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6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TONY E. BELL, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-02681-DAD-CSK 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 KATE M. VAN PARYS, et al., 15 Defendants. (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 16 17 Plaintiff Tony E. Bell is representing himself in this action and seeks leave to 18 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) For the 19 reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied, and the 20 Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 26 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 2 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 5 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 6 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 7 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 8 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 9 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 10 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application is incomplete. See ECF No. 2. Plaintiff states 11 “N/A” when asked about his “gross pay or wages” and when asked to describe each 12 source of money and the amount received, Plaintiff states “under seal.” Id. at 1 ¶ 3. 13 Plaintiff has also failed to answer questions related to Plaintiff’s assets and liabilities, 14 including whether Plaintiff has any dependents. Id. at 2 ¶¶ 4-8. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 15 not made the required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Further, the Court will 16 recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is facially frivolous or 17 without merit. “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset 18 if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without 19 merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. 20 First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of 21 Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not 22 abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears 23 from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without 24 merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District 25 Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 26 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is 27 without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma 28 pauperis.”). Because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is 1 frivolous or is without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends 2 Plaintiff’s IFP motion be denied. 3 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s 5 required pre-answer screening. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen 6 every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is 7 “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks 8 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is 10 legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 11 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 12 court accepts as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are 13 clearly baseless or fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to 14 the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 15 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 16 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 17 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal). 18 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 19 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 20 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 21 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 24 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 25 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 26 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 28 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 1 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 2 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. Pro Se Plaintiff Cannot Represent Another Individual 5 Review of the Complaint indicates Plaintiff is seeking to bring this action on behalf 6 of himself and his deceased son, Benjamin Parker Bell. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 7 1) (naming Benjamin Parker Bell as a Plaintiff).
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6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 TONY E. BELL, et al., Case No. 2:25-cv-02681-DAD-CSK 12 Plaintiffs, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 KATE M. VAN PARYS, et al., 15 Defendants. (ECF Nos. 1, 2) 16 17 Plaintiff Tony E. Bell is representing himself in this action and seeks leave to 18 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) For the 19 reasons that follow, the Court recommends Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied, and the 20 Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. 21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement, 23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person 24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security 25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the 26 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient 27 1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. 28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c). 1 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo, 2 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient 3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of 4 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis 5 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some 6 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department 7 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not 8 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service 9 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines). 10 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP application is incomplete. See ECF No. 2. Plaintiff states 11 “N/A” when asked about his “gross pay or wages” and when asked to describe each 12 source of money and the amount received, Plaintiff states “under seal.” Id. at 1 ¶ 3. 13 Plaintiff has also failed to answer questions related to Plaintiff’s assets and liabilities, 14 including whether Plaintiff has any dependents. Id. at 2 ¶¶ 4-8. Accordingly, Plaintiff has 15 not made the required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Further, the Court will 16 recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is facially frivolous or 17 without merit. “‘A district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset 18 if it appears from the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without 19 merit.’” Minetti v. Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. 20 First Nat. Bank & Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of 21 Child Support Servs., 584 Fed. App’x. 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not 22 abuse its discretion by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears 23 from the face of the amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without 24 merit”); Smart v. Heinze, 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District 25 Court to examine any application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine 26 whether the proposed proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is 27 without merit, the court is bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma 28 pauperis.”). Because it appears from the face of Plaintiff’s Complaint that this action is 1 frivolous or is without merit as discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends 2 Plaintiff’s IFP motion be denied. 3 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT 4 Plaintiff’s Complaint warrants dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)’s 5 required pre-answer screening. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen 6 every in forma pauperis proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is 7 “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks 8 monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. 