometimes the federal courts are permitted to entertain a claim or an incidental
proceeding that does not satisfy requirements of an independent basis of subject matter
jurisdiction.” 13 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice & Procedure § 3523.2 (3d ed. 2026).
This concept, known as supplemental jurisdiction, permits federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction over claims that, while not independently satisfying the requirements of subject
matter jurisdiction, “are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
Ancillary jurisdiction is a subspecies of supplemental jurisdiction. It comes in two
forms. First, Section 1367 grants federal courts jurisdiction “over claims asserted in a case
over which the district court [otherwise] has [Section 1331] jurisdiction.” Robb Evans &
Assocs., LLC v. Holibaugh, 609 F.3d 359, 363 (4th Cir. 2010). Second, federal common
law grants federal courts ancillary jurisdiction “over related proceedings that are
technically separate from the initial case that invoked federal subject matter jurisdiction.”
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Id. (quoting 13 Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure § 3523.2 (3d ed. 2010));
see also Boim v. Am. Muslims for Palestine, 9 F.4th 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2021) (“Congress
codified much of the first category in the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367, while the latter category—at times called ‘ancillary enforcement jurisdiction’—
remains grounded in federal common law.”); Atlas Biologicals, Inc. v. Kutrubes, 50 F.4th
1307, 1318 (10th Cir. 2022) (same). This case concerns new proceedings, rather than new
claims in an ongoing proceeding.
Relevant to this appeal, “[i]t is well-settled that a federal court may exercise
ancillary jurisdiction to enforce its judgments.” Marino v. Pioneer Edsel Sales, Inc., 349
F.3d 746, 752 (4th Cir. 2003). In fact, the Supreme Court has “approved the exercise of
ancillary jurisdiction over a broad range of supplementary proceedings involving third
parties to assist in the protection and enforcement of federal judgments—including
attachment, mandamus, garnishment, and the prejudgment avoidance of fraudulent
conveyances.” Peacock, 516 U.S. at 356. Although federal courts have the authority to
exercise this power, the Supreme Court has nonetheless outlined certain types of
enforcement proceedings that do not fall within the ambit of ancillary jurisdiction -- one of
which is the circumstance we face in this case.
The Supreme Court has specifically recognized that ancillary jurisdiction does not
extend to “new actions in which a federal judgment creditor seeks to impose liability for a
money judgment on a person not otherwise liable for the judgment.” Peacock, 516 U.S. at
350–1. This is so, the Court concluded, because “[i]n a subsequent lawsuit [against a third
party] involving claims with no independent basis for jurisdiction, a federal court lacks the
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threshold jurisdictional power that exists when ancillary claims are asserted in the same
proceeding as the claims conferring federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 355; see also 36 C.J.S.
Federal Courts § 23 (March 2026 Update) (“[I]f a party has obtained a valid federal
judgment, only extraordinary circumstances can justify the assertion of ancillary
jurisdiction in a later action.”).
In reaching this conclusion, the Court made clear that subsequent suits to enforce
judgments entered in prior federal actions must have their own source of federal
jurisdiction when they involve new theories of liability, such as fraudulent conveyances or
piercing the corporate veil. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 358–59. This is particularly true where,
as here, the subsequent suit named as defendants parties not found liable in the first suit.
In these circumstances, a district court’s jurisdiction over the first suit does not carry over
to a new, independent suit, even when the new suit is brought to enforce a prior federal
judgment. Id. at 359.
Peacock plainly forecloses Appellants’ efforts to enforce the judgment in Messer I
against Appellees. When Appellants voluntarily dismissed Garrison in Messer I, the case
proceeded to judgment against BCI -- and BCI only. Thus, the only entity “already liable
for that judgment” is BCI. Peacock, 516 U.S. at 357 (“We have never authorized the
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in a subsequent lawsuit to impose an obligation to pay an
existing federal judgment on a person not already liable for that judgment.”); see e.g.,
Continental Indemnity Company v. BII, Inc., 104 F.4th 630, 644 (7th Cir. 2024) (explaining
that there is no ancillary jurisdiction when a plaintiff “seeks to hold a new party liable on
a new theory,” as “[t]his is the type of dispute that courts have found to fall outside their
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ancillary enforcement jurisdiction”). And, again, because Appellants do not allege any
additional ERISA violations beyond those litigated in Messer I, there is no independent
basis for subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Peterson v. Bank Markazi, 121 F.4th 983,
1000 (2d Cir. 2024) (holding that although the plaintiffs claimed that they were relying on
a federal statute for liability rather than common law alter ego principles to support their
veil piercing theory, their underlying claim was “ultimately an attempt to establish liability
directly on the part of a new party,” and “[u]nder Peacock, ancillary jurisdiction cannot
extend to this type of claim”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Lack of Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In sum, because Appellants’ suit here is based exclusively on veil piercing and does
not allege any new or additional ERISA or WARN Act violations, and because their
voluntary dismissal of Garrison from Messer I resulted in a judgment against BCI only, the
district court correctly held that it lacked federal subject matter jurisdiction in this action.
See Peacock, 516 U.S. at 357–58; Alexandria Resident Council, Inc. v. Alexandria Redev.
& Hous. Auth., 218 F.3d 307, 308–09 (4th Cir. 2000); Marino, 349 F.3d at 752; Flame S.A.
v. Freight Bulk Pte. Ltd., 807 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir 2015); U.S. ex rel. Bunk v. Gov’t
Logistics N.V., 842 F.3d 261, 273 (4th Cir. 2016). 4
4 Because we resolve this case based on the lack of subject matter jurisdiction, we do not reach the alternative reasoning of the district court that the case should be dismissed as untimely.
20 USCA4 Appeal: 25-1657 Doc: 63 Filed: 05/26/2026 Pg: 21 of 21
As Appellees’ counsel aptly stated at oral argument, this is “not a case of
Garrison . . . not being willing to face the music. It’s a case of the plaintiffs not doing their
job.” Oral Argument at 26:27–34, Messer v. Garrison, No. 25-1657 (4th Cir. Mar. 17,
2026), http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/oral-argument/listen-to-oral-arguments.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.