9 § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is 10 legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. 11 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the 12 court accepts as true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are 13 clearly baseless or fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to 14 the plaintiff. See id. at 326-27; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 15 592 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011). 16 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 17 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post-Iqbal). 18 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable 19 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 20 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does 21 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); 22 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 23 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough 24 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A 25 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court 26 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 27 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the 28 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be 1 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 2 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996). 3 III. DISCUSSION 4 A. Pro Se Plaintiff Cannot Represent Another Individual 5 Review of the Complaint indicates Plaintiff is seeking to bring this action on behalf 6 of himself and his deceased son, Benjamin Parker Bell. See generally Compl. (ECF No. 7 1) (naming Benjamin Parker Bell as a Plaintiff). Plaintiff may not bring an action on 8 behalf of his deceased son because pro se plaintiffs are prohibited from pursuing claims 9 on behalf of others in a representative capacity. Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 10 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008); see also E.D. Cal. Local Rule 183(a) (“Any individual who is 11 representing himself or herself without an attorney must appear personally or by 12 courtesy appearance by an attorney admitted to the Bar of this Court and may not 13 delegate that duty to any other individual, including husband or wife, or any other party 14 on the same side appearing without an attorney.”). As such, the Court will disregard 15 Benjamin Parker Bell in its review of the Complaint. 16 B. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 17 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases 18 authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). 19 Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack jurisdiction, 20 ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516, 21 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 22 (1986)); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 858 23 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court cannot decide the 24 merits of a case or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See Morongo, 858 F.2d 25 at 1380. A federal court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of two ways: actions 26 arising under federal law or those between citizens of different states in which the 27 alleged damages exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-matter jurisdiction 28 can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider sua sponte” 1 subject matter jurisdiction even when not raised by the parties. Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 2 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). 3 The Complaint does not establish the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See 4 Compl. As best as the Court can tell, Plaintiff is seeking criminal prosecution for the 5 death of his son, Benjamin Parker Bell. See Compl. at 2 (“The child of mention has been 6 referenced for the final time as deceased, his name known as Benjamin Parker Ball. This 7 motion removes case [unintelligible] from state court to federal court and assign the case 8 with the Federal Bureau of Investigation for criminal prosecution.”). Plaintiff’s two-page 9 Complaint includes state court filings, including a “preparation litigation strategy” 10 document (Compl. at 3-8) and a Request for a Temporary Emergency Order (Compl. at 11 9-18). The Complaint states no basis for federal court jurisdiction, and none is apparent. 12 No federal cause of action is asserted, and no federal claims are suggested by the facts, 13 to the extent the facts are discernible. 14 To the extent Plaintiff is requesting this Court address issues relating to child 15 custody proceedings in state court (Compl. at 9-18), this Court lacks jurisdiction because 16 child custody issues are exclusively matters of state law. See Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 17 504 U.S. 689, 702-704 (1992) (holding that the domestic relations exception to federal 18 subject matter jurisdiction “divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony 19 and child custody decrees”); Peterson v. Babbitt, 708 F.2d 465, 466 (9th Cir. 1983) 20 (stating that “federal courts have uniformly held that they should not adjudicate cases 21 involving domestic relations, including ‘the custody of minors and a fortiori, right of 22 visitation.’ For that matter, the whole subject of domestic relations and particularly child 23 custody problems is generally considered a state law matter.”) (internal citations 24 omitted); see also Thompson v. Thompson, 798 F.2d 1547, 1558 (9th Cir. 1986) (“Even 25 when a federal question is presented, federal courts decline to hear disputes which 26 would deeply involve them in adjudicating domestic matters.”). 27 C. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 28 Plaintiff’s Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim 1 as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims 2 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of 3 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v. 4 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). Here, the Complaint does not contain facts 5 supporting any cognizable legal claim against Defendants. The Complaint consists of 6 vague and conclusory allegations that fail to establish Plaintiff’s causes of action. 7 Because the Complaint is unintelligible, granting leave to amend in this case would not 8 be fruitful. The Complaint therefore fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted 9 and is subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 10 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot determine from the complaint 11 who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with enough detail to guide 12 discovery”). 13 D. Leave to Amend 14 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court finds that the 15 Complaint consists entirely of minimal allegations with no discernible basis in law. See 16 generally Compl. The Complaint does not contain facts supporting any cognizable legal 17 claim against Defendants. In light of the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction and the 18 Complaint’s deficiencies, granting leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint should 19 therefore be dismissed without leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato 20 v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that: 23 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED; 24 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend; 25 and 26 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case. 27 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District 28 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within 1 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file 2 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should 3 || be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any 4 | reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14 5 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time 6 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 7 || 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991). 8 9 | Dated: November 24, 2025 C iy S \U 10 CHI S00 KIM oeeeets UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